Columbus reported to his king and queen that the world was round, and he went down in history as the

1
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?????, ????????, ?????????????

• Columbus reported to his king and queen that the
  world was round, and he went down in history as
  the man who first made this discovery. I returned
  home and shared my discovery only with my wife
  and only in whisper Honey, I confined, I think
  the world is flat Thomas L. Friedman, The
  World is Flat, Farrar Straus and Giroux, New
  York, 2005

2

• Equally important, these different lenses make it
  possible to imagine a genuinely new set of
  possibilities for a future world order. The
  building blocks of this order would not be states
  but parts of states courts, regulatory agencies,
  ministries, legislatures. The government
  officials would participate in many different
  types of networks, creating links across national
  borders and between national and supranational
  institutions. The result could be a world that
  looks like the globe hoisted by Atlas at
  Rockefeller Center, crisscrossed by an
  increasingly dense web of networks. (Anne-Marie
  Slaughter)

3
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4

• ???????? ???????????? ?????? ???? ?? ???????? ??
  ??????????, ??????????? ? ???????????????
  
• ? ?????????????? ???????????? ?????? ???????????
  ???????? ?????? ???????? ???????? ?? ??????, ?
  ???? ?????? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????. ??? ??,
  ???????, ????. ???? ?????? ?? ???????? ???????? ?
  ????????? ???? ???? 1945. ?????? ???? ?? ??? 50
  ?????? ? ????? ?? ??????? 21. ???? ???? ?? ??
  ?????? ???? ???? ?? ????? ???? ???? ??? ??????.
  ????? ??????? ?? ??????? ????? ?????? ?? ?????
  ?????????? ??????.

5

• In diplomacy, international law, journalism, and
  academic analysis, it is widely assumed that
  international relations consists of the relations
  between coherent units called states.
• Better understanding of political change is
  obtained by analyzing the relations between
  governments and many other actors from each
  country. Global politics also includes companies
  and non-governmental organizations

6

• Terrorists, arms dealers, money launderers, drug
  dealers, traffickers in women and children, and
  the modern pirates of intellectual property all
  operate through global networks. So,
  increasingly, do governments. Networks of
  government officialspolice investigators,
  financial regulators, even judges and
  legislatorsincreasingly exchange information and
  coordinate activity to combat global crime and
  address common problems on a global scale. These
  government networks are a key feature of world
  order in the twenty-first century, but they are
  underappreciated, undersupported, and underused
  to address the central problems of global
  governance. (Anne-Marie Slaughter A New World
  Order, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New
  Jersey, 2003)

7

• Turning to the global economy, networks of
  finance ministers and central bankers have been
  critical players in responding to national and
  regional financial crises. The G-8 is as much a
  network of finance ministers as of heads of
  state it is the finance ministers who make key
  decisions on how to respond to calls for debt
  relief for the most highly indebted countries.
  The finance ministers and central bankers hold
  separate news conferences to announce policy
  responses to crises such as the East Asian
  financial crisis in 1997 and the Russian crisis
  in 1998.5 The G-20, a network specifically
  created to help prevent future crises, is led by
  the Indian finance minister and is composed of
  the finance ministers of twenty developed and
  developing countries.
• Beyond national security and the global economy,
  networks of national officials are working to
  improve environmental policy across borders.
  (Anne-Marie Slaughter)

8

• Stop imagining the international system as a
  system of statesunitary entities like billiard
  balls or black boxessubject to rules created by
  international institutions that are apart from,
  above these states. Start thinking about a
  world of governments, with all the different
  institutions that perform the basic functions of
  governmentslegislation, adjudication,
  implementationinteracting both with each other
  domestically and also with their foreign and
  supranational counterparts. States still exist in
  this world indeed, they are crucial actors. But
  they are disaggregated. They relate to each
  other not only through the Foreign Office, but
  also through regulatory, judicial, and
  legislative channels.

