Between Exit and Loyalty: The Dealignment and Realignment in the Turkish Party System - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Between Exit and Loyalty: The Dealignment and Realignment in the Turkish Party System

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Title: Between Exit and Loyalty: The Dealignment and Realignment in the Turkish Party System


1
Between Exit and Loyalty The Dealignment and
Realignment in the Turkish Party System
  • Thesis Defense by Emre Erdogan

2
Exit, Voice and Loyalty Framework
  • Provided by Hirschman (1970)
  • Aim to understand the responses of
    consumers/citizens etc. to a decline in the
    product quality

3
Components of Exit, Voice and Loyalty Framework
  • Exit the withdrawal from a relationship with a
    person or organization
  • Reaction to decline in quality differentials
    between competing products
  • The quality of good A may decline
  • Qualities of competing products may increase
  • All products in the market may decline in quality

4
Components of Exit, Voice and Loyalty Framework
  • Voice consumers prefer to communicate their
    dissatisfaction stemmed of quality decline,
    rather than Exit
  • Heavily dependent to uncertainty of results of
    communicating dissatisfaction
  • Openness of communication channels push citizens
    to Voice, than Exit

5
Components of Exit, Voice and Loyalty Framework
  • Loyalty Consumer prefers to being loyal to
    his/her previous choice, despite the quality
    decline, without communicating his/her
    satisfaction
  • Brand Loyalty Psychological resistance to change
  • Dependent to the Cost of Exit
  • Group Loyalty Identification with the group
  • Dependent to the previous investment made to the
    group, in other words, the previous voice

6
Outline of the Exit, Voice and Loyalty Framework
7
When the Cost of Exit is Smaller?
  • When Competing Political Parties are similar
  • Similarity in reputations
  • Retrospective economic voting theory
  • Similarity in promises
  • Spatial Theory of Voting
  • Irrelevant Promises
  • The Study of Cleavages

8
Similarity in Reputations
  • Voters evaluate political parties according to
    their performances in the office
  • Especially economic performances of incumbents
    are considered
  • Pocketvoting vs. Sociotropic Voting
  • Sophisticated vs. Unsophisticated voter
  • Embedded Uncertainty Assigning Responsibility
  • If competing parties exposed similar reputations
    in the office
  • Positive similarities A long period of Economic
    Prosperity
  • Negative similarities Enduring period of
    Economic Problems
  • Factors contributing to uncertainty

9
Similarity in Promises
  • Voters vote according to their future
    expectations (Downs)
  • Promises of political parties play an important
    role
  • Ideologies are important shortcuts to reduce
    uncertainty
  • Competing actors have to be reliable and
    responsible
  • Political parties are similar in their positions
    in the issue space
  • Increased Uncertainty
  • Lacking link between past performances and
    promises
  • Competition in the non-salient issues
  • Reservation of a set of issues Limited space for
    competition

10
Irrelevant Promises
  • Political parties are organized along societal
    cleavages
  • Old Politics A product of old cleavages
  • National Revolution
  • Center vs. Periphery
  • Secular vs. Religious
  • Industrial Revolution
  • Farmers vs. Industrialists
  • Capitalists vs. Workers
  • Emergence of new cleavages
  • Political Parties compete in non-salient issues
  • Positions of parties in old issues are not
    relevant for voters
  • ie. Emergence of New Politics as a result of
    postmodernization

11
The Role of Institutions
  • Institutions are important determinants of the
    cost of Exit
  • By directly effecting the cost of exit
  • Electoral Systems
  • By effecting the uncertainty
  • Presidential vs. Parliamentary Systems
  • Single vs. Bicameral Parliaments
  • Coalition Governments
  • Corporatist Institutions
  • By effecting the Group Loyalty
  • Lack of institutionalization

12
Reasons of Exit Schematized Framework
13
Three Waves of Mobilization
  • From one party rule to democracy (1950-60)
  • Emergence of interparty competition
  • Mobilization of local networks to mobilize masses
  • High level of social and economic mobilization
  • Failure to consolidate democratic practices

