Todays Lecture

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Todays Lecture

• One more thing about your first assignment
• David Hume
• Some comments on religious experience

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One more thing about your first assignment

• I need your first assignments back. It wont take
  long, but I forgot to do something with them. Im
  afraid that I wont be able to return your second
  assignment until I see your first assignment.
  Sorry about the inconvenience.

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part III

• Demea proffers the following replies to
  Cleanthes.
• (1) Cleanthes argument assumes a strong
  resemblance between the Divine and human. This is
  suspicious on at least two grounds. (i) (As even
  the pagans will admit) the Divine is beyond
  comprehension or description. (ii) We appear to
  be showing a partiality to our ourselves in
  likening the Deity to humanity (rather than
  something or someone else) (FP, p.63).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part III

• (2) An examination of the human mind makes it
  unlikely that the Divine resembles it in any
  substantial way. After all, human sentiments aid
  in our survival and well-being ... something we
  cannot reasonably say of a Divine Mind. Our
  mental content, all of which is derived form the
  senses, often lacks veracity ... something again
  we cannot reasonably say of a Divine Mind. Our
  thought, which is all that remains of the human
  mind, is fluctuating, uncertain, fleeting,
  successive and compounded (FP, p.64) ... again
  something we cannot reaonsably say of a Divine
  Mind (FP, pp.63-64).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part IV

• Cleanthes has three important responses to these
  contentions.
• (1) Theists must presume that there is some
  correspondence between the Deity and humanity if
  they are to be left with anything to regard,
  worship or talk about at all (FP, p.64).
• (2) Those theists who insist that we cannot
  intelligibly anthropomorphize the Deity, and that
  the Deitys nature is wholly incomprehensible to
  mortals such as ourselves, commit themselves to a
  view of Deity irrelevant to their lives and the
  lives of those around them (FP, p.64).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part IV

• (3) Perfect Being Theology does not describe a
  Divine Person (or the Goddess), as it does not
  describe what can be sensibly called a person at
  all (FP, pp.64-65).
• A mind, whose acts and sentiments and ideas are
  not distinct and successive one, that is wholly
  simple, and totally immutable, is a mind which
  has no thought, no reason, no will, no sentiment,
  no love, no hatred or, in a word, is no mind at
  all (FP, p.65).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part IV

• Note that Cleanthes rejects the view of Deity
  assumed in the Ontological and Cosmological
  Arguments, as Philo points out (FP, p.65).
• You are honouring with the appellation atheist
  all the sound, orthodox divines, almost, who have
  treated of this subject and you will at last be,
  yourself, found, according to your reckoning, the
  only sound theist in the world (FP, p.65).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part IV

• Philo now begins a critical assessment of the
  anthropomorphic view of God proffered by
  Cleanthes.
• Note his aim is to show that there is no ground
  to suppose a plan of the world to be formed in
  the divine mind, consisting of distinct ideas,
  differently arranged, in the same manner as an
  architect forms in his head the plan of a house
  which he intends to execute (FP, p.65).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part IV

• (1) There is no good reason to think that only
  the material or physical world requires an
  explanation involving a Cause. If, indeed, we
  ascribe mind to the Deity we ascribe a mental
  world as diverse and rich as the physical or
  material universe. If these effects resemble each
  other (i.e. if the universe of objects and the
  Divine universe of mental ideas relevantly
  resemble each other in their complexity and
  arrangement), then they also resemble each other
  in having a cause (FP, p.65).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part IV

• Philo contends that Cleanthes cant have it both
  ways.
• (1) Either the Divine World of ideas, to which we
  go in the Teleological Argument to explain the
  material or physical world, is in need of
  explanation for its own existence, or, if it is
  appropriate to go no further than that World of
  ideas, then we need not begin the journey in
  search of a cause of the material or physical
  world in the first place (FP, pp.65-66).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part IV

• (2) If we do pursue a cause for the Divine World
  of ideas we are threatened with an infinite
  regress of causes.
• (3) This is not acceptable.
• (4) So, we need not begin the journey in search
  of a(n ultimate) cause of the material or
  physical world in the first place. (I.e. it is
  enough that we find a cause for its existence
  within itself.) (FP, pp.65-66).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part IV

• We could preempt this move, argues Philo, only by
  cheating on the explanation of the order held to
  exist in the mind of the Deity. After all, if we
  have no substantial explanation of such order
  except that it is the nature of the Divine Mind
  to be so ordered (i.e. it is by nature rational),
  why not explain the order of the material or
  physical universe through an appeal to its own
  natural tendency to move towards order? (FP, p.66)

