Aristoteles Nicomachean Ethics

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AristotelesNicomachean Ethics

• Human Excellence and
• The Good Life

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The Nicomachean Ethics

• The Nicomachean Ethicsa work Aristoteles may
  have written for his son, Nikomakhosis one of
  the easiest to read, so its an excellent place
  to begin the study of Aristoteles philosophy
• Despite its title, it isnt so much a work on
  what wed call ethics today as a book about the
  goal of all human striving and what it takes to
  live life supremely well
• Accordingly, it dwells at length on the question
  of the qualities of character and intellect one
  must have to be able to do this, and its in fact
  the Greek word for having to do with
  characterethikethat gives both the work and
  the relevant science their names

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook I

• Book I is devoted to identifying the goal of all
  human striving and characterizing it in
  reasonably full detail
• Aristoteles begins by saying that its generally
  agreed that its eudaimonia that all human beings
  want by naturewant, that is, whether they know
  that this is what they want or notand he then
  proceeds to argue that this is not what most
  people take it to be, namely, pleasure, honor, or
  wealth (McKeon 349-351)
• Instead, Aristoteles argues, eudaimonia is
  activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and
  if there are more than one virtue, in accordance
  with the best and most completein a complete
  life (McKeon 357)

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook I

• The traditional translation of the word
  eudaimonia happinessis, I think, terribly
  misleading. Aristoteles makes it plain that what
  he means by eudaimonia is not any sort of state
  of mind, and yet thats exactly what most of us
  mean by the term happiness
• So one must constantly remind oneself what this
  central term really means the distinctively
  human part of human life, lived supremely well
  (cf. Study Guide 30ff.)
• Given this characterization of the goal of all
  human striving, the next question is what
  qualities of character and intellect one must
  have to be able to achieve this, and thats the
  question taken up in Books II-VI

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook II

• Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics begins with the
  distinction between the moral and intellectual
  virtuesthe qualities of character and intellect
  that
• Make those who possess them good people, and so
• Make it possible for them to be happyi.e., to
  achieve eudaimonia
• Aristoteles begins by observing that theres a
  difference in the way these qualities are
  acquired (Nic. Eth. II.i., 1103a15ff, McKeon
  369)
• Excellence of intellect owes both its birth and
  its growth to teaching (and so requires both
  experience and time)
• Excellence of character comes about as a result
  of the formation of the right habits (and so
  requires a good upbringing)

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook II

• This said, Aristoteles turns his attention
  specifically to the moral virtues, the
  excellences of character, which are the sole
  subject of discussion in Books II-V, the
  intellectual virtues (or excellences of
  intellect) being the subject of Book VI
• First, he argues that
• none of the moral virtues arises in us by
  nature rather, we are adapted by nature to
  receive them, and are made perfect i.e., made
  into the particular people that we are by ethos
  custom, usage, manners, habit (1103a19-25),
  and consequently
• we must conduct ourselves virtuously, and in the
  first instance, must be required to do so (by our
  parents and by good laws), if we are to become
  good (1103a26-1103b26)

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook II

• Then, after discussing a variety of
  methodological considerations and answers to
  possible objections (chapters ii-iv), Aristoteles
  takes up the question what virtue isand
  specifically, what moral virtue is (chapters
  v-vi). His answer
• Neither our virtues nor our vices are passions or
  faculties (i.e., they arent the feelings we have
  or the capacities we have to have those
  feelings) instead, theyre states of character
  the things in virtue of which we stand well or
  badly with reference to the passions or in other
  words, theyre dispositions (1105b19-1106a11),
  and this gives us the genus for the virtues (the
  moral virtues, and, for that matter, for the
  moral vices as well)
• And as for the specific difference.