9

• The end of the Cold War has brought no mere
  adjustment among states but a novel
  redistribution of power among states, markets,
  and civil society. National governments are not
  simply losing autonomy in a globalizing economy.
  They are sharing powersincluding political,
  social, and security roles at the core of
  sovereignty with businesses, with international
  organizations, and with a multitude of citizens
  groups, known as nongovernmental organizations
  (NGOS). The steady concentration of power in the
  hands of states that began in 1648 with the Peace
  of Westphalia is over, at least for a while.
• Nontraditional threats, however, are
  risingterrorism, organized crime, drug
  trafficking, ethnic conflict, and the combination
  of rapid population growth, environmental
  decline, and poverty that breeds economic
  stagnation, political instability, and,
  sometimes, state collapse. The nearly 100 armed
  conflicts since the end of the Cold War have
  virtually all been intrastate affairs.
• (Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, Foreign
  Affairs, January/February 1997, pp. 50-66.)
  

10

• Subsequent to the end of the Cold War, analysts
  groped for an understanding of the overall
  structures of world politics that marked the
  emergence of a new epoch. As a result, the
  concept of empire became a major preoccupation,
  with the economic and military power of the
  United States considered sufficient for regarding
  it as an empire. Due to the proliferation of new
  microelectronic technologies and for a variety of
  other specified reasons, however, the constraints
  inherent in the new epoch make it seem highly
  unlikely that the U.S. or any other country can
  ever achieve the status of an empire. In effect,
  the substantial shrinkage of time and distance in
  the current period has led to the replacement of
  the age of the nation-state that originated with
  the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 with the. It is
  an age that has developed on a AGE OF THE
  NETWORKED INDIVIDUAL global scale and that has
  brought an end to the history of empires. (James
  N. Rosenau, Illusions of Power and Empire,
  History and Theory, Theme 44, December 2005, pp.
  73-87

11

• Numerous sources contribute to the processes of
  fragmegration. Eight seem especially relevant and
  these are listed as the rows in Table 1, along
  with the four columns that refer to the levels of
  aggregation at which the dynamics are operative.
  THE MICRO COLUMN PERTAINS TO INDIVIDUALS, THE
  MACRO COLUMN TO COLLECTIVITIES, THE MICRO-MACRO
  COLUMN TO THE INTERACTION OF INDIVIDUALS AND
  COLLECTIVITIES, AND THE MACRO-MACRO COLUMN TO THE
  INTERACTION OF COLLECTIVITIES. The entries in the
  thirty-two cells are crude hypotheses estimating
  how each of the sources may shape what unfolds at
  each of the levels. None of the hypotheses have
  ever been systematically tested, but they are
  offered by way of suggesting how the newly
  emergent epoch is likely to evolve.

12

• In so doing Table 1 highlights the messiness,
  nonlinearity, and complexity of our
  disaggregated, fragmegrative world. A measure of
  the complexity is further indicated by
  appreciating that each of the eight sources
  shapes and is shaped by each of the other seven,
  by two of the others, three of the others, and so
  on, an array of permutations and combinations
  that totals 85,344. What follows is confined only
  to the eight sources, leaving their singular and
  combined impact on the other seven for readers to
  ponder if they are so inclined.

13

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15
Thus the five main categories of political actors
in the global system are

• Nearly 200 governments, including 192 members of
  the UN
  
• 64 000 major transnational companies (TNCs), such
  as Shell, Microsoft, or Nestle, with these parent
  companies having just over 866 000 foreign
  affiliates
• 9 000 single-country non-governmental
  organizations (NGOs) such as Population Concern
  (UK) or the Sierra Club (USA), which have
  significant international activities
• 240 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such
  as the UN, NATO, the European Union, or the
  International Coffee Organization, and
  
• 6 600 international non-governmental
  organizations (INGOs), cuch as Amnesty
  International, the Baptist World Alliance, or the
  International Chamber of Shipping, plus a similar
  number of less well-established international
  caucuses and networks of NGOs. (Steve Smith, John
  Baylis)

16

• Za razliku od sistema hladnog rata, medunarodni
  sistem globalizacije ima sledeca obeleja Prvo,
  struktura moci u medunarodnom sistemu
  globalizacije je mnogo sloenija nego kod sistema
  hladnog rata - ravnotea hladnog rata koja se
  vrtela oko nacionalnih drava (SAD-a i SSSR-a)
  sada ima i dve dodatne ravnotee (izmedu
  medunarodnog sistema globalizacije i nacionalnog
  trita, te izmedu pojedinaca (recimo Osama Bin
  Laden) i nacionalne drave). Ove tri ravnotee
  medusobno se dodiruju, preklapaju i uticu jedna
  na drugu (Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and Olive
  Tree)

