Closing the governance gap on illicit fisheries activities

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Closing the governance gap on illicit fisheries
activities

• Kieran Kelleher
• Fisheries Team Leader

THE WORLD BANK Washington DC
THE WORLD BANK
THE WORLD BANK
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key messages

• illicit fisheries activities are a symptom of
  weak governance
• policy and anti-corruption measures need to
  supplement direct efforts to combat illicit
  fishing activities
• a responsible fishing industry is fundamental
• some of the solutions are not within the
  fisheries sector
• but fall under a broader governance agenda

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contents

• World Bank perspective
• examples
• actions
• tackling corruption
• ALLFISH - building a responsible international
  seafood industry
• name and shame lists
• conclusions

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IUU and illicit fisheries activities

• the term IUU tends to mix different but related
  problems
• the term illicit fisheries activities used here
  covers a broader suite of related problems,
• for example
• fishing licenses issued for political or personal
  gain
• selling subsidized fisheries fuel
• transfer pricing (e.g. under-invoicing of exports)

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illicit fisheries activities are part of a
broader governance failure

• The World Bank defines governance as the set of
  traditions and institutions by which authority in
  a country is exercised. It includes
• the process by which governments are selected,
  monitored and replaced,
• the capacity of the government to effectively
  formulate and implement sound policies, and
• the respect of citizens and the state for the
  institutions that govern economic and social
  interactions among them.

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the World Bank measures six dimensions of
governance

1. political stability and absence of violence
2. regulatory quality
3. government effectiveness
4. rule of law and
5. control of corruption
6. voice and accountability

See World Bank Institute Governance indicators
by country
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linking governance to wealthillegal fisheries
activities cause loss of wealth
World Bank 2006 Where Is the Wealth of Nations?

• Factors best explaining intangible capital
• school years per capita
• rule of law index

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2. impacts and examples

• impacts
• examples
• the story of the ice plant and the President
• what can we learn from parking fines?
• not just legal but legitimate!

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illicit fisheries activities have a wide range
of impacts

• on the profits of legitimate businesses
• on fish resources market prices illicit fish
  discounted
• on public revenues licenses, expert taxes,
  profit taxes
• on reputation of exporting country and exporters
• undermines regulatory fabric and rule of law
• organized trade in illicit fish often requires
  corrupt officials (judges, police, politicians)
• survival of the most corrupt
• often a disproportionate impact on the poor
  (dynamiting, fishing in area reserved for
  small-scale fishers)
• on maritime security Somalia, G. Guinea,
  Caribbean

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the ice plant storyand the letter to the
President

• the Ice Company signed a 20-year contract to
  operate the ice plant in the countrys main
  fishing Port.
• but the Ice Company found that a Supply Company
  had an exclusive contract to supply the Port with
  water and electricity
• so the Ice Company could not buy the water or
  electricity directly from the Electricity and
  Water Company
• but the Supply Company was charging about 30
  times the price charged by the electricity
  company.
• so the Ice Company closed the ice plant to avoid
  loss.
• after years of argument and lack of ice for the
  fishers a contract for direct supply of
  electricity was signed.
• then a new fisheries minister ordered the Port to
  cut this direct supply of water and electricity.
• as a last resort the Ice Company wrote this
  letter to the President

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its not just deterrence

• Diplomats and parking fines in New York

• UN diplomats New York exempt from parking fines
• no deterrence/ penalty so parking tickets
• UK, Switzerland, Canada 0
• Russia .. 30,000 tickets
• Chad, Nigeria, middle eastern highest
• correlation with WB governance score
• so not just deterrence
• but culture of respect for rule of law

The Economist Aug 10th 2006
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the rule of law must be seen to be legitimate

• Norway it is prohibited to catch
• EC it is prohibited to have on board

a Danish skipper was caught with more then 40
illegal fish on board. To the media the skipper
says I was in Norwegian zone and because of
their discard ban, I had to keep the fish on
board. the Danish Ministry argues to us the
skipper has no excuse for having illegal catch
onboard he have to sail in Danish waters and
dumped the catch there. K. B. Christensen,
Danish Society for a Living Sea

• sensible, cost effective regulations
• laws that have the support of the fishers

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3. World Bank ACTIONS

• WB Governace and Anti-Corruption Strategy
• is the framework for Bank activities
• examples of activities
• training in implementation of Port State Measures
  (completed)
• trials of low-cost vessel tracking (ongoing)
• reforms in Peru (World Bank policy loan)
• addressing corruption (workshop)
• ALLFISH - building a culture of responsibility
  (startup)
• list of irresponsible vessels (on hold)

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simple cost-effective measures

• training in Port State measures in Dakar and
  Nuadhibou
• port level cooperation, practical guidelines and
  training
• police, port inspectors, sanitary authorities,
  customs, ships agents, coast guard working
  together
• Bank/ Netherlands funding, FAO implementation

• cost-effective tracking of small fishing vessels
  in Maldives (trials)
• GPS cell phone (no satellite) . 100 / unit?
• provide effort and location information
• link to catch data
• Bank/ Iceland funding

