Amerika izmedu imperije i hegemonije, izmedu globalne dominacije i globalnog vodstva

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Amerika izmedu imperije i hegemonije, izmedu
globalne dominacije i globalnog vodstva
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• Empires, more than nation-states, are the
  principal actors in the history of world events.
  Much of what we call history consists of the
  deeds of the 50 to 70 empires that once ruled
  multiple peoples across large chunks of the
  globe.
• Officially, there are no empires now, only 190-
  plus nation-states. Yet the ghosts of empires
  past continue to stalk the Earth.

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• Imperije su oblici politicke kontrole nad
  efektivnim suverenitetom nekih politickih
  drutava koje im namecu druga politicka drutva
  (Majkl Dojl)
• Sve imperije koje su tokom vekova uspostavljene
  imale su tri zajednicka obeleja jedno se
  ocituje u podredivanju, svaka imperija je
  nejednak odnos, pri cemu je jedna strana
  superiorna a druga inferiorna. Drugo se ogleda u
  prinudi. Iako veliki broj imperija ukljucuje i
  saradnju, katkad ekstenzivnu saradnju izmedu onih
  koji vladaju i onih kojima se vlada, iza toga
  odnosa uvek stoji pretnja silom, koja se katkad i
  realizuje, od strane imperije u cilju odravanja
  vlastite kontrole. Trece odredujuce obeleje
  sastoji se u etnickoj, religioznoj ili rasnoj
  razlici ili u nekoj njihovoj kombinaciji
  izemdu imperijalne sile i drutva koje ona
  kontrolie. Imperija je oblik diktature, ali
  osobenog tipa diktature koju sprovode stranci?
• Pojam vlada koji potice od grcke reci za
  krmaniti, stariji je nego termin imperija koji se
  izvodi iz latinske reci komandovati Vlada je
  optiji pojam imperija je samo jedna od mnogih
  oblika vladavine. (Majkl Mandelbaum)
• Naglasak na kvalitetu odnosa izmedu politickih
  jedinica a ne samo na kvantitetu. Imperija moe
  biti i regionalna po svom obimu

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• Empire is the rule exercised by one nation over
  others both to regulate their external behavior
  and to ensure minimally acceptable forms of
  internal behavior within the subordinate states.
  Merely powerful states do the former, but not the
  latter. (Stephen Peter Rosen)

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• The central--one may say the necessary but not
  sufficient--imperial task is the creation and
  management of a hierarchical interstate order.
• From that key task of regulating the external
  behavior of other states proceeds the imperial
  problems of maintaining a monopoly on the use of
  organized military power, and of using its
  monopolistic but still finite military power
  efficiently--a problem captured in the military
  concept of "economy of force."
• But an empire must also ensure the security and
  internal stability of its constituent parts,
  extract revenue to pay the costs of empire, and
  assimilate the elites of non-imperial societies
  to the metropolitan core, tasks that presuppose
  influence over the internal affairs of other
  societies.

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• Today, the picture for the United States is
  mixed. It exercises effective, if less than
  formal, hierarchical authority in the Western
  Hemisphere, in the Asian rimland, on the Arab
  side of the Persian Gulf and in the NATO area. At
  the start of 2003, it was trying to extend its
  hierarchical interstate order to the Balkans and
  Afghanistan, and was preparing to intervene in
  the internal affairs of Iraq. China, Russia and
  India cooperate opportunistically with the United
  States, but have been willing to challenge
  American dominance when possible. They certainly
  reject the right of the United States to
  intervene in their internal affairs, and thus
  remain the major countries outside the U.S.
  hierarchical order.

