Categories

1
Categories

• Barry Smith

2
JOBS FOR PHILOSOPHERS
3
PUT YOUR PHILOSOPHY TRAINING TO USE IN THE
HI-TECH WORLD !
www.kanisa.com

• is looking
  for people who can organize information into
  carefully defined hierarchical categorization
  schemes.
• The information architecture model we employ is
  rather like an Aristotelian category schema in
  which information is grouped into genus-species
  relationships.

4
www.kanisa.com

• We are looking for people with at least a
  Masters degree, Ph.D. preferred,in philosophy or
  a related field, e.g., linguistics.

Contact richard.beatch_at_kanisa.com
5
jobs_at_ontologyworks.com

• employment_at_bowstreet.com
• hr_at_yahoo-inc.com
• www.ontek.com

6
What do ontological engineers do?

• They build catalogue systems for given domains
  of reality
• for example meat.com
• ... a catalogue system for an entire industry

7
... a catalogue system

• ... designed to allow customers, suppliers,
  insurers, subcontractors, shippers, and so on
• to find their way about the world of
• meat
• ... as readers find their way about the world of
  books in a library

8
Varieties of information system ontology

• Business ontology
• Legal ontology
• Military ontology
• Art ontology
• Archeology ontology
• Image ontology
• ...

9
there are too many individuals ...
10
Therefore
catalogue systems must rest on general concepts
11
There are too many general concepts
able about account acid across act addition
adjustment advertisement after again against
agreement air awake all almost among amount
amusement and angle angry animal answer ant any
apparatus apple approval arch argument art arm
army as at attach attempt attention attraction
authority automatic baby back bad bag balance
ball band base basin basket bath be beautiful bed
because bee before behavior belief bell bent
berry best between bird birth bit bite bitter
black blade blood blow blue board boat body
boiling bone book boot bottle box boy brain brake
branch brass bread breath bridge brick bright
broken brother brown brush bucket building bulb
burn burst business but butter button by cake
camera canvas card care carriage cart cat cause
certain chain chalk chance change cheap cheese
chemical chest chief chin church circle clean
clear clock cloth cloud coal coat cold collar
color comb come comfort committee common company
comparison complete complex condition connection
conscious control cook copper copy cord cork
cotton cough country cover cow crack credit crime
cruel cry cup curtain current curve cushion cut
damage danger dark daughter day dead dear death
debt decison deep degree delicate dependent
design desire destruction detail development
disease different digestion direction discovery
discussion disgust distance distribution division
dirty do dog door doubt down drain drawer dress
drop dry drink driving dust ear early east earth
edge education effect egg elastic electric end
engine enough equal error even event ever every
example exchange existence expansion experience
expert eye face fact fall false family far farm
fat father fear feather feeble feeling female
fertile fiction field fight finger fish fire
first fixed flag flame flat flight fly floor
flower fold food foolish foot for force fork form
forward fowl frame free frequent friend from
front fruit full future garden general get girl
give glass glove go goat gold good government
grain grass great green grey grip group growth
guide gun hair hammer hand hanging happy harbor
hard harmony hat hate have he head healthy
hearing heart heat help here high history hole
hollow hook hope horn horse hospital hour house
how humor i ice idea if ill important impulse in
increase industry ink insect instrument insurance
interest invention iron island jelly jewel join
journey judge jump keep kettle key kick kind kiss
knee knife knot knowledge land language last late
laugh law lead leaf learning leather left leg let
letter level library lift light like limit line
linen lip liquid list little living lock long
look loose loss loud love low machine make male
man manager map mark market married mass match
material may meal measure meat medical meeting
memory metal middle military milk mind mine
minute mist mixed moon money monkey month morning
mother motion mountain mouth move much muscle
music nail name narrow nation natural near
necessary neck need needle nerve net new news
night no noise normal north nose not note now
number nut observation of off offer office oil
old on only open operation opinion opposite or
orange order organization ornament other out oven
over owner page pain paint paper parallel parcel
past paste part payment peace pen pencil person
physical picture pig pin pipe place plane
plant plate play please pleasure plough pocket
point poison polish political poor porter
position possible pot potato powder power present
price print prison private probable process
produce profit property prose protest public pull
pump punishment purpose push put quality question
quick quiet quite rail rain range rat rate ray
reaction reading ready reason receipt record red
regret regular relation religion request
representative respect responsible reward rhythm
rice right ring river road rod roll roof room
rough round rub rule run rush sad safe sail salt
same sand say scale school science scissors screw
sea seat second secret secretary see seed seem
selection self send sense separate serious
servant sex shade shake shame sharp sheep shelf
ship shirt shock shoe short shut side sign silk
silver simple sister size skin skirt sky sleep
slip slope slow small smash smell smile smoke
smooth snake sneeze snow so soap society sock
soft solid some son song sort sound soup south
spring spoon sponge spade special space stage
stamp star start statement station steam steel
stem step stick sticky stiff still stitch
stocking stomach stone stop store story straight
strange street stretch strong structure square
substance such sudden sugar suggestion summer sun
support surprise sweet swim system table tail
take talk tall taste tax teaching tendency test
than that the then theory there thick thin thing
12
Therefore

