Naval Review Panel On Space Admiral William D. Smith, USN Ret. Panel Chairman 7 December 2001

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Naval Review Panel On Space Admiral William
D. Smith, USN (Ret.)Panel Chairman7 December
2001
For Official Use Only
For Official Use Only
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Genesis

• Space Commission implementation was the catalyst
  for a re-examination of DoN posture on space
• Independent of the Space Commission, there were
  signs
• of problems within DoN
• The growing importance of space to naval
  operations
• Contrasted with
• - Declining naval investment
• - A shrinking base of space expertise
• - Reduced Flag Officer involvement
• A Naval Review Panel was formed to examine the
  issue

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Terms of Reference

• The Panels judgments were requested on
• DoN space policy
• Organization
• Management
• Investment
• Requirements development
• Acquisition and operations
• The naval space cadre
• The Panel did not assess current space programs

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Panel Members
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SecDef Response to Space Commission

• Air Force will be designated as Executive Agent
  for Space, with Department-wide responsibility
  for planning, programming, and acquisition of
  systems
• Army and Navy will establish requirements,
  maintain a cadre of space-qualified officers, and
  research, develop, acquire, and deploy systems
  unique to each Service.
• DARPA and the Service laboratories will
  undertake research and
• demonstration of innovative space technologies
  for military missions
• Military Departments will enhance space
  Professional Military Education to ensure forces
  have the understanding necessary to integrate
  space into military operations.

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Bottom Line

• The Panel believes
• Space is, and will remain, vital to the
  application of maritime power
• The naval service is not postured to ensure
  future space support
• - The Panel recognizes the significant
  progress by N6, N7, and Navys
• full-time space flags in focusing
  attention on space issues
• The problem is insidious
• - We have been living off past investments
  and successes
• - The shortcomings are easy to overlook in the
  near term
• - Unless corrected, future naval generations will
  pay a serious price
• DoDs implementation of the Space Commission
  recommendations provides a (brief) window of
  opportunity
• - New vision, new model for partnership

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Findings
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First, A Frank Appraisal

• Navy has a distinguished 40-year record in space

• Pioneered space-based comms, navigation, and
  surveillance
• Led the Services in adapting space for tactical
  support, e.g., direct targeting support,
  tasking-free systems, tactical comms, automated
  tracking, etc.
• In partnership with NRO, leveraged national
  systems effectively

• But Navy also has missed many opportunities

• Translating technology into capabilities---Space-b
  ased wide-area surveillance, environmental
  satellites
• Integrating space into naval combat systems
• Leveraging Air Force programs

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Space and Maritime Power

• Todays naval forces cannot operate--let alone
  have information dominance--without space
• Tomorrows systems will offer new opportunities
  for exploitation of space
• GPS III
• SBIRS (High Low)
• Space-based radar/GMTI/AMTI
• FIA and IOSA
• Multi- and hyperspectral sensors
• NPOESS
• Commercial capabilities
• High bandwidth laser communications
• If Navy takes on a larger role in missile
  defense, space becomes even more critical
• Offensive/defensive operations in space no longer
  a distant idea
• The more we depend on space, the more we must be
  concerned about its vulnerabilities

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Missions, Roles, Functions

• The Air Force
• Is Executive Agent for space, with MDA authority
  for all DoD space programs
• Views space as theater of operations and force
  enhancement, space control, space force
  application, and space support as missions
• Is concerned with space infrastructure--launch
  ranges, on-orbit control
• Is working toward merger of USAF and NRO
  acquisition, operations is establishing
• itself as future Space Operational
  Commander, a role similar to JFACC
• Together with NRO, holds 95 of space TOA
• The Naval Services
• Must apply space power to the maritime mission
• Must leverage Air Force and NRO investments
• Must be assured of (and contribute to) space
  superiority
• Have legacy funding obligations NAVSPASUR (Naval
  Space Surveillance System), MUOS (Mobile User
  Objective System), and NAVSOC (Naval Satellite
  Operations Center)
• Must integrate space systems with naval combat
  systems
• Must be a good joint partner objectives similar
  to Armys

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Policy, Organization, Management

