Moral Theory

1

• Moral Theory

2
QUESTION What exactly are moral judgements about?

• a. Permissibility, Optionality, and
  Obligatoriness
• Permissible (right, acceptable, justified)
• Optional Permissible to do and permissible not
  to do
• Obligatory Permissible to do but not
  permissible not to do

3
b. The Moral Point of View

• Morality is a normative viewpoint the concern of
  which is to impartially protect and/or promote
  the basic interests of all individuals.
• A normative viewpoint is one that classifies
  actions, etc. in terms of their permissibility or
  in terms of their goodness.
• Normative viewpoints are concerned with how
  things should be, and not necessarily with how
  things are.

4
Morality vs. Rational Self-Interest

• These two points of view may conflict It may be
  permissible from the viewpoint of self-interest
  to break a promise, but it may not be permissible
  from the moral point of view.

5
Morality vs. the Law

• The moral point of view can also conflict with
  the legal point of view. What is morally
  permissible need not be legally permissible
• (e.g., going through a red light when no one is
  around).
• And what is legally permissible need not be
  morally permissible
• (e.g., failing to pull a drowning baby out of the
  water).

6
Descriptive vs. Critical Morality

• The descriptive morality of a given individual or
  society consists of the moral norms reflected in
  the verbal and other behavior of that individual
  or society.
• It is an empirical matter and is part of what
  social science studies. The descriptive morality
  of a given individual or society (e.g., of Nazis)
  may be deeply defective.
• Critical morality is not a mere descriptive
  matter. It concerns the correct moral norms, and
  thus provides a basis for criticizing the
  prevailing descriptive morality of a given
  individual or society. We will be concerned with
  critical morality.

7
QUESTION

• Are there any valid moral judgments (or are such
  judgments just matters of emotion with no room
  for error)?

8
Moral Nihilism

• Moral nihilism denies that there are any valid
  moral judgments, and holds that there is no point
  in discussing, or reflecting about, moral issues.
  
• Most of us, however, reject this view. Suppose,
  for example, that a fellow student beats you up,
  smashes your car, and steals your wallet.
  According to moral nihilism there is no moral
  issue, whereas most of us would say that he did
  something wrong. We would criticize his behavior,
  blame him for what he did, hold him responsible
  for compensating you for the damages, and think
  it appropriate that he be punished. According to
  moral nihilism, this would all be a mistake,
  since morality is an illusion.
• (Moral nihilism is closely related to moral
  relativism, which holds that there are no moral
  judgments valid for all people, but we won't
  worry about the distinction between the two
  here.)

9
Moral Realism

• Moral realism is the view that there are
  objective (i.e., mind independent) laws of
  morality that determine which actions are
  permissible (the laws of morality are often
  thought of as analogous to the laws of nature
  that determine which actions are possible, or to
  laws of mathematics).
• According to moral realism there is an
  objectively correct moral view.

10
Moral Constructivism

• Moral constructivism is the view that the
  validity of a moral judgment, for a given person
  or group of persons, is based on whether it would
  be endorsed after careful reflection (and not on
  whether it conforms to any objective law of
  morality).

11
QUESTION What is the point of moral reflection
and discussion?

• If moral realism is true, then one should engage
  in moral discussion to find out about the
  objectively correct moral theory. Of course, even
  if moral realism is true, there is no guarantee
  that we will all agree, or even that all well
  informed experts will agree. Morality, like
  physics, may be very complicated, and we may not
  understand it very well. But careful
  investigation and discussion will at least
  improve our understanding, and reduce (if not
  eliminate) disagreement.
• If, however, moral constructivism is trueand
  many people think it iswhy should one engage in
  moral discussion? Here are some reasons why Even
  if there is no objectively correct moral theory,
  we can still defend/criticize a person's moral
  view on internal grounds. That is, instead of
  criticizing a person's moral views on external
  grounds (i.e., because they do not correspond to
  objective reality), we can criticize them in some
  of the following ways

12

• (a) A person's moral view might be based on a
  confused or ill understood notion. For example,
  someone might believe that abortion is wrong
  because the fetus is a "person". Or someone might
  hold that homosexuality is wrong because it is
  "unnatural". But what exactly is meant by
  "person" or "unnatural"? Forcing the person to
  clarify what they mean may lead them to change
  his/her mind.
• (b) A person's moral view might be based on a
  false belief, or lack of any belief. For example,
  a person's view that killing animals is
  permissible might rest on the false belief that
  they cannot feel pain, or on the lack of any
  belief about the matter. Providing the relevant
  information may lead the person to change his/her
  mind.
• (c) A person's moral view combined with certain
  plausible assumptions might have unforeseen
  implications that are incompatible with some of
  that person's particular moral judgments. For
  example, a person may hold that abortion is
  permissible on the grounds that it is not
  generally wrong to kill something that is unaware
  of its own existence and the fetus is so unaware.
  When it is pointed out that on that view
  infanticide is also generally permissible (since
  infants are also unaware of their own existence),
  the person may change his/her view.