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part IV

• Cleanthes has two responses for Philo.
• (1) Even in common investigations of causes we do
  not demand that an explanation is complete unless
  we definitively finish the chain of relevant
  causes.
• (2) Despite the difficulties highlighted by
  Philo, it is still plain (or self-evident) that
  the universe was created (FP, p.67).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part IV

• Philos response to Cleanthes is to grant (1),
  but with the caveat that no one would view an
  explanation complete if the explanatory cause is
  in as much need of explanation as the effect to
  be first explained. This is the trouble with
  Cleanthes view, according to Philo (FP, p.67).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part V

• The beginning of this Part of the Dialogues
  consists of Philo getting Cleanthes to admit that
  his Teleological Argument will only work if he
  supposes that the mind of the Deity is relevantly
  similar to the minds of humanity. But this lies
  in tension with discoveries of a macro and micro
  universe that no human mind could duplicate or
  maintain (FP, pp.67-68).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part V

• Cleanthes so agrees, and Phil provides the
  following concerns about such an anthropomorphic
  view of God.
• (1) We need only propose a cause necessary to
  bring about the perceived effect. We must also be
  wary, under Cleanthes account, of describing the
  mind of the Deity in such a way that it no longer
  relevantly resembles that of humanity. This means
  that, on both counts, we must jettison all claim
  to infinity in any of the attributes of the
  Deity (FP, p.68).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part V

• (2) We need not regard the Deity perfect even in
  His finite capacities to create and maintain the
  universe, as we cannot assume this universe to be
  itself perfect (FP, p.68).
• (3) Even if the universe is itself perfect, this
  does not require a perfect creator, just a good
  learner of what works and what, in the long or
  short term, does not (FP, p.69). Thus, we cannot
  eliminate the possibility that the Deity has
  created many universes, and that this universe is
  the result of His (or Her) cumulative learning
  experience (predicated on His or Her past
  failures) (FP, p.69).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part V

• (4) Once down this road we also cannot rule out
  the possibility that the creation of the universe
  was a group effort. Only Perfect Being Theology
  necessitates monotheism (FP, p.69).
• (5) This possibility also raises the possibility
  that the Deities so involved are by no means
  perfect. After all, the effort of a group
  requires less expertise from any one member to
  successfully coordinate the activities of the
  whole (FP, p.69).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part V

• (6) This, now, only gets worse. We need not, at
  this point, insist that the relevant Deity or
  Deities are immortal. Cleanthes, remember, is not
  interested in worries about infinite regresses,
  so this worry need not restrain our philosophical
  sensibilities within this context of conversation
  (FP, p.69).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part V

• (7) We need not restrain our philosophical
  sensibilities concerning the form of the Deity or
  Deities either. After all, the Transcendence of
  Deity is not to be thought of, at least in this
  context, as beyond anything recognizably human.
  So, it is possible that the relevant Deity or
  Deities have a physical, and not just a mental,
  form that relevantly resembles humanity (FP,
  p.69).
• Think of it this way. Cleanthes doesnt want us
  to radically depart from the human model of
  mentality or cognition. But of course embodiment
  is an important aspect of human cognition.
  Consequently, to remain relevantly human-like,
  the Deity or Deities should, perhaps, be thought
  of as embodied.

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part V

• In a word, Cleanthes, a man who follows your
  hypothesis is able perhaps to assert, or
  conjecture, that the universe, sometime, arose
  from something like design but beyond that
  position he cannot ascertain one single
  circumstance and is left afterwards to fix every
  point of his theology by the utmost license of
  fancy and hypothesis. ... From the moment the
  attributes of Deity are supposed finite, all
  these have place. And I cannot, for my part,
  think that so wild and unsettled a system of
  theology is, in any respect, preferable to none
  at all (FP, p.70).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part VII

• In this Part of the Dialogues you have Philo
  suggest a competing model of the universe than
  the model suggested by Cleanthes.
• Solely on the grounds of relative fit,
  Cleanthes has likened the universe to the
  artifacts created by human ingenuity or skill.
• Philo suggests that Cleanthes method of
  generating adequate models of the universe from
  which to infer its ultimate cause cannot exclude,
  at least in principle, likening the universe to
  biological organisms, be they fauna or flora (FP,
  pp.70-71).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part VII

• Through this suggestion Philo hopes to raise
  suspicions about the choices Cleanthes has made
  along in this argument ... including Cleanthes
  willingness to relax the criteria for what counts
  as principled argument and what counts as
  rational or reasonable. Philo does not, himself,
  take this suggestion seriously (FP, p.71).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part VII

• This is the topic on which I have all along
  insisted. I have still asserted, that we have no
  data to establish any system of cosmogony. Our
  experience, so imperfect in itself, and so
  limited both in extent and duration, can afford
  us no probable conjecture concerning the whole of
  things. But if we must needs fix on some
  hypothesis by what rule, pray, ought we to
  determine our choice? .... And does not a plant
  or an animal, which springs from vegetation or
  generation, bear a stronger resemblance to the
  world, than does any artificial machine, which
  arises from reason and design? (FP, p.71)

