Title: Properties, entity correlates of properties, and existentials
1Properties, entity correlates of properties, and
existentials
- Louise McNally
- Universitat Pompeu Fabra
- Workshop on Indefinites and Weak Quantifiers
- 1/7/2005
2Goals of the talk
- Review two underappreciated aspects of McNallys
1992 semantics for English existential sentences - Lexical semantics of There be
- Formalization of the notion of property
- Reflect on some of their implications for the
study of incorporation(-like) phenomena
3McNally 1992 lexical semantics
- There be denotes a property of properties
paraphraseable as to be instantiated. - Existential quantification is only entailed it
plays no role in semantic well-formedness (cf.
Strawson 1959). - Similarities between There be sentences and
incorporation constructions or presentational-ther
e sentences are accidental or superficial. - Translation ?P.There-be(P)
4Alternative lexical semantics
- There be denotes a property of entities
paraphraseable as to exist but (for whatever
reason) it can only combine with its argument via
something like semantic incorporation (see e.g.
Van Geenhoven 1998). - The role of existential quantification depends on
how semantic composition works. - A deeper connection to presentational sentences
is in principle possible (see e.g. Landman 2004). - Translation ?P?x.There-be(x) ? P(x)
5The formalization of property
- McNally 1992 The postverbal NP in
existential-there sentences denotes the entity
correlate of a property (a sort within type e,
using a property-theoretic semantics inspired in
Chierchia 1984) - McNally 1998 and various others The NP denotes a
functional type in a set-theoretic semantics
(e.g., type lte,tgt ex-/intensionality will be set
aside).
6Basic case
- (1) There were problems.
- McNally 1992 ?y.There-be(y)(n?x.problems(x))
There-be(n?x.problems(x)) - McNally 1998 ?P.There-be(P)(?x.problems(x))
There-be(?x.problems(x))
7The problem case
- Quantification into postverbal position (Lumsden
1988) - (2) Among our dresses there were most kinds of
shabby and greasy wear,. - C. Dickens, The Uncommercial Traveler, Chap. 4
8The problem case McNally 1992
- most kinds of shabby and greasy wear can quantify
unproblematically over the existentials argument
if we model kinds as entity correlates of
properties (Cocchiarella 1976) - kind(s) of shabby and greasy wear denotes a
property of subkinds of the kind shabby greasy
wear - ?x.kind(x,n?y.shabby-greasy-wear(y))
- Most xkind(x, n?y.shabby-greasy-wear(y))
- There-be(x)
9The problem case McNally 1998 (1)
- How to make most kinds of shabby and greasy wear
quantify over a type lte,tgt argument? - Option 1 kind(s) of shabby and greasy wear
denotes a property of properties (see also de
Swart 2001) - ?P.kind(P, ?y.shabby-greasy-wear(y))
- Most Pkind(P, ?y.shabby-greasy-wear(y))
- There-be(P)
- Problem Motivating a higher type for nouns like
kind and resulting proliferation of types for
other categories
10The problem case McNally 1998 (2)
- Option 2 kind(s) of shabby and greasy wear
denotes a property of subkinds of the kind
shabby greasy wear, as on McNallys 1992
analysis use type coercion to permit
quantificationbut how? -
- If the argument NP is coerced, its unclear how
quantification will work - Most xkind(x,n?y.sh-gr-wr(y))?P.There-be(P)(?x
)
11The problem case McNally 1998 (3)
- Option 2, cont. Coercing the type of the
existential predicate (ltlte,tgt,tgt ? lte,tgt) amounts
to adopting the McNally 1992 analysis for the
problem case - Most xkind(x,n?y.sh-gr-wr(y))?z.There-be(?z)(x
) - Conclusion On the basis of simplicity, the
analysis on which the existential predicate
always selects for an entity correlate of a
property appears superior.
12Another argument for entity correlates of
properties
- The failure of non-DP, property-type expressions
to appear in existentials is not
straightforwardly predicted by a property
analysis - (3) There was happiness/happy.
- (4) There was president. (cp. She is president.)