17
Podela vlasti u dvadeset prvom veku
18

• Today's powerful nonstate actors are not without
  precedent. The British East India Company ran a
  subcontinent, and a few influential NGOS go back
  more than a century. But these are ?xceptions.
  Both in numbers and in impact, nonstate actors
  have never before approached their current
  strength. And a still larger role likely lies
  ahead. (Jessica T. Mathews)

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21

• First, knowledge is now the key driver of wealth
  creation, and, second, the radical fusion of
  production and consumption prosumingwill lead
  to the explosion of the non-money economy.
• Conventional economics is about scarcity. But
  knowledge is essentially inexhaustible. If you
  grow rice in a paddy, I cant grow rice in the
  same paddy at the same time. If you use a machine
  tool, I cant use it at the same time. But we can
  both use the same knowledge at the same timeand
  not deplete it. No matter how many people use
  arithmetic, it doesnt get used up. In fact, the
  more people use knowledge together, the more new
  knowledge they tend to create.
• Its more portable than any other product. It can
  be compressed into symbols and abstractions. It
  tends to leak and is hard to protect. Its
  non-linear, so that tiny insights can yield huge
  outputs. Above all, its intangible.

22

• And the knowledge at our disposal will only
  continue to grow. Everything a person remembers
  in a 70-year lifespan can be stored digitally on
  a 6-gigabyte chip. And today we have 400
  gigabytes in a personal computer!
• externalization of labor the third job. Your
  first job is the one you get paid for when you go
  to your office or factory and get a paycheck
  every week or month. Your second job is taking
  care of yourself, your kids, your parents or your
  home, cleaning up or doing the dishes.
• The third job is the work being outsourced by
  the producer not to India or the Philippines, but
  to you, the consumer, from the friendly companies
  all around you.
• A few years ago, if I wanted to find out what
  happened to a FedEx or DHL package, Id call some
  number in Memphis or Frankfurt or Tokyo to talk
  to a clerk. Now, Im my own clerk. I go to my
  computer, punch in the tracking number and trace
  the package myself. Im doing what the clerk used
  to do and was paid for. The same is true when we
  use an ATM machine. We do what the teller used to
  do.
• So, in this new economy, our third job is the
  work we do for all these companies, but dont get
  paid for! Clearly, this adds to our daily stress
  and is yet another reason we always seem to have
  less and less disposable time. (Alvin and Heidi
  Toffler, Revolutionary Wealth How It Will Be
  Created and How It Will Change Our Lives.)

23

• The most powerful engine of change in the
  relative decline of states and the rise of
  nonstate actors is the computer and
  telecommunications revolution, whose deep
  political and social consequences have been
  almost completely ignored. Widely accessible and
  affordable technology has broken governments'
  monopoly on the collection and management of
  large amounts of information and deprived
  governments of the deference they enjoyed because
  of it. In every sphere of activity, instantaneous
  access to information and the ability to put it
  to use multiplies the number of players who
  matter and reduces the number who command great
  authority. The effect on the loudest voicewhich
  has been government's has been the greatest.
  (Jessica T. Mathews)

24
The Ten Forces that Flattened the World Thomas
L. Friedman

• Flattener 1 11/9/1989 When the Walls come
  down and the Windows Went up
  
• Flattener 2 8/ 9 / 95 When Netscape Went
  Public
  
• Flattener 3 Work flow software Lets do Lunch
  Have Your Application Talk to My Application
  
• Flattener 4 Open sourcing self-organizing
  Collaborative Communities
  

25

• Flattener 5 Outsourcing Y2K
• Flattener 6 Offshoring Running with Gazelles,
  Eating with Lions
  
• Flattener 7 Supply Chaining Eating Sushi in
  Arkansas
  
• Flattener 8 Insourcing
• Flattener 9 In-forming Google,Yahoo, MSN Web
  search
  
• Flattener 10 The Steroids Digital, Mobile,
  Personal, and Virtual
  

26

• Tri glavne karakteristike "kompleksne
  meduzavisnosti" po Dozefu Naju i Robertu
  Kiohejnu su
  