• concepts/genera must be hierarchically organized

13
Porphyrian Hierarchy
14
Linnaean Hierarchy
15
Desktop Hierarchy
16
From Species to Genera
canary
17
From Species to Genera
animal
bird
species-genus hierarchy as inference machine
canary
18
From Species to Genera
19
From Species to Genera
has skin
eats
animal
breathes
moves
bird
X
can sing
canary
is yellow
species-genus hierarchy as inference machine
20
Why are species-genus hierarchies good ways to
represent our reasoning?

• 1. They capture the way the world is
  (Aristotelian realism)
• 2. They capture the natural ways we think
  (Kantianism) ... species are concepts

21
Species-genus trees can be represented also as
map-like partitions
22
From Species to Genera
canary
23
From Species to Genera
24
Species Genera as Tree
canary
25
Species-Genera as Map/Partition
canary
26
Tree and Map/Partition
27
Species-genus trees can be represented also as
map-like partitions
If Aristotelian realism is right, then such
partitions are transparent to the reality beyond
28
Albertis Grid c.1450
29
Coarse-grained Partition




 
30
Fine-Grained Partition




 
31
Map of US Stocks by Category
32
Map of US Stocks by Category
33
... a way of viewing the stock market

• as we might view other parts and dimensions of
  reality

34
Artists Grid
as through a transparent grid
35
Aristoteles und die vernetzte Welt
36
Net
37
Partitions come with a labelling and an address
system
38
Periodic Table
Die periodische Tabelle der chemischen Elemente
39
Perspectivalism

• Perspectivalism

Different partitions may represent cuts through
the same reality which are skew to each other
40
Universe
41
Universe/Periodic Table
42
All veridical perspectives are equal

• Each veridical perspective ( transparent
  partition) captures some corresponding domain of
  objects

43
Scientific partitions (like the periodic table)
and database partitions (like the Dewey Decimal
Classification System) ... are transparent to
the hierarchical order of an associated domain of
objects
44
Question

• what other sorts of partitions have this feature
  of transparency?

Answer
the partitions of common sense (folk biology,
folk physics, folk psychology ...)
45
Aristotle
Aristotle

• the ontologist of common-sense reality

46
Die Welt des gesunden Menschenverstands

• the world as apprehended via that
  conceptualization we call common sense
• the normal environment (the niche) shared by
  children and adults in everyday perceiving and
  acting

47
The world of mothers, milk, and mice ...
48
The Empty Mask (Magritte)
milk
mama
Mount Washington
mouse
49
our common-sense partition of the world of common
sense is transparent

• (common sense is true)mothers exist ...
• ...but there is a problem

50
Why are species-genus hierarchies good ways to
represent our reasoning?
Recall our question
51
From Species to Genera
52
From Species to Genera
y
53
From Species to Genera
y
54
Theory of vagueness

• How can -based
• conceptualizations be transparent,
• if the world is shaped like this
  
• 
  
• 
  

?
55
no such problems arise for the closed worlds
constructed in information systems

• hierarchies as reasoning tools work very well
  for the closed worlds of database engineers