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part VII

• Now, that vegetation and generation, as well as
  reason, are experienced to be principles of order
  in nature, is undeniable. If I rest my system of
  cosmogony on the former, preferably to the
  latter, it is at my choice. The matter seems
  entirely arbitrary. And when Cleanthes asks me
  what is the cause of my great vegetative or
  generative faculty, I am equally entitled to ask
  him the cause of his great reasoning principle.
  These questions we have agreed to forbear on both
  sides and it is chiefly his interest on the
  present occasion to stick to this agreement (FP,
  p.72).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part VIII

• Note that Philo is giving Cleanthes room to move
  here. All he is saying is that, given the
  parameters of the conversation, Cleanthes cannot
  rule out, in any principled way, the alternative
  models of the universe Philo has suggested.
  Cleanthes can regard his path so far as adequate,
  but only at the price of regarding various
  antithetical models as legitimate competitors to
  his own model (FP, p.73).

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part VIII

• Cleanthes cannot even use the criterion of that
  which admits of no problems or inconsistencies
  with experience as a way of ruling out
  antithetical models of the universe. His own
  model is as liable to fail such a criterion than
  anything Philo might suggest (FP, p.75).
• This, Philo, thinks generates, at best, a
  stalemate between the anthropomorphite and the
  Perfect Being Theologian or atheist. Given that
  there is no principled way, in this context, to
  decide between the alternatives, it is best,
  contends Philo, to totally suspend judgment of
  the matter (FP, pp.75-76).

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Some comments on the philosophical analysis of
religious experience

• As I have already said, there is no principled
  reason to exclude the phenomena of religious
  experience from philosophical discussion.
• I think we can make this claim stronger. If we
  are not going to beg questions against theism, we
  need to make room for philosophical analyses of
  religious experience.

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Some comments on the philosophical analysis of
religious experience

• On the other hand, we have no good reason to
  suspect that religious experience is directly
  tied to, or immediately gives rise to, a
  particular theological system of beliefs.
• That is to say, despite similarities in the
  reports of those who experience a presence of the
  Divine, there is not a corresponding similarity
  in the doctrinal expressions used to interpret
  said experiences. Whats more, there are, in many
  cases, no particular set of doctrinal expressions
  that best fits the experiences in question.

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Some comments on the philosophical analysis of
religious experience

• There are at least two competing non-naturalistic
  models of religious experience discussed in the
  literature (1) Perceptual models of religious
  experience and (2) Other Minds models of
  religious experience.

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Some comments on the philosophical analysis of
religious experience

• (1) Perceptual models of religious experience
  liken an individuals experience of the Divine to
  our common experiences of objects in the external
  world.
• (2) Other Minds models of religious experience
  liken an individuals experience of the Divine to
  our common experiences of other (human or
  nonhuman) minds.
• (1) and (2) primarily differ on (i) the
  proximity of religious experience to the
  relevant religious beliefs and, consequently,
  (ii) the relevant cognitive mechanisms or
  processes used to acquire certain rudimentary or
  theoretically simple interpretive beliefs about
  the experience.

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Some comments on the philosophical analysis of
religious experience

• Given what I have already said about the
  underdetermination of many, if not most,
  religious beliefs, perceptual models of religious
  experience lack prima facie plausibility.

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Some comments on the philosophical analysis of
religious experience

• A naturalistic model of religious experience
  seeks to find an adequate explanation of
  religious experience that does not require the
  existence of supernatural or non-natural
  entities.
• We might, for instance, think that a continuing
  need for a parental figure in certain
  individuals lives inclines some to have
  experiences that confirm their safety or security
  in a Power that is both invincible, loving and
  ever present.
• Alternatively, we might think that certain
  religious experiences help various oppressed or
  disenfranchised members of society deal with
  their ongoing encounters with said oppression or
  disenfranchisement.

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Some comments on the philosophical analysis of
religious experience

• One philosophical approach to Natural or Dogmatic
  Theology is to see it as providing the details of
  a working hypothesis for interpreting past, and
  predicting future, religious experience.
• The cost of such an approach is the tentative
  epistemic status accorded the relevant Natural or
  Dogmatic Theology. I.e. the individual seeking to
  confirm or disconfirm the relevant religious
  hypothesis ought to remain open to the
  possibility that her religious framework is false
  or, at the very least, deeply flawed.
• This makes it very difficult, though not
  impossible, to integrate a philosophical approach
  to Natural or Dogmatic Theology into an ongoing
  devotional practice.