Title: RRW and Complex 2030 Transformation The Path to the 2030 Stockpile and Infrastructure
1RRW and Complex 2030 Transformation The Path to
the 2030 Stockpile and Infrastructure
- Briefing to
- Security for a New Century Study Group
- 110th Congress
- John R. Harvey
- National Nuclear Security Administration
- 20 April 2007
2Basic message
- To meets its security needs and those of its
allies, the U.S. will need a safe, secure, and
reliable nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable
future. - We will achieve this with the smallest stockpile
consistent with our nations security. - We assess increased risk, absent nuclear testing,
in assuring long-term safety and reliability of
todays aging stockpilethe legacy warheads left
over from the Cold War. - Todays nuclear weapons complex is not
sufficiently responsive to technical problems
in the stockpile, or to potential emerging
threats. - Our task is to ensure that the U.S. nuclear
weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure,
meets long-term national security needs. - Our approach is to develop and field replacement
warheads for the legacy stockpile as means to
transform both stockpile and supporting
infrastructure. - These warheads will have enhanced safety and
security. - We intend to accomplish all this without
requiring nuclear tests.
3RRW features enable transformation
- Legacy Design
- Optimized for high yield-to-weight
- Relatively low margin-to-failure
- Energetic high explosives
- Limited security features
- Exotic/hazardous materials
- Hard-to-manufacture components
RRW Design
- Optimized for high performance margins
- Insensitive high explosive
- Enhanced security
- Ease of manufacture
- relaxed tolerances
- eliminate exotic materials
- reduce process steps
- Reduced surveillance needs
- Improved dismantlement and material disposition
4Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties
Performance Margin M gt U1U2
U1
U2
Primary Operating Range
Total Yield
Uncertainties U1 ? primary yield U2 ?
cliff position
Primary Yield
5Vision of stockpile transformation
WARHEADS
Legacy Capability
RRW
Adaptive Capability
Refurbished Legacy
Stockpile evolved to all-RRW (?)
Refurbished Legacy
Today
2012
2012-2030
Far Future
6Todays Nuclear Weapons Complex
The Defense National Laboratories and Test Site
The Production Complex
Nevada Test Site Test readiness
and subcritical nuclear material tests
Kansas City Plant Nonnuclear manufacturing/procur
ement
Sandia Systems engineering and nonuclear
component design
Pantex Plant Weapons assembly/disassembly
Los Alamos Nuclear design lab (B61, W76, W78,
W88)
Y-12 National Security Complex Uranium
operations
Savannah River Site Tritium operations
Lawrence Livermore Nuclear design lab (W62, W80,
W84, W87)
7Nuclear Weapons Complex Past and Present
Hanford
INEL
Mound
LLNL
LLNL
NTS
NTS
Fernald
RFP
KCP
KCP
LANL
Y-12
Y
-
12 and
LANL
SNL
K
-
25
SRS
PX
SNL
PX
SRS
Pinellas
Nuclear Weapons Complex (2006)
Nuclear Weapons Complex (1980)
- Plan for the 2030 Complex
- Retain current sites with reduced footprint
- Consolidate SNM to fewer sites
- Integrate sites, eliminate duplication, share
facilities - Modernized, fully-capable, production facilities
- Construct consolidated Pu center at existing site
Legend
Category I/II SNM
No Category I/II SNM
8What are elements of a Complex 2030 Responsive
Infrastructure (RI)?
- Excellent, trained, well-managed workforce
- Enhanced science and technology base including
modern, maintained research facilities - Efficient, modern, right-sized manufacturing
facilities/equipment - Streamlined business practices and technical
processes that permit rapid and flexible response
to emerging needs - reverse risk averse culture that has limited
productivity - And, very importantly, frequent, end-to-end
exercise of key capabilities - to remain highly responsive
- to train the next-generation workforce
9RI must redress past underfunding of warhead
production complex
10How responsive do we need to be?
11Stockpile/Infrastructure transformation seeks to
achieve
- Sustained long-term confidence in stockpile
safety/reliability - Smaller stockpile
- Reduced likelihood of future underground nuclear
tests - Increased diversity in critical areas of
stockpile (e.g., W76) - Enhanced stockpile safety and security
- Modernized, fully capable, warhead manufacturing
facilities - Exercise of key nuclear design capabilities that
have lain dormant for two decades - essential for mentoring next generation of
weapons scientists/engineers - Reduced DOE and DoD ownership costs for nuclear
forces - reduced costs to certify, remanufacture,
refurbish, dismantle - must bound ever-increasing resources devoted,
post-9/11, to physical security of warheads and
associated nuclear materials
12RRW Counterarguments
- Current U.S. nuclear arsenal is OK now and for
foreseeable future stockpile reliability not
degrading. If it aint broke, dont fix it. - RRW risky because diverts funds/capabilities from
maintaining legacy stockpile (which is becoming
more reliable, cheaper to maintain). - RRW will increase the political pressure to test.
Resumption of testing will lead to an arms race
where US has most to lose. - RRW is a backdoor to new nuclear weapons
capabilities. - As a result of (3) and (4) above, RRW will
undermine the global nonproliferation regime,
making the world less safe. - Might need RRW in the future, but no urgency to
do it now. Can wait until we observe some
degradation in legacy stockpile. - RRW not necessary for infrastructure
transformation. Reduce/restore infrastructure
now, but continue to support LEPs. Use restored
infrastructure in future if RRW becomes
necessary. - Enhanced surety will not reduce security
costspresence of SNM will still dictate the
security posture.
13RRW Myths
- RRW means that the Stockpile Stewardship Program
has failed. - RRW will eliminate the need for the SSP.
- RRW means we can halt now the LEPs for the legacy
stockpile. - RRW means that the current stockpile is not safe
or reliable. - RRW will be more reliable than todays legacy
warheads (including LEPs). - RRW is new warhead and therefore not permitted
under FY03 NDAA. - RRW will provide (or lead to) new military
capabilities. - RRW will obviate the need for expanded pit
production capacity. - RRW is an enabler for RNEP.