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook II

• One of Aristoteles most interesting claims is
  the one that provides him with the specific
  difference he needs for his definition that each
  of the moral virtues must be seen as a mean
  between two vices one of which exceeds and one of
  which falls short of what is right in both
  passions and actions, while the virtue finds and
  chooses that which is intermediatei.e., just
  right (1107a2-6)
• He argues for this point with considerable care
  (in the passage at 1106a25-1106b35), prefacing
  that argument with an absolutely crucial
  explanation of whats involved in the concept of
  a virtue (or excellencei.e., the concept of a
  good-making property) in general. The passage in
  question is at 1106a15-23, and with it one may
  profitably compare a discussion at the end of
  Book I of Platons Republic, (352e-354b, Rouse
  152ff).

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook II

• This, then, gives Aristoteles the definition hes
  been seeking, which is formulated with precision
  at 1106b36-1107a26 (q.v.)
• Now, as to what the virtues and vices
  specifically recognized by Aristoteles are, the
  list is in Book II, chapter vii (1107a26-1108b11
  cf. the table of contents for Nic. Eth.
  III.vi-V.xi, McKeon 340-341)

• Courage (Bravery)
• Rashness/Fearlessness
• Cowardice

• IV. Magnificence (Civic Generosity)
• Tastelessness and Vulgarity
• Niggardliness

• V. Proper Pride (Arrogance? Haughtiness?)
• Empty Vanity
• Undue Humility
• Of all the virtues recognized by Aristoteles,
  this one seems always to give modern readers the
  greatest difficulty see Book IV, chapter iii

• II. Temperance (Moderation)
• Self-indulgence
• Insensibility

• III. Liberality (Private Generosity)
• Prodigality
• Meanness

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook II

• VI. The Mean Between Ambition and Unambitiousness
• Ambition
• Unambitiousness

• IX. Ready Wit
• Buffoonery
• Boorishness

• VII. Good Temper
• Irascibility
• Inirascibility

• X. Friendliness
• Obsequiousness and Flattery
• Quarrelsomeness and Surliness

• Truthfulness
• (Straightforwardness About
• Oneself)
• Boastfulness
• Mock Modesty

• Justice (As this word has many senses, there are
  actually many virtues and vices here see Book V
  for the full analysis)

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook II

• This concludes the introductory discussion of the
  moral virtues (and vices)
• As we shall see, Book III begins with a
  challenging discussion of the conditions under
  which we can be held to be responsible for our
  actions and for our character itself
• Then, beginning with chapter 6 of Book III,
  Aristoteles provides a lengthy, detailed account
  (not assigned) of all the moral virtues and vices
  hes identified for us in Book II
• Thats then followed, in Book VI, by the
  discussion of the intellectual virtues, and well
  turn to that next Monday

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook III

• Chapters i-v of Book III are devoted to a
  discussion of the conditions of responsibility
  for action, beginning with a series of
  reflections on the distinction between voluntary
  and involuntary passions and actions, the
  distinction being important, Aristoteles
  suggests, because praise and blame are bestowed
  on voluntary actions and passions whereas the
  involuntary is pardoned, and sometimes even
  pitied (1109b30-32)
• Aristoteles maintains that since that which is
  done either under compulsion or owing to
  ignorance is involuntary, it must be action of
  which the moving principle is in the agent
  himself, the agent being aware of the
  particular circumstances of the action that is
  voluntary (1111a21-23)

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook III

• Chapters i-v of Book III are devoted to a
  discussion of the conditions of responsibility
  for action, beginning with a series of
  reflections on the distinction between voluntary
  and involuntary passions and actions, the
  distinction being important, Aristoteles
  suggests, because praise and blame are bestowed
  on voluntary actions and passions (those done or
  suffered on purpose) while the involuntary is
  pardoned, and sometimes even pitied (1109b30-32)
• Aristoteles maintains that since that which is
  done either under compulsion or owing to
  ignorance is involuntary, its action of which
  the moving principle is in the agent himself, he
  being aware of the particular circumstances of
  the action that is voluntary (1111a21-23)

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook III

• This distinction is, as Aristoteles points out,
  indispensable for those who assign honors and
  punishments (1109b33-34), but it provides those
  who want to grasp the nature of virtue with only
  a part of what they need to understand virtue,
  we must also understand choice, for its ones
  choices that especially reveal ones character
  (1111b4-6)
• So what is choice? Aristoteles answers this
  question by means of a process of elimination,
  arguing against a number of ideas that must have
  been advanced by his contemporaries or his
  predecessors it isnt merely to want something,
  he says, or to act in anger, or to wish for
  something, or to have some sort of opinion
  instead.