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Tackling Corruption in Fisheries World Bank/
IUCN Workshop, 2008
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a typology of corruption in fisheries
Value chain Corruption character Actors Incentives Possible actions
Science
Allocation and Access
Commerce and Trade
International
Political dimensions
Enforcement
World Bank / IUCN Workshop in 2008
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Area Character of Corruption Actors Incentives Possible actions
Science Allocation and Access Political dimensions International Commerce and Trade Enforcement Misuse of knowledge Leakage of advice (e.g. prior knowledge of quota changes) Granting of licenses Provision of subsidies (state capture) Quotas grossly exceed scientific advice on TAC Bribery of customs, fisheries and sanitary inspectors, port police Auction rings Scientific advisors Fisheries directors or ministers Industry lobbyists Politicians Company officials/ vessels owners Customs officers, police Vessel/ sanitary inspectors Naval officers Auctioneers Traders Job security Personal gain Political gain (including elections) National pride Keep scientific advice and independent Public dissemination of science findings Transparency public lists of licenses, license holders information on who gets the benefits Corruption hotline Training / adequate remuneration Informed / balanced media/ free press Codes of practice/ procedures Name and shame lists of vessels or companies
World Bank / IUCN Workshop, 2008
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improved transparency and control is a key to
reforms in the worlds largest fishery
8
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control is a key part of reforms in the worlds
largest fishery

• independent determination of TAC strict
  adherence to scientific advice
• independent monitoring of all landings -industry
  funded - 6 million/ year
• 100 VMS cover
• cleaning up the register of fishing vessels
  (measurements, safety, check authorization)
• move to individual quota system
• social safety net funded from increased returns

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ALLFISH

• Alliance for Responsible Fisheries targeted
  actions to establish a vision of a responsible
  industry

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start small and build on lessons

• partners
• International Coalition of Fisheries Associations
  (ICFA - secretariat) currently mainly OECD
  countries
• FAO, World Bank, (others in discussion GEF, GTZ,
  NEPAD, GAA, ISSF)
• core values of sustainable fisheries are shared
  by public and private sector stakeholders
• ICFA commitment to
• sustainable and socially-responsible supply
  chains
• expansion to developing countries
• be inclusive of small-scale producers

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drive corporate social responsibility along
value chains

• Clear vision of responsible industry
• Codes of conduct
• no illegal fish
• fair trade
• combat corruption
• active engagement with public sector

• Expand ICFA to developing countries
• financial and technical support to create common
  purpose and industry codes
• Active engagement with public sector

• Focus on selected value chains
• sustainable profitable and equitable trade
• 1 per major market as examples
• ? Caribbean spiny lobster US
• ? Nile perch to EU

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ALLFISH first steps in a global public private
partnership

• 3-year window to structure and pilot global codes
  of industry conduct and build corporate social
  responsibility
• deliver a clear vision of a responsible private
  sector environmentally sustainable, profitable,
  equitable
• a structured approach for engagement of the
  private sector
• focus on developing country seafood export value
  chains
• build public private partnerships along selected
  seafood value chains
• communicate informed and balanced positions on
  issues e.g. endangered species, trade barriers,
  subsidies

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name and shame lists of irresponsible vessels

• A. RFMO lists plus
• B. national lists of primary offenders
  foreign vessels convicted of fishing without a
  license
• link to beneficial ownership
• gradually compile at regional global level
• Bank efforts liability issue with IUCN on
  hold

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enforcement must be cost effective

• common issues
• fisheries, drugs, immigration, customs, marine
  pollution, money laundering, corruption, piracy
• cost-effective use of assets and capacity
• customs, police, coastguard, critical control
  points ports, airports (live/ fresh fish)
• vessels, aircraft, communications, information
• new cost-effective technologies
• remote sensing, tracking and traceability, e.g.
  France in Southern Ocean
• effective regional cooperation essential
• West Africa, South Pacific, Caribbean, Indian
  Ocean

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conclusions

• illegal fishing is a symptom of weak governance
• policy and anti-corruption measures need to
  supplement direct efforts to combat illegal
  fishing
• a responsible fishing industry is fundamental
• some of the solutions are not within the
  fisheries sector

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References

• World Bank fisheries www.worldbank.org/fish
• World Bank governance indicators
  http//go.worldbank.org/5QM8VLZRW0
• Where Is the Wealth of Nations?
  http//siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEEI/214578-1
  110886258964/20748034/All.pdf
• The Sunken Billions www.worldbank.org/sunkenbilli
  ons
• Changing the Face of the Waters. The Challenge
  and Promise of Sustainable Aquaculture
  http//www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSC
  ontentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/12/03/000020953_20071203
  133332/Rendered/PDF/416940PAPER0Fa18082137015501PU
  BLIC1.pdf

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www.worldbank.org/fish

• Thank you

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• " responsibility for illegal fisheries
  activities?"

no political willingness
its too many fishers
forget fishing, more money in aquaculture
no enforcement
ho! ho! he bribed the minister for the shrimp
license
its not us, its the foreign boats
thers no control over small-scale fishing
we fish responsibly .. its the laws that are
wrong!
10th Annual Forum on the Global Fish Crisis