The Bush Doctrine and Operations in Afghanistan - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 14
About This Presentation
Title:

The Bush Doctrine and Operations in Afghanistan

Description:

CIA paramilitary and US special ops seek to mobilize anti-Taliban Pashtun and ... Joint CIA/DoD involvement in operations sets tone for 'new' type of war ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:150
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 15
Provided by: DennisM3
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: The Bush Doctrine and Operations in Afghanistan


1
The Bush Doctrine and Operations in Afghanistan
  • PO 326 American Foreign Policy

2
Whom to Fight?
  • The Bush Doctrine indicated Americas willingness
    to use force against states to combat terrorism,
    but was vague in its indication of precisely
    which actors would be the targets of American
    military action (Afghanistan? Axis of Evil?
    Countries in which fundamentalist terrorism is
    rampant?)
  • Some important questions
  • Would it truly be a war on terror, or just
    against Al-Qaeda and its obvious supporters?
  • What would actual American operations look like?
  • How would Americas allies and other important
    states factor in?
  • Though Bush declares his overarching doctrine
    with little expert input, he relies extensively
    on his advisers to answer these questions

3
Formulating a Plan of Action
  • Immediately following 9/11, there is no off the
    shelf plan for counterterrorism abroad, but
    there are several general views held by various
    foreign policy actors
  • Extensive meetings of principals, often with
    president absent
  • CIA (Tenet) Al-Qaeda and Taliban should be
    primary targets, and Afghanistan primary
    battleground
  • CIA paramilitaries deployed with Northern
    Alliance link up with US Special Ops forces to
    create united northern front
  • Exceptional authority to be granted to CIA
    operatives
  • Attempt to smoke out Bin Laden supporters
  • Covert attack on Al-Qaeda finances
  • Buy off limited Taliban opposition in south
  • CJCS (Shelton) Three options in Afghanistan
  • Cruise missile attacks against al-Qaeda bases
  • Option 1 plus manned bomber attacks against bases
  • Options 1 and 2 plus boots on the ground
    (Special Ops, Army, Marines)

4
Formulating a Plan of Action
  • State (Powell) KISS
  • Warns against extension of war focus on al-Qaeda
    and Afghanistan first
  • Avoid unilateralism (initial support by Bush,
    Cheney)
  • Avoid any discussion of Iraq at outset will cost
    support
  • Overall, military operations to be only part of
    longer-term diplomatic effort
  • Defense (Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz) Broader views
  • Emphasize that Afghanistan and even al-Qaeda are
    not our only enemies advocate global dimension
    of war on terror
  • Iraq must be considered an enemy at the outset
    (Wolfowitz) WMD presents threat to US, should be
    addressed
  • Defense believes simultaneous involvement in two
    major conflicts is possible
  • Rumsfeld dislikes military options presented by
    Shelton unimaginative wants better defined
    role for revamped military (global role of
    special forces, etc.), and sees war as
    opportunity to accomplish this
  • Chief of Staff (Card) Simultaneous attacks on
    terrorists across globe
  • NSA (Rice) Coordinator of viewpoints closest to
    president, she often is his conduit to
    principals discussions

5
Afghanistan Considerations
  • In Afghanistan, the administration faces a
    country that presents some daunting hurdles
  • History of holding out against more powerful
    countries (UK in 19th Century, USSR in 20th)
  • History of fundamentalism (e.g., Mujahadin), but
    it is largely imported
  • Paragon of geographic inhospitality one reason
    it is chosen by Bin Laden as sanctuary
  • Political situation is problematic Taliban is de
    facto ruling party (after lengthy civil war with
    Northern Alliance), but Northern Alliance is
    still fighting and al-Qaeda is thoroughly
    intertwined with Taliban
  • Uneasy coexistence of Arabs and Afghans
    Taliban/al-Qaeda domination in Kabul and south,
    Northern Alliance and Pashtun opposition remains
    in north provides both problems (finding enemy)
    and opportunity (getting others to fight on the
    ground)

6
Afghanistan Laying the Groundwork
  • Despite problems of strategy/potential costs,
    Afghanistan chosen as initial target (need for
    action, blank check)
  • Administration does, however, make clear that
    operations in Afghanistan are only part of a
    larger war on all terrorist organizations
    (Presidential Directive 9)
  • Iraq question temporarily put aside
  • Bush approves all of Tenets suggestions,
    delivers ultimatum to Taliban to turn over Bin
    Laden or face consequences
  • Administration hopes that the threat of US action
    will create fissures in the Taliban, separating
    them (or at least moderate portions) from
    al-Qaeda
  • Bush freezes al-Qaedas financial assets by
    executive order

7
Afghanistan Laying the Groundwork
  • The question of international coalition building
    (Powell Doctrine)
  • Invocation of NATO Article 5 but what role would
    allies play?
  • Favorability of maintaining international
    support, though burden-sharing less of a concern
    than moral support and basing (Bush repeatedly
    states that the US will go it alone if
    necessary)
  • US seeks basing rights in nearby countries, some
    of which have large fundamentalist populations
    (Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Oman, Qatar,
    etc.), and tacit support from other powers
    (Russia, NATO)
  • Ultimatum to Taliban eases the way to
    coalition-building amongst Arab states, but
    removal of Taliban problematic (esp. for Saudis
    and Pakistanis)
  • Taliban does not respond to ultimatum (hopes of
    splitting allegiance dashed), and American action
    becomes necessary

