Theories of Political DecisionMaking

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Theories of Political Decision-Making

• 1. SEU or rational choice model (based on how
  people SHOULD behave if rational)
• 2. Behavioral or descriptive model (based on
  research how people in SMALL GROUPS
• ACTUALLY make decisions
• 3. Role other variables BUREAUCRATIC
  POLITICS

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(Subjective) Expected Utility Theory (SEU)

• Normative theory of decision making
• how people SHOULD make decisions under
  uncertainty

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AND implicit model of how people make decisions
(for many)

• Example Will North Korea use nukes if system is
  collapsing???
• Motivational analysis.infer what will Kim Il
  Sung do?

• What are his options? Preferences
• How does he calculate risks/success (P of success
  each outcome)
• How will he maximize North Koreas national
  interests????

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Rational choice -motivational analysis.

• What is Kim Il Sung likely to do if country
  collapsing?
• what if or plausibility motivational analysis
• based on information perceived to be relevant,
  prior beliefs values BUT
• rationality culture-bound concept

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SEU or Rational choice model

• Assumptions
• 1) People know can rank order preferences
  (logical order altbltc)
• 2)Estimate P of success (based on all relevant
  available information (use P theory)
• 3) Maximize pick most preferred option with
  high P of success

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Behavioral decision-making model

• People satisfice (dont usually try to
  maximize)

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Key concepts (research how people ACTUALLY -
decisions

• Use status quo as anchor
• Find good enough solution (change)
• Preferences risk calculus vary (framing)

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Research - how people ACTUALLY make decisions

• Dont use probability theory
• -weights not frequencies of occurrence
• - avoid Regrets
• - focus on ONE aspect of problem
• I.e., dont lose war before next
• elections
• Use intuitive heuristics prior beliefs

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Research - how people ACTUALLY make decisions

• Use intuitive HEURISTICS ( prior beliefs)gt
• lots of cognitive BIASES
• -attribution bias (motivational analysis)
• -retrospective bias..gtdont learn from experience

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Research - how people ACTUALLY make decisions

• PROCESS only LIMITED AMOUNTS of INFORMATION
  (often inconsistently)
• Simplify PROBLEM (BINARY CHOICE)
• COGNITIVE CONCEITgtresult
• think we make better (more rational)
  decisions than we do

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Implications (Scary)???

• If NOT rational choosers who maximize
• Cant predict in advance what other will do
• Cant assume weve chosen the best
• solution
• Cant ignore fact intuitive decision making
• often leads to biases and errors

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BUT

• There are patterns in way people make decisions
  UNDER UNCERTAINTY
• .gtif limited information processor
• easier to design DECISION AIDS

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Political problems ill-structured problems

• No Simple choice
• Not single person
• Small Group

• STEPS
• 1 develop shared problem representation
• 2 discuss-reach consensus
• 3 Development problem solution
• (key reference point
• STATUS QUO - make a minor adjustment

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Develop a shared problem representation
(immediate problem at hand

• Define Problem
• .
• .
• Discuss (what are we doing now?)
• .
• .
• shared solution

• CUBAN MISSILE
• CRISIS
• Must get the missiles out before next election
• .
• .
• blockade use force if necessary

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Descriptive research on Group Judgments
Decisions

• Do groups operate with same heuristics and biases
  as individuals?
• (Plous Ch 18)

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How Groups are similar to Individuals

• Individual and Group Attribution Error
• (ignore external determinants of behavior)
• Self-serving Group-serving biases
• (team winsgtgood players, team losses???)
• Outgroup homogeneity bias (perceptions of own
  group as highly varied others all the same)

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GROUPS

• may amplify biases resulting from using
  heuristics

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Implications for politics????(groups amplify
pre-existing tendencies)

• Perpetuate
• STEROTYPES
• Individuals
• Groups
• Americans
• Serbs vs. Albanians
• hawks doves

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GROUP POLARIZATION

• tendency for group discussion to amplify the
  inclinations of group members
• RISKY SHIFT
• (Stoner, 1961)

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Impact of Group on problem solving?

• Usually IMPROVES problem-solving
• ESPECIALLY if
• OPEN discussion encouraged
• I.e.,
• -dissenting viewpoints are heard
• -minorities have a say

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How good are Group Problem solving abilities

• Construct shared
• PROBLEM REPRESENTATION

• BASED on
• WHOSE
• Knowledge?

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GROUPS tend to be more ACCURATE

• UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
• -Nature and difficulty of the task
• -Competence of group members, how group members
  interact, etc
• BETTER for Quantitative judgements
• average individual performance (not best
  individual performance)

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Research on creativity

• Brainstorming
• more effective when ideas generated
  independently
• combined rather than
• in group
• .gtindependent work
• then SHARE ideas

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Groupthink

• a general pattern of concurrence seeking in a
  highly cohesive group who seek to maintain group
  solidarity at all costs

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SYMPTOMS of GROUPTHINK

• ILLUSION of INVULNERABILITY
• excessive RISKS taking (nothing can stop us)
• STEREOTYPED views of ENEMY
• (we good guys
• theyre weak bad

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Why so many miscalculations?