13

• So, even if moral constructivism is true,
  discussing moral issues can be useful.
• (1) We still care about what morality says. The
  issue of the moral permissibility of abortion,
  strong affirmative action, capital punishment,
  etc., don't disappear if moral constructivism is
  true.
• (2) By being reflective one may come to change
  one's view (e.g., to make one's view coherent in
  light of a criticism of the above type).
• (3) Even if one does not change one's moral
  views, one will at least better understand one's
  own moral views and those of others, and be
  better able to defend one's own views (rather
  than simply being dogmatic).
• In general we must be on our guard against
  blindly accepting the prevailing ideology. In the
  past all sorts of weird views were generally
  accepted, such as that earth is flat, that
  monarchy is the only acceptable form of
  government, that women are the property of their
  husbands, that blacks aren't human, etc. Some of
  our current views are surely just as mistaken.

14
Ethics vs. Political Morality

• Moral theory is concerned with moral
  permissibility. For simplicity we can think of it
  as having two branches.
• Ethical theory (or individual moral theory) is
  concerned with the moral permissibility of the
  actions (things done on a particular occasion)
  and practices (things done repeatedly over time)
  of individual agents.
• Political moral theory is concerned with the
  moral permissibility of legal social structures
  (laws and systems of laws).
• Although each of the following theories can be
  formulated as a theory of political morality,
  well only consider their formulations as ethical
  theories.

15
DIVINE COMMAND THEORY

• a. This is the oldest moral theory.
• The Divine Command Theory An action is
  permissible if and only if (and solely because)
  it violates none of God's commands.
• A note on terminology "An action satisfies God's
  commands" means that it does not violate any of
  Gods commands.
• Note that this theory does not make any specific
  assumptions about what God's commands are (e.g.,
  that they are as represented in Christian,
  Jewish, or Muslim holy documents). It simply
  appeals to God's commands as they truly are
  (whatever they are).

16
b. An assessment of the Divine Command Theory

• Attractive features (1) If God exists, then (at
  least on a common conception) God is omnipotent,
  omniscient and perfectly benevolent. If God gave
  us commands, then it makes a lot of sense that we
  should obey them.
• Unattractive features
• (1) The theory presupposes that God exists. Many
  people deny this.
• (2) The theory presupposes that God gave us
  commands. God might simply have created the world
  and left it at that. (Deists hold this view.)
• (3) Why think that Gods commands determine what
  is morally permissible? That is, why think that
  it is Gods commands that make things permissible
  or impermissible? Would it be permissible to
  torture babies if God gave us no commands?
• Note that the rejection of the Divine Command
  theory does not entail that God is not the source
  of morality, it only entails that Gods commands
  are not the source of morality. Cf. Natural Law
  Theory.

17
A. Gods Commands as Creating Morality (Divine
Command Theory)
18
B. Gods Commands Instruct us about Morality
(Natural Law)
God lets us know that killing innocent humans is
wrong by telling us Dont kill innocent humans!
19
UTILITARIANISM

• a. Utilitarianism is the most well known
  goal-directed theory.
• It arose primarily in Great Britain during the
  1600s and 1700s during which time social thinkers
  were beginning to challenge the traditional
  social, economic, and political systems (e.g.,
  monarchies) and their Divine Command
  justifications.
• The utilitarian emphasis was on designing and
  justifying social structures in terms of
  promoting human wellbeing. The most famous
  proponents are Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and
  John Stuart Mill (1806-1873).
• There are many versions of utilitarianism (e.g.,
  act utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism), but we
  will consider only act utilitarianism, which is
  the most common one.
• (Act) utilitarianism An action (practice) is
  permissible if and only if it maximizes social
  wellbeing.

20
UTILITARIANISM

• b. There are different versions of utilitarianism
  that understand social wellbeing in different
  ways.
• The notion of individual wellbeing (welfare,
  utility) can be interpreted in a number of
  different ways
• (1) net pleasure over pain,
• (2) happiness, or
• (3) preference satisfaction. For simplicity,
  we'll usually understand well-being to be
  happiness.
• Social well-being can be understood either as the
  total well-being for all members of society
  (adding together everyone's individual
  well-being), or as the average level of
  well-being in society.

21
UTILITARIANISM

• There are further variations depending on what
  kinds of entity count as members of society. All
  sentient beings (i.e., that can feel pleasure and
  pain)? Only rational and self-conscious
  beings? Only homo sapiens? Only members of one's
  country? Only presently living beings, or also
  beings that will potentially exist in the future?
  
• In general, we will not worry about these
  differences, except where relevant.

