Critical Infrastructure Protection THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR Security Initiatives

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Critical Infrastructure ProtectionTHE
ELECTRICITY SECTOR Security Initiatives

• Presented to
• WATER SECURITY
• WORKING GROUP
• October 2004

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Topics

• Electricity Sector (ES)
• North American Electric Reliability Council
  (NERC)
• Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)
  Organization
• ES CIP
• Initiatives
• Cyber Security Standard
• Security Guidelines
• ES Information Sharing Analysis Center (ESISAC)

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The Electricity Sector
6 x10? C1
aGen bTransm cLSE dRC eCA fGov
3I
Characteristics Instantaneous, Interconnected,
Interdependent,
Reliability, Security
Organizations APPA, CEA, EEI, ELCON, EPRI,
EPSA, ESISAC other
ISACs, NEI, NERC, NAESB,
NRECA
Agencies DOE, DHS, DOD, FERC, NARUC, NRC,
PSEPC, RUS, USSS
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Description and Definitions

• APPA American Public Power Association
• CA Control Area
• CEA Canadian Electricity Association
• DOD Department of Defense
• DOE Department of Energy
• DHS Department of Homeland Security
• EEI Edison Electric Institute
• ELCON Electr Consumers Resource Council
• EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
• EPSA Electric Power Supply Association
• ES Electricity Sector
• FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
• IAIP Info Analysis, Infrastructure Protection
• ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center
• NAESB No. Amer. Energy Standards Board
• NARUC Natl Assoc Reg Utility Commissioners
• NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
• NERC North American Electric Reliability Cncl
• NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• The equation
• Summed over millions of Customers
• Entity types that comprise the ES
• Divided by three Interconnections
• Eastern
• Western
• Texas
• Generation, Transmission, Load Serving
  Entities, Purchasing-Selling Entities,
  Reliability Coordinators, Control Areas, Regional
  Transmission Organizations, Independent System
  Operators, Regulators (Canada/US
  Federal/State/Provincial/Local)

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13 RC
3 RC
1 RC
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What is NERC?

• NERC was formed in 1968
• NERC's mission is to ensure that the bulk
  electric system in North America is reliable,
  adequate and secure.
• NERC operates as a voluntary industry
  organization, relying on reciprocity, peer
  pressure and mutual self-interest.
• Energy legislation pending in the House and
  Senate Energy bills would enable NERC to become
  an SRO capable of enforcing compliance with its
  reliability standards.

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What Does NERC Do?

• Sets reliability standards.
• Ensures compliance with reliability standards.
• Provides education and training resources.
• Conducts assessments, analyses, and reports.
• Facilitates information exchange and coordination
  among members and industry organizations.
• Supports reliable system operation and planning.
• Certifies reliability service organizations and
  personnel.
• Coordinates critical infrastructure protection of
  the bulk electric system (ESISAC).
• Administers procedures for conflict resolution on
  reliability issues.

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North American Electric Reliability Council
Structure

• Board of Trustees
• 9 independent members
• Plus President
• Standing Committees
• Broad Sector representation
• Subcommittees
• Working Groups
• Task Forces

Board of Trustees
Stakeholders
Staff
Operating Committee
Planning Committee
Operating
Committee
Market Committee
Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee
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CIP Committee Structure
Physical Security Cyber Security Operations Policy
September 18, 2004
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Electricity Sector Security Initiatives-1

• Responses to 14 August 2004 Blackout
  Recommendations physical and cyber security
• Implement the National Infrastructure Protection
  Plan for the Electricity Sector
• Indications, Analysis, Warnings program
• Data/information exchange between ES and DHS
• Threat Alert Levels Physical and Cyber
• Guidance for ES actions in response to Homeland
  Security Alert System
• Reference materials available
  http//www.esisac.com

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Electricity Sector Security Initiatives-2

• Cyber Security Standard
• 1200 in place 1300 under development
• 15 Security Guidelines
• Physical, Cyber, Data
• Critical Spares Project
• Control Systems Security
• Other technical studies
• Outreach including workshops
• Bi-lateral discussions and Urban Utility Center
• Reference materials available
  http//www.esisac.com

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Critical Assets

• Those facilities, systems, and equipment
  which, if destroyed, damaged, degraded, or
  otherwise rendered unavailable, would have a
  significant impact on the ability to serve large
  quantities of customers for an extended period of
  time, would have a detrimental impact on the
  reliability or operability of the electric grid,
  or would cause significant risk to public health
  and safety.