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• The organizing principle of interstate relations,
  Kenneth Waltz famously wrote, is anarchy In the
  absence of an overarching power that creates and
  enforces rules for interstate behavior, states
  help themselves by "balancing" against other
  centers of power that could hurt them--either by
  building up their own forces or by joining with
  other states. The organizing principle of empire
  rests, in contrast, on the existence of an
  overarching power that creates and enforces the
  principle of hierarchy, but is not itself bound
  by such rules. In turn, subordinate states do not
  build up their own capabilities or join with
  others when threatened they call instead on the
  imperial power for assistance. In so doing, they
  give up a key component of state sovereignty,
  which is direct control of their own security.
  This condition is the result of two sets of
  factors the ability and willingness of the
  imperial power to acquire and maintain something
  close to a monopoly on the organized use of
  military power, and the abdication of states
  within the empire of responsibility to build
  their own effective military capabilities. How
  does such overarching power come to exist?

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• The formation of a monopoly on military power is
  greatly facilitated by the decision of other
  potential powers not to compete. The Roman Empire
  effectively had two components, one in the west
  and one in the east (centered on Byzantium). As
  is well known, the eastern empire persisted long
  after the sack of Rome in 476 CE. Less well known
  is the fact that the internal factors associated
  with the fall of the Roman Empire--the rise of
  Christianity, increasing social rigidity and the
  bureaucratization of imperial governance--were
  just as powerful in the east as they were in the
  west. The difference was that there were fewer
  organized military challenges in the east, and
  the one potential challenger to Byzantium, the
  Parthian Empire, chose to accept Rome's dominant
  role.(n3) Similarly, the British monopoly on
  seapower began to emerge in the early 18th
  century, when French Continental concerns led to
  the virtual disappearance of the French battle
  fleet. The withdrawal of competitors was even
  more marked following the wars of the French
  Revolution, at which time British naval mastery
  rested, according to Paul M. Kennedy, on the
  "simple wish of other nations not to spend the
  time or energy to challenge the British.

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• The same phenomenon is at work today. The
  American empire did not emerge simply as the
  result of the growth of American power, but as a
  result of the collapse of Russian power, the
  decline of European and Japanese military
  spending relative to the United States, and the
  unwillingness of those countries to take military
  action or make military preparations in response
  to a host of security problems. A surprising
  number of major states are not now engaging in
  the self-help that Waltz says is at the heart of
  interstate relations, but are relying instead on
  the United States for their security.

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• The ability of republican Rome to develop
  military power from a population of free adult
  males from Rome and its Italian allies (totaling
  approximately 2.75 million men) was the basis of
  Roman expansion. From this base it built an army
  that controlled an imperial population of
  approximately fifty million people. Rome's
  ability to develop more military power than its
  rivals rested primarily on the organizational
  practices of the Roman Legions, which created a
  unified and coordinated fighting force that could
  routinely defeat opposing armies five times its
  size. Drill and discipline produced formations
  that could withstand uncoordinated infantry and
  cavalry attacks mounted by less well-organized
  adversaries. The internal divisions and lack of
  social cohesion among the rivals of Rome, with
  the exception of the armies of Hannibal, created
  an enduring military advantage that cascaded
  overtime, for as Rome's area of control expanded,
  the population base from which it could draw
  military recruits expanded, too.

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• The Roman Empire in the West can be dated from 27
  B.C., when Octavian became Caesar Augustus and
  emperor in all but name. It ended when
  Constantinople was established as a rival capital
  with the death of the Emperor Theodosius in 395,
  making a total of 422 years.
• The Roman Empire in the East can be dated from
  then until, at the latest, the sack of Byzantium
  by the Ottoman Turks in 1453, a total of 1,058
  years.
• The Holy Roman Empirethe successor to the
  Western empirelasted from 800, when Charlemagne
  was crowned emperor of the Romans, until Napoleon
  ended it in 1806. The average Roman empire
  therefore lasted 829 years.

