Timothy OConnor, Agent Causation

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Timothy OConnor, Agent Causation

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The first objection that we'll consider appears on p. 268. TO quotes C.D. Broad: ... because of her friendship with the lecturer.'(290) 36. Review ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Timothy OConnor, Agent Causation

1

Timothy OConnor, Agent Causation
The first task that TO sets himself is to show
how the concept of agent causation can be
understood as a distinct species (from event
causation) of the primitive idea, which Ill term
causal production, underlying realist or
non-Humean conceptions of event causation. (258)
That is a mouthful. Here is what TO is going to
do
1. Articulate a certain conception of causality
(or causal production). This conception is
going to be realist and non-Humean. Well
see what this means later on.
2. Show how the notion of agent causation is
recognizable as a species of the kind of
causality articulated in (1).

Lets start with the Humean conception of
causality to which TO is opposed. Humean
refers to David Hume.
On the Humean conception, the essential component
of the concept of causality is the idea of a
regularity in nature. On this conception, the
truth of the claim that C caused E depends on a
regular connection in nature between events
like C and events like E.
There are two ways of making this more precise.
(a) C caused E it is a law of nature
that whenever events like C occur events like E
follow
- law-like connection between C and E
(b) C caused E had C not happened
then E would not have happened
- counterfactual connection between C and E

TO calls this Humean conception of causality a
reductive account. He thinks it is an attempt
to reduce the notion of causality to the notions
of law-like connection or counterfactual
connection. By calling the opposing, anti-Humean
view realist, he also shows that he views the
Humean view as somehow skeptical or
anti-realist about causality.
TO points out that if the Humean conception of
causality is correct, then the notion of agent
causation is incoherent.
Let A be an agent, and consider what the claim
that A caused E would have to imply on the two
different versions of the Humean view
A caused E it is a law of nature
that whenever events like A occur events like E
follow
A caused E if A had not
occurred then E would not have occurred.
Since A is an agent, the statements to the right
of the arrows dont make any sense.
So, if the Humean conception is right, then the
notion of agent causation is incoherent (since
claims about agent causation would have
incoherent consequences.)

What TO wants to show is that there is a
different conception of causality, the realist
or anti-Humean conception, on which the notion
of agent causation is not incoherent.
So what is the anti-Humean conception of
causality?
TO ...the core element of the concept of
causality is a primitive notion of the
production or bringing about of an effect.
This anti-Humean view sees no connection between
the concepts of causality and the concept of a
regularity in nature. Rather, it understands
causality in terms of the idea of an effect being
produced or brought about by an object.
Anti-Humean conception
C caused E E was brought about
by an object occurring in C

When we apply the anti-Humean conception of
causality to agent causation, TO thinks that no
incoherency results.
A caused E E was brought about by
A
TOs next step is to articulate an account of
causation that makes use of this primitive notion
of production or bringing about.
To do this, TO first introduces the idea of a
causal power.
An objects causal powers determine the effects
that the object will produce when placed in
different circumstances. This allows us to think
of causal powers as functions from circumstances
to effects.
Causal power function from circumstances to
effects

Example a stick of dynamite. A stick of
dynamite has the causal power to produce an
explosion when placed in certain circumstances.
In circumstances in which the fuse is lit and
there is plenty of oxygen you will get an
explosion.
circumstances effect
lit fuse explosion
sufficient oxygen
lit fuse no explosion
no oxygen
unlit fuse no explosion
sufficient oxygen

The causal powers possessed by an object are
determined by that objects properties.
A stick of dynamite has certain chemical and
physical properties. Because of these
properties, the dynamite has a causal power that
determines that it will produce an explosion when
its fuse is lit and there is sufficient oxygen in
the air.
A picture of event-causation is emerging. When
an event C causes another event E the following
is the case
- There is an object O which has certain
properties that endow it with the causal power to
produce E in certain circumstances.
- C is event which contains an object O in
circumstances in which its causal power to
produce E is activated.

So far weve been considering the anti-Humean
conception of event causation. How does agent
causation fit into this account of causality?
Two kinds of causal powers
Event-causal powers an object has a
event-causal power to produce an effect E in
certain circumstances if it is such that when the
object is in those circumstances it necessarily
produces E
Agent-causal powers an agent has an
agent-causal power to produce an effect E in
certain circumstances if the agent is such that
when she is in those circumstances it is possible
for the agent to produce E
Both notions invoke the primitive notion of
something producing or bringing about an effect.
The difference is that when an object exercises
one of its event-causal powers in certain
circumstances it must produce the effect that it
produces. On the other hand, when an agent
exercises one of her agent-causal powers in
certain circumstances, she may or may not produce
the effect.
Hopefully you can see how this is going to help
with the problem of free will.

