Nuclear Disarmament: Challenges, Opportunities and Next Steps

1
Critical Issues Forum 2009
Nuclear Disarmament Challenges, Opportunities
and Next Steps (Benchmark 2)
Students-participants Andrey Kulikovskikh,
Nastya Petryakova, Also Alexander Demidkin,
Kseniya Kuksina, Kostya Kalistratov, Maxim
Mukhametzhanov, Andrey Kononov, Dmitriy
Zimin Teacher-consultant Larisa
Zlokazova School 125 in Snezhinsk, Russia
2
Critical Issues Forum
Nuclear Disarmament Challenges, Opportunities
and Next Steps (Benchmark 2)
Objective 3 Modernization of the weapons now
possessed by nuclear powers, and the
challenges of monitoring and verification
Objective 1 An understanding of national and
international controls of nuclear weapons
Objective 2 an understanding of some of the
challenges to nuclear disarmament in the world
today
Students-participants Andrey Kulikovskikh,
Nastya Petryakova, Also Alexander Demidkin,
Kseniya Kuksina, Kostya Kalistratov, Maxim
Mukhametzhanov, Andrey Kononov, Dmitriy
Zimin. Teacher-consultant Larisa
Zlokazova School 125 in Snezhinsk, Russia
3
CIF 2009 Nuclear Disarmament Challenges,
Opportunities and Next Steps Benchmark 2
Time-line on Disarmament and Arms
Control Treaties
NPT
Other Treaties
Parties to the NPT
Objective 1 an understanding of national and
international controls of nuclear weapons
Nuclear Weapon States
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
IAEA
The System of Export Control Functioning in
Russia
UN
Other International Organizations
UNODA
4
Time Line on Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control
Since the USA had tested its first nuclear bomb
Trinity in 1945 and later the USSR had exploded
its atom bomb in 1948 the Arms Race began. It
lasted for about 50 years. Nuclear weapons
proliferated and matured. Something had to be
done with the threat of new global catastrophe
which could fire the new world war in the early
1960s till the end of the Soviet Union and the
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1980s-1990s.
The result of the international efforts is that
now 110 states declared themselves free of
nuclear weapons, Southern Hemisphere is
Nuclear-Free Zone. Parties of NPT are 189 states.
Five countries are NPT Nuclear Weapon States.
Only two states remain to be states of immediate
concern because of their steps to the status of
being a nuclear state. No nuclear tests can be
exploded on Antarctic, in outer space.
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Sources http//www.reachingcriticalwill.org/index
keyissues.html 24 Feb.2009 Disarmament and Arms
Control Treaties at http//www.reachingcriticalwi
ll.org/legal/treaties.html 24 Feb.2009
(Created by Andrey Kulikovskikh, 10th grade)
5
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) the
Treaty to limit the spread of nuclear weapons
was opened for signature on 1st July, 1968
Preamble to the NPT Considering the
devastation that would be visited upon all
mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need
to make every effort to avert the danger of such
a war and to take measures to safeguard the
security of peoples, Believing that the
proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously
enhance the danger of nuclear war, Declaring
their intention to achieve at the earliest
possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms
race and to undertake effective measures in the
direction of nuclear disarmament, Urging the
cooperation of all States in the attainment of
this objective, Recalling the determination
expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty
banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere,
in outer space and under water in its Preamble to
seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test
explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to
continue negotiations to this end, Desiring to
further the easing of international tension and
the strengthening of trust between States in
order to facilitate the cessation of the
manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation
of all their existing stockpiles, and the
elimination from national arsenals of nuclear
weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant
to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international
control, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, States have agreed as follows

• not to proliferate nuclear weapons (article
  I,II)
• promote nuclear disarmament (article VI)
• contribute to peaceful use of nuclear energy
  (article III,IV)
• measures and encouragement the total absence of
  nuclear weapons in respective territories
  (article VII)

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Sources Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (in
English) http//en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nuclear_No
n-Proliferation_Treaty, 10 Feb.2009 Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty-preamble (in Russian)
http//www.pircenter.org/WebHelp/dss/dnyao.htm 10
Feb.2009
(Created by Alexander Demidkin, 10th form)
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189 Parties to the NPT (and the year of signing)
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Nine States are not Party to the Treaty (July
1996 ) Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Cuba, Djibouti,
India, Israel, Oman, Pakistan
Source WISE, List of States Parties to the NPT
http//www10.antenna.nl/wise/index.html?http//www
10.antenna.nl/wise/beyondbomb/ , 27 Feb.2009
Indefinite Extension of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty Risks and Reckonings, Acronym No.7,
September 1995. (Up-date and corrections by Huub
Jaspers, Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, July
1996.)
(Created by Kuksina Kseniya, 10th grade)
7
Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control Treaties
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(Created by Nastya Petryakova, 10th grade)
Source Treaties at http//www.reachingcriticalwi
ll.org/legal/treaties.html 24 Feb.2009
8
Treaty Commitments Chart
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Source http//www.nti.org/db/disarmament/treaty_c
hart.html 5 Mar.2009
(Made by Kostya Kalistratov, 10th form)
9
The United Nations
? UN was founded in 1945 to prevent conflicts, to
support peace and international security (UN
Statutes, Article 1) ? the largest international
organization with 191 member states
The existing arsenals of the Nuclear Weapon
States (NWS) are the main justification for
countries to acquire their own nuclear weapons
which, undermines the security of the NWS
themselves. Without doubt, the elimination of
nuclear weapons must be put high on the agenda of
the world community. (Jürgen Scheffran (Source
Nuclear Disarmament after the NPT Extension and
the Role of NGOs at http//www10.antenna.nl/wis
e/index.html?http//www10.antenna.nl/wise/beyondbo
mb/ , 26 Feb.2009)
General Assembly The main task is to eliminate
all kind of weapons of mass destruction from
national arsenals of countries
First Committee
Disarmament Commission
Security Council 15 members, 5 of which are
permanent NWS.
Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA)
Article 26 of the UN Charter stipulates the
following functions of the Security Council In
order to promote the establishment and
maintenance of international peace and security
with the least diversion for armaments of the
world's human and economic resources, the
Security Council shall be responsible for
formulating, with the assistance of the Military
Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans
to be submitted to the Members of the United
Nations for the establishment of a system for the
regulation of armaments . The Military Staff
Committee advises and assists the Security
Council in maintaining international peace and
security.
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
(UNIDIR)
Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament
Matters
(Source International Organizations at
http//www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nucle
ar-weapons/issues/arms-control-disarmament/interna
tional-organizations.htm 11.03.2009)
Effective global standards are urgently needed,
for in the face of terrorists with global reach,
nuclear security is only as good as its weakest
link. The standard should be designed to be
rigorous enough that all stockpiles with security
measures meeting the standard are well protected
against plausible insider and outsider threats,
but flexible enough to allow each country to take
its own approach to nuclear security and to
protect its nuclearsecrets. (Source Securing
the Bomb 2006 by Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier,
NTI, page 11)
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(Created by Andrey Kulikovskikh, 10th form)
10
UNODA (United Nations Office for Disarmament
Affairs)
DDA was originally established in 1982 upon the
recommendation of the General Assembly's second
special session on disarmament (SSOD II) and
functioned as a department until 1992. From 1992
until the end of 1997, it was a Centre under the
Department of Political Affairs. In January 1998
it has become part of the Secretary-Generals
programme for reform in accordance with his
report A/51/950 to the General Assembly. (Source
UNODA at http//www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage
/about_us/aboutus.shtml)
UNODA
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Branch
CD Secretariat Conference Support Branch
(Geneva)
WMD Branch provides substantive and
organizational support to UN Member States for
disarmament. The Weapons of Mass Destruction
Branch supports multilateral efforts to
disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, it cooperates with other UN
agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA).
Conventional Arms Branch (CAB)
Regional Disarmament Branch (RDB)
Information and Outreach Branch (IOB)
Source UNODA at http//www.un.org/disarmament/
HomePage/about_us/odastructure.shtml, 25 Feb.2009
ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN DISARMAMENT In
carrying out its role in the field of
disarmament, the United Nations should seek to
promote complementarity between regional and
global processes of disarmament by establishing
effective liaison and cooperation with relevant
regional bodies. The United Nations can
contribute to the regional disarmament and arms
limitation process, inter alia, by (a)
Facilitating regional disarmament efforts in
cooperation with other appropriate United Nations
bodies and international organizations (b)
Collecting and disseminating information on
disarmament and arms limitation, including the
experience of the United Nations in carrying out
activities related to the maintenance of
international peace and security (c) Promoting
greater openness in military matters through the
United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and
the United Nations standardized system of
reporting on military expenditures (d)
Facilitating the functions of the existing United
Nations Regional Centres (e) Serving as a source
of expertise in disarmament and arms
limitation (f) Organizing and, where
appropriate, coordinating conferences on regional
disarmament issues, including confidence-
and security-building measures (g) Assisting,
where regional arrangements so provide, in
verifying compliance. 52. The recommendations on
the role of the United Nations in the field of
disarmament which were adopted by the General
Assembly in 1990 should serve as useful
guidelines for enhancing the role of the United
Nations with respect to regional approaches to
disarmament and arms limitation. (Source The
General Assembly forty-seventh session, adopted
resolution 47/54 A of 9 December 1992,
Introduction, Chapter IV, para 51, pages 20-21
at http//www.un.org/disarmament/disarmsec/Perspe
ctive/docs/A.48.42_eng.pdf , 14 Mar.2009)
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(Created by Andrey Kulikovskikh, 10th form)
11
International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA was founded as Atoms for Peace a global
organization in 1957 and later it was renamed
as IAEA. Its task from the very beginning has
always been to secure, save a promote peaceful
use of nuclear energy.
IAEA (the main areas of work)
Traditional view
IAEA 3S Concepts
Safeguards
Safeguards and Verification
Science and Technology
Safety and Security
The global nuclear inspectorate, inspectors of
which work worldwide to verify nuclear materials
and activities to be used only for peaceful (not
military) purposes.
The main goal is peaceful applications of
nuclear science and technology, international
cooperation in all fields of nuclear science and
technology.
Safety
The main aim of the staff is protection of
people and world environment from harmful
radiation exposure caused by nuclear testing and
nuclear weapons.
Security
(Source Pillars of Nuclear Cooperation at
http//www.iaea.org/OurWork/index.html 11.03.2009)
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IAEA conducts its activities in conformity with
the principles and policies of the United Nations
to provide for peace and security through
safeguards. IAEA is authorized to conduct
inspections of the countrys declared nuclear
sites and facilities.
(Created by Nastya Petryakova, 10th grade)
12
Other International Organizations
CTBTO
GREENPEACE
Conference on Disarmament
CD was founded in 1979 after the first Special
Session on Disarmament of the United Nations
General Assembly held in 1978. Its an autonomous
institution with its own Rules of Procedure, its
own agenda, though it takes into account the
recommendations of the United Nations General
Assembly. (Source International Organizations
at http//www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/
nuclear-weapons/issues/arms-control-disarmament/in
ternational-organizations.htm 11.03.2009)
The Preparatory Commission (founded in 1996) is
an international organization with a strong
technical focus, some 80 of its budget to the
establishment of the global verification regime.