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• The three Roman empires were uncharacteristically
  long lived. By comparison, the average Near
  Eastern empire (including the Assyrian, Abassid,
  and Ottoman) lasted a little more than 400 years
  the average Egyptian and East European empires
  around 350 years the average Chinese empire
  (subdividing by the principal dynasties) ruled
  for more than three centuries. The various
  Indian, Persian, and West European empires
  generally survived for between 200 and 300 years.
• The empires created in the 20th century, by
  contrast, were comparatively short. The
  Bolsheviks Soviet Un ion (192291) lasted less
  than 70 years, a meager record indeed, though one
  not yet equaled by the Peoples Republic of
  China. Japans colonial empire, which can be
  dated from the acquisition of Taiwan in 1895,
  lasted barely 50 years. Most fleeting of all
  modern empires was Adolf Hitlers Third Reich,
  which did not extend beyond its predecessors
  borders before 1938 and had retreated

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• Moreover, many of todays most important states
  are still recognizably the progeny of empires.
  Look at the Russian Federation, where less than
  80 percent of the population is Russian, or
  Britain, which is, for all intents and purposes,
  an English empire. Modern-day Italy and Germany
  are the products not of nationalism but of
  Piemontese and Prussian expansion.
• Todays world, in short, is as much a world of
  ex-empires and ex-colonies as it is a world of
  nation-states.

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The United Stes of America as country in position
of primacy
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• The U. S. Position in the current World order is
  best understood as one of primacy. The United
  Stets is not a global hegemon, because it cannot
  physically control the entire globe and thus
  cannot compel other states to do whatever it
  wants Nonetheless, the United States is also
  something more than first among equals If
  primacy is defined as being first in order,
  importance or authority or holding first or
  chief place, then it is an apt description of
  Americas current position. (Stephen M. Walt)

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• Kao posledica rata u Iraku 2003.godine, drugi
  analiticari opisuju medunarodni poredak kao
  Americku svetsku imperiju. Na mnogo nacina
  metafora o imperiji je privlacna. Americka vojska
  ima globalni domaaj, sa bazama irom sveta i
  njihovim regionalnim komandantima koji ponekad
  deluju kao prokonzuli. Engleski je lingua franca
  kao to je to svojevremeno bio Latinski jezik.
  Americka ekonomija je najveca na svetu, a
  americka kultura je magnet drugim kulturama.
  Ipak, pogreno je pomeati politiku prvenstva sa
  politikom imperije. Sjedinjene Americke Drave
  zasigurno nisu imperija na nacin na koji mi
  mislimo o evropskim prekomorskim imperijama iz
  devetnaestog i dvadesetog veka, jer je sutinska
  osobina takvog imperijalizma bila politicka
  kontrola nad ostalim delovima planete. Iako
  odnosi u kojima postoji nejednakost zasigurno
  postoje izmedu Sjedinjenih Drava i slabijih sila
  i lako mogu dovesti do jednog eksploatatorskog
  odnosa sa americke strane, odsustvo formalne
  politicke kontrole nad tim dravama, cini termin
  "imperijalna" ne samo nedovoljno tacnim, nego i
  potpuno pogrenim...

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• Sjedinjene Americke Drave imaju vie izvora moci
  nego to ih je imala Velika Britanija na vrhuncu
  svoje imperijalne moci, ali Sjedinjene Drave
  imaju manje moci u smislu kontrole nad ponaanjem
  i unutranjom politikom drugih zemalja, nego to
  je to imala Britanija u doba kada je vladala
  cetvrtinom Planete. Na primer, kole u Keniji,
  izbori, proces donoenja zakona i ubiranje poreza
  - da ne pominjemo spoljnu politiku zemlje - bili
  su pod kontrolom britanskih zvanicnika. U
  poredenju sa tim, Sjedinjene Drave imaju malo
  takve kontrole u dananje vreme. Tokom 2003.
  godine Sjedinjene Drave nisu cak uspele da
  zadobiju glasove Meksika i Kine za drugu
  rezoluciju o Iraku u Savetu bezbednosti
  Ujedinjenih Nacija. Analiticari imperije
  odgovaraju da je termin "imperija" samo metafora.
  Ipak, problem sa tom metaforom jeste da ona
  podrazumeva kontrolu iz Vaingtona koja se teko
  uklapa sa sloenim nacinom na koji je moc u svetu
  danas raspodeljena...