56
whether a file is in a given folder on your
hard-drive is completely determinate
57
Dewey Decimal Classification as Map
58
Dewey Decimal Classification (Detail)
59
No borderline cases in the closed world of a
database

• Every book is assigned a determinate Dewey
  Classification Number at birth

this yields a classificationthat is completely
crisp
60
... and always up-to-date

• To be a book to have a reference number in the
  Catalogue System
• Each of the ontologies produced by ontological
  engineers deals with objects which are
  constructed (Kant would say constituted) by
  the database itself

61
Sharpness of database reality vs. vagueness of
flesh and blood reality
How to deal with the problemof conceptual
vagueness? How to extend ontology beyond the
quasi-Kantian realm of database engineers
62
Kantianism

• There are no species-genus hierarchies in
  reality unless we put them there
• The world -- insofar as it is accessible to us
  through our concepts -- is a closed system
  tailored by us to fit

63
Kantianism

• seems to work very well for the closed worlds of
  database environments (which are always finite)

64
veiled reality
or Kantianism asMidas-touch epistemology
65
hard vs. soft categories

• Kantianism we constitute/shape (empirical)
  reality in such a way that it corresponds to our
  categories
• Aristotelianism reality in itself is messy, but
  our categories fit nonetheless

66
How ?

• because they are made up, not of crisp (hard),
  but of open (soft) genera and species

67
that is

• when we apply our categories to reality we are
  aware that we have to deal with an opposition
• ... between standard or focal or prototypical
  instances
• ... and non-standard or fringe instances

68
Natural categories have borderline cases
ostrich
birds
69
... they have a kernel/penumbra structure
70
every cell in every common-sense partition is
subject to this same kernel-penumbra structure
71
Dürer
72
What is common-sense reality?

• the mesoscopic space of everyday human action
  and perception
• a space centered on objects organized into
  hierarchies of species and genera
• ... and subject to prototypicality

73
but more
74
in addition to objects (substances),

• which pertain to what a thing is at all times at
  which it exists

cow man rock planet
75
the common-sense world contains also accidents

• which pertain to how a thing is at some time at
  which it exists

red hot suntanned spinning
76
An accident

• what holds of a substance per accidens

77
Accidents, too, instantiate genera and species

• Thus accidents, too, form trees

78
R232, G54, B24
79
and they are distinguished as between tokens and
types

• (which is to say between genera and species on
  the one hand,
• ... and instances on the other)

80
Accidents Species and instances
quality
color
red
scarlet
R232, G54, B24
this individual accident of redness (this token
redness here, now)
81
Nine Accidental Categories

• quid? substance
• quantum? quantity
• quale? quality
• ad quid? relation
• ubi? place
• quando? time
• in quo situ? status/context
• in quo habitu? habitus
• quid agit? action
• quid patitur? passion

82
Substances are the bearers of accidents
83
Aristotle 1.0
an ontology recognizing substance
tokens accident tokens substance
types accident types
84
Aristotles Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental
Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread
First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread
Universal
Particular
85
Aristotles Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental
Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread
First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread
Universal
Particular
86
Aristotles Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental
Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread
First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread
Universal
Particular
87
Aristotles Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental
Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread
First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread
Universal
Particular
88
Aristotles Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental
Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread
First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread
Universal
Particular
89
Albertis Grid c.1450
90
Some philosophers

• accept only part of this ontology

91
Standard Predicate Logic F(a), R(a,b) ...
Substantial Accidental
Attributes F, G, R
Individuals a, b, c this, that
Universal
Particular
92
Bicategorial Nominalism
Substantial Accidental

First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread
Universal
Particular
93
Process Metaphysics
Substantial Accidental

Events Processes Everything is flux
Universal
Particular
94
Aristotle 1.0
in fact however we need more than the ontological
square
What is missing from Aristotle 1.0 asan ontology
of common-sense reality?
95
Is everything in common-sense reality either a
substance or an accident?
96
well, what about artefacts ?
97
Shoes
98
Temple at Corinth
99
Pipe
100
Standard Aristotelian theory of artefacts

• artefacts are mereological sums of substances

101
Positive and negative parts
negative part
or hole
(not made of matter)
positive part
(made of matter)
102
Shoes
103
Temple at Corinth
104
Pipe
105
Some entities consist entirely of negative parts