• 1. Postojanje viestranih kanala za kontakte
  izmedu drutava, koji ne moraju odvijati
  iskljucivo preko vlada. Naprotiv. Nevladine
  organizacije, ekonomske elite i drugi "nedravni
  akteri" ovde se pojavljuju kao sasvim
  ravnopravni ucesnici u svetu medunarodnih odnosa
  
• 2. Odsustvo hijerarhije medu pitanjima, to
  znaci da se odnosi izmedu razlicitih aktera ne
  mogu klasifikovati po nekakvoj hijerarhiji. Kao
  posledica ovoga, bezbednost drava shvacena
  iskljucivo u vojnom smislu (military security)
  nije jedini predmet odnosa meduzavisnosti izmedu
  aktera. Tako se na agendi spoljnopolitickih
  odnosa mogu naci i takva pitanja kao to su
  ekonomija, ekologija, ljudska prava i drugo
• 3. Manja uloga vojne sile u odnosima izmedu
  aktera. Oni tvrde da iako u nekim regionima sveta
  (Srednji Istok, Balkan, Afrika, ) vojna sila i
  dalje ostaje cinilac na koji se mora racunati u
  odnosima izmedu drava, u nekim podrucjima je ta
  mogucnost, ipak manje verovatna (Severna Amerika,
  Evropa, Japan, Australija).

27

• Whatever utility the concept of empire may have
  in probing and explaining earlier epochs, its
  relevance to emergent and future epochs is
  negligible. To summarize the dynamics examined
  here that underlie and sustain the emergent
  epoch, a vast and relentless disaggregation of
  authority is underway throughout the world. It is
  a disaggregation that is likely to severely
  constrain states even as it empowers less
  encompassing sociopolitical entities. Among the
  factors are recent advances in information
  technologies that, in turn, have enabled and
  encouraged individuals to act more
  consequentially on the global stage, either by
  themselves or, equally important, by joining one
  or more of a crowd of organizations that have
  clambered onto the stage. (James N. Rosenau)

28
???? ?? ????????? ????????? ?????? ??????? ??????

• Every morning in Africa a gazelle wakes up. It
  knows it must run faster than fastest lion or it
  will be killed. Every morning a lion wakes up. It
  knows it must outrun the slowest gazelle or it
  will starve to death. It doesnt matter whether
  you are lion or a gazelle. When the sun comes up,
  you better start running.

29

• By drastically reducing the importance of
  proximity, the new technologies change people's
  perceptions of community. Fax machines, satellite
  hookups, and the Internet connect people across
  borders with exponentially growing ease while
  separating them from natural and historical
  associations within nations. In this sense a
  powerful globalizing force, they can also have
  the opposite effect, amplifying political and
  social fragmentation by enabling more and more
  identities and interests scattered around the
  globe to coalesce and thrive.

30

• These technologies have the potential to divide
  society along new lines, separating ordinary
  people from elites with the wealth and education
  to command technology's power. Those elites are
  not only the rich but also citizens groups with
  transnational interests and identities that
  frequently have more in common with counterparts
  in other countries, whether industrialized or
  developing, than with countrymen.

31

• More international decision-making will also
  exacerbate the socalled democratic deficit, as
  decisions that elected representatives once made
  shift to unelected international bodies this is
  already a sore point for EU members. It also
  arises when legislatures are forced to make a
  single take-it-or-leave-it judgment on huge
  international agreements, like the
  several-thousand-page Uruguay Round trade accord.
  With citizens already feeling that their national
  governments do not hear individual voices, the
  trend could well provoke deeper and more
  dangerous alienation, which in turn could trigger
  new ethnic and even religious separatism. The end
  result could be a proliferation of states too
  weak for either individual economic success or
  effective international cooperation. Finally,
  fearsome dislocations are bound to accompany the
  weakening of the central institution of modern
  society. The prophets of an internetted world in
  which national identities gradually fade,
  proclaim its revolutionary nature and yet believe
  the changes will be wholly benign. They won't be.
  The shift from national to some other political
  allegiance, if it comes, will be an emotional,
  cultural, and political earthquake. (Jessica T.
  Mathews)

