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Long-term Financing

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Title: Long-term Financing Author: Miranda Lam Detzler Last modified by: Jacoby Created Date: 10/29/1996 6:45:12 PM Document presentation format: On-screen Show – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Long-term Financing


1
Chapters 1516
The Capital Structure Questions
The balance sheet of the firm(market
values) We can write V B S Or, draw a
pie Two questions 1. Should the management
aim at maximizing V or S? 2. What is the debt
to equity ratio (B/S) that will maximize S?
Debt (B) Equity (S)
Assets (V)
B
S
2
Is There An Optimal Capital Structure?
  • Modigliani Miller (MM) Proposition I (No Taxes)
  • Firm value is not affected by financial
    leverage
  • VL VU
  • MM assume (among other things)
  • No risk of default
  • Perpetual Cash Flows
  • Firms and investors can borrow/lend at the same
    rate
  • No taxes

3
  • Proving MM Proposition I (No Taxes)
  • Consider two firms, identical in every way except
    that one is levered and the other is all equity
    (unlevered)
  • Unlevered Levered
  • Assets VU 1,000,000 VL ?
  • Equity SU 1,000,000 SL ?
  • Debt BU 0 BL 400,000
  • Cost of Debt rB 5
  • Recall Firms and investors can borrow/lend at
    the same rate, and there are no taxes
  • The (uncertain) dollar return on the firms
    assets is given by Y

4
Consider the following two investment
strategies Strategy A Dollar
Investment Dollar Return Buy 10 of SL 0.1SL
0.1(VL - BL) 0.1(Y - rBBL)
0.1(Y -
0.05400,000) Total CF from A 0.1(VL - BL)
0.1Y - 2,000 Strategy B
Dollar Investment Dollar Return 1) Buy 10 of
VU 0.1VU 0.1Y 2) Borrow 10 of BL
- 0.1BL - 0.1rBBL - 0.1
0.05400,000
- 2,000 Total CF
from B 0.1(VU - BL) 0.1Y -
2,000 Since the dollar return from A and B is
identical, the initial cost of both strategies
must be identical, thus 0.1(VL - BL) 0.1(VU -
BL), and VL VU MM Proposition I (No
Taxes) Firm value is not affected by leverage
(VL VU )
5
The Value of a Levered Firm UnderMM Proposition
I with No Corporate Taxes
Value ofthe firm(VL )
VL VU
VU
Debt-equity ratio (B/S)
6
MM Proposition II (No Taxes) The cost of equity
and financial leverage A. Because of Prop. I,
the WACC must be constant. With no taxes, WACC
rU (S/A) rS (B/A) rB, where A S
B where rU is the constant return on the firms
assets B. Solve for rS to get MM Prop. II (No
Taxes) rS rU (rU - rB) (B/S) Cost of
equity has two parts 1. rU and business
risk the risk inherent in the firms
operations (beta of assets) 2. B/S and
financial risk extra risk from using debt
financing
7
The Cost of Equity, the Cost of Debt, and the
Weighted Average Cost of Capital MM Proposition
II with No Corporate Taxes
Cost of capital
rS rU (rU rB) x (B/S)
WACC rU
rB
Debt-equity ratio (B/S)
8
Debt, Taxes, and Firm Value
  • The interest tax shield and firm value
  • For simplicity (1) perpetual cash flows (2) no
    depreciation (3) no fixed asset or NWC spending
  • A firm is considering going from zero debt to
    400 at 10
  • Firm U Firm L (unlevered) (levered)
  • EBIT 200 200
  • Interest 0 40
  • Tax (40) 80 64
  • Net income 120 96
  • Cash flow from
  • assets (EBIT-Taxes) 120 136
  • Tax saving 16 0.4 40 TC rB B

16
9
Debt, Taxes, and Firm Value (concluded)
  • Whats the link between debt and firm value?
  • Since interest creates a tax deduction,
    borrowing creates an interest tax shield. Its
    value is added to the value of the firm.
  • PV(perpetual tax savings) 16/0.1 160
  • (TC rB B)/rB TC B
  • MM Proposition I (with taxes)
  • VL VU TC B