22
UTILITARIANISM

• c. An example (a1 and a3, but not a2, are judged
  permissible)
• Action John Mary Sue Total
• a1 80 30 70 180
• a2 40 60 60 160
• a3 20 90 70 180

23

• d. An assessment of utilitarianismAttractive
  features

24

• (1) It takes a tough-minded approach to morality
  (worrying about the long-term consequences for
  human well-being).

25

• d. An assessment of utilitarianismUnattractive
  features

26

• (1) It is very demanding of the agent (very few
  actions are judged permissible). For example,
  normally it judges it wrong to watch television,
  go to restaurants, etc..
• (2) It gives little protection from interference
  from others (it can permit others to kill,
  torture, lie to, and steal from us). For example,
  it judges it permissible for the sheriff to
  execute the innocent person if that avoids
  horrible riots.
• (3) It is relatively insensitive to distributive
  considerations. It doesn't care how unequally
  well-being is distributed. All it cares about is
  the total (or average) well-being.
• (4) It is insensitive to what the past was like
  (what promises or agreements were made, who did
  something wrong, who worked hard, who chose to
  take a risk, etc.).
• (5) It presupposes that well-being is cardinally
  measurable and interpersonally comparable (i.e.,
  that there is a natural scale for precisely
  measuring everyone's well-being on the same
  scale).

27

• e. An example that illustrates utilitarianism's
  insensitivity to distributive considerations
• Action John Mary Sue Total
• a1 0 105 100 205
• a2 65 65 65 195
• Utilitarianism judges a1 (with its unequal
  distribution) permissible, but not a2 (with its
  more equal distribution).
• f. Satisficing utilitarianism The maximizing
  nature of utilitarianism makes it very demanding.
  It could be modified by requiring only that the
  social well-being be "satisfactory" (or adequate)
  according to some specified criterion (e.g., 50
  of the maximum possible, or an amount that would
  be sufficient for a minimally decent life for
  each person).
• g. Libertarian-constrained utilitarianism This
  holds that an action is permissible if and only
  if (1) it violates none of the libertarian
  constraints, and (2) it produces as much social
  well-being as possible without violating the
  libertarian constraints. Adding the constraints
  provides greater protection from interference and
  introduces sensitivity to the past (past
  wrongdoings, past commitments).

28
LIBERTARIANISM

• a. A well known constraint theory is
  libertarianism. It arose primarily in Great
  Britain during the 1600 and 1700s during which
  time social thinkers were beginning to challenge
  the traditional social, economic, and political
  systems (e.g., monarchies) and their Divine
  Command justifications.
• The libertarian emphasis was on designing and
  justifying social structures in terms of
  protecting human rights of liberty. The most
  famous proponents are John Locke (1632-1704
  British) and more recently Robert Nozick
  (1938-2002 American). Although most advocates of
  libertarianism focus on political libertarians
  (the permissibility of legal structures), for
  simplicity well focus on ethical libertarianism.
  
• Libertarianism An action (practice) is
  permissible if and only if it violates none of
  the libertarian constraints.

29

• b. The libertarian constraints consist of
• (1) personal body constraints against killing,
  physically harming, physically annoying, or
  moving an innocent person, without his/her
  consent
• (2) physical property (other than personal body)
  constraints against destroying, damaging, or
  moving an innocent person's physical property
  without his/her consent
• (3) spatial property constraints against moving
  on, or causing physically annoying things to move
  on, an innocent person's spatial property without
  his/her consent
• (4) communication constraints (a) against
  breaking promises (and agreements) without an
  innocent promisee's consent and (b) against
  deception (e.g., lies, non-rational manipulation,
  or misleading statements or practices) without an
  innocent deceived party's consent and
• (5) compensatory constraints against failing to
  provide compensation to people that the agent has
  previously wrongedwithout their consent.

30

• c. Above, killing, harming, annoying, moving,
  destroying, damaging, etc., are to be understood
  solely in terms of the things that an agent
  brings aboutas opposed to what he/she allows to
  happen. An agent brings about X just in case X
  occurs, but would not have occurred had that
  agent "done nothing", i.e., not intervened in the
  "normal course of events".
• pushing a non-swimmer into a lake brings about
  her death, whereas
• watching as a non-swimmer who fell in the lake
  drowns is merely allowing her to die.
• Above property is understood to be moral property
  (that which a person morally owns)not legal
  property (that which a person legally owns). Cf.
  Slavery.
• The above constraints are to be understood so
  that people who violate these constraints lose
  some of their protection from the constraints. A
  note on terminology "An action satisfies the
  constraints" means that it does not violate the
  constraints.