This anti-Humean, agent-causation account of
causality gives us a picture of what happens when
an agent performs an action freely.
Agent A has a certain property or properties that
endow her with the agent-causal power to fire a
gun when placed in the right circumstances (shes
holding the gun, there is no one forcing her
finger on the trigger, etc.).
A finds herself in the relevant circumstances in
which her agent-causal power is activated. The
activation of her agent-causal power makes it
possible for her to produce a firing of the gun.
It does not necessitate that she produces the
firing. Her agent-causal power allows her to
bring about the firing of the gun, but it does
not necessitate that she will.
A fires the gun. But since it was not
necessitated by her the activation of her
agent-causal power to fire the gun, it is still
the case that she could have refrained from
firing the gun. Hence, her action was performed
freely.
TOs main goal is just to show that there is a
coherent notion of agent-causation, that allows
for free action, which can be seen as a variety
of a more general kind of causality.

This description of what happens when an agent
acts freely does not precisely capture TOs view.
The problem is that on this account, what the
agent produces is the action of firing the gun.
This is not how TO thinks of it. TO thinks that
the effect produced by the agent is an intention
or volition - a mental event that proceeds to
cause the firing of the gun.
ac ec
agent volition firing of the gun
decision
TO calls the event of the agents causing the
volition a decision.

Furthermore, TO thinks that we should call the
action the whole sequence of events plus the
agent at the beginning plus the existent causal
relations.
ac ec
agent volition firing of the gun
action
TO In the case of an observable bodily movement
such as waving my hand, my action consists of the
causal relation I bear to the coming-to-be of the
state of determinate intention volition to wave
my hand, plus the sequence of events that flow
from that decision.(266)
This may seem like an odd way of thinking of the
action. Wouldnt we normally say that the action
is just the firing of the gun (or the waving of
the hand)? It is odd to say that the action
itself includes the intention or volition that
caused it.

TO thinks that the alternative to his way of
individuating the action is wedded to the Humean
conception of causality, which sees an action as
part of a sequence of events. The intention is
one event, it causes another event - the firing
of the gun. The action is the firing of the gun,
and it is caused by the previous intention.
If we adopt the anti-Humean conception of
causality we will view things differently.
Instead of seeing sequences of events, we see
objects and agents producing effects. On this
conception, the natural way to view an action is
as something produced by an agent. The notion
of an action includes the agent, and it includes
the fact of being produced by the agent. The
agent and the agents production are part of the
action.
TO uses this way of individuating actions to
respond to a dilemma raised by Davidson - but I
dont want to talk about Davidsons dilemma. I
leave this as an exercise for you how does
individuating actions in the way TO proposes
solve Davidsons dilemma?

Lets now look at some objections and responses
to this agent-causation account.
The first objection that well consider appears
on p. 268. TO quotes C.D. Broad
Broad How can an event possibly be determined
to happen at a certain date if its total cause
contained no factor to which the notion of a date
has any application? And how can the notion of a
date have any application to anything that is not
an event?(268)
Suppose that a volition comes-to-be at a certain
time t, and it is caused by the agent.
agent volition
happens at t

Why does the volition occur at t, and not at some
other time?
Usually when we ask this kind of question about
an event we answer it by citing the previous
event that caused it. Since that previous event
occurred at a time immediately prior to when its
effect occurred, we can understand why the effect
occurred when it did.
But if the volition is caused by an agent and not
by a previous event we cannot give this kind of
explanation. The agent is not something that
occurs at some time. Just citing the agent as
cause of the volition seems to leave it
completely mysterious why the volition occurred
when it did.
TOs response the volition occurred at t because
it was caused to occur at t by the agent.
TO Consider, for example, my consideration a
while ago concerning whether to continue working
on this paper for another hour or to stop and do
something else. After a brief moment of
consideration, I formed the intention (at time t,
say) to continue working. According to the
agency theory, we may suppose that at t I
possessed the power to choose to continue working
or to choose to stop, where this is understood as
the capacity to cause either of these mental
occurrences. And, in fact, the capacity was
exercised at t in a particular way (in choosing
to continue working.)(269)

agent volition
happens at t
The agent caused the volition at t. - this
explains why the volition occurred at t.

This response seems sensible, but it immediately
gives rise to another question
Why did the agents causing of the volition
occur when it did?
Using TOs terminology, another way to put this
is to ask
Why did the agents decision occur when it did
(i.e. at t)?
And there is another closely related question
that one might ask
Why did the agent cause the volition that she
did cause?
or, equivalently
Why did the agent make the decision that she
made?