• places, spatial regions
• institutions
• laws, constitutions

106
Nine Accidental Categories

• quid? substance
• quantum? quantity
• quale? quality
• ad quid? relation
• ubi? place
• quando? time
• in quo situ? status/context
• in quo habitu? habitus
• quid agit? action
• quid patitur? passion

107
Places

• For Aristotle the place of a substance is the
  interior boundary of the surrounding body
• (for example the interior boundary of the
  surrounding water where it meets a fishs skin)

108
Places are holes
109
Places are holes
110
Places are holes
111
Places are holes
112
niches, environments are holes
113
The metaphysics of holes
114
A hole in the ground

• Solid physical boundaries at the floor and walls

but with a lid that is not made of matter
115
Holes involve two kinds of boundaries

• bona fide boundaries which exist independently
  of our demarcating acts
• fiat boundaries which exist only because we put
  them there

116
Examples

• of bona fide boundaries
• an animals skin, the surface of the planet
• of fiat boundaries
• the boundaries of postal districts and census
  tracts

117
Mountain

• bona fide upper boundaries
• with a fiat base

118
Architects Plan for a House

• fiat upper boundaries
• with a bona fide base

119
where does the mountain start ?
... a mountain is not a substance
120
nose
...and its not an accident, either
121
Aristotle 1.5
an ontology of substances accidents
holes (and other entities not made of
matter) fiat and bona fide boundaries
artefacts and environments
is true
122
its truthmaker

• those parts and dimensions of reality which we
  call the common-sense world
• knowledge of this common-sense world is, in
  relation to prototypical instances of the
  relevant species and genera, quite easy to come by

123
corrected
partition
124
folk biology

• Aristotelian folk biology, folk physics, folk
  psychology, etc., are true of the common-sense
  world as it currently exists

(they have nothing to offer regarding its
pre-history, its long term evolution, its
position in the cosmos)
125
reference vs. theory

• They have not much to offer, either, by way of
  good explanatory theories of the entities in
  their respective domains,

but they are transparent to those
domainsnonetheless
126
reference realism vs. theory realism

• this distinction applied not only to science
  (against T. S. Kuhn et al.) but also to common
  sense (against sceptics of various stripes)
• the sun exists, and has existed for a long time
  the very same object

127
Both scientific partitions and common-sense
partitions

• are based on reference-systems which have
  survived rigorous empirical tests

128
Criteria of quality of partitions

• serves communiction
• learnable (including via scientific training)
• sensitive to nuances
• serves prediction

129
The 64000 Question

• How do those parts and dimensions of reality
  which we call the common-sense world
• ... relate to those parts and dimensions of
  reality which are studied by science?

130
Aristotle 2000
131
Universe/Periodic Table
folk biology
partition of DNA space
132
Universe/Periodic Table
both are transparent partitions of one and the
same reality
133
many transparent partitions

• at different levels of granularity
• will operate with species-genus hierarchies
• and with an ontology of substances (objects) and
  accidents (attributes, processes)
• along the lines described by Aristotle

134
relative hylomorphism

• substances and accidents reappear in the
  microscopic and macroscopic worlds of e.g.
  molecular biology and astronomy
• (Aristotelian ontological zooming)

135
we do not assert

• that every level of granularity is structured in
  substance-accident form -- perhaps there are pure
  process levels, perhaps there are levels
  structured as fields

136
Perspectivalism

• Perspectivalism

Different partitions may represent cuts through
the same reality which are skew to each other
137
An organism is a totality of atoms

• An organism is a totality of molecules
• An organism is a totality of cells
• An organism is a single unitary substance
• ... all of these express veridical partitions

138
all express partitions which are transparent,

• at different levels of granularity,
• to the same reality beyond

139
Coarse-grained Partition




what happens when a fringe instance arises ?
 
140
Coarse-grained Partition




what happens when a fringe instance arises ?
 
