NAVWAR Navigation Warfare: Electronic Warfare and the Global Positioning System

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• NAVWAR (Navigation Warfare) Electronic Warfare
  and the Global Positioning System

Presentation to AFCEA Ottawa Chapter March 2007
Directorate of Joint Capability Production LCol
Bill Hawken DJCP 3-7
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Outline

• Awareness video
• Satellite Navigation Overview
• GPS as a Military Enabler
• GPS Vulnerabilities, Real World Environment
• NAVWAR Definition
• Protection Techniques/GPS Modernization
• International NAVWAR Activities
• DND/CF NAVWAR Activities
• Summary

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SatNav Systems
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)

• Global Positioning System
• Glonass (Russia)
• Galileo (Europe)
• Beidou/Compass (China)

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GLONASS

• Russian Satellite Navigation system
• 18 MEO Satellites in 3 planes
• Currently 13 transmitting satellites, 17 on orbit
• Recent launches (3 satellites at a time)
• Plan is for 18 satellites in 2008 and 24 by 2011
• Signals are differentiated by frequency
• FDMA rather than CDMA, 511kHz separation
• C/A and P-codes - C/A same for all satellites
• Two RF carriers L1 1,602 MHz, L2 1,246 MHz

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Galileo

• 24 MEO satellites in three planes
• Operational by 2008(10?) - GIOVE A test bed
  launched Dec 2005
• Multiple RF carriers - L1 _at_ 1575.42MHz (same as
  GPS L1)
• 10 different signals and 4 different services

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GPS Satellite Constellation

• 24 operational GPS satellites
• Orbit about 20,200 km above the earth in 6
  orbital planes.
• Each satellite completes one orbit every 12 hours.

• First significant military use
• Gulf War
• Made the left hook possible
• System barely ready (FOC 95)

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How GPS Works
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Present GPS Signals

• Two RF carriers
• L1 _at_ 1575.42 MHz
• L2 _at_ 1227.60 MHz
• Two CDMA signals
• C/A code (Coarse/Acquisition) on L1
• Short (1023 chips)
• 2 MHz Bandwidth
• Easy to track and acquire, can be spoofed
• P(Y) code (Precision) on L1 and L2
• Non-repeating sequence _at_ 10.23MHz, 20 MHz
  Bandwidth
• hard to acquire directly without C/A code
  handover
• Encrypted military signal, accessed via timing on
  C/A
• Y-code encrypted P-code. Nearly impossible to
  spoof
• Selective Availability permanently set to zero
  in May 2000 highly accurate C/A signal freely
  available 9/11 terrorists!

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GPS Signals

• SV transmitted power is 50 W (20,000 km away)
• Received power at Earths surface is extremely low

• The GPS receives the SVs signals embedded in the
  noise floor

P(Y) signal after de-spreading is significantly
stronger
The signal emerges after C/A code de-spreading
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GPS as Military Enabler

• Military (L1 and L2, Y-code)
• C4ISR critical enabler
• Aircraft, Ships, Tanks, Missiles, munitions
• Precision targeting
• Robotics
• Surveillance, UAVs
• Timing Secure comms networks/ systems
• Commercial (Mostly L1 C/A code)
• Vehicle tracking, In-car, personal navigation,
• mobile phones
• Precision Survey (L1 L2 codeless)
• Farming
• Timing (L1 C/A code)
• Communications,
• Power Grids,
• Financial transactions
• Timing is the leading and fastest-growing use of
  GPS

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GPS is susceptible to

• Unintentional disruption from such causes as
• signal blockage from buildings, terrain
• interference from
• communications equipment
• TV broadcasts
• Mobile Satellite Services
• Ultra Wide-Band systems
• military jamming/spoofing tests
• Deliberate Jamming

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Jammer plans from Internet

• Example plans available from internet A 2 MHz
  Narrowband jammer (more effective than simple CW)
• Could be built by any competent electronics
  tinkerer

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The Jamming Problem
Approximate Jamming Range as a function of Power
10000.00
1000 km
1000.00
100.00
d(km)
C/A Acq
10.00
C/A Trk
1.00
0.10
100 W
0.01
0.0001
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
10
100
1000
10000
Jammer Power (watts)
A 100 W jammer (equivalent of a light bulb) can
deny acquisition of the civil GPS signal (C/A
code) at up to 1000 km, and break C/A and finally
P(Y) at lesser ranges
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Hostile Jamming Deployment Tactics
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Real World Environment

• Hostile Jamming
• Jammers were used by Iraq in OIF
• Jammers are proliferating
• Criminal use
• Terrorists
• Denial Jamming
• Availability of accurate civil GPS signal
  underscores the need to deny GPS to hostile
  elements