The Commission has the legal authority to
build-up the verification regime and the
provisional operation of it. CTBTO is not part
of the United Nations although it follows the UN
system for international civil service. This
includes practices related to administration,
finance and personnel. Member States 180 Total
Ratification 148 SourceThe Organization
at http//pws.ctbto.org/ 17 Mar.2009
Greenpeace exists because this fragile earth
deserves a voice. It needs solutions. It needs
change. It needs action.Greenpeace is an
independent global campaigning organisation that
acts to change attitudes and behaviour, to
protect and conserve the environment and to
promote peace by working for disarmament and
peace by tackling the causes of conflict and
calling for the elimination of all nuclear
weapons. Greenpeace is present in 40 countries
across Europe, the Americas, Asia, Africa and the
Pacific. (Source About Greenpeace at
http//www.greenpeace.org/international/about 17
Mar.2009)
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Created by Nastya Petryakova, 10th form
13
National organizations that govern nuclear weapons
The most ambitious attempt in the international
efforts to acquire and use nuclear weapons, the
greatest effort was made in 1960s with the
signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). Since then states have evolved rules and
institutions to govern nuclear exports,
safe-guard and account for nuclear materials,
control and even reduced the number of nuclear
weapons.
The System of Export Control Functioning in Russia
Russia considers that effective national system
of Export Control is the most perspective source
of preventing WMD proliferation. National System
of Export Control in nuclear industry in Russia
includes 1. Legislative and Standard Control. 2.
Licensing of goods and technologies included in
the control lists. 3. Inter-department
co-ordination. 4. Customs control. 5. Preventing
of Law-breaking and punishment
President of Russian Federation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Aerospace Agency
Ministry of Defense
Conventional Weapons Agency
Minatom
Agency for Control Systems
Government
Ministry of Science and Industry
Rosboepripasi (Russian Ammunition)
Russian Academy of Sciences
Rossudostroenje (Shipbuilding)
Export Control Commission
Federal Agency for Technological and Nuclear
Oversight
Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)
Ministry of Education
State Customs Committee
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade
Ministry of Justice
Federal Safety Bureau (FSB)
Application for license, a copy of contract,
importers obligations of the goods usage in
accordance to declared purpose
Now Russia is facing the same problems as those
in other highly-developed states. Export Control
is possible only in case of strict respect the of
Law, its indisputable maintenance by exporter on
the one hand and the state official free from
lobbyists pressure (exporters or those who
support exporters interests) on the other hand.
High attention to the problem is the result of
other countries interest to Russian technologies
and fissile materials, suitable for WMD.
Export License
EXPORTERS
Export License, Customs Declaration and other
documents
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CUSTOMS SERVICE
(Source Nuclear Non-Proliferation, PIR Center,
Moscow 2002, Volume 1, Chapter 12, pages 360-378)
Created and translated by Andrey Kulikovskikh,
10th form)
14
NPT Nuclear Weapon States
"....For the purposes of this Treaty, a
nuclear-weapon State is one which has
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or
other nuclear explosive device prior to 1
January, 1967." (Article 9, paragraph 3 of the
NPT at http//en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nuclear_Non
-Proliferation_Treaty)
USA
Russia
UK
France
USA
China
North Korea
Israel
Pakistan
India
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http//www.nti.org/db/disarmament/map.html
15
Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones Around The World
States-parties 0 Signatories that have ratified
the treaty are Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekstan,
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan.
Central Asia
Mongolia
State-parties 10 total Brunei Darussalam,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.
Pelindaba Treaty
States-parties 33 total Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Suriname,
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Bangkok Treaty
Tlatelolco Treaty
Rarotonga Treaty
States-parties 0 Signatories that have ratified
the treaty are Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea,
Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South
Africa, Swaziland, Togo, United Republic of
Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.
States-parties 13 total Australia, Cook
Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand,
Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands,
Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
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Antarctica Treaty
Existing NWFZs at http//www.nti.org/h_learnmore/
nwfztutorial/mm_map_existing/ 4 Mar.2009
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) At a Glance at
http//www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nwfz 4
Mar.2009
(Made by Kseniya Kuksina, 10th form)
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CIF 2009 Nuclear Disarmament Challenges,
Opportunities and Next Steps Benchmark 2
Major Differences between NWS and NNWS
NPT Review Conferences
Objective 2 an understanding of some of the
challenges to nuclear disarmament in the world
today
Nuclear Weapon States
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
New Leaders and Their Position Towards
Disarmament
Challenges to Nuclear Disarmament
The Future of the NPT
17
NPT review conferences
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Source NPT Tutorial at http//www.nti.org/h_l
earnmore/npttutorial/chapter04_01.html 16 Mar.2009
(Created by Andrey Kulikovskikh, 10th form)
18
Major differences between NWS and NNWS
The 1995 Review and Extension Conference had the
responsibility of both reviewing the
implementation of the Treaty and deciding, as
required by article X, paragraph 2, "whether the
Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or
shall be extended for an additional fixed period
or periods". At the time that it was held, 38
more States had become parties to the Treaty,
increasing the membership to 178 States parties.
The NWS maintained that the arms race had ended,
as demonstrated by the deep cuts in nuclear
armaments being made by the United States and the
Russian Federation following START. Significant
reductions by France and the United Kingdom were
another sign of this trend. A number of States,
while recognizing that some positive developments
had taken place, considered that the nuclear arms
race continued, particularly with respect to the
qualitative improvement of existing nuclear
weapons and their delivery systems. A majority of
NNWS, especially non-aligned, called for an
intensification of negotiations towards the
elimination of all types of nuclear weapons and
their means of delivery by all NWS within a
time-bound framework. Once again, the issue of
security assurances was given significant
attention. Responding to past demands from NNWS,
the NWS issued statements just prior to the
Conference, in which they updated their
unilateral declarations on both negative and
positive security assurances to NNWS. In
addition, on 11 April 1995, the Security Council
adopted, by consensus, a resolution on the
subject (resolution 984 (1995)). Although this
resolution was seen as an important and
encouraging measure, many NNWS parties held that
the declaration did not address their main
concerns. They maintained that early conclusion
of a multilateral legally binding instrument on
unconditional security assurances was still
required to effectively ensure the security of
NNWS parties to the Treaty.