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• U globalnom informatickom dobu, moc je medu
  dravama raspodeljena po obrascu koji podseca na
  sloenu trodimenzionalnu ahovsku tablu, na kojoj
  se igra odvija i horizontalno i vertikalno. Na
  vrhu ahovske table gde su politicko-vojna
  pitanja, vojna moc je uglavnom unipolarna sa
  Sjedinjenim Dravama kao jedinom supersilom, ali
  u sredini table gde su ekonomska pitanja,
  Sjedinjene Drave nisu hegemon ili imperija, i
  moraju da se cenjkaju sa Evropom sa jednakih
  pozicija kada Evropa deluje kao ujedinjena
  celina. Na primer, povodom antimonopolskih ili
  pitanja koja se odnose na privredu, one moraju
  naci kompromis, da bi postigle sporazum. I na dnu
  table transnacionalnih odnosa koji prelaze
  granice van kontrole vlada drava i tako
  ukljucuju raznovrsne aktere kao to su bankari i
  teroristi, moc se haoticno rasprava. Uzmimo kao
  dodatak pitanjima terorizma samo nekoliko
  primera privatni akteri na globalnom tritu
  kapitala ogranicavaju nacin na koji se kamatne
  stope mogu koristiti za upravljanje americkom
  ekonomijom, a trgovina droge, AIDS, migracija
  stanovnitva, i globalno zagrevanje koji imaju
  duboke drutvene korene u vie od jedne zemlje,
  izvan su kontrole americkih vlasti. U takvoj
  jednoj situaciji cini se da nema ba puno smisla
  koristiti tradicionalne termine poput
  unipolarnost, hegemonija ili imperija s ciljem da
  se opiu takvi problemi. (Dozef Naj)

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• Americans, in short, don't "do" empire they do
  "leadership" instead, or, in more academic
  parlance, "hegemony."
• According to S. Ryan Johansson, the word
  "hegemony" was used originally to describe the
  relationship of Athens to the other Greek
  city-states that joined it in an alliance against
  the Persian Empire. "Hegemony" in this case
  "meant that Athens organized and directed
  their combined efforts without securing permanent
  political power over the others.
• By contrast, according to the "world-system
  theory" of Immanuel Wallerstein, "hegemony" means
  more than mere leadership but less than outright
  empire. A hegemonic power is "a state ... able to
  impose its set of rules on the interstate system,
  and thereby create temporarily a new political
  order." The hegemon also offers "certain extra
  advantages for enterprises located within it or
  protected by it, advantages not accorded by the
  'market' but obtained through political pressure."

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• Yet another, narrower definition is offered by
  Geoffrey Pigman. Pigman describes a hegemon's
  principal function as underwriting a liberal
  international trading system that is beneficial
  to the hegemon but, paradoxically, even more
  beneficial to its potential rivals. Pigman traces
  this now widely used definition of the word back
  to the economic historian Charles Kindleberger's
  seminal work on the interwar economy, which
  describes a kind of "hegemonic interregnum."
  After 1918, Kindleberger suggested, the United
  Kingdom was too weakened by war to remain an
  effective hegemon, but the United States was
  still too inhibited by protectionism and
  isolationism to take over the role. This idea,
  which became known, somewhat inelegantly, as
  "hegemonic stability theory," was later applied
  to the post-1945 period by authors such as Arthur
  Stein, Susan Strange, Henry Nau, and Joseph Nye.

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• The very concept of "hegemony" is really just a
  way to avoid talking about empire, "empire" being
  a word to which most Americans remain averse. But
  "empire" has never exclusively meant direct rule
  over foreign territories without any political
  representation of their inhabitants.
• There is an important and now widely accepted
  distinction between "formal" and "informal"
  empire. The British did not formally govern
  Argentina, for example, but the merchant banks of
  the City of London exerted such a powerful
  influence on that country's fiscal and monetary
  policy that its independence was heavily
  qualified.