Lets take the second question first
Why did the agent make the decision that she
made?
Lets suppose that at a given time an agent
causes the intention to X. Why did the agent
make this decision?
TO points out that there will be reasons -
desires and beliefs - that support X. For
example, the agent wants to ?, and believes that
by doing X she can accomplish ?. These are her
reasons for causing the intention to X.
agent intention to X
This also answers the first question, because the
desire and belief are present at some particular
time, and so they explain why the agent caused
the intention to X when she did.

desire to ? belief that by Xing, she can ?
18

Why did the agent decide to X?
- because she desired to ? and believed that by
Xing she could ?
Why did the agent decide to X at t?
- because at t she desired to ? and believed
that by Xing she could ?
The idea is that at t the agent found herself
with this desire and belief. These are the
circumstances that activate her agent-causal
power to X.

2 objections
To explain why the agent caused the intention to
X we have to explain why she caused this
intention and not any other intention. Just
citing the reasons for X fails to explain why she
didnt cause the intention to Y, or the intention
to Z, or etc. and if we dont know why she didnt
cause these other intentions, then we dont have
an explanation for why she caused the intention
to X.
Citing the agents reasons for causing the
intention to X renders the appeal to
agent-causation superfluous. The presence of the
belief and desire on their own explain the
coming-to-be of the intention to X. In
explaining this intention, there is no additional
need to bring in the fact that the agent caused
the intention.

Lets start with the first objection. We are to
imagine the following scenario
agent intention to X
intention to Y
The objection is that merely citing the reasons
for X wont explain why the agent decided to X
because the agent also had reasons for Y, and so
we dont know why the agent didnt decide to Y on
the basis of her reasons for Y. This means that
merely citing the reasons for X wont explain why
the agent decided to X - we also have to cite
reasons that show why the agent didnt decide to
Y.

reasons for X
reasons for Y
21

There is the threat of regress. It looks as
though in order to explain why the agent chose X
instead of Y on the basis of her reasons for X we
have to cite some reasons she had for acting on
her reasons for X rather than her reasons for Y.
In other words, we have to explain why the agent
decided to act on the reasons for X rather than
the reasons for Y. This is another decision that
needs to be explained by appealing to the agents
reasons, and now the regress has started. Let
X reasons for X
agent
Now the question is why did the agent cause the
intention to act on X? To answer this, we have
to appeal to further reasons - reasons for or
against choosing the reasons for X. But then
well need an explanation for why the agent
favored the reasons for the reasons for X - and
so on, into the night.

X
Y
intention to act on X
22

TOs response is to reject one of the assumptions
on which the objection is based.
The objection makes use of two assumptions
1. Citing the agents reasons for X does not
explain why the agent didnt choose to Y or to Z
or etc.
2. Unless the explanation can explain why the
agent didnt choose to Y or to Z or etc. it
cannot explain why the agent chose to X.
TO accepts the first assumption but rejects the
second.
In simply assuming that an explanation of the
action will cite all the salient psychological
features of the agent at the time of his
decision, Kane is clearly presuming that there is
only one type of adequate explanation of a
choice, the type that explains why only that
choice could have been at that point in the
agents psychological history. But that is
unsupported.(276)

Compare
The wall collapsed into a pile of rubble because
the stick of dynamite exploded.
The question is does this successfully explain
why the wall collapsed into a pile of rubble? Do
we also have to show why the wall didnt do
something else, e.g. fall over flat, remain
standing, split in half, etc.?
If the 2nd assumption is correct, merely citing
the explosion of the dynamite is not enough to
explain why the wall collapsed into a pile of
rubble. We would also have to explain why the
wall didnt do anything else. TOs point is that
this is an unreasonable demand on successful
explanation.

Recall the second objection
Citing the agents reasons for causing the
intention to X renders the appeal to
agent-causation superfluous. The presence of the
belief and desire on their own explain the
coming-to-be of the intention to X. In
explaining this intention, there is no additional
need to bring in the fact that the agent caused
the intention.
TOs view
agent intention to X
desire and belief
Objection
desire and belief intention to X

explains
intention to X
explains
25

agent intention to X
To allow for freedom and responsibility the
explanation of the intention to x which appeals
only to the belief and desire would have to be a
non-causal explanation. If the belief and desire
cause the intention, then the agent is not
responsible for the action that that intention
ends up causing.
TOs response ..the agents free exercise of
his causal capacity provides a necessary link
between reason and action, without which the
reason could not in any significant way explain
the action. It allows us to claim that the
reason had an influence on the production of the
decision, while not causing it. Were we to
remove the element of causal production of
decision altogether, and simply claim that the
decision was uncaused, then noting the fact that
the agent had a reason that motivated acting in
that way would not suffice to explain it
....(277)

desire belief
desire belief cannot cause intention to X
26

Randolph Clarke Toward a Credible Agent-Causal
Account of Free Will
The problem of rational action
RC ...if an agents action is not caused by her
having certain reasons for action, then it is
unclear how she can be said to have acted on
those reasons and how her action can be said to
be rational (and rationally explicable).(286)
On OConnors account, an action is not caused by
the agents reasons. Remember reasons
desire belief
For OConnor, the agent is the one who causes the
action (or rather, the intention which then
causes the action). RC thinks this shows that
for OConnor, no actions are rational.