(Source Reaching Critical Will NPT Review
Process 1970-1995 at http//www.reachingcritica
lwill.org/legal/npt/hist.html 11 Mar.2009)
As I see the difference between NWS and NNWS from
the point of view of an average citizen of the
state which possesses NW
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(Created by Andrey Kulikovskikh, 10th form)
19
The Future of the NPT
The Non-Proliferation Treaty signed on 1st July
1968 remains the most successful multilateral
arms control agreement in the post-Second World
War global non-proliferation regime. It has 189
states-parties. The 1995 NPTREC decision on
principles and objectives recommended a
programme of action comprising three specific
measures an immediate objective of the
completion of negotiations on a CTBT before the
end of 1996 a follow-on objective of the early
conclusion of negotiations on a
non-discriminatory and universally applicable
convention banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
devices (a FMT) and the determined pursuit by
the nuclearweapon States of systematic and
progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons
globally. (Source Towards Nuclear Disarmament
by Tariq Rauf, Director of the International
Organizations in Nonproliferation Project at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies in
California, 2000, page 42)
At the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, the
following practical steps for the systematic and
progressive efforts to achieve complete
disarmament were agreed to by all governments
signed to the NPT
The 2000 NPT Conference decision on "thirteen
steps" on nuclear disarmament could become
practical working steps for NWS. However, the
opposite has happened. To name just a couple of
examples CTBT has not entered into force, and,
primarily with the U.S. position in mind, the
Treaty looks more dead than alive even a
moratorium on nuclear tests has been questioned
the U.S. has increased a role of nuclear weapons
in its policy Conference on Disarmament is now
more sleepy than ever before in its history and
sub-strategic nuclear weapons have not been yet
included in US-Russian arms control agenda.
Is this the end of multilateral nuclear
disarmament process and a beginning of an era of
unilateral steps? Unlikely so. But is definitely
a profound crisis of multilateral
diplomacy. Russia is currently in an awkward
position, balancing between its view of
multilateral disarmament diplomacy as an
important tool in a changing world and its
frustration with the low efficiency of existing
multilateral instruments. There has been a
growing temptation in Kremlin to make deals with
Americans, simply ignoring multilateral fora. But
it would be also true to mention another
tendency, competing with the US-centric one,
which is to re-evaluate role of multilateral arms
control mechanisms and find ways to bring a new
life in them.
Source The Future of NPT Regime A View from
Russia by Vladimir A. Orlov at
http//www.eusec.org/orlov.htm 19 Mar.2009
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(Created by Andrey Kulikovskikh, 10th form)
20
Challenges to Nuclear Disarmament
START expires on December 5 and the Obama
administration is still assembling its Russia
team while juggling other pressing issues such as
Iran, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the
economic crisis. Russia has resisted that option,
though, insisting in recent years it wants to
negotiate a new, updated and legally-binding
treaty with a broader scope. "To have a new
document on December 5 ... above all it is
necessary to have a clear change in the climate
of Russian-US relations, said Koshelev, the
deputy head of the Russian foreign ministry's
security and disarmament department. Both sides
should make concessions on missile defense to
move forward, said Edward Ifft, a former US
diplomat and negotiator in the original START
talks who is now a professor at Georgetown
University in Washington. "The US needs to take
more seriously Russian concerns regarding future
ABM systems, especially those close to Russian
territory," Ifft said at the discussion. "For its
part ... Russia needs to recognize more fully US
concerns regarding terrorism and rogue states,
and this includes understanding US views on
missile defenses," he added. Other wide gaps
between the US and Russian positions are also
likely to keep negotiators busy as they thrash
out the terms of a new accord this year. For
instance Russia insists that a new treaty must
limit not just the number of warheads but also
the means of delivering them -- missiles, bombers
and submarines. The US meanwhile would prefer to
keep the focus on warheads, in particular on
"operationally deployed" warheads which are
actually kept in missiles and bombers. But Russia
worries this would give the US too much "upload
potential" -- in other words, that Washington
could keep numerous warheads in storage and
quickly alter the balance of power by "uploading"
them onto missiles. Even with those differences
things can only improve from the Bush years,
argued Roland Timerbaev, a retired Russian
diplomat and veteran of US-Soviet arms control
talks. "The last few years were the worst in
terms of arms control for the entire postwar
period," Timerbaev said. "It cannot get worse. It
can only get better. (Source Philippines news
Despite upbeat mood, tough US-Russia talks
ahead experts at http//ph.news.yahoo.com/afp/2
0090308/twl-russia-us-diplomacy-treaty-missile-7e0
7afd.html 12.03.2009
Let me just quote what President Obama said
said 'new direction in nuclear weapons policy and
show the world that America believes in its
existing commitment under the Nuclear Non
Proliferation Treaty to work ultimately to
eliminate all nuclear arms'.  That is a very
radical statement for a new President of the
United States to say.    the six key steps are
necessary And Ill just run through them briefly
The first is to prevent proliferation Second
issue is the growth of civilian nuclear power
The third area is the need and the benefit of
the United States and Russia re-engaging to
achieve dramatic cuts in their own nuclear
stockpiles  The fourth area is the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.    I think that
the reinvigoration of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty through the commitment of the Obama
administration in this respect is very, very
significant The fifth issue is progress on the
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty which is
blocked by Pakistan and Iran. a sixth set...
Is we really do need a lot of expertise.
(Source David Miliband Address Lifting the
Nuclear Shadow Creating the Conditions for
Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, a Policy Information
Paper by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at
http//www.iiss.org/recent-key-addresses/david-mil
iband-address/ 19 Mar.2009
David Miliband, MP, Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
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A Foreign Office policy paper, Lifting the
Nuclear Shadow, published by Miliband stated
"Although the challenges are considerable,
progress on these six steps would mark a decisive
break from the deadlock of the past decade.
