Organizing for Policy Implementation: Comparisons, Lessons and Prospects for Cabinet Implementation

1
Organizing for Policy Implementation
Comparisons, Lessons and Prospects for Cabinet
Implementation Units

• Evert Lindquist, Director
• School of Public Administration
• University of Victoria
• British Columbia, Canada
• February 22, 2006

2
Why Implementation Units?

• Cabinet implementation units have recently
  emerged in the UK, Australia and Queensland
• Implementation has been a concern of policy
  designers and observers since the 1960s
• What appears to be driving the latest interest in
  policy implementation project management?
• What are the implications for the practice of
  project management in the public sector?
• What does this say about the state of public
  sector governance?

3
The Implementation Literature

• First wave gap between policy intentions and
  resultsan exploration of failure
• Second wave developing theories and frameworks
  to guide implementation debates on top-down
  and bottom-up views grappling with the
  complexity of anticipating implementation
  challenges measuring impact of policy and
  program interventions
• Third wave network, game theory
  principal-agent perspectives alignment of
  multiple instruments whole-of-government and
  multi-level governance
• A bias against large-scale change, and very
  little exploration of the question of
  capability/capacity.

4
Central Ecological Perspectives

• Traditional cabinet secretariats
• Other standing secretariats
• Coordinating secretariats
• Department policy adhocracies
• Scrutiny and challenge
• Facilitation advice
• Downstream coordination
• Monitoring performance

Implementation units function in congested
environments they may constitute critiques of
system capabilities.
Do implementation and delivery units focus on
upstream scrutiny or downstream monitoring?
5
Hypotheses to Consider

• Meeting government commitments?
• Asserting political control?
• Anticipating design challenges?
• Navigating implementation challenges?
• Addressing political optics?
• Cultural change in delivery agencies?
• Each hypothesis implies different strategic
  goals, and therefore different orientations and
  capabilities in central implementation units.

6
Cases Three Implementation Units

• David Richards Martin Smith (Sheffield
  University) Central Control and Policy
  Implementation in the UK A Case Study of the
  Prime Ministers Delivery Unit
• John Wanna (ANU ANZSOG) From Afterthought to
  Afterburner Australias Cabinet Implementation
  Unit
• Anne Tiernan (Griffith University) Working
  With the Stock We Have The Evolving Role of
  Queenslands Implementation Unit

7
UK Prime Ministers Delivery Unit

• Created in 2001 in response to perceived lack of
  follow-through in Joined-up Government
  Initiatives
• Focus on priority government initiatives in a
  highly de-concentrated service delivery
  environment
• PMDU has mix of central and department officials
  and private sector officials about 40 FTEs
• Reports to PM but moved to Treasury in 2002
• Closely connected to PSA process for government
  priority initiatives (25 of 130)
• PM involved in negotiations with departments and
  service delivery entities

8
Commonwealth of Australia Cabinet Implementation
Unit

• Created by Prime Minister Howard in early 2004 on
  advice of Cabinet Secretary to ensure better
  policy implementation, project management
  monitoring
• Informed by UK PMDU, but based in DPMC
• Small group with about 10 staff not PM
  specialists
• Focus on better upstream policy design of
  initiatives on a traffic-light system for
  priority initiatives (about 30) with quarterly
  reports to Cabinet
• Not connected to budget process, perhaps a
  reflection on DOFA priorities
• Part of running a disciplined cabinet system and
  also associated with driving change into agencies

9
Queenslands Implementation Unit

• Established by Premier Beattie in June 2004 in
  the Department Premier and Cabinet following
  several failures to implement government policies
• Informed by PMDU CIU, but key decision to work
  through DPC desk officers (PCOs) for departments
• Has about 15 staff with policy expertise
  monitoring key election commitments and
  encouraging policy initiatives build in good
  implementation thinking
• Identifies and reports on Top Fifty, assists
  with Charter letters, and templates for
  implementation
• Latent function involves dealing with crisis
  issues
• More recent focus on risk management but from
  inception has had a low-key educative ambition

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Practices and Hypotheses on Roles
11
Observations and Lessons

• All units were instituted by experienced first
  ministers and supported by top central officials
• All units involved in upstream and downstream of
  decision-making, but had focused roles along with
  collaboration, and engaged in selective
  monitoring
• Differences UK PMDU handles PSA negotiations and
  Queensland IU involved in policy fire-fighting,
  though has lower profile than other two
• All units have persisted without much conflict
  and survived changes in implementation unit
  leadership
• A tool of first ministers, not for cabinets
  bolstering ministers inevitable resistance to
  change

12
Final Thoughts

• Major test awaits changes in first ministers
• Role expansion implies working with other central
  agencies role of budget and management offices
• Most other jurisdictions did not adopt the
  innovation of implementation units presumably
  functional equivalents exist, but judged against
  what standard?
• First ministers have driven implementation units,
  but it is not clear if scholarly literature was
  levered, and there is much to be mined a
  challenge to scholars and leaders alike

13
Thank You!
For copies of this paper, contact Professor
Evert Lindquist School of Public
Administration University of Victoria Victoria,
BC, Canada evert_at_uvic.ca