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Cyber Security Standard 1200

• Development process
• To whom does it apply?
• To what does it apply?
• What are the requirements?
• Compliance
• Workshops planned

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Cyber Security Standard 1200

• Requirements
• Cyber Security Policy
• Critical Cyber Assets
• Electronic Security Perimeter
• Electronic Access Controls
• Physical Security Perimeter
• Physical Access Controls
• Personnel
• Monitoring Physical Access
• Monitoring Electronic Access

• Information Protection
• Training
• Systems Management
• Test Procedures
• Electronic Incident Response Actions
• Physical Incident Response Actions
• Recovery Plans

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Cyber Security Standard 1300

• Requires that critical cyber assets related to
  the reliable operation of the bulk electric
  systems are identified and protected.
• Builds upon the concepts and requirements found
  in the Urgent Action Cyber Security Standard
  1200.
• Includes process control and SCADA assets
  critical to grid reliability
• Provides additional detail to clarify technical
  requirements and compliance measures

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Security Guidelines
Best practices for protecting critical
assets

• Cyber Access Control
• Cyber IT Firewalls
• Cyber Intrusion Detection
• Cyber Risk Management
• Protecting Sensitive Info
• Securing Remote Access Process Control Systems
• Incident Reporting
• Physical Security Substations

• Overview
• Communications
• Emergency Plans
• Employment Background Screen
• Physical Security
• Threat Response
• Physical
• Cyber
• Vulnerability/Risk Assessment
• Continuity of Business Process

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Spare Equipment Project

• NERC maintains a database of spare transformers
  and is planning expansion to include other
  critical spare equipment.
• Establishing spare equipment requirements,
  sharing protocols, acquisition, spares
  repositories.
• Collaborating with EPRI, Government Agencies

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Control Systems in Electricity Sector
System Operations Center
EMS
ICCP
Interconnected System Operations Center
SCADA
Telecom
Generating or Transmission Station
RTU
Protective Relays
BTG
Transmission Control
Data Sensors
DCS and PLC
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The Security Challenge

• PCS are universal
• PCS operate in real-time
• PCS may not have built-in security features
• Reality of security concern
• Some testing
• Electronic access beyond physical security
  perimeter
• Access within physical security perimeter

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Securing Control Systems

• CIPC is working with electricity sector
  participants, governments, other critical
  infrastructure sectors, and control system
  vendors to
• Evaluate vulnerabilities and solutions in a test
  bed environment
• Assess risk
• Create plans to secure new systems
• Create plans to secure old systems
• Recognize a potential or actual attack
• Mitigate an attack on control systems
• Developed Security Guideline Securing Remote
  Access to Electronic Control and Protection
  Systems

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ESISAC

• Electricity SectorInformation Sharing Analysis
  Center
• Share information about real and potential
  threats and vulnerabilities
• Received from DHS and communicated to
  electricity sector participants
• Received from electricity sector participants and
  communicated to DHS
• Analyze information for trends, cross-sector
  dependencies, specific targets
• Coordinate with other ISACs

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http//www.esisac.com
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Governments Sectors CoordinationOperations
(ES focus)
------------------ Governments ----------------
Sectors

DHS
DOE
PSEPC
CHEM
FS
ESISAC
. . .
TEL
Electricity Sector
Electricity Sector
RC
CA
TRAN
GEN
DIST
PSE
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Operational ISACs

• Chemical
• Electricity
• Emergency Management and Response
• Energy (Oil and Gas)
• Financial Services
• Health Care
• Highway

• Information Technology
• Multi-State
• Public Transit
• Research and Education Network
• Surface Transportation
• Telecommunications
• Water

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ISACCouncil Activities

• Discussion papers
• Government-Private Sector Relations
• HSPD-7 Issues and Metrics
• Information Sharing and Analysis
• Integration of ISACs into Exercises
• ISAC Analytical Efforts
• Policy Framework for the ISAC Community
• Reach of the Major ISACs
• Vetting and Trust
• Operational Clarity Matrix

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Electricity Sector Dependency On
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ES Dependency on the Internet

• Categories
• Business System
• Market System
• Control System
• Control System Support
• Security System

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Report

• Malicious physical events that cause transmission
  outages, loss of generation, loss of load, damage
  to facilities
• Malicious physical events that cause damage to
  facilities, breach of security
• Malicious cyber events that result in actual or
  potential intrusion to a critical computer or
  utility telecom system
• Threats received (eg bomb, mail, tel)
• Surveillance

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Possible Steps Toward A Terrorist Attack
Target Selection
Surveillance (first level, non professional)
Planning (weapons, location, etc)
Final Selection (target)
Deployment (equipment, people)
Final Surveillance (professional)
ATTACK!
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Reports

• From the ES,
• Together with other critical infrastructures,
• And intelligence sources
• May help the DHS to

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Some Things to Think About

• Does the ESISAC have your 24x7 contact? Are there
  multiple contact points and communications
  available?
• Is a security decision-making process in place?
• How will your organizations physical and cyber
  security decision-makers get notified? Are there
  backup communications?
• Is there a means in place to communicate
  decisions to action-takers? A backup?
• Consider responses in accordance with the Threat
  Alert Systems and Physical / Cyber Response
  Guidelines for the Electricity Sector.

READY Business http//www.ready.gov/business/
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Contacts

• Lynn Costantini, CIO, NERC
• lynn.costantini_at_nerc.net
• Lou Leffler, CIP Project Manager, NERC
• lou.leffler_at_nerc.net
• NERC 609-452-8060
• ESISAC 609-452-1422
• Note Referenced materials and this
• presentation available at
• http//www.esisac.com

TY