Making progress will require the active
engagement of the entire international
community. "The UK is working to build a broad
coalition of governments, international
organizations, non-governmental organizations and
businesses which share the vision of a world free
of nuclear weapons and to forge agreement on how
we will work together to make it happen.
(Source http//www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/
feb/04/miliband-nuclear-weapons 19 Mar.2009)
Made by Kostya Kalistratov, 10th form
21
New Leaders and Their Positions Towards
Disarmament
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev is "ready to
work constructively " with Washington on
disarmament and other issues, a Kremlin
spokeswoman said Tuesday. The remarks appear to
be a response to President Barack Obama, who
called Monday for Washington and Moscow to "lead
the way" in reducing the global nuclear
threat. Medvedev welcomes the initial signals
from Washington on the potential for future
U.S.-Russian relations. (SourceMedvedev Says
Russia Ready to Work With U.S. on Nuclear
Disarmament at http//www.foxnews.com/story/0,29
33,490611,00.html 17 Mar.2009)
Here's what I'll say as President America seeks
a world in which there are no nuclear weapons. We
will not pursue unilateral disarmament. As long
as nuclear weapons exist, we'll retain a strong
nuclear deterrent. But we'll keep our commitment
under the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty on the
long road towards eliminating nuclear weapons.
We'll work with Russia to take U.S. and Russian
ballistic missiles off hair-trigger alert, and to
dramatically reduce the stockpiles of our nuclear
weapons and material. We'll start by seeking a
global ban on the production of fissile material
for weapons. And we'll set a goal to expand the
U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles
so that the agreement is global. (Source On
Fifth Anniversary of Speech Opposing Iraq War,
Obama Again Challenges Conventional Washington
Thinking, Chicago, IL, (October 02, 2007) at
http//www.baracko bama.com/2007/10/02/on_fifth_an
niversary_of_speech.php 17 Mar.2009)
Dmitry Medvedev
Barack Obama (Wikipedia http//en.wikipedia.org/w
iki/Barack_Obama 17 Mar.2009
The old system of non-proliferation, which we
have now, is not approach to solve the problems
we are having now, but it has not used all its
recourses. We have a lot of problems here, like a
hole in the NPT in some points, or lack of
progress in it. We attach exclusive significance
to the creating a new Russia US treaty about
reducing of nuclear weapons. (Source
http//www.rosbalt.ru/2008/10/08/530952.html 16
Mar.2009. Translated by A.Kulikovskikh)
"We intend to press for the drafting of new
agreements in the sphere of security and
disarmament with other members of the
international community," Vladimir Putin told a
meeting of ambassadors. "I am convinced that
Russia will continue to propose to its foreign
partners a highly positive agenda for fruitful
discussions and joint work, (Source Putin
speaks for new international security,
disarmament deals at http//en.rian.ru/russia/20
080422/105612328.html 17 Mar.2009)
"It is time to press the reset button and to
revisit the many areas where we can and should
work together."He also signalled that the Obama
team was ready to consider Russian demands in
negotiations -- stalled under Bush -- to renew
START, a key Cold War-era nuclear disarmament
treaty set to expire in December.Russia's NATO
envoy Dmitry Rogozin said Biden's speech
"contained many hints and associations from which
one can conclude that it is possible to expect
some new accents in US foreign policy on the
irritants in Russian-US relations, including
missile defence.
(Source AFP, Sunday 8 Feb.2009 By Olivia
Salazar-Winspear at http//www.france24.com/20090
208-biden-meet-russian-sergei-ivanov-munich-confer
ence 17 Mar.2009
(Picturehttp//www.lexpress.fr/actualites/1/hilla
ry-clinton-offre-un-bouton-de-remise-a-zero-a-serg
uei-lavrov_745173.html 12 Mar.2009)
GENEVA US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
handed Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov a
mock "reset" button on Friday as they began their
first meeting in Geneva on an upbeat note. After
shaking hands, Clinton handed Lavrov a block with
a red button marked "reset" in English and
"overload" in Russian, a reference to a speech by
new US Vice-President Joe Biden in January
signaling that the Obama administration wanted
vastly improved ties with Russia. Moscow regards
the meeting as an opportunity to set a warmer
tone and mark the end of a fraught relationship
under the Bush administration. A Russian Foreign
Ministry statement issued Friday said "We are
cautiously optimistic about results of these
talks." One of the tasks of the Lavrov-Clinton
meeting is "to understand attitudes" to the
development of bilateral relations and "to
establish personal contacts," it said. Clinton
said in Brussels Thursday she hoped to "discuss a
wide range of critical matters where we can
cooperate and those where we have differences."
"I think in some areas we're going to find
there's a great potential for cooperation. In
others, we're going to have differences and we
will stand our ground and they will stand theirs
and we'll hope to find some accommodation if
possible," she added. (Source Clinton hands
Lavrov 'reset' button, Saturday, March 07, 2009
at http//www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?editio
n_id10categ_id2article_id99916 12 Mar.2009)
BACK TO INDEX
(Picture www.nos.nl/nosjournaal/images/clinton_la
vrov_tcm44-487610.jpg 12.03.2009)
(Created by Andrey Kulikovskikh, 10th form)
22
NPT Nuclear Weapon States
"....For the purposes of this Treaty, a
nuclear-weapon State is one which has
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or
other nuclear explosive device prior to 1
January, 1967." (Article 9, paragraph 3 of the
NPT at http//en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nuclear_Non
-Proliferation_Treaty)
USA
Russia
UK
France
USA
China
North Korea
Israel
Pakistan
India
BACK TO INDEX
http//www.nti.org/db/disarmament/map.html
23
Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones Around The World
States-parties 0 Signatories that have ratified
the treaty are Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekstan,
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan.
Central Asia
Mongolia
State-parties 10 total Brunei Darussalam,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.