Aristotle 1.0 you shrug your shoulders
141
Aristotle 2000
you go out to find a finer grained partition
which will recognize the phenomenon in question
as prototypical




 
142
The advance of science

• is not an advance away from Aristotle towards
  something better.
• Provided Aristotle is interpreted aright, it is
  a rigorous demonstration of the correctness of
  his ontological approach

143
It still remains the case, that

• all sciences are perfect, to the extent that
  Aristotle treated of them (Averroes)

144
Kantianism

• there is some unknown x, beyond all that can be
  grasped by our partitions
• as our partitions get better and better they will
  approximate ever more closely to this x, but x
  itself will never be arrived at

145
Summary of the argument against Kantianism

• each coarse-grained partition gives only a
  partial view (no complete map)
• but it is a partial view which is already
  transparent to reality the objects themselves
  already fall within our grasp
• there are objects, with which we are already
  thoroughly familiar, at different levels of
  reality

146
b
THE END
147
Open problems

• how deal with ethical structures in the
  mesoscopic level -- to what do they correspond on
  the lower levels?
• can the granularity based theory of vagueness be
  made to work here? (Brogaard)

148
Open Problems

• how deal with institutions, and other holistic
  structures on higher levels?
• mind-body problem
• freedom of the will

149
Good conceptualizatons

• Philosophical ontologists are interested in
• 1. transparent conceptualizations, veridical
  perspectives on reality
• 2. which are at the same time interesting
• science, and what else

150
Problem with process metaphysics

• arises only if it comes along with the claim to
  be complete

151
Multitree
152
Multitree

• any directed acyclical graph which satisfies
  the descendants of any node form a tree

153

• two trees sharing the same set of leaves, for
  example the Dewey Decimal and the Library of
  Congress classification systems
• As Furnas and Zacks note, genealogies, although
  frequently called "family trees", are in fact
  multitrees. Multitrees offer a natural notion of
  context (displaying ancestors) and content
  (displaying descendants), and are therefore very
  well suited for reusing hierarchical structure.

154
Aristotle 2000

• closed, open universe -- different layers of
  partitions. relative hylomorphism, plus a load
  der/die/das) multitrees

155
there are too many individuals ...
156
species, genera
mammal
frog
instances
157
Common nouns
common nouns proper names
158
types
mammal
frog
tokens
159
substance
accidents
one substantial category John, man
nine accidental categories hunger, your hunger,
being hungry your sun-tan your being taller
than Mary
160
substance
accidents
time (yesterday)
quantity (two feet long)
John
position (is sitting)
quality (white)
action (cuts)
relation (taller than)
passion (is cut)
place (in the Lyceum)
possession (has shoes on)
161
Bearers
substance
accidents
Substances are the bearers of accidents
162
Bearers
substance
accidents
Substances are the bearers of accidents
John
hunger
relations of
inherence (one-sided existential dependence)
163
(No Transcript)
164
Aristotelian Ontology of Weather

• Substance earth
• Accidents wind, thunder

165
States of Affairs
substance
accidents
Substance Accident State of Affairs
166
States of Affair
Substance Accident State of Affairs
setting into relief
s
167
Aristotles Ontological Square (full)
168
Lake Tahoe Land Cover
169
Lake Tahoe Land Cover
170
Cerebral Cortex
171
Mouse Chromosome 5
172

• Constitutions of 158 States

worlds first database
173
Prototypicality amongsub-categories

• some sub-categories of a given category are more
  typical, standard, than others
• canary is more typical than ostrich

174
Prototypicality among instances too
instances
175
What is missing from Aristotle?
Gibson affordances niches geometry of
surface layout
176
Places

• For Aristotle a place is a hole filled by a
  substance
• The place occupied by you is the boundary of the
  surrounding air where it meets your body

177
Varieties of Controlled Airspace
178
Question

• Are mountains bona fide or fiat objects?
• Did mountains exist before human cognitive
  agents came along?

179
Filled Holes
180
Superficial Objects?
181
(No Transcript)
182
Fields
183
Cognition imposes upon fields a division into
objects

• Are all objects fiat objects

184
Aggregates
185
Der Bevölkerung
186
Dem Deutschen Volke
187
Dem Deutschen Volke
188
Business Objects
189
Summer Forms, Winter Forms
190
Alps
191
Alps
192
Alps
193
Alps
194

• Mountain is the most prominent kind of
  geographic thing in the common-sense ontology.
  But it is absent from the scientific ontology as
  a kind of thing.
• Scientific ontology topography as a field,
  represented by sampled values and interpolation
  functions, or by simple geometric forms such as
  triangles. The scientific ontology includes slope
  steepness and direction at every point, but even
  hillslopes are represented as fields.

