Aid effectiveness in crisis settings: Lessons from Afghanistan

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Aid effectiveness in crisis settings Lessons
from Afghanistan

• Belinda Bowling, Afghanistan Programme Manager,
  UNEP

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(No Transcript)
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Afghanistan in crisis

• Insecurity and a blossoming insurgency
• Ongoing and recurring humanitarian crises
• Illicit poppy-driven parallel economy
• Rampant corruption

Development must be seen within this broader
geopolitical landscape of competing issues
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Q Do you think things are going in the right
direction or the wrong direction?
Source The Asia Foundation, 2009
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Q Would you say that today your family is more
prosperous, less prosperous or about the same as
under the Taliban?
Source The Asia Foundation, 2009
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Facts and figures on aid (2008)

• 90 of public expenditure is ODA.
• Over 50 of aid is tied.
• More than 60 of aid bypasses the Govt.
• 40 of aid goes back to donor countries in
  corporate profits/ salaries.
• Afghan Government does not know how 30 of aid
  since 2001 has been spent.
• US military spends 100m p/d aid volume is only
  7m p/d.
• 57 per capita vs 679 (Bosnia)/ 233 (Timor)
• Less than 40 of TA is coordinated with the
  Government.
• 1billion of aid spent by the UNCT annually.

Source ACBAR report Falling Short, 2008
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Development framework
Bonn Agreement, 2001
National Development Framework, 2003
Afghanistan Compact, 2006
Afghanistan National Development Strategy/ PRSP,
2008
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Aid effectiveness and the UN

• Strengthening MDGs/ NDS
• - UN supported Afghanistan becoming a signatory
  to the MD.
• UN was a key facilitator of the ANDS process,
  including building government capacity to lead
  and own the process.
• UN provided key support to development of most
  sectors.

• Aligning aid with priorities
• - ANDS used as CCA.
• - New UNDAF cycle.
• Strong sector support, especially agriculture,
  rural development, education, health.
• Donor coordination efforts on 5 sectors in 2009.

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Aid effectiveness and the UN

• Harmonization
• Trust funds.
• Joint programmes (6 existing, more planned).
• Jointly programmed development packages for most
  needy provinces in terms of UNDAF.
• Lead in the JCMB political process.
• HACT initiated.
• Common facilities in some regional offices.

• Accountability
• Dedicated aid effectiveness unit in UNAMA.
• Capacity building support to line ministries and
  public financial management institutions.
• Pressure on donors to provide info to Govt
  (DAD).
• Improving transparency, especially procurement.

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UNAMAs coordination role

• Paris Donor Conference on ANDS, June 2008
• The international community agreed to provide
  increased, more predictable, transparent and
  accountable assistance. They agreed that all
  their development assistance would be delivered
  in a more coordinated way. It will be
  increasingly channeled through the national
  budget as strengthened, and accountable
  government institutions acquire greater capacity
  for management. The international community also
  committed itself to providing aid in a way that
  promotes local procurement and capacity-building.
  We agreed that the benefits of development must
  reach all provinces equitably. We also agreed to
  focus on state building efforts and avoid
  parallel structures.
• UNAMAs role is to break bad donor habits re aid
  effectiveness.
• The vacuum that existed in 2002 no longer exists.
• Capable local institutions exist with improved
  local capacity (from Parliament to district
  councils)
• The private sector has developed to meet many of
  the demands of the international community

First DPKO mission to be given this mandate, so
still at the experimental stage. Not yet welcomed
by donors locally, but is welcomed in the
capitals.
First DPKO mission to be given this mandate, so
still at the experimental stage. Not yet welcomed
by donors locally, but is welcomed in the
capitals.
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Key lessons learnt

• Direct budgetary support is not the answer in
  fragile states like Afghanistan.
• Tying aid to the provinces in which the donors
  international forces are operating results in
  inequity and promotes insecurity in otherwise
  peaceful provinces.
• Aid should promote local ownership, sustainable
  poverty reduction and longer-term capacity
  building too much aid in Afghanistan seeks
  rapid results at the cost of these goals.
• The widespread use of military actors and
  contractors to implement assistance programs has
  contributed to a blurring of the distinction
  between security forces and aid agencies.
• Less aid should be channelled through private
  contractors.
• Rampant corruption is undermining public trust in
  the Afghan government and hindering its
  effectiveness. Donors should act decisively
  against corruption from word go.
• Procurement should be local as far as possible.

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UNAMA contact details

• Mark Ward, Special Advisor on Development to the
  SRSG
• ward3_at_un.org
• Resident Coordinators Office
• rco_afg_at_un.org