32

• This world would still include traditional
  international organizations, such as the United
  Nations and the World Trade Organization (WTO),
  although many of these organizations would be
  likely to become hosts for and sources of
  government networks. It would still feature
  states interacting as unitary states on important
  issues, particularly in security matters. And it
  would certainly still be a world in which
  military and economic power mattered government
  networks are not likely to substitute for either
  armies or treasuries.
• At the same time, however, a world of government
  networks would be a more effective and
  potentially more just world order than either
  what we have today or a world government in which
  a set of global institutions perched above
  nation-states enforced global rules. In a
  networked world order, primary political
  authority would remain at the national level
  except in those cases in which national
  governments had explicitly delegated their
  authority to supranational institutions.
  (Anne-Marie Slaughter)

33
THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX NEEDING MORE
GOVERNMENT AND FEARING IT ((Anne-Marie Slaughter)
34

• Peoples and their governments around the world
  need global institutions to solve collective
  problems that can only be addressed on a global
  scale. They must be able to make and enforce
  global rules on a variety of subjects and through
  a variety of means... Yet world government is
  both infeasible and undesirable. The size and
  scope of such a government presents an
  unavoidable and dangerous threat to individual
  liberty. Further, the diversity of the peoples to
  be governed makes it almost impossible to
  conceive of a global demos. No form of democracy
  within the current global repertoire seems
  capable of overcoming these obstacles. This is
  the globalization paradox. We need more
  government on a global and a regional scale, but
  we dont want the centralization of
  decision-making power and coercive authority so
  far from the people actually to be governed.
• Robert Keohane argues that globalization creates
  potential gains from cooperation if institutions
  can be created to harness those gains however,
  institutions themselves are potentially
  oppressive. The result is the Governance
  Dilemma although institutions are essential for
  human life, they are also dangerous.
• The governance dilemma even becomes a tri-lemma
  we need global rules without centralized power
  but with government actors who can be held to
  account through a variety of political
  mechanisms.

35

• The state is not the only actor in the
  international system, but it is still the most
  important actor.
  
• The state is not disappearing, but it is
  disaggregating into its component institutions,
  which are increasingly interacting principally
  with their foreign counterparts across borders.
  These institutions still represent distinct
  national or state interests, even as they also
  recognize common professional identities and
  substantive experience as judges, regulators,
  ministers, and legislators.
• Different states have evolved and will continue
  to evolve mechanisms for reaggregating the
  interests of their distinct institutions when
  necessary. In many circumstances, therefore,
  states will still interact with one another as
  unitary actors in more traditional ways.
• Government networks exist alongside and
  sometimes within more traditional international
  organizations.
  

36

• Horizontal Networks - The structural core of a
  disaggregated world order is a set of horizontal
  networks among national government officials in
  their respective issue areas, ranging from
  central banking through antitrust regulation and
  environmental protection to law enforcement and
  human rights protection. These networks operate
  both between high-level officials directly
  responsive to the national political processthe
  ministerial levelas well as between lower level
  national regulators.
• Vertical Networks - In a disaggregated world
  order, horizontal government networks would be
  more numerous than vertical networks, but
  vertical networks would have a crucial role to
  play. Although a core principle of such an order
  is the importance of keeping global governance
  functions primarily in the hands of domestic
  government officials, in some circumstances
  states do come together the way citizens might
  and choose to delegate their individual governing
  authority to a higher organizationa
  supranational organization that does exist, at
  least conceptually, above the state.

37

• The emergent structures of world politics are
  such that no countrynot the U.S., not China, not
  the European Unioncan ever exercise imperial
  rule to the extent that the concept of empire,
  however defined, calls for.
• The processes of disaggregating authority are
  likely to prevent imperial reach from occurring.
  Long concentrated primarily in nation-states and
  their governments, in the present era authority
  has migrated upwards to international and
  transnational organizations, sideways to national
  organizations, and downwards to local governments
  and organizations. In more than a few cases,
  moreover, networked individuals other than public
  officials serve as nodes of authority. These
  migratory patterns have unfolded at different
  paces and moved in different directions in
  different parts of the world, but they are all
  accelerating inasmuch as they derive their energy
  from the same sources and thus serve to hasten
  what has been called the death of time and
  distance. As a consequence, processes of
  integration and fragmentation are unfolding
  simultaneously and endlessly interacting as the
  migration of authority moves helter-skelter and
  in contradictory directions. I have labeled these
  interactive dynamics as fragmegration,
  (odvijanje procesa fragmentacije i integracije u
  isto vreme) a seemingly awkward designation but
  one that fills a gaping whole in our vocabulary.