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook III

• Choice always involves deliberation, or at the
  very least a rational principle and thought
  (1112a16), so given the sorts of things we
  deliberate about, choice can be defined as
  deliberate desire of things i.e., actions or
  passions within our own power (1113a11)
• And this definition further clarifies how what we
  choose is different from what we wish for its
  always ends we wish for, and always means to
  those ends we deliberate about and choose
  (1113b2-3)
• For example while we may wish to be in good
  health, we cant simply choose to be we must do
  and put up with certain things to be and to stay
  healthy, and its about these things that we
  deliberate and ultimately make a choice

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook III

• Finally, Aristoteles argues in chapter v of Book
  III that since the exercise of the virtues is
  concerned with means and since means are things
  that are within our power, virtue also is
  within our own power, and so too vice
• The thought is this since we become good or bad
  as a result of doing the things we choose to do,
  even if we cant easily change our character once
  its been formed, it was open to us at the
  beginning (1114a20) to do and put up with the
  things that would make us good and not to do or
  give in to the things that would make us bad
• And so, Aristoteles concludes, were not only
  responsible for the things we do were at least
  partly responsible for our character as well

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook VI

• Aristoteles opens Book VI by suggesting, in
  effect, that an analysis of the intellectual
  virtues will actually give us two things for the
  price of one
• Itll complete the survey of the virtues begun in
  Books III-V
• Itll also enable us to understand the right
  rule referred to in the definition of moral
  virtue given in Book II
• While we dont get the second of these two things
  till the end of Book VI in chapters xii-xiii,
  youll need to bear in mind that the whole
  discussion is designed to achieve both these
  goals
• To set the stage for the discussion that follows,
  Aristoteles presents in broad outline his
  conception of the structure of the soul, which
  hes already said (at 1102a26-8) consists of two
  main parts (well get a much fuller account in
  the De Anima, Aristoteles treatise on the soul)

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook VI

• The Parts of the Soul
• The rational partthe part that grasps rules or
  rational principles (intellect)
• The scientific part (the contemplative intellect)
• The calculative or deliberative part (the
  calculative intellect)
• The part of this part that deliberates about
  means to ends in the sphere of action (the
  practical intellect)
• The part of this part that deliberates about
  means to ends in the sphere of production (the
  productive intellect)
• The irrational part
• The sensitive part (the faculty of sensation)
• The desiderative or appetitive part (the faculty
  of desire)see 1102b13ff on how, in a sense, the
  faculty of desire has a rational principle
• The vegetative or nutritive part (the faculties
  of growth and nutrition)see 1102a33ff
• Note the claim is that the various virtues are
  the virtues of the contemplative, practical, and
  productive intellects and of the faculty of desire

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook VI

• With this account of the various parts of the
  soul in place, the next question is this whats
  the work of each of the two main subdivisions of
  the rational part? We need to know this, because,
  as youll recall, the virtue of a thing is
  relative to its proper work (1139a15)
• Aristoteles answer, in a nutshell is this the
  work of both parts of the intellect is the
  apprehension of truth
• The contemplative intellect apprehends truth for
  its own sake, so the goal here is truth per se
• The calculative intellect apprehends it with an
  eye to action (or production), so the goal here
  is choice ideally, truth in agreement with
  right desire (1139a31)
• Even production, whose ends are subordinate to
  those of action, aims at truth in agreement with
  right desire (cf.. Nic. Eth. I. i-ii)