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• Broadly speaking, two kinds of change can be
  conceived in relation to the exercise of power by
  states in the global system. The first involves
  shifts along a dimension from the highly
  centralized to the highly diffuse that is, from
  a situation in which the actual and threatened
  use of force is carried by out by one political
  actor to a situation in which more states
  participate actively in deterrence and are
  prepared to intervene militarily abroad. Of
  course, it is also conceivable that the
  international system will maintain the current
  level of centralization for a long time. The
  second type of change involves movement along a
  dimension in which the exercise of power may
  become more discretional, or more
  constitutionalized. (David Held)

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Great Britain and United States Anglophone
Empires? Comparative analysis

• A century ago, the United Kingdom's formal empire
  was very large indeed, covering nearly a quarter
  of the world's surface and ruling roughly the
  same proportion of its population. Today, on the
  other hand, the United States' formal empire
  includes just 14 dependencies (of which the
  largest is Puerto Rico) and covers less than
  11,0000 square kilometers. A century ago, the
  United Kingdom could draw wealth and personnel
  from the 15 million of its subjects who had
  settled in the temperate zones of the empire.
  Today, by contrast, fewer than four million
  Americans reside abroad, and nearly all of them
  live in Canada, Mexico, or Western Europe. A
  century ago, the United Kingdom was a net
  exporter of capital, on such a scale that it
  truly deserved to be called "the world's banker."
  Today, the United States is a net importer of
  capital on almost as large a scale. A century
  ago, British leaders could devote the lion's
  share of their attention and taxpayers' money to
  imperial defense and grand strategy, since before
  1910, government provided only minimal care for
  the sick and elderly, and most of that was local.
  Today, Washington spends its money on social
  security, defense, welfare, and Medicare - in
  that order.

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• Imperial denial in United States
• The distinction between hegemony and Empire would
  be legitimate if the term Empire did simply mean,
  as so many American commentators seem to assume,
  direct rule over foreign territories without any
  political representation of their inhabitants.

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• With a broader and more sophisticated definition
  of empire, it seems possible to dispense
  altogether with the term hegemony. Instead, it
  can be argued with some plausibility that the
  American Empire has up until now, with a few
  exceptions, preferred indirect rule to direct
  rule and informal empire to formal empire.
• Cold War USA as an Empire by Invitation

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34

• ????? ????????, ????? ?? ?? ???? ?????????? ????
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  ? ???????? ???? ??????), ??????? ???? ?????? ??
  ????? 45 000 ????????? ??????, ?????? ??????
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35

• ????? ?????????? ??????????? ?????? ?????
  ??????????? ?? ?????? ?????????? ?????
  (Associated Press-Ipsos poll), ???? 6 ?? 10
  ??????????? ???????? ?????? ???????? ? ???? ??
  ????? ??????? (????? ?? ?? ???????????? ?????? ??
  11. ????????? 2001 ????. ?. ?.), ???????? ??
  ??? ?????? ?? ?? ???????? ????? ?????? ?????????
  ?????????, ??? 6 ?? 10 ?????????? ?????? ?? ??
  ??? ? ????? ????????? ???? ??? ???? ?????????????
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  ????????????, ??? ?????????? ????? ??????? ?
  ?????? ?? ?????? ??????????? ?? 2002. ??????.