Pelindaba Treaty
States-parties 33 total Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Suriname,
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Bangkok Treaty
Tlatelolco Treaty
Rarotonga Treaty
States-parties 0 Signatories that have ratified
the treaty are Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea,
Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South
Africa, Swaziland, Togo, United Republic of
Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.
States-parties 13 total Australia, Cook
Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand,
Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands,
Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
BACK TO INDEX
Antarctica Treaty
Existing NWFZs at http//www.nti.org/h_learnmore/
nwfztutorial/mm_map_existing/ 4 Mar.2009
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) At a Glance at
http//www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nwfz 4
Mar.2009
(Made by Kseniya Kuksina, 10th form)
24
CIF 2009 Nuclear Disarmament Challenges,
Opportunities and Next Steps Benchmark 2
Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles
Status of World Nuclear Forces
Nuclear Weapon States
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
Objective 3 Modernization of the weapons now
possessed by nuclear powers, the challenges of
monitoring and verification
Modernization of Weapons
Resources used
Challenges of monitoring
Challenges of verification
25
All numbers are estimates and further described
in the Nuclear Notebook in the Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, and the nuclear appendix in
the SIPRI Yearbook. Additional reports
are published on the FAS Strategic Security Blog.
Unlike those publications, this table is updated
continuously as new information becomes
available. Current update February 27, 2009.
BACK TO INDEX
Source Federation of American Scientists Status
of World Nuclear Forces http//www.fas.org/progr
ams/ssp/nukes/nukestatus.htm
26
Key Sources 1Robert S. Norris and Hans M.
Kristensen, Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008,
Nuclear Notebook, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,
July/August 2008, pp. 42-45.2 Robert S. Norris
and Hans M. Kristensen, Russian Nuclear Forces,
2008, Nuclear Notebook, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,
May/June 2008, pp. 54-57.3 Speech by UK
Secretary of State for Defence Mr Des Browne.
http//www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/s
peeches08/1session/Feb5UKDefSecDesBrown.pdf4
Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "U.S.
Nuclear Forces, 2008," Nuclear Notebook, Natural
Resources Defense Council, Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists, March/April 2008. pp. 50-53 (vol. 64,
no. 1) http//thebulletin.metapress.com/content/pr
53n270241156n6/fulltext.pdf5The White House
announced that President Bushs decision to
reduce the size of the DoDs nuclear weapons
stockpile by nearly 50 from the 2001 level was
accomplished in December 2007. 6 The United
States appears to have withdrawn 130 nuclear
weapons from Ramstein Air Base in Germany in July
2007, and 110 from the RAF Lankenheath Air Base
in the UK in June 2008. Nuclear capable
aircrafts
BACK TO INDEX
(Source Nuclear weapons Stockpiles at
http//www.nti.org/db/disarmament/stockpile_chart.
html 5 Mar. 2009)
(Made by Kseniya Kuksina, 10th form)
27
Modernization of Nuclear Weapons in NPT NWS
BACK TO INDEX
Created by Maxim Mukhametzhanov, 10th form)
28
Challenges of Monitoring
Nuclear Weapons The necessary tools for enhanced
transparency and monitoring for nuclear weapons
are either available today or could be available
with some additional development. These tools
include Cryptography used in banking and other
commercial transactions offers secure way to
exchange sensitive information about nuclear
weapons. Methods to examine from a short
distance radiation from a nuclear weapon or to
question a weapon container with an external
radiation source permit identification without
revealing sensitive weapon design information.
Tags and seals (e.g. bar codes, tamper-indicating
tape, electronic chips) applied to containers
and storage rooms for weapons to check their
status. Monitored perimeter-portal systems that
use radiation and other distinctive signatures
confirms what enters and leaves a facility is
what it is supposed to be. Sensors and
accountability systems to monitor declared
activity and detect undeclared activity in
facilities. These tools make possible
transparency and monitoring measures such
as Declarations of nuclear weapon stocks at
progressively increased levels of detail ranging
from total numbers of weapons to specification
of numbers of different types, including their
operational status and associated delivery
vehicle to declarations for each weapon by
serial number, weapon type, status, and
current location. Declarations of name and
location of facilities at which nuclear weapons
are currently deployed, stored, assembled,
maintained, remanufactured, dismantled, or
otherwise handled, along with information about
each site and its operating history. Continuous
monitoring of weapon stocks at facilities at all
stages throughout the nuclear weapon life cycle,
either with personnel on-site or remotely.
Confirmation of weapon remanufacture and assembly
as well as weapon elimination. Provisions for
routine on-site inspections at facilities to
confirm declarations and any updates, as well as
for inspections of both declared and suspect
sites in the event of detection of suspicious
activity or unexplained discrepancies. Nuclear-Exp
losive Materials (NEM) Transparency and
monitoring measures for NEM at declared sites
include Comprehensive declarations describing
quantities and locations of existing NEM, along
with information on chemical forms and isotopic
composition on the material. Declarations of
inventories of NEM surplus to military and
civilian needs. Provisions for inspections of
all declared facilities as well as any undeclared
suspicious activities. Transparency for NEM
could be supplemented by information from states.
The following measures could help reduce stocks
of NEM and the number of sites where it is
stored Accelerated disposition of excess
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) inventories through
down blending and eventual use in reactor fuel
Replacement of HEU fuels in research reactors
with high-density low enriched uranium fuels and
decommissioning of nuclear reactors using HEU
fuels when replacement is not possible
Disposition of excess separated plutonium either
by conversion to fuel for use in civil reactors
or by immobilizing with fission products in a
glass or ceramic matrix Comprehensive cutoff
of production of NEM for weapons Serious
international effort to develop nuclear fuel
cycles for civil reactors that minimize or
eliminate the exposure of NEM Centralization
under multinational control of all facilities
capable of enriching uranium or reprocessing
plutonium Beyond measures to reduce NEM stocks
and storage sites, two broader efforts would
increase transparency and monitoring. Important
efforts to support both of these goals are under
way, but they should be enhanced and
accelerated. 1) Continued improvements in
national management, protection, control, and
accounting of NEM holdings so countries are aware
of quantity and status of all their holdings and
have provided effective protection against theft
or diversion for all stocks of NEM. 2) Continued
efforts to strengthen safeguards regime
administered both bilaterally and by the IAEA,
including universal applicability of Additional
Protocol, with increased manpower and funding to
carry out the expanded mandate. Clandestine
Stocks and Production of Nuclear Weapons The
potential for clandestine activities poses the
largest challenge to transparency and monitoring
of nuclear weapons. The methods available to
detect clandestine efforts to acquire a nuclear
weapons include Real-time, high-resolution
satellite photography and other satellite
sensors. Satellite, groundbased, and sea-based
receivers also collect signal intelligence.