31
d. An assessment of libertarianism

• Attractive features
• (1) It leaves lots of liberty to the agent (it's
  permissible to watch television).
• (2) It gives lots of protection from interference
  from others (it's always judged wrong to kill or
  torture).
• (3) It holds people responsible for their actions
  (sensitivity to the past).
• Unattractive features
• (1) It demands very little of the agent (i.e.,
  leaves the agent too much liberty). For example,
  it judges it permissible to allow the baby in the
  puddle to drown, or to refuse to give a starving
  person some food.
• (2) It is totally insensitive to the long-term
  impact on society (it's too rigid). For example,
  it's wrong to kill one innocent person, even if
  that saves millions of lives.
• (3) It is totally insensitive to distributive
  considerations.

32
OPPORTUNITY EGALITARIANISM

• a. Opportunity egalitarianism, like
  utilitarianism, is a goal-directed theory.
• Unlike utilitarianism, its goal is a kind of
  equality of opportunity for well-being rather
  than total well-being.
• Although it has antecedents that go back at least
  to the 1600s, its most famous proponent is John
  Rawls, who published his extremely influential A
  Theory of Justice in 1971. (His theory is much
  more complex than the simple version that we are
  considering.)
• Opportunity Egalitarianism An action (practice)
  is permissible if and only if it maximizes
  equality of initial effective opportunity for
  well-being.

33

• Initial effective opportunity for well-being
  This is the effective opportunity for a good life
  that individuals face at the beginning of their
  responsible life. It reflects the real
  opportunities that individuals then have to lead
  fulfilling lives.
• There are many versions of egalitarianism. Each
  has a different conception of what is to be
  equalized. For simplicity we are focusing on
  equality of effective opportunity for well-being.
  Unlike outcome egalitarianism, opportunity
  egalitarianism denies that morality requires
  outcomes (e.g., well-being) to be equal.
• Any plausible version of egalitarianism will
  require the promotion of equality by benefiting
  someone (e.g., improving someones opportunity
  for well-being). It will not, for example,
  require the promotion of equality when no
  benefits and some are harmed.
• For example, it will not require choosing giving
  everyone 2 (perfect equality) rather than giving
  some 3 and some 4 (less equal, but better for
  everyone). For simplicity, I have left this
  qualification implicit.

34
c. An assessment of opportunity egalitarianism

• Attractive features
• (1) It takes a tough-minded approach to morality
  (worrying about the long-term consequences for
  human well-being).
• (2) It is sensitive to distributive
  considerations.
• (3) It is sensitive to what the past was like
  (who worked hard, who chose to take a risk,
  etc.).
• Unattractive features
• (1) It is very demanding of the agent (very few
  actions are judged permissible). For example,
  normally it judges it wrong to watch television,
  go to restaurants, etc..
• (2) Although the concern for equality gives more
  protection from interference from others to
  disadvantaged individuals than act utilitarianism
  does, it doesnt provide very much protection for
  advantaged individuals. Execution example.
• (3) It presupposes that there is a natural scale
  for precisely measuring everyone's well-being on
  the same scale.

35

• d. Satisficing opportunity egalitarianism The
  maximizing nature of egalitarianism makes it very
  demanding. It could be modified by requiring only
  that the degree of equality of opportunity for
  well-being be "satisfactory" (or adequate)
  according to some specified criterion (e.g., 50
  of the maximum possible).
• e. Libertarian-constrained opportunity
  egalitarianism This holds that an action is
  permissible if and only if
• (1) it violates none of the libertarian
  constraints, and
• (2) it produces as much equality of opportunity
  for well-being as possible without violating the
  libertarian constraints.
• Adding the constraints provides greater
  protection from interference and introduces
  greater sensitivity to the past (past
  wrongdoings, past commitments).

36
SATISFICING LIBERTARIAN-CONSTRAINED OPPORTUNITY
EGALITARIANISM

• This is the theory that I believe (roughly
  speaking) to be the most plausible. There will be
  no test questions on this. This is included
  solely for your reference.
• Satisficing Libertarian-Constrained Opportunity
  Egalitarianism An action (practice) is
  permissible if and only if
• (1) it violates none of the libertarian
  constraints, and
• (2) of those actions satisfying the libertarian
  constraints that benefit at least one person, it
  produces a satisfactory (relative to the
  circumstances) degree of equality of opportunity
  for well-being.

37

• Attractive features
• (1) It takes a tough-minded approach to morality
  (worrying about the long-term consequences for
  human well-being).
• (2) It is moderately demanding.
• (3) It provides strong protection from
  interference.
• (4) It is sensitive to the equality of effective
  opportunity for well-being.
• (5) It is sensitive to the past and holds
  individuals accountable for their past choices.
• Unattractive features
• (1) It provides too much protection from
  interference (e.g., wrong to forcibly remove the
  kidney of a privileged person when it would save
  thousands of lives).
• (2) It recognizes no duty to help the needy when
  their neediness is their own fault.
• (3) It presupposes that well-being is cardinally
  measurable and interpersonally comparable (i.e.,
  that there is a natural scale for precisely
  measuring everyone's well-being on the same
  scale).