• The current naval space policy is inadequate
• It does not reflect a compelling vision for Navy
  space
• It does not address the hard questions about
  changing roles and missions, and the new national
  security space environment
• No one is in charge of the overall naval space
  program
• N6 has been the primary POC at OPNAV but has a
  broad portfolio N2 also has responsibilities,
  for ISR
• N091/CNR has sponsored space ST, but not at a
  level commensurate with importance of space 6.3
  funding notably absent
• Naval participation in the space system
  requirements process (beyond communications) has
  been inconsistent
• No single authority has ownership of the naval
  space cadre
• No process to synchronize emerging space
  capabilities with Navy programs and budgets

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The ST/RD Program

• The Navy has benefited from two world-class ST
  centers
• NRL (NCST) APL
• Both have widely respected, cradle-to-grave
  capabilities
• These centers, however, are not focused on naval
  space RD objectives
• NCST is primarily supported by non-naval
  organizations (and in danger of going out of
  business)
• APL no longer performs space work for Navy
• Maritime space requirements are unique
• Only people with experience in maritime
  operations can recognize the potential value of
  technologies for maritime requirements and
  applications
• If we dont invest in the technology for maritime
  applications, no one will
• Recent Navy efforts to revitalize this program
  are well motivated
• Current RD proposals promise to sharply increase
  funding
• But, proposed concepts need further refinement

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Development and Acquisition

• Navy must be involved throughout development and
• acquisition processes
• Requirements often lag capability developments
• Many breakthroughs in tactical applications
  occur during the
• development process
• Essential to maintain operational perspective
  during years-long
• requirements formulation and acquisition
  processes, to ensure naval
• requirements are effectively met
• Essential to maintain space cadre currency and
  effectiveness
• Navy also must be capable of making (and carrying
  out) alternative proposals when joint proposals
  are too costly or dont satisfy Navy needs in
  timely way

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Space Operations

• Space operations means different things to Navy
  and Air Force
• To Air Force it means launching and flying
  satellites and generally ensuring space
  superiority
• Navy has no inherent need to independently launch
  or fly satellites
• - Naval Space Command has a legacy commitment to
  fly UFO
• - But the NAVSOC (Naval Satellite Operations
  Center) billets contribute little to overall
  space cadre expertise
• - Navy should not insist on continuing NAVSOC
  after UFO
• - Similar arguments may apply to ASCC (Alternate
  Space Control Center) and space surveillance
  operations (Fence)
• Navy has cryptologic role in NRO operations this
  has many benefits

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Space Cadre

• The Navys space cadre today has no unifying
  identity
• It is (and must be) made up of many designators
• 11xx, 13xx, 1440, 1510, 1600, 1610, 1630 also
  includes Enlisted, Civilian, and Reserve
  components
• Acquisition cadre is well-managed, has career
  path to flag
• Many key jobs for naval space cadre will be in
  Joint or Air Force billets
• In the past, with the exception of naval element
  in the NRO, there has been little contact with
  these people
• An aggressive, well placed cadre is essential for
  effective participation, leverage
• Traditional sub-specialty management techniques
  have been insufficient
• There has been no effective space community
  manager
• The Naval Postgraduate Schools space curriculum
  is excellent
• But graduates are under-utilized
• Creation of the IP community, while supported by
  the Panel, will not solve our space cadre problems

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Space Control

• Vitally important to naval forces
• Protection Ensure availability of capabilities
  critical to naval operations
• Denial Counter adversary use of space against
  us
• Some space control functions may best be done in
  theater
• Protection Theater injection contingency
  satellite control
• Denial Small control footprints sensor jamming
  and dazzling
• Forward deployed naval platforms may offer
  advantages
• Requires integration with USAF capabilities

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Recommendations
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Overall Objective

• Overall objectives of the Panels
  recommendations
• Redefine the naval space vision and policy
• Effectively participate in the new national
  security space structure
• Reorganize so that
• - Someone is clearly in charge
• - We can present a coherent face to the Air
  Force/NRO
• Reinvigorate our essential space ST activities
• Overhaul the functions of Naval Space Command
• Define and nurture the naval space cadre
• More specific recommendations follow
• But assignment of specific responsibilities must
  follow the reorganization effort

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Policy, Organization, Management