Audits or inspections carried out as part of
formal agreements include use of forensic
techniques to reveal illicit alteration of
records may call attention to discrepancies or
suspicious activities that suggest potential
clandestine activity. Human sources, including
travelers, emigrants, defectors,
whistle-blowers, and intelligence agents
working within the institutions of a state
engaged in illegal activities.
BACK TO INDEX
Source Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and
Nuclear-Explosive Materials. An Assessment of
Methods and Capabilities (2005) athttp//www7.nat
ionalacademies.org/dsc/monitoring_summary.pdf 20
Mar.2009
Made by Sasha Demidkin
29
Challenges of Verification
Verification is the process to collect data that
demonstrates a party's compliance with an
agreement or treaty. The Verification Regime of
the CTBT includes an International Monitoring
System, supported by an International Data
Centre, consultation and clarification measures,
and on-site inspections. Verification
technologies For the CTBT, four types of
technologiesseismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound
and radionuclidework in complementary fashion to
monitor the underground, the water and the
atmosphere for any sign of a nuclear explosion.
Vertical proliferation is an increase in the
size, quality, or destructive capacity of an
existing weapon of mass destruction arsenal.
In a major disarmament step, Russia and the
United States appear poised to negotiate a
significant new agreement on strategic arms
reduction as the clock ticks toward the December
2009 expiration of the 1991 START. At the same
time, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
issued a report detailing proposed steps for an
eventual ban on all nuclear weapons. Speaking at
the 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy
Feb. 7, Vice President Joe Biden reiterated the
Obama administration's commitment to a new
strategic arms agreement with Russia. The two
countries should "renew the verification
procedures in the START...and then go beyond
existing treaties to negotiate deeper cuts in our
arsenals," he said. The Russian response to
Biden's address and to other overtures from the
Obama administration on the issue has been
largely positive. After meeting with Biden in
Munich Feb. 8, Deputy Prime Minister Sergey
Ivanov said that the new administration's stance
"inspires optimism." Ivanov agreed with Biden
that Russia and the United States should extend
the START verification procedures and agree to
reduce their nuclear arsenals. Working out the
details of a new arms agreement between Russia
and the United States promises to be a thorny
process. Ivanov, in his address to the Munich
conference, argued that any new agreement should
limit delivery vehicles as well as warheads and
should ban the deployment of strategic weapons
beyond national borders. Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton said in her Jan. 13
confirmation hearing that the Obama
administration "will seek deep, verifiable
reductions in all U.S. and Russian nuclear
weapons-whether deployed or nondeployed,
strategic or nonstrategic."
the British Foreign Office released a report
Feb. 4 detailing proposed steps to rid the world
of nuclear weapons. British Foreign Secretary
David Miliband, noting that Prime Minister Gordon
Brown and Obama have each pledged to work toward
a world free of nuclear weapons, wrote that the
time has come to move from "a decade of deadlock
to a decade of decisions." The British report
lays out six "attainable" steps toward abolishing
nuclear weapons. These steps are designed to curb
proliferation, decrease stockpiles, and build
confidence. The international community must
agree to more stringent measures to prevent
proliferation, according to the report, while
working with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) to help states develop peaceful
nuclear technology. Next, the report urges Russia
and the United States to make substantial
reductions in their total nuclear stockpiles, not
simply in deployed weapons. IAEA Director-General
Mohamed ElBaradei echoed this call in a Feb. 16
editorial in the International Herald Tribune,
suggesting that Russia and the United States
could reduce their stockpiles to as few as 500
warheads each. Fourth, the British Foreign Office
calls for the entry into force of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which the
Obama administration supports. In her Jan. 13
testimony, Clinton said that she and President
Barack Obama are "strongly committed to Senate
approval of the CTBT and to launching a
diplomatic effort to bring on board other states
whose ratifications are required for the treaty
to enter into force." The CTBT has been ratified
by 148 countries, but the United States and eight
other specific states must still ratify the
treaty before it can take effect. In order to lay
the groundwork for an eventual ban on nuclear
weapons, the report also calls for the
negotiation and implementation of a treaty
banning the production of highly enriched uranium
and plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. Lastly,
the report urges those states possessing nuclear
weapons to begin a strategic dialogue to explore
the political and security issues that would
arise during the transition from low numbers of
nuclear weapons to zero nuclear weapons. The
British government has proposed a 2009 conference
of the five nuclear-weapon states recognized in
the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to discuss
these issues. As Russia and the United States
seem prepared to negotiate substantial reductions
in their nuclear arsenals and with the Obama
administration supportive of the CTBT, there is
an emerging consensus on many of the points
listed in the British plan. As Ivanov noted in
Munich, however, "The devil is in the details."