10
The Value of a Levered Firm UnderMM Proposition
I with Corporate Taxes
Value ofthe firm(VL )
VL VU TC B
Present value of taxshield on debt
VU
VU
Total Debt (B)
11
Debt, Taxes, and the WACC
  • Taxes and firm value an example
  • EBIT 100
  • TC 30
  • rU 12.5
  • Q. Suppose debt goes from 0 to 100 at 10,
    what happens to equity value, S?
  • VU EBIT(1 - TC) / rU
  • VL
  • SL VL - B

12
Debt, Taxes, and the WACC (concluded)
  • WACC and the cost of equity (MM Proposition II
    with taxes) With taxes
  • Recall WACC (S/A) rS (B/A) rB (1-TC)
  • MM Proposition II (with taxes)
  • rS rU (rU - rB) (B/S) (1 - TC )
  • In the above example
  • rs
  • WACC
  • The WACC decreases as more debt financing is used
  • gt since WACC is a discount rate for future cash
    flows, the optimal
  • capital structure is all debt!

13
Taxes, the WACC, and Proposition II
Cost of capital
rS
rU
rU
WACC
rB (1 TC)
Debt-Equity Ratio (B/S)
14
Financial Distress
  • MM with taxes
  • VL VU TC B
  • debt provides tax benefits to the firm gt the
    firm should borrow an infinite amount
  • In reality
  • the firm has to pay interest and principal to
    bondholders regardless of profitability
  • if the firm defaults on a payment to its
    bondholders, it will enter a phase of financial
    distress (e.g. Eatons), or
  • ultimately, if financial distress persists, the
    firm will declare bankruptcy
  • there are costs involved in both financial
    distress and bankruptcy

15
Costs of Financial Distress
  • Direct Costs
  • Legal and administrative costs (e.g. lawyers,
    accounting, expert witnesses)
  • Indirect Costs
  • Impaired ability to conduct business (e.g. lost
    sales)
  • Agency costs -
  • In financial distress, stockholders may engage
    in
  • Selfish strategy 1 Incentive to take large risks
  • Selfish strategy 2 Incentive toward
    underinvestment
  • Selfish Strategy 3 Milking the property
    (liquidating dividend, or Increase perks to
    owners/management )

16
Selfish Strategy 3 Milking the Property
  • Liquidating dividends
  • Such tactics are often illegal
  • Increase perks to owners/management

17
The Firm Value, Tax-Shield of Debt, and Financial
Distress Costs
  • The Value of a levered firm
  • VL VU TC B - PVexpected costs of financial
    distress
  • For firms with a low financial leverage, the
    probability of default is close to zero, and
  • PVexpected costs of financial distress 0
  • a 1 increase in debt, will increase tax
    benefits (and the firm value) at a constant rate
    of TC
  • For highly levered firms, the probability of
    default is positive, and
  • PVexpected costs of financial distress gt 0
  • a 1 increase in debt, will
  • increase tax benefits at a constant rate of TC
  • increase costs of financial distress at
    increasing rates
  • Conclusion - increase debt as long as tax
    benefits exceed the PV
  • of the costs of financial distress (up to the
    optimal level of debt B)

18
The Optimal Capital Structure and the Value of
the Firm
Value ofthe firm(VL )
VL VU TC B
Present value of taxshield on debt
Financial distress costs
Maximumfirm value VL
Actual firm value
VU
VU Value of firm with no debt
Total Debt (B)
B Optimal Level of Debt
19
The Optimal Capital Structure and the Cost of
Capital
WACC (S/V) rS (B/V) rB (1-TC) Premium
for Costs of Financial Distress
Cost ofcapital()
rS
rU
rU
WACC
Minimum cost of capital
rB (1 TC)
WACC
Debt/equity ratio (B/S)
(B/S) Optimal Leverage Ratio
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