8
Preparing for War Strategy Dictating Operations,
or Vice Versa?
  • Despite international issues, the consequences
    decided upon become removal from power of the
    Taliban
  • Main approach Get opposition forces to do most
    of the ground work, thus limiting the
    intrusiveness and danger of large-scale US troop
    involvement (Soviet failure)
  • Problem Want to do this without re-installing
    Northern Alliance, which might lead to
    difficulties and further instability
  • This meant that the US would seek Northern
    Alliance troop support for its activities, but
    would try at the same time to put a leash on
    their full fury becomes a difficult balancing
    act

9
Preparing for War Strategy Dictating Operations,
or Vice Versa?
  • Military operations Hopes and obstacles
  • CIA paramilitary and US special ops seek to
    mobilize anti-Taliban Pashtun and Northern
    Alliance in North against Taliban and are
    necessary to mark targets for US bombing, but
    money needed and allegiance uncertain (strong
    Taliban defenses, Russian problems)
  • Introduction of overall military buildup and
    special ops, limited ground troops, air campaign
    in North necessary, but held up due to Combat
    Search and Rescue (CSAR) issues, basing
    negotiations, scant number of targets
  • CIA claims that bombing alone would destroy
    Taliban, but Bush wishes to avoid weak
    Clintonian response
  • In the South, more difficulty in finding friendly
    Afghans

10
Preparing for War Strategy Dictating Operations,
or Vice Versa?
  • Associated Considerations
  • Necessity of limiting collateral damage, not
    alienating Afghan people humanitarian aid needed
  • Means engaging in nation-building, something
    Bush wanted to avoid in 2000 but which would
    become crucial to war on terror
  • Concerns of retaliation by al-Qaeda on US
    homeland
  • What would Afghanistans postwar government look
    like?
  • In the end, the perceived need for action drives
    the Bush Administration into beginning the Afghan
    campaign before these obstacles and
    considerations are fully resolved in a sense,
    then, the overall strategy results as a product
    of the progress of the war, and not the other way
    around

11
The Conduct of the War The Opening Assault
  • As per DoDs plans, the US opens air campaign
    against Taliban positions on 7 October 2001
  • Limited number of targets, and initial failure to
    destroy all of them some frustration in first
    few weeks
  • Focus also on Taliban positions in Mazar-e
    Sharif, Shamili Plains
  • Covert ops are largely CIAs through this point
    special ops (DoD) are not on ground (tension
    between bureaus)
  • CIA is attempting to both solidify Northern
    Alliance support and hold them back
  • Attacks on areas in western Afghanistan aimed at
    Bin Laden
  • In second week, US seeks to get teams into the
    south by contacting Pashtuns (Karzai), but this
    proves difficult
  • Special Forces finally arrive at end of second
    week of bombing, but initial actions seem to
    embolden rather than weaken Taliban leads to
    public concern that larger-scale troop
    involvement is necessary (Americanizing the
    war)

12
The Conduct of The War Intensification and Quick
Resolution
  • Due to concerns about progress (especially given
    the coming winter), the US steps up the conflict
    during its second month, but does not
    Americanize it
  • Intensifies bombing of Taliban front-line
    positions and eastern areas, moving forward from
    predesignated target list to positions identified
    by CIA (problems with collateral damage)
  • Inserts more Special Ops teams
  • Most importantly, the US turns loose the full
    force of the Northern Alliance and Pashtun forces
    against the Taliban in early November Mazar is
    taken with American bombing and Special Ops
    support, and Taliban support begins to crumble
    and they flee south
  • Southern opposition forces begin to coalesce,
    make headway
  • Northern Alliance moves on Kabul while
    administration debates whether or not they
    should city falls in mid November
  • Kandahar (southern city) falls to opposition in
    early December Taliban is effectively ousted
  • All accomplished with little solicitation of or
    assistance by European allies

13
The Issue of Postwar Rule
  • US seeks to negotiate with opposition groups for
    the purposes of putting together a coalition
    replacement government
  • Agreement to settle upon Karzai as leader of
    coalition, a Pashtun moderate with broad contacts
    and appeal to most concerned parties
  • American special forces, CIA remain in
    Afghanistan to smoke out Bin Laden and remaining
    al-Qaeda in the east (near Pakistani border)

14
A Review of the First Round of the War on Terror
  • Afghanistan is initial focus, but administration
    makes clear it desire to maintain global aspect
    of war
  • Afghan operations seek immediate results, but
    administration is constrained by problems
    associated with large-scale US troop involvement
    (Vietnam) results in strategy stemming from
    success of operations, not other way around
  • Because it advocates global war and because
    military operations determine strategy, the stage
    is set for heavy DoD influence over war on
    terror State, with its focus on diplomacy and
    caution, is relegated to secondary importance
    (would be crucial in future)
  • Joint CIA/DoD involvement in operations sets tone
    for new type of war
  • Despite initial misgivings, Northern Alliance
    tapped to do the groundwork
  • Beginnings of American unilateralism in
    operations, despite widespread international
    support
  • Deposal of Taliban in line with dictates of Bush
    Doctrine how would the Doctrine be utilized in
    future stages of war on terror?
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com