BACK TO INDEX
Source Disarmament Efforts Get New Impetus by
Cole Harvey, Mar.2009 at http//www.armscontrol.o
rg/act/2009_03/Disarmament 20 Mar.2009
Made by Sasha Demidkin
30
NPT Nuclear Weapon States
"....For the purposes of this Treaty, a
nuclear-weapon State is one which has
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or
other nuclear explosive device prior to 1
January, 1967." (Article 9, paragraph 3 of the
NPT at http//en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nuclear_Non
-Proliferation_Treaty)
USA
Russia
UK
France
USA
China
North Korea
Israel
Pakistan
India
BACK TO INDEX
http//www.nti.org/db/disarmament/map.html
31
Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones Around The World
States-parties 0 Signatories that have ratified
the treaty are Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekstan,
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan.
Central Asia
Mongolia
State-parties 10 total Brunei Darussalam,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.
Pelindaba Treaty
States-parties 33 total Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Suriname,
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Bangkok Treaty
Tlatelolco Treaty
Rarotonga Treaty
States-parties 0 Signatories that have ratified
the treaty are Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea,
Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South
Africa, Swaziland, Togo, United Republic of
Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.
States-parties 13 total Australia, Cook
Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand,
Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands,
Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
BACK TO INDEX
Antarctica Treaty
Existing NWFZs at http//www.nti.org/h_learnmore/
nwfztutorial/mm_map_existing/ 4 Mar.2009
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) At a Glance at
http//www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nwfz 4
Mar.2009
(Made by Kseniya Kuksina, 10th form)
32
CIF 2009 Nuclear Disarmament Challenges,
Opportunities and Next Steps Benchmark
2 Resources used

• Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (in English)
  http//en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nuclear_Non-Prolifer
  ation_Treaty
• Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty-preamble (in
  Russian) http//www.pircenter.org/WebHelp/dss/dny
  ao.htm
• WISE, List of States Parties to the NPT
  http//www10.antenna.nl/wise/index.html?http//www
  10.antenna.nl/wise/beyondbomb/ , 27 Feb.2009
• Indefinite Extension of the
  Non-Proliferation Treaty Risks and Reckonings,
  Acronym No.7, September 1995. (Up-date and
  corrections by Huub Jaspers, Transnational
  Institute, Amsterdam, July 1996.)
• National Security and Nuclear Weapons
  Maintaining Deterrence in the 21st Century A
  Statement by the Secretary of Energy,
• Secretary of Defense and Secretary of
  State, July 2007 at http//www.globalsecurity.org
  /wmd/library/report/2007/ns-nw-21st-century_jul200
  7.htm 20 Mar.2009
• Disarmament and Arms Control Treaties at
  http//www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/treaties
  .html 24 Feb.2009
• Treaty Commitment Chart at
  http//www.nti.org/db/disarmament/treaty_chart.htm
  l 5 Mar.2009
• International Organizations at
  http//www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclea
  r-weapons/issues/arms-control-disarmament/internat
  ional-organizations.htm 11.03.2009)
• Securing the Bomb 2006 by Matthew Bunn,
  Anthony Wier, NTI, page 11
• The Future of NPT Regime A View from
  Russia by Vladimir A. Orlov at
  http//www.eusec.org/orlov.htm 19 Mar.2009
• The General Assembly forty-seventh session,
  adopted resolution 47/54 A of 9 December 1992,
  Introduction, Chapter IV, para 51, pages 20-21
  at http//www.un.org/disarmament/disarmsec/Perspe
  ctive/docs/A.48.42_eng.pdf , 14 Mar.2009
• Pillars of Nuclear Cooperation at
  http//www.iaea.org/OurWork/index.html 11.03.2009
  
• Nuclear Non-Proliferation, PIR Center,
  Moscow 2002, Volume 1, Chapter 12, pages 360-378
• Map Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) at a
  Glance at http//www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/
  nwfz 4 Mar.2009
• Map Existing NWFZs at http//www.nti.org/h
  _learnmore/nwfztutorial/mm_map_existing/ 4
  Mar.2009
• NPT Tutorial at http//www.nti.org/h_learnm
  ore/npttutorial/chapter04_01.html 16 Mar.2009
• Reaching Critical Will NPT Review Process
  1970-1995 at http//www.reachingcriticalwill.org
  /legal/npt/hist.html 11 Mar.2009
• David Miliband Address Lifting the Nuclear
  Shadow Creating the Conditions for Abolishing
  Nuclear Weapons, a Policy Information Paper by
  the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at
  http//www.iiss.org/recent-key-addresses/david-mil
  iband-address/ 19 Mar.2009

BACK TO INDEX
t o b e c o n t i n u e d
33

• Nuclear weapons Stockpiles at
  http//www.nti.org/db/disarmament/stockpile_chart.
  html 5 Mar. 2009
• Spending on US Strategic Nuclear Forces
  Plans Options for the 21st Century by Steven
  M. Kosiak-Center for Strategic and Budgetary
  Assessments, 2006 Chapter Future Nuclear
  Offensive Strategic Forces at
• http//www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary
  /R.20060901.Spending_on_US_Str/R.20060901.Spending
  _on_US_Str.pdf
• 20 Mar.2009
• Modernization of Strategic Nuclear Weapons In
  Russia The Emerging New Posture by Dr. Nikolai
  Sokov, CNS
• Senior Research Associate, May 1998 at
  http//www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/modern.htm 20
  Mar.2009
• InoPressa, 19 Mar.2009 Rodrigo Fernandez, El
  Pais at http//www.inopressa.ru/article/19Mar2009
  /elpais/kremlin.html 20 Mar.2009
• Disarmament Efforts Get New Impetus by Cole
  Harvey, Mar.2009 at http//www.armscontrol.org/ac
  t/2009_03/Disarmament 20 Mar.2009
• Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and
  Nuclear-Explosive Materials. An Assessment of
  Methods and Capabilities (2005) at
  http//www7.nationalacademies.org/dsc/monitoring_s
  ummary.pdf 20 Mar.2009
• Philippines news Despite upbeat mood, tough
  US-Russia talks ahead experts at
  http//ph.news.yahoo.com/afp/20090308/twl-russia-u
  s-diplomacy-treaty-missile-7e07afd.html
  12.03.2009

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