14
Three Waves of Mobilization
  • Participation of Masses to the Game (1960-80)
  • Opened avenues for mass participation
  • High social and economic mobility
  • Emergence of new cleavages
  • Urban vs. Rural
  • Capitalists vs. Workers
  • Big Industrialists vs. small merchants
  • Emergence of new political parties
  • First Signals of Institutionalization
  • Fragmentation in the Party system

15
Three Waves of Mobilization
  • The Miracle of Özal and the MP
  • Economic liberalization
  • High social and economic mobilization
  • The referendum of 1987 A critical point
  • Intensified political competition
  • Unorthodox economic policies

16
Failures of the Party System
  • Macroeconomic Instability
  • Problem of income distribution
  • Failure to sustain economic stability
  • Series of economic crises
  • Demand for distributional policies

17
Failures of the Party System
  • Corruption
  • Competition for clientelist networks
  • Rent-distribution via state investments
  • Declining power of judiciary
  • Increased powers of local municipalities
  • Series of scandals
  • Demand for the fight with corruption

18
Failures of the Party System
  • Kurdish Issue
  • Increased terrorist activities of the PKK
  • Failure of governments to stop these activities
  • Active role of the military
  • Emergence of two nationalisms
  • Kurdish nationalism
  • Turkish nationalism
  • Failure to integrate this new cleavage

19
Failures of the Party System
  • The Rise of the Welfare Party
  • Historical Roots
  • Exclusion of the Islam as a threat to
    modernization 1923-1946
  • Politicization of religion 1950-1980
  • Penetration of the periphery to the Center 1980s
  • Explanations
  • Promotion of religious movements
  • Economic liberalization
  • Consequences
  • Emergence of new dimension
  • Laicist vs. Islamist
  • Failure of the system to respond this cleavage

20
Institutional Factors
  • Electoral Engineering
  • Subsequent changes in the electoral system
  • Empowerment of the President
  • Problem of responsibility
  • Coalition Governments
  • Problem of responsibility
  • Problem of Institutionalization
  • Lack of continuity in the party system

21
Putting Together
22
Evidence for the Change
  • Fragmentation of the party system
  • Effective Number of Political Parties

Elections
Parliament
23
Evidence for the Change
  • Fragmentation of the party system
  • Power Fragmentation Index

24
Evidence for the Change
  • Volatility of the party system

Pedersens Volatility Score
Laakso and Taageperas Index of Electoral
Volatility
25
Similarity in Promises Government Programs
Consensus on Declaration Technology and infrastructure Economic goals Distributional Policies Military Government Efficiency
Consensus on Ignorance Social services expansion negative Education expansion negative Military negative National unity negative Minority Rights Decentralization negative
26
Determinants of the Government Agenda
1980s Economic Orthodoxy Free Enterprise Democracy Freedom and domestic human rights Non economic demographic groups Environmental protection European community () Economic Planning Regulation of capitalism Social services expansion () Protectionism () Labor groups () Social justice Technology and infrastructure Constitutionalism () Government effectiveness () Military () National effort National way of life () Traditional morality()
27
Determinants of the Government Agenda
Interim Governments Government efficiency Government effectiveness and authority Law and order Constitutionalism () Military () Foreign relationships Nationalization Controlled economy Agriculture and farmers Social services expansion () Labor groups () National effort, social harmpny () Traditional morality () Defense of national way of life ()
28
Determinants of the Government Agenda
Electoral Government Labor groups () Free enterprise Agriculture and farmers Foreign relationships European Community () Technology and infrastructure Government efficiency
Coalition Governments European Community () Government corruption Democracy Economic goals
29
Determinants of the Government Agenda
Left in government National effort, social harmony Democracy Labor groups Law and order Economic goals Technology and infrastructure Productivity Social services expansion (-)
30
Grouping Turkish Governments
31
Grouping Turkish Governments
1960-1980
1980-2000
32
Plotting Turkish Governments
33
Plotting Turkish Governments
34
Plotting Turkish Governments
35
Relationship Between Government Programs and
Party Manifestoes
  • Determinants of the government agenda
  • Party Effect If the government program is
    totally determined by the governing partiess
    programs
  • Issue Effect If each issue in the government
    program has reserved spaces
  • The Basic Equation
  • Gf (P,I)