36

• ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ?? ?????? ?????????? ????
  ? ?o???????? (?????? ?????)
• Myth of Empire (Myths of Security Through
  Expansion) OFFENSIVE ADVANTAGE, POWER SHIFTS,
  PAPER TIGER ENEMIES, BANDWAGONS , BIG STICK
  DIPLOMACY, FALLING DOMINOES, EL DORADO AND
  MANIFEST DESTINY, NO TRADEOFFS, - Jack L. Snyder

-
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• Nacionalizam kao rak rana imperija
• Imperije su icezle zato to su postale preskupe
  (Majkl Mandelbaum)
• Hierarchy is usually costly. Dominant states can
  offer concessions to induce subordinates to give
  up their valued freedom. The Soviet Union
  rejected this course, at first, electing to
  extract resources from Eastern Europe rather than
  share its benefits from cooperation. Indeed, by
  one estimate, Moscow withdrew nearly 1 billion
  per year from the region until 1956. By the late
  1950s, however, the flow of resources reversed,
  and by the 1980s the Soviet Union was subsidizing
  Eastern Europe to a total of about 17 billion
  per year. (David Lake)

38

• ??????????????? ?????? (Fareed Zakaria)
• ?????????? ????????? 2001. ??? ?? ????????
  ??????? ? ???????? ???????? ???? (Power
  Politics). ?????????? ????????, ?? ????? ????
  ???? ???? ??????? ??????????, ?? ????????
  ???????????? ??????????, ??????? ?? ?????????? ?
  ?????????? ????????????? ??????? ???? ? ?????? ?
  ?????? ??????? ? ????? ????????? ?????.
• ?????? ?????? ?????? ????? ???? ???? ????
  ?????? ???? ?????? ??????? ?? ???? ???????
  ??????????. ?? ???? ?????? ?? ?????? ???????
  ????????? ???? ?? ?????? ?? ???????????? ???? ??
  ??????? ???? ??? ???? ???????? ?????????
  ??????????. (Zbigniew Brzezinski)

39

• A?????? ????? ????? ????? ??????????? ???????????
  ???? ?? ?????? ????????? ????????, ?? ???? ??
  ?????????? ???? ???? ????? ???? ????????
  ?????????? ?????????, ???? ??? ?? ?? ??? ??????
  ?? ??????? ???????????? ????,?. ? ?????? ??
  ????????? ?? ????? ? ???????????? ?? ??????????
  ?? ???? ?????????? ?????? ?????.
• ???? ?? ?????????? ??????? ?? ???? ? ??????
  ?????????? ?????? (??????? ?????????)
• ???????? ???????? ???? ????? ?????? ???????
  ????????? ?? ???? ????? (????? ???)
• ???? ?? ?? ??????? ????????? ???????????

40

• As we work our way through this seemingly
  intractable problem in Iraq, we must constantly
  remember that this is not just a troublesome
  issue form which we can walk away if it seems too
  costly to continue. What is at stake is not only
  Iraq and the stability of the Middle East, but
  the global perception of the reliability of the
  United States as a partner in a deeply troubled
  world. We cannot afford to fail this test And
  this is why America cant just walk away. (Brent
  Scowcroft, The International herald Tribune,
  Thursday, January 4, 2007, p. 6)

41
However, if the United States was not an Empire,
then what was it?(Niall Ferguson)
42
??????????

• Charles Crauthammer, Unipolar moment, Foreign
  Affairs, Winter 1990/1991, pp. 23-33.
• David Held, Mathias Koenig Archibugi,
  Introduction Whither American Power?, in
  David Held, Mathias Koenig Archibugi, Eds.,
  American Power in the 21st Century, Polity Press,
  Cambridge, UK, 2003, pp. 1- 20
• Niall Ferguson, Colossus The Price of Americas
  Empire, The Penguin Press, New York, 2004, pp.
  1-29
• Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power The
  Global Response to U. S. Primacy, W. W. Norton,
  New York, 2005, pp. 11 61
• Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment
  Revisited, The National Interest, Winter
  2002/03, pp. 5 17
• Niall Ferguson, A World Without Power, Foreign
  Policy, July / August 2004, pp. 32 -39
• Michael Mandelbaum, Davids Friend Goliath,
  Foreign Policy, January / February 2006, pp. 50
  56
• Niall Ferguson, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Going
  Critical American Power and the Consequences of
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