Transforming Space Surveillance To Meet Todays Space Superiority Needs 15th AASAIAA Space Flight Mec

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Transforming Space Surveillance To Meet Todays
Space Superiority Needs15th AAS/AIAA Space
Flight Mechanics ConferenceCopper Mountain,
ColoradoJanuary 26, 2005

• Dave Desrocher
• President CEO
• Situational Awareness Solutions, Inc.
• Ph 719-884-1195
• Email Dave_at_SAS-Corp.net

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Overview

• Transformation The Bar is Set
• Space Surveillance Role in Space Superiority
• Conditions Leading to Todays State of Space
  Surveillance
• Problems
• Required Changes

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Transformation The Bar is Set
the U.S. must be able to identify and track
much smaller objects in space than it can track
todayAn improved space surveillance network is
needed to reduce the chance of collision between
satellites, the Space Shuttle or the
International Space Station and the thousands of
pieces of space debris orbiting the earth. It
will also have to track objects deeper in space,
such as asteroids or spacecraft. And to reduce
the possibility of surprise by hostile actors, it
will have to monitor space activity.
11 January, 2001
March, 1998
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Space Surveillance Role inSpace Superiority

• Counterspace Operations
• The Ways and Means to Space Superiority
• Components DCS, OCS, SSA
• Space Situation Awareness
• Comprised of Intelligence, Surveillance,
  Reconnaissance, Environmental Monitoring, C2
• Space Surveillance
• Contributes to SSA
• Increased Importance to DCS and OCS

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Conditions Leading to Todays State of Space
Surveillance

• Born of Cold War Necessity to Enable Missile
  Warning
• Tied to ITW/AA Environment
• Stove-Piped, Classified C2 Systems
• Upgrades Very Difficult Expensive
• Predominantly Ground Based Radars
• Established Trusted Access Personnel
• Set Stage for Development Environment
• National Space Asset Involvement
• Introduced Trump Card
• Co-opted Development Approach, Controlled Players

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Problems

• Too Few Outsiders Allowed to Contribute
• Uniformed Personnel at Disadvantage
• At Mercy of Closed Group of Advisors Developers
• Frequent Rotation Aids Status Quo
• Cannot Readily Assess Merits of One Approach or
  Method from Another
• Do Not Learn the Art of the Possible
• Limited by Organizational Authority, Time, Money,
  Contract Hurdles
• Deficiencies Only Come to Light in Crisis
• Explained Away and/or ForgottenUntil Next Crisis

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Required Changes

• Expand Sharing of Information and Data
• Create Means for Rapid Integration of New or
  Improved Capabilities
• More Broadly Engage and Unleash Human Potential

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What all these stories have in common is a
system that requires a demonstrated "need to
know" before sharing. This approach assumes it is
possible to know, in advance, who will need to
use the information. Such a system implicitly
assumes that the risk of inadvertent disclosure
outweighs the benefits of wider sharing. Those
Cold War assumptions are no longer appropriate.
The culture of agencies feeling they own the
information they gathered at taxpayer expense
must be replaced by a culture in which the
agencies instead feel they have a duty to the
informationto repay the taxpayers' investment by
making that information available.
Page 417
But the security concerns need to be weighed
against the costs. Current security requirements
nurture overclassification and excessive
compartmentation of information among agencies.
Each agency's incentive structure opposes
sharing, with risks (criminal, civil, and
internal administrative sanctions) but few
rewards for sharing information. No one has to
pay the long-term costs of over-classifying
information, though these costseven in literal
financial terms are substantial. There are no
punishments for not sharing information. Agencies
uphold a "need-to-know" culture of information
protection rather than promoting a
"need-to-share" culture of integration.15
Recommendation Information procedures should
provide incentives for sharing, to restore a
better balance between security and shared
knowledge.
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Required Changes Means for Rapid Integration

• Modernize C2 and Ops Integration Pathway
• Emulate Successes of Air Domain
• Remove Space Surveillance from ITW/AA Development
  Environment
• Move to TACSAT-Like Approach for Developing
  Exploitation Methods Applications
• Establish Effects-Based Acceptance Criteria

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Required Changes Engage and Unleash Human
Potential

• Restore an Advisory Body Like the Old JAWG, But
• With General Officer Accountability
• With Safeguards to Ensure Promotion of Best of
  Breed Capabilities
• With Specified Problems to Solve (May Be
  Identified By the Group)
• With Broader Review of Capabilities (e.g., via
  DCS Exercises)

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Conclusion

• Transformation in Space Surveillance Must Be
  Revolutionary, Not Evolutionary
• The Role That Space Surveillance Must Play in SSA
  Has Changed
• Broader Collaboration is Needed to Ensure
  Greatest Space Surveillance Contribution to SSA
  and to Space Superiority