• Draft and publish a new space policy that
  reflects Navys vision for space
• Give Navy Undersecretary responsibility for
  policy, oversight, and contacts with the Air
  Force Under/DNRO, ASD C3I, and USD (ATL)
• Assign responsibility to N6/7 for managing
  overall Navy space efforts, including
• Articulating a vision for making space part of
  the combat system
• Developing Navy space requirements
• - N6/7-N2 coordination for ISR and
  national system requirements
• Defining space responsibilities for all naval
  organizations
• - Redefining the responsibilities of
  Naval Space Command is a priority
• Leadership of the Navy space cadre
• Oversight/sponsorship of ST/RD funding
• Close coordination with NavSpaceCom, SysComs,
  and naval space flags in USCincSpace and USAF/NRO
• Coordination with Air Force, NRO and other
  external space organizations
• Periodic reviews of naval space transformation
  and readiness
• Assign PPO similar responsibilities in USMC
  Navy and USMC efforts must be harmonized
• Seek an early meeting with new AF Under
  Secretary--Establish relationship before key
  decisions are made

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The ST/RD Program

• Identify specific investment areas and increase
  ST/RD funding commensurate with space value to
  maritime operations
• Focus investment on naval missions and
  applications
• Ensure the program covers all maritime
  applications from space
• Look for opportunities to cooperate with AFRL,
  Army RD
• Dont duplicate work done elsewhere
• Advocate the value of NRL to the DoD space
  acquisition community
• Remove any policy barriers that prevent ST/RD
  investment in demonstrations

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Acquisition

• Reaffirm commitment to Naval-NRO partnership
• Flag assignments, personnel
• Develop and propose acquisition management role
  for Navy in new space organizational structure
• Expand on successful Naval-NRO partnership model
• Provide naval operational expertise in
  acquisition process
• protect naval interests
• Assure effective structure for assigning naval
  personnel to
• space programs, avoiding body-shopping
• Use Navy expertise in senior acquisition
  positions to support requirements process assign
  senior Navy flag in AF/NRO ADDU to N6/7

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Space Operations

• Review the future of NAVSOC, SPASUR, and ASCC
• Navy has no enduring reason for these operations
• But should respect legacy obligations
• Refocus resources as feasible on following
  neglected space areas
• Expand Naval Space Command role in supporting
  space requirements
• process
• - Invest in MS, analysis capabilities to
  quantify value of space
• capabilities to naval
  operations
• Explore potential role of forward-deployed naval
  platforms in space
• control missions
• Create an aggressive applications laboratory
• Built around TENCAP model, but expanded beyond
  national systems
• Fully coordinated with ONR/NRL, NWDC, MCWL,
  SSC-SD
• Above actions will better support fleet/FMF
  requirements and operations,
• and enhance NavSpaceCom role in NavNetWarCom

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Space Cadre

• Conduct a complete review of the space cadre
• Identify/review billets, bodies, assignment
  policies, and incentives, e.g., opportunities for
  command and major program management
• Identify Flag Officer requirements as well as
  targeted joint Flag assignments and ensure
  community can support them
• Model management on Navy Nuclear Power and
  Acquisition Professional Communities
• Establish Space Cadre Manager in N1, responsible
  to N1 and oversight panel including N6/7, N2,
  NavSpaceCom, and SPAWAR (PD14/SSFA)
• Employ innovative means (e.g., lateral entry) to
  capture, sustain talent
• The acquisition element of the space cadre should
  receive special attention
• Continue existing flag billet in NRO/USAF
  acquisition, dual-hatted as
• Naval space acquisition lead
• That Flag Officer is responsible to N6/7 for
  management of naval space acquisition community,
  and for providing support to N 6/N7
• Provide second acquisition flag for emerging flag
  opportunities in USAF/NRO structure, e.g., NSSA
  (National Security Space Architect)

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Findings and Recommendations Summary

• Space is vital to the future of the Naval
  Services
• We have serious problems to confront
• The Space Commission implementation presents a
  unique opportunity to act
• The Panel will provide more complete
  recommendations in its written report
• Implementation (as always) will require careful
  management

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Closing Thoughts

• The Space Commission is not the only reason
  change is needed
• Internal problems have been growing for years
  they must be addressed
• We have a short window in which to act
• Once the new structure settles within Air Force
  and NRO, further changes will be difficult
• Change must begin at the top
• Space must have attention of SECNAV and CNO/CMC
• Oversight and management roles by UnSecNav, N6/7,
  and PPO
• Space flag/SESs in key positions
• ADDU link between senior Navy flag in AF/NRO and
  N6/7
• Naval space cadre must be refocused, managed

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Closing Thoughts, cont.