38

• Other terms suggestive of the void in our
  vocabulary that highlight the contradictory
  tensions pulling systems toward both coherence
  and collapse are chaord, a label that
  juxtaposes the dynamics of chaos and order
  glocalization, which points to the simultaneity
  of globalizing and localizing dynamics and
  regcal, a term designed to focus attention on
  the links between regional and local phenomena.
  The chaord designation is proposed in Dee W.
  Hock, Birth of the Chaordic Age (San Francisco
  Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1999) the
  glocalization concept is elaborately developed in
  Roland Robertson, Glocalization Time-Space and
  Homogeneity-Heterogeneity, in Global
  Modernities, ed. Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash,
  and Roland Robertson (Thousand Oaks, CA Sage
  Publications, 1995), 25-44 and the regcal
  formulation can be found in Susan H. C. Tai and
  Y. H. Wong, Advertising Decision Making in Asia
  Glocal versus Regcal Approach, Journal of
  Managerial Issues 10 (Fall 1998), 318-339

39

• We live in a messy, disaggregating world of
  fragmegrative processes sustained by both
  globalizing and localizing forces. To be sure,
  authority was widely dispersed in earlier
  empires. Rome had its proconsuls and they ruled
  through decentralized arrangements. But I have in
  mind a disaggregation that reaches down to the
  small group and the individual as a consequence
  of technological innovations. If the Treaty of
  Westphalia ushered in the age of the state in
  1648, it can readily be asserted that the age of
  the networked individual took root with the end
  of the Cold War and the explosion of the internet
  as a means of person-to-person, person-to-many,
  and many-to-many communications. More accurately,
  the internet and the cell phone are only the most
  conspicuous of several explosive technologies
  that have enabled people and their organizations
  to mobilize, demand, agree, yield, inform,
  coalesce, fragment, or otherwise interact with
  one another on a global scale.

40

• The most stubborn authority structure is the
  state. While some states have undergone severe
  authority crises and decline in their capacities
  to cope with challenges from home and abroad, a
  number of states have managed to absorb and adapt
  to the effects of the skill and organizational
  revolutions... Yet, in the nuanced age of the
  networked individual, states can no longer count
  on traditional means of control. Authority has
  been too widely disaggregated, too dispersed
  among a huge variety of mechanisms that
  effectively govern the behavior of people within
  particular spherescodes of conduct, auditing
  mechanisms, certification schemes, truth
  commissions, issue regimes, organizational
  regulations, by-laws, and so onfor states to
  exercise the degrees of authority they once
  possessed. Thus to maintain control they have to
  innovate and adapt, requirements that are likely
  to incrementally erode their controls even as
  they slow the pace of change. States are likely
  to be active on the global stage for a long, long
  time, but their structures and processes seem
  destined for transformation and diminution. It
  follows that, no, we are not looking toward a
  hierarchy-free world and, yes, the flux inherent
  in disaggregated processes may well involve
  occasional reversals to old forms of authority.
  Clearly, trajectories into the future will be
  nonlinear, characterized by zigs and zags that
  will be hard to follow and that will render world
  affairs ever more complex. (James N. Rosenau)

41
??????????

• James N. Rosenau, Illusions of Power and
  Empire, History and Theory, Theme 44, December
  2005, pp. 73-87.
  
• Dragan R. Simic, Nauka o bezbednosti- savremeni
  pristupi bezbednosti, Slubeni list SRJ, Fakultet
  politickih nauka, Beograd, 2002, str. 15- 19.,
  narocito mapa na strani 16.
• Dozef S. Naj, Jr., Paradoks americke moci
  zato jedina svetska supersila ne moe sama, BMG,
  Beograd, 2004, str. 76-84
  
• Dozef S. Naj, Jr., Kako razumevati medunarodne
  sukobe, Stubovi kulture, Beograd, 2006, u tampi,
  poglavlje 8 i poglavlje 9
  
• Thomas L. Friedman, Longitudes and Attitudes
  The World in the Age of Terrorism, Anchor Books,
  New York, 2003, pp. 3-6
  
• Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order,
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