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook VI

• But then it follows that the states that are
  most strictly those in respect of which each of
  these parts will reach truth are the virtues of
  theparts (1139b12-13)
• With this principle, we can now begin from the
  beginning (1139b14) the intellectual virtues
  must be
• Scientific knowledge (epistemescientific
  ability)
• Art (tekhnetechnical skill)
• Practical wisdom (phronesisprudence or good
  judgment)
• Intuitive reason (nousintelligence a nose for
  principles)
• Philosophic wisdom (sophiaunderstanding of the
  highest things)
• For these are the states by virtue of which the
  soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or
  denial (1139b16), supposition and opinion being
  omitted as capable of error

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook VI

• Aristoteles proceeds to discuss these, the chief
  intellectual virtues, in chapters iii-vii, and
  what finally emerges is this
• The virtue of the contemplative intellect is
  episteme, which becomes, with the addition of
  nous, sophia
• The virtue of the practical intellect is
  phronesis, and
• The virtue of the productive intellect is tekhne
• So the five reduce to threeone for each of the
  various intellects
• Further, since choice is what gives rise to
  action, and since desire and reasoning with a
  view to an end are the things that give rise to
  choice (1139a32-33), excellence in the sphere of
  action requires both excellence of character
  (moral virtue) and phronesis

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook VI

• In fact, strictly, one cannot have either without
  the other (1144b30-31), for virtue makes us aim
  at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us
  take the right means (1144a7-8)
• One cannot determine the correct means to the end
  we ought to have before us unless one already
  desires that end (and its only moral virtue that
  ensures that one will) (1144a34), and yet
• One will be able to aim intelligently at the mark
  virtue sets before us only if one possesses
  phronesis without this, ones moral virtue wont
  be real virtuevirtue in the strict sense
  (1144b1ff)
• In short practical wisdom providesindeed isthe
  right rule that weve been seeking (1144b20-29)
• Does this, then, make practical wisdom the best
  and most complete of all the virtues? Not at all.

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook VI

• Earlier, in declaring sophia to be nous combined
  with epistemeepisteme of the highest objects
  which has received as it were its proper
  completion (1141a18-19), Aristoteles went on to
  say this Of the highest objects, we say for it
  would be strange to think that the art of
  politics, or phronesis, is the best knowledge,
  since man is not the best thing in the world
  (1141a20-24)
• Its sophia, then, thats the most finished of
  the forms of knowledge (1141a16)the virtue
  thats the best and most completeand so
  phronesis is not supreme over sophia, i.e., over
  the superior part of us,for it does not use it
  but provides for its coming into being it issues
  orders then for its sake, but not to it, and so
  happiness must be activity of soul in accordance
  with sophia, in a complete life.

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook VI

• What remains is to look more closely at
  Aristoteles definitions of each of the
  intellectual virtues, for the names alone are
  hardly adequate to the task of making it plain
  just what Aristoteles has in mind in the case of
  each
• This is what well take up next time, so review
  chapters iii-xiii of Book VI, but with special
  attention to chapters iii-viionce again making
  careful use of the relevant material in the Study
  Guide.

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook VI

• The Intellectual Virtues defined
• Sophia (Philosophic Wisdom, or Wisdom or even
  Mastery in the Sphere of Theory) Episteme Nous
• Episteme (Scientific Knowledge, or Scientific
  Ability) A state of capacity to demonstrate
  (1139b30). See the Study Guide, pp. 45-50 for a
  detailed discussion of just what this is
• Nous (Intuitive Reason, or Intelligence or even A
  Nose for First Principles) An acquired
  capacity to grasp first principles (i.e., the
  first principles of demonstration) (1141a6)
• Phronesis (Practical Wisdom, or Prudence or Good
  Judgment) A state of capacity to act with regard
  to human goods involving a true course of
  reasoning (1140b20)
• Tekhne (Art, or Technical Skill or Technical
  Expertise) A state of capacity to make involving
  a true course of reasoning (1140a9)

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook X

• After completing his discussion of intellectual
  virtue in Book VI, Aristoteles turns in Books
  VII-IX to a number of interesting, but for our
  purposes less important topics
• The nature of continence and incontinence
  (VII.i-x)
• Widely held views regarding pleasure and the good
  (VII.xi-xiv)
• The nature of friendship and the need for it
  (VIII-IX)
• At the beginning of Book X, he returns to the
  topic of pleasure, finally saying what kind of
  thing it is if not quite defining it (in chapter
  iv), and formulating a criterion that can be used
  to determine the value of pleasures since its
  virtue and the good man that are the measure of
  all things, those pleasures are the best that
  accompany the noblest activities and are sought
  by the best of men (chapter v)