• limited information processing capabilities
• Situational factors (crisis)
• Group Dynamics
• Organization Constraints (Bureaucratic Politics

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ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS

• HIGH degree of group COHESIVENESS
• INSULATION of group
• Lack tradition impartial LEADERSHIPLack NORMS
• critical appraisal of situation alternatives

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ILLUSION of UNANIMITY

• ASSUMED CONSENSUS
• silence consent
• Uniformity Pressures
• Closed-mindedness
• Collective rationalizations
• No one speaks out

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Self-Appointed MINDGUARDS

• Ensure no counter arguments raised
• social pressures against DEVIANT views
• Keep DEVIANTS
• quiet or away

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SUAVE or FORCEFUL LEADERSHIP

• Encourages DOCILITY
• among ADVISERS
• No DEVIANT views
• expressed
• FEAR loosing ACCESS (value
• extension)

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SELF-CENSORSHIP

• Suppression of personal doubts
• .gt
• Ignore group consequences of actions
• Unquestioned belief
• in groups morality

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NORMS I.e.. Dont ANTAGONIZE VALUED (New) MEMBERS

• dont attack CIA plan
• importance of AFFECT
• group cohesiveness

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Consequences of Groupthink

• Incomplete survey of
• alternatives (2)
• objectives
• Failure to examine RISKS or COSTS
• of PREFERRED outcome
• Failure reappraise other alternative

• Poor information search (ignore experts)
• Selective biases in processing information
• Little or no time
• discussing implementation , why if, contingency
  plans

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High Quality Political Decisions

• How can such intelligent people make such
• BAD decisions?
• What are political decisions so difficult?

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Other Factors influencing decision-making process

• Decision-making the Quintessential Political Act

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Complex problem solving(ill-structured problems)

• LOTS of
• UNCERTAINTY
• --Outcome unknown
• --Information
• incomplete
• conflicting

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Why political decisions are so difficult

• Multiple and competing values
• Complexity
• Value Extension
• Should US maintain troops in Balkans?
• Send troops to Sierra Leone? Help police?

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SMALL GROUP is political decision unit

• Small group interaction
• Distribution of roles, personal
• relationships, expertise
• Type of Group new (crisis) or working
• 
  group
• Physical factors group size
• seating arrangements

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Other factors

• Cognitive limitations
• memory
• cognitive
• complexity

• Political Power
• dispersed
• Across individuals
• organizations
• Role
• Organizational rules,norms,constrains

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BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

• Institutional rules Civilian control of
• 
  military
• Norms
• national interest agency interest
• where you stand on an issue depends
• upon where you sit
• Constraints

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Importance of bureaucratic politics depends

• Who are key actors
• (how diffuse is responsibility)
• What are key issues
• (framing is a political exercise)

• Each agency
• SOP
• institutional culture(oral )
• interpersonal relationships -heads
• key managers

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How individuals bureaucratic actors resolve
value conflicts?

• Compromise (inter-agency pulling
• 
  hauling)
• Accept
• Deny
• Misinterpret information, decision

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Other important factors

• MICRO
• Individual variables (personality,cognition)
• Role formal,informal
• (Advisory system)

• MACRO
• Information
• Bureaucratic politics
• Domestic Political,
• Economic, Social
• factors
• International factors
• Remembered History

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Decision Fiascoes Bay of Pigs

• Background
• JFK 2 days after elected approved CIA plan to
  provide COVERT US military aid to Cuban exiles to
  
• OVERTHROW
• CASTRO

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6 MISCALCULATIONS (false assumptions)

• People would believe CIA cover story
• Cuban Air Force is ineffectivecan be knocked
  out before attack
• Castros army so weak Exile brigade can
  establish well-protected beachhead

• High morale of 1400 Cubans dont need support
  US troops
• Invasion with spark
• popular uprising
• If fails can retreat to Escombray Mountains and
  join guerrillas

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Why did Kennedy ADVISERS make such faulty
assumptions?

• POLITICAL calculations (Cold War)
• ADMINISTRATION
• captive bureaucracy
• need for secrecy
• threats personal reputation status
• faulty dmgroupthink

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Decision to escalate Korean War

• Trumans Bay of Pigs
• Background
• Authorized Gen MacArthur to cross 38th parallel
  to occupy North Korea
• June 1950 North Korea invades
• Oct US uniting for peace UN resolution
• Nov China enters war in mass
• longest retreat in US history

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Major miscalculations

• Ignored risks
• Shared sense invulnerability
• Mindguards excluded experts (Acheson-Kennan)
• Selective self perception
• Deflected anger from group (Press)

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Pearl Harbor 1941- INTERLOCKING GROUP THINK

• It cant happen here
• Japs wont take risk
• Fleet in harbor IS a
• deterrent
• Let GEORGE do it (Army)
• Noisy warning
• Wishful thinking and SOPs

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Johnsons decisionmaking 1964-67 Case of
Groupthink?

• Rejects Ellsbergs quagmire myth
• (methaheuristic-DONT LOSE WAR BEFORE NEXT
  ELECTION)
• vs
• slow motion Bay of Pigs

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HIGH QUALITY DM Cuban Missile Crisis Why?

• Canvassed lots alternatives
• Analyzed objectives,value implications,costs
• cont. search information, expert advise
• attention to details implementation

• LEARNED from
• Bay of Pigs
• Everyone encouraged to play DEVIL ADVOCATES
• LEADER absent
• 2 subgroups
• Bob Kennedy intellectural mindguard

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Marshall Plan - High Quality Decisonmaking 2 weeks

• 6 independent groups
• assumed Europeans must play central role
• assumed Germany keyoffered to all
• highly emotional (Kennan wept)
• new members for advise (Harriman)

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Who sucumbs to GROUPTHINK?

• What can be done????

• Use decision aids
• ALGORITHMS
• (picking a college)
• Use computer aids -
• develop problem
• problem solving heuristics, choice

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Unanswered questions/criticisms

• How widespread is groupthink?
• Janis methodology
• convenience sample s
• incomplete data-CMC
• new research -problem framing-solution ALL
• how to judge process-oucome