RC ...if an agents action is not caused by her
having certain reasons for action, then it is
unclear how she can be said to have acted on
those reasons and how her action can be said to
be rational (and rationally explicable).(286)
As stated, this is the claim
action is not caused by reasons R
This is equivalent to
the agent acted on reasons R the action
was caused
by R
An action is rational if and only if in
performing the action the agent acted on reasons.

implies
the agent did not act on R
implies
28

The obvious question for RC is why believe these
claims, i.e. why believe that
acting rationally
TO would undoubtedly deny this claim. Why does
RC think that it is so obvious?
An example will be helpful. Suppose an agent has
a number of different reasons for the same
action.
agent
Suppose R1, R2, and R3 are all reasons for
doing X. Suppose the agent does X, and she does
X for reasons R1 - not for R2 or R3. How do we
explain this notion of doing something for a
particular reason?

implies
being caused to act by ones reasons
R2
R3
R1
29

Heres an example to flesh this out
Suppose Claire voted for Ralph Nader in the last
election. Before she voted, she had two reasons
for voting for Nader
Reason 1 she wanted to reduce the power of
corporations in American politics
Reason 2 she wanted to annoy her parents, who
are Democrats
When Claire actually voted for Nader, she voted
for Reason 1 - i.e., the reason on which she
acted was her desire to reduce corporate power.
How should we make sense of this notion of the
reason on which Claire acted?
RC thinks the only way to make sense of this is
to say that Reason 1, and not Reason 2, is the
reason that caused Claire to vote for Nader.
This is not something that TO can say.

So lets suppose RC is right and that in order
for an action to be rational it has to be caused
by the agents reasons. How do we allow for
rational action on an agent-causal view of
action?
RCs main idea
... what an agent directly causes, when she acts
with free will, is her acting on (or for) certain
of her reasons rather than on others ...(290)
On TOs view, what the agent causes is an action
(or, rather, an intention which then causes the
action).
agent intention action
RC thinks that agents cause actions for reasons
agent action for a reason

Remember that for RC, acting for a reason is
being caused to act by a reason. So his view is
that what the agent causes is that her reasons
cause her action.
agent
Claire

reason action
vote for Nader
desire to reduce corporate power
32

There is another wrinkle in Clarkes account.
The kind of event-causation that happens between
reason and action is indeterministic or
probabilistic. Prior to the agent causing the
action, each of her reasons has some probability
of event-causing one of various actions.

R1
R2
R3
30
30
40
agent
action1
action2
action3
33

The probabilistic nature of the event-causal
relation between reasons and actions is crucial
to Clarkes account. Otherwise, if this relation
were necessitating - i.e. if the presence of a
reason necessitated the occurrence of the action
- then there would be no role for agent-causation
to play and no room for freedom and
responsibility.

R1
R2
R3
0
0
100
agent
action1
action2
action3
34

There is another wrinkle.
Clarke ...what an agent directly causes, when
she acts with free will, is her acting on (or
for) certain of her reasons rather than on
others, and her acting for reasons ordered in a
particular way by weight, importance or
significance as the reasons for which she
performs that action.(290)
Suppose that in a given situation I have a number
of different reasons for performing different
actions, and for any one of these actions I have
more than one reason for performing it.

R2
R3, R4, R5
R1
4
agent
1
25
30
40
action 1
action 2
action 3
35

agent

R4 R5 R3
action 3
Clarke Pam attends a lecture on Mapplethorpe,
say, primarily because she is interested in his
work and secondarily because she knows the
speaker. She might also have some desire to
accompany a second friend to an interesting movie
that is showing at the same time. But she causes
her acting on the first set of reasons, and on a
particular ordering of them, instead. What she
directly causes is her attending the lecture
primarily because of Mapplethorpes work and
secondarily because of her friendship with the
lecturer.(290)
36

Review
1. Chisholms dilemma argument for a
libertarian, agent-causal account of human
responsibility and freedom.
2. Humean vs. Anti-Humean causation
3. OConnors account of agent-causation in
terms of agent-causal powers
4. OConnor on the relation between reasons and
actions
5. Clarke on rational action action for a
reason action caused by a reason
6. Clarkes version of agent-causation
Next week van Inwagen, An Argument for
Incompatibilism