- If There be selects for an entity correlate of a
property, we need only exclude APs, PPs, etc.
from denoting such entities. A theory of the
semantics of nominalization should handle this
(e.g. Chierchia 1984).
13Reflection on existentials
- We shouldnt be surprised if the semantics of
existential constructions is cross-linguistically
variable. - Still, finding empirical arguments to distinguish
obligatory incorporation over an ordinary entity
from lexical selection for a(n entity correlate
of a) property might be difficult. - However, in the spirit of Chierchia 1984, we
might expect a correlation between lexically
selecting for a property and that property being
best formalized in type e. - If so, it might be useful to test for whether an
existential construction selects for a
property-qua-function or its entity correlate.
14Example W. Greenlandic?
- Unlike There be, incorporating verbs in W.
Greenlandic can incorporate non-nominal
predicates (see refs. in Van Geenhoven 1998) - If W. Greenlandic existential qar- combines with
non-nominal predicates, we can explain the
similarities and contrasts with There be by
positing that qar- denotes a property of
ordinary entities but is obligatorily
incorporating.
15Reflection on incorporation
- Entity correlates of properties are not the right
sorts of input to operations such as Farkas de
Swarts Unification or Chung Ladusaws 2004
Restrict. - We might expect clear cases of Unification or
Restrict to contrast with the English existential
construction in terms of quantification over
properties/kinds.
16Example Chamorro?
- Unlike There be, the incorporating Chamorro
existential predicates guäha exist, taya not
exist, and täi- not have do not permit
quantification over properties or kinds (Chung
Ladusaw 2004, chapter 3, fn. 5). - This contrast with English follows if the
composition mechanisms involved in the two cases
are distinct ordinary function application for
There be, and Unification or Restrict for the
Chamorro existential predicates.
17Reflection on properties and kinds
- If the English existential construction selects
for the entity correlate of a property and if
kinds are modeled as entity correlates of
properties, the distinction between properties
and kinds must be more subtle than we thought
Expressions like dogs and three dogs will denote
in the same general sort in English. - Perhaps opens the door for reconciling certain
aspects of Chierchias (1998) work on Romance
with that represented by e.g. Dobrovie-Sorin and
Laca 2003.
18Final comments
- The possibility that some expressions might
really lexically select for properties should not
be forgotten in the move to abandon the original
lexical formulation of semantic incorporation in
favor of alternative composition mechanisms. - Entity correlates of properties have been
prematurely marginalized even by their few
promotors their utility beyond the modeling of
kinds should be reexplored.
19References
Chierchia, G. 1984. Topics in the syntax and
semantics of infinitives and gerunds. Ph.D.
diss., U. MA Amherst. Pub. 1989, Garland, New
York. Chierchia, G. 1998. Reference to kinds
across languages. NLS 6, 339-405. Chung, S. W.
A. Ladusaw. 2004. Restriction and saturation.
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Cocchiarella, N. 1976.
On the logic of natural kinds. Philosophy of
Science 43, 202-222. de Swart, H. 2001. Weak
readings of indefinites type-shifting and
closure. The Linguistic Review 18,
69-96. Dobrovie-Sorin, C. B. Laca. 2003. Les
noms sans déterminant dans les langues romanes.
In D. Godard (ed.), Les langues
romanes. Problèmes de la phrase simple.
Editions du CNRS, Paris, 235-281. Farkas, D. H.
de Swart. 2003. The semantics of incorporation.
CSLI Pubs., Stanford, CA.
20References, cont.
Landman, F. 2004. Indefinites and types of sets.
Blackwell, Oxford. Lumsden, M. 1988. Existential
sentences Their structure and meaning.
Routledge, London. McNally, L. 1992. An
interpretation for the English existential
construction. Pub. 1997 as A semantics for the
English existential construction, Garland, New
York. McNally, L. 1998. Existential sentences
without existential quantification. LP 21,
353-392. Strawson, P. F. 1959. Individuals An
essay in descriptive metaphysics. Routledge,
London. Van Geenhoven, V. 1998. Semantic
incorporation and indefinite descriptions. CSLI
Publications, Stanford, CA. More eventually at
http//mutis.upf.es/mcnally louise.mcnally_at_upf.e
du