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NAVWARAn evolving US-led military program to
Protect the military use of GPS during times of
conflict Prevent the use of GPS by
adversaries Preserve civilian use outside the
arena
GPS was designed knowing that it was potentially
susceptible to Electronic Warfare. That is
todays reality. There now exist numerous GPS
jamming systems in the world. EW as applied to
radio navigation systems (particularly, but not
exclusively GPS) is known as NAVWAR
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Initiating NAVWAR Activity The NAVWAR MOU

• Australia, Canada, UK, US
• Project Arrangements
• Electronic Protection
• Electronic Attack
• Electronic Support
• Test, Trials Demonstrations
• Leverages RD efforts of all nations
• Provides for cooperative development of NAVWAR
  technologies

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Electronic ProtectionMilitary Anti-jam
Technologies
Nulling antenna

• There are many ways to improve GPS resistance to
  interference/jamming. Most are for military
  users, subject to export control and covered by
  ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations)
• Receiver level
• Jammer-nulling/beam-forming antennas
• Receiver precision clocks
• Frequency excisers
• Direct Y-Code signal acquisition
• Tight INS coupling
• All digital receivers
• Signal in Space Level
• Increased signal power, spot Beams
• New signal structures (M-Code)
• Augmentation
• Network aiding, pseudolites

Micro inertial sensor
New Signals/Structures
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AJ Technologies Antenna Techniques Spatial
Filtering (Null pointing / Beam Steering)
Low gain in direction of jammers
S. Rounds IEC, GPS World Jan/Feb 2004
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AJ Technologies Integration with Inertial
Measurement Units

• Integration with of GPS with an IMU improves J/S
  by
• Measuring dynamics to feed into GPS tracking
  loops allows the use of lower bandwidth loops
  which pass less jammer energy into the receiver
• The combined system can navigate on the IMU alone
  after GPS is finally lost
• There are several levels of integration
  increasing in both J/S improvement and
  complexity/cost
• Loosely Coupled
• Tightly Coupled
• Ultra Tightly Coupled (Also called Deeply
  integrated)

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Modernized GPS - Signal Evolution
Present Signal (Block II/IIA/IIR)
2nd Civil M-Code Block IIR-M (2009-2011)
3rd Civil M-Code spot Block IIF
(2012-2014) Block III (2014)
1227 MHz (L2)
1575 MHz (L1)
1176 MHz (L5)
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AJ improvement

• The goal of all these Anti Jam Technologies is to
  increase the J/S, or Jammer to Signal power
  ratio required to defeat a receiver.
• This forces the jammer to radiate much more power
  to have the same effect, or equivalently, allows
  the receiver to be able to operate much closer to
  the jammer before it is affected.
• Equally important, allows own force EA

J/S lt30 dB
Additional AJ required
J/S gt110 dB
Courtesy P. StopForth, US GPS JPO
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Canadian NAVWAR RD SLA with ADM(ST)/DRDC
Vulnerability Trials
DRDC High Power Jammer
Jammer MODSIM
DRDC Miniature Jammer
DRDC Jamming Direction Finder
GPS Ground based Augmentation
Low Cost small CRPA antennas
Jamming Field Strength Monitor
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National Vulnerability Trials

• Petawawa Jun 2004 LAV III
• Northern Lights (NL) Series
• NL1 Petawawa Jan 2005 LAV III, CF-18, Griffon
• NL2 Cold Lake Nov 2005 CF-18
• NL3 Sea Trial 2007 Iro, Hfx class
• NL4 - TBD
• NATO Trial Spartan Hammer 2006
• Shadow Period work with HMCS Iroquois
• Precursor to NL3 Sea Trial

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Northern Lights 2
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Vulnerability Assessments

• NAVWAR Operational Vulnerability Assessment
  (NOVA)
• National Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment

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NAVWAR Operational Vulnerability Assessment (NOVA)

• NOVA Phase 1 Investigative contract completed
• NOVA Phase 2 Follow on contract for targeted,
  in-depth investigation planned in FY 07/08
• Explore mitigation with users
• Emphasis on use of GPS for timing

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National Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment

• Objectives
• Document uses of GPS in civil infrastructure
• Emphasis on use of GPS for timing
• Document vulnerabilities to signal
  loss/degradation
• Explore mitigation with system/process owners
• Rationale
• DND/CF use national infrastructure for
  initiation/conduct of operations
• CF has developing capability at CFEWC to deal
  with GPS jamming/interference and may be asked to
  assist

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Approach

• Partnership with PSEPC
• Proposed at DM level
• Positive response received
• DND-funded contract award early FY 07/08
• OGD involvement
• PSEPC as lead and coordinator