36
Additional Variables
  • Majority Effect If the party is the major party
    or single party in the government
  • Post-1980 Effect If the government is set up
    after 1980
  • Coalition Effect If the government is a
    coalition government

37
Findings
  • Issue effect dominates all other external
    variables. (R20.72) (Model 2)
  • There is no majority/single party effect
  • 1980s
  • Spaces reserved for issues changed
  • The effective power of Party declined
  • Being a coalition partner reduces the power of
    the Party Effect
  • Distributional policies are among first
    compromises given by the coalition partners

38
Perceptions of the Voter
  • Respondents are asked to position themselves and
    major parties in a seven item issue set
  • When perceptions (P) are compared with average
    positions of the voters (AV)
  • The WP and the NAP have no image gap
  • All other parties are moderate than perceptions

39
Spatial Models
  • Three different spatial models are used
  • Basic model
  • Proximity model
  • Unified model

40
Findings
  • Left-Right and Religiosity are important
    components of the voter preferences
  • Some issues are cross-cutting
  • Parties attract voters despite distances
  • Nationalism for the NAP, Local values for the TPP
  • When vote changers are considered
  • Left-Right and Religiosity confirm our
    expectations
  • Other issues dont confirm
  • Explanatory power remains limited

41
Findings
  • When utilities are considered
  • The .NAP, the VP and the TPP dont borrow voters
  • All other parties borrow voters from other parties


42
Why the Voice is not a valid option?
  • Voice Dependent to the openness of communication
    channels
  • Party organization is the most important
    communication channel
  • History of organization of political parties, is
    the evolution of communication channels

43
Different Party Types
The Old Cadre Party Organized in the parliament Connection of ruling elites Personalistic network
The Mass Party Organized to mobilize the electorate Strong Organization Intra-party democracy Financed by members fees Uses the party newspaper Electoral campaigns labor intensive
The Catch-all Party Transformation of the traditional parties Financed by contributions Uses independent channels of communication Electoral campaigns labor and capital intensive Party mechanism is not important
44
The Cartel Party
  • Aim keeping in touch with resources of the state
  • Financed by state subventions
  • Electoral campaigns professionalized and capital
    intensive
  • Has access to state regulated channels of
    information
  • Membership is not significant
  • The least sensitive type to the Voice

45
The Voice in the Turkish Case
  • Transition to democracy was mobilization of
    clientelist networks
  • Transformation to mass parties prevented by
    frequent military interventions
  • Post-1980 parties failed to takeover party
    mechanisms of old regime
  • Competition for old clientelist networks
  • Emergence of new patronage mechanisms
  • The WP, the NAP and the DLP
  • Emphasized on establishing party organizations
  • Strong intraparty discipline

46
Turkish Political Parties are Cartel Type Parties
  • Elections dont serve to transform the power from
    one party to others. All political parties have
    continuous access to the state funds
  • Major source of finance is the state subventions
  • Electoral competition became clashing advertising
    campaigns
  • Major political parties dominate the use of the
    national media

47
Turkish Voter Dont Use Party Organizations as
Communication Channels
  • Political parties are among least trusted
    institutions
  • There is no intraparty democracy
  • Members dont care about intraparty democracy and
    dont participate

48
Future Research
  • Increased similarities between political parties
  • Similarity in reputations
  • Similarity in promises
  • Effect of institutions
  • Party members and organizations
  • Development of the Cartel party
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