• There will be resource implications
• Additional ST/RD funding
• Some additional targeted personnel requirements
• Partnership with Air Force will be needed
  include following elements
• Coordination role between Under Secretary of Navy
  and Under
• SECAF/DNRO
• Additional flag/SES representation in Air
  Force/NRO structure
• Navy role in program management, based on current
  NRO
• partnership model
• NRL/NCST cooperative efforts with Air Force
  Research Laboratory
• Reciprocal assignments of space personnel

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Long-Term Commitment

• Ultimately, the question is not whether the
  Naval Services should be involved in space but
  rather,
• what kind of Navy and Marine Corps will we
  have
• in 15 years if we arent involved in space?

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Imagine a Day Underway Without Space

• No Precision Execution
• No Effective Long Haul Connectivity
• No Timely Imagery Products, ATO, Tomahawk MDU
• No Direct C2 With Joint or Coalition Partners
• Limited Intra-BG Connectivity, Impacts IT-21
• Minimal Targeting and Battle Damage Assessment
• Extremely Limited METOC
• No GPS, Including Timing Signal
• No Off Board I W, SIGINT, COMINT, IMINT, MASINT
• No Quality of Life Improvement
• TV DTS, VTC, Distance Learning, Email

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Back-ups
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DoN Space Organization
Spec Asst for Space, Intel
CINC SPACE1
NSSA1
DEP1
DASN Space C4I
CNR/ 091
NAVAIR SPAWAR2 NAVSEA
DirCOMM/PD14/SSFA Deputy PD14/SSFA
Chief Space Engr3
ASCC
NAVSPOC
New SES position reports to Under Secretary for
space policy and management coordination Reports
to CNO (N6/7) for coordination of naval/national
programs SPAWAR for space systems acquisition
and DNRO as Dir COMM 1Nominative among Services
2SPAWAR will be ADDU to ComNavNetWar
3Dual-hatted NCST/Chief Space Engineer
Proposed space flag/civ equivalent position
Existing space flag/civ equivalent position
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Proposed Model for Partnering inProgram
Management

• Navy role based on NRO model Navy 2-star,
  under Air Force Executive
• Agent, assigned programs in single functional
  area, e.g., communications
• (see notional organization)
• Benefits to Navy Provides structure for
  assigning Navy personnel to
• space programs, avoiding body-shop syndrome
  maintains critical
• mass for space cadre career path thru flag
  protects Navy interests
• Benefits to Air Force Navy fleet operational
  experience in acquisition
• process Navy support in creating a strong,
  effective national security
• space program
• To be credible, Navy role should involve
  additional personnel resources
• beyond those currently allocated to NRO

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Consolidated Acquisition Programs Communications
Example
Communications Directorate
Program Execution
SMC Program Offices
SPAWAR Program Offices
SMDC Program Offices
NRO Program Offices
- Navy Two Star Billet
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What Space Provides To TheNaval Warfighter

• Navigation
• Precision weapon guidance, CSAR
• Communications
• Netted force, speed of command, common
  operational picture
• Environmental
• Weather, battlespace characterization
• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
  (ISR)
• Intel preparation of battle area, early warning,
  precision targeting,
• battle damage assessment

Space and Naval Missions
Critical Time-critical strike, Theater missile
defense Contributing USW, Air defense, SOF,
Expeditionary
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Comparison of Service Involvement in Space
Marine Corps Army
Air Force Navy
Requirements Yes Yes
Yes Yes ST
No Yes1 Yes
Yes Acquisition No No2
Yes Yes3 Operations
No4 Component
Component Component Exploitation/TenCap
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investment Minimal Small Large
Small 1Technology primarily related to
space control 2Army aggressively develops and
acquires exploitation capabilities for its
forces. 3Navy acquires UFO, MUOS, Windsat, and
terminals has key management role in NRO
acquisitions 4Marine Corps provides personnel to
NavSpaceCom and US CincSpace
Assessment MarCorps Effective at user
interface minimal influence on system
capability Army Good requirements
representation, exploitation min influence on
system thru life cycle Air Force Full
sprectrum large investment historically low
tactical emphasis, but this is improving Navy
Low investment strong tactical emphasis
naval systems integration improving effective
influence on some but not
all systems high leverage potential
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