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NATO Activities

• NC3B SC/8 Navigation/NAVWAR Ad Hoc WG NAVWAR
  STANAG
• NATO MOU IV allows NATO nations to use military
  GPS
• NATO Trial Spartan Hammer
• Greece Nov 06
• Canada sent EWCC Officer and monitor teams from
  CFEWC, jammer teams from DRDC
• First NATO activity featuring live GPS jamming
• Trial activity supported NAVWAR STANAG
  development, including Annex developed by Canada

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NATO Trial Spartan Hammer
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(No Transcript)
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NATO Trial Spartan Hammer

• Canada took part in GPS jamming and traditional
  EW activities
• GPS jammer team worked within coalition
• EA systems performed very well
• Superb opportunity to
• demonstrate and observe effects of GPS jamming
• work with the wider EW community
• Follow-on Trial Imperial Hammer
• Sardinia Apr 08 (TBC)
• Likely CFEWC and DRDC activity EA and ES

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14-nation RDTE MOU

• Recently negotiated, signed by CFD last week
• Deals with GPS user equipment, not just NAVWAR
• Opportunity to influence US GPS Wing receiver
  equipment development
• Opportunities for cooperative development of user
  equipment with one or more of the other
  signatories
• First Project Arrangement military receiver
  module with USB interface (TBC)

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NAVWAR Implementation

• Communication and Governance via GNSS Management
  and Coordination Committee
• GNSS and NAVWAR Policies
• GNSS Policy promulgated
• NAVWAR Policy drafted
• The Navy, Army and Air Force as Force Generators
  are progressively implementing NAVWAR through
  capital equipment projects to meet CanadaCom and
  CEFCOM requirements

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Canada COM Requirement

• Robust, adequately protected civil infrastructure
  for initiation and conduct of domestic operations
• NAVWAR - protected systems/platforms/processes
  for operations

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CEFCOM Requirement

• Initiation of Operations
• Robust, adequately protected civil infrastructure
• Deployed Operations
• NAVWAR - protected systems for use in theatre

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Navy GPS Project

• GPS System Replacement on
• Iroquois Class
• Halifax Class
• Replacement incorporates NAVWAR improvements

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Army GPS Equipment Replacement (AGER) Project

• Replacement for PLGR
• Total 8000 DAGR Handheld
• Individual soldier use
• Vehicle use
• AJ antenna option

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Air Force GPS project

• Phase 1
• Worldwide navigation
• Phase 2
• NAVWAR capability
• Objective Provide tactical fleets with a higher
  anti-jam capability.
• Upgrade receivers
• Most aircraft can be upgraded with a GPS receiver
  card replacement.
• Replace Fixed Radiation Pattern Antennas with
  Controlled Radiation Pattern Antennas (jammer
  nulling capability)
• Phase 3
• Cat I Precision Approach

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NAVWAR and GPS Timeline
05/06
08/09
07/08
06/07
11/12
10/11
09/10
15/16
14/15
13/14
12/13
04/05
GPS/NAVWAR MOUs and National Tests, Trials,
Demonstrations
NOVA Project
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
PSEPC/OGD Activity
Army GPS (AGER) Proj
Army GPS follow-on Proj?
GNSS MCC
Air Force GPS Project
Ph 3 - CAT I PA
Ph 2 (proposed) - NAVWAR
Ph 1 Worldwide Nav
Navy GPS Project
Navy GPS Follow-on Proj?
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Canadian NAVWAR Program
Overview
Capabilities
NAVWAR GPS EW
Protected platforms
Accurate civil GPS signal!
Leveraging RDTraining development
USE
while DENY
and PRESERVE
Possible low-cost military GPS receiver module
for various applications
CF Environmental Capital Projects
NAVWAR MOU - AS/CA/UK/US
Mitigation advice for platform/infrastructure
protection (project follow-on)
EW WGs, Cooperative RD, test, training, etc
RDTE MOU 14 Nations coop eqpt devel
Schedule
Resources

• Recurring Funding
• DRDC SLA
• Pers
• 1xLCol Res Cl B
• 1xLt(N) Res Cl A
• 1xMaj Reg (APS 07)

Trials and Vulnerability Assessments
DND/CF 2004-09
Coord via GNSS MCC
National Infrastructure 2006-08
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Summary

• NAVWAR is a large new EW area
• Many systems rely on GPS (some not obviously)
• Systems relying on civilian receivers are
  especially at risk
• Various levels of protection are available for
  military users
• Canada has a NAVWAR program including RD, trials
  and assessments, plus a 4-eyes MOU, NATO
  activity/MOU and a 14-nation MOU
• Communication and governance via GNSS MCC
• Environmental Capital projects progressively
  implementing NAVWAR to meet Operational Command
  Requirements

Questions?