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook X

• Finally, in chapter vi, Aristoteles returns to
  the question of the nature of happiness, last
  discussed in Book I
• He begins be reiterating that it cannot be a
  disposition, for if it were, then even those who
  are comatose or suffering the greatest
  misfortunes could well be happy therefore, once
  again happiness must be an activity
  (1176a34-1176b1)
• But it must also be desirable for its own sake
  and not for its effects, for it lacks nothing and
  is in and of itself enough(1176b3-7)
• So what activitywhat kind of lifecould it
  actually be?
• Not a life of pleasant amusements, for unless one
  is silly and utterly childish, one relaxes so
  that one may worknot the other way around
  (1176b8-1177a11)
• But also not simply a life of virtuous action,
  for war and political activity are undertaken not
  for their own sake, but for the sake of something
  else (1177b6-15)

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook X

• It must therefore be the contemplative life, for
  this is all that remains as a life of activity
  in accordance with virtue
• If among virtuous actions political and
  military actions are distinguished by nobility
  and greatness, and these are unleisurely and aim
  at an end and are not desirable for their own
  sake, but the activity of reason, which is
  contemplative, seems both to be superior in
  serious worth and to aim at no end beyond itself,
  and to have its pleasure proper to itself, and
  if the self-sufficiency, leisureliness,
  unweariedness (so far as this is possible for
  man), and all the other attributes ascribed to
  the supremely happy man are evidently those
  connected with this activity, it follows that
  this will be the complete happiness of man, if it
  be allowed a complete term of life (for none of
  the attributes of happiness is incomplete)
  (1177b16-25)

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook X

• This, at any rate, is what we must try to
  achieve
• We must not follow those who advise us, being
  men, to think of human things, and, being mortal,
  of mortal things, but must, so far as we can,
  make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve
  to live in accordance with the best thing in us
  for even if it be small in bulk, much more does
  it in power and worth surpass everything
  (1177b35)
• Yet in a secondary degree the life in
  accordance with the other kind of virtuei.e.,
  moral virtue and the virtue of the calculative
  intellectis happy as well, for this too is a
  human life (1178a8-14), and even those who live
  the contemplative life need the things that
  enable them to do well in the sphere of action
  (1178a34-1178b7)
• So who is the happiest of human beings?

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook X

• Aristoteles answer the philosopher
• He who exercises his reason and cultivates it
  seems to be both in the best state of mind and
  most dear to the gods. For if the gods have any
  care for human affairs, as they are thought to
  have, it would be reasonable both that they
  should delight in that which was best and most
  akin to them (i.e., reason) and that they should
  reward those who love and honor this most, as
  caring for the things that are dear to them and
  acting both rightly and nobly. And that all these
  attributes belong most of all to the philosopher
  is manifest. He, therefore, is the dearest to the
  gods. And he who is that will presumably be also
  the happiest so that in this way too the
  philosopher will more than any other be happy.
  (1179a23-33)
• Yet its not enough to know all this we must do
  what it takes to become happy (1179a34-1179b4),
  and arguments alone arent enough to make men
  good (1179b4-5), so.

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The Nicomachean EthicsBook X

• So we must turn to political activity and become
  legislators (1180b23-28)
• And that means we must learn to legislate
  (1180b28)
• And that means we must determine what
  constitution is best, how each constitution must
  be ordered, and what laws and customs it must use
  if it is to be at its best (1181b22-25) so the
  end of the Nicomachean Ethics makes the
  transition to the Politics, Aristoteles work on
  just this set of questions
• We ourselves will go in yet another
  directionthat of Aristoteles treatise On Soul,
  a work that will help us substantially in our
  effort to understand Aristoteles thought more
  deeply