195
Process vs. Form in Geomorphology
with thanks to Bernard Bauer
The interest of geomorphologists in processes is
motivated by attempts to understand form (morphe
Greek form) Form has to do with boundary
conditions Forms mountain, river, valley, bay,
etc.
196
Process vs. Form in Geomorphology
Hypothesis 1. Processes occur at small scales
(examples entrainment and transport of
sediments, groundwater effluxes, weathering,
etc.) 2. Eventually they manifest themselves as
forms (which exist at larger scales and change
much more slowly through time)
197
Process vs. Form in Geomorphology
Question Is the dynamics of how a particular
form changes through time (e.g., how a meander
bend shifts or how a hillslope degrades) to be
considered process?
198
Process vs. Form in Geomorphology

• We can after all interpret sedimentary strata
  and make inferences about changing meandering
  patterns and flood sequences floods are then
  the 'processes' that lead to the form known as a
  floodplain

199
Process vs. Form in Geomorphology
Microprocesses (erosion) involving Microforms
(gravel)
Macroprocesses (flooding) involving Macroforms
(rivers)
200
Process vs. Form in Geomorphology
Object Process
floodplain valley delta flood glacial motion sedimentation
this floodplain this valley this delta this flood this glacial motion this sediment transport
Type
Token
201
Different ways of slicing up reality

• Fields vs. Objects
• landscapes are continuous (fields) view of
  contemporary geomorphology
• landscapes consist of assemblages of objects
  falling under natural kinds view of ordinary
  cognitive agent
• What is the relation between these two ?

202
Cognitive Contexts

• language-communities
• organizations
• sciences
• religions
• information systems
• business firms

203
Each involves a certain conceptualization
a system of concepts pertaining to a given
domain ... concepts that are more or
less coherently specified
204
Tom Grubers Definition
... designed to provide a stable forum for
translation and interoperability as between
different conceptualizationsOntolingua
Esperanto for Information Systems
205
conceptualizations are associated with stories,
sciences, organizations, etc.

• Ontology, for Gruber, starts with our
  conceptualizations, and sees how far we can push
  through from there to a description of a
  corresponding domain of objects

206
Ontology, for Gruber,

• deals with surrogate created worlds
• with models
• ... with the generated correlates of both good
  and bad conceptualizations

207
Two sorts of conceptualizations

• bad those which relate merely to a created,
  surrogate world
• good those which are transparent to some
  independent reality beyond

208
Not all conceptualizations are equal

• Bad conceptualizations ... lying,
  story-telling, dreaming, astrology, metaphysical
  error ...
• Good conceptualizations
• science
• what else?

209
Scientific conceptualizations

• those based on reference-systems which have
  survived rigorous empirical testsReferential
  realism
• vs. Theory realism

210
Are there transparent conceptualizations outside
science?
211
The Empty Mask (Magritte)
212
Good conceptualizatons

• Philosophical ontologists are interested in
• 1. transparent conceptualizations, veridical
  perspectives on reality
• 2. which are at the same time interesting
• science, and what else

213
Internet Ontology

• Die Welt löst sich auf in unseren Datentabellen.
  Welt und elektronische Erfassung sind untrennbar.
• Die Medien der e-Erkenntnis sind undurchsichtig

214
Kantian Idealism

• Die Welt löst sich auf in unseren
  Bewußtseinsakten. Welt und Erfahrung sind
  untrennbar.
• Die Medien der Erkenntnis sind undurchsichtig
• (die Wirklichkeit ist verschleiert)

215
hard vs. soft categories

• Kant wir prügeln die Wirklichkeit, bis sie
  unseren Kategorien entspricht
• Aristoteles Die Kategorien in der Welt sind
  offene (sanfte) Kategorien, d.h., sie werden auch
  Grenzfällen gerecht

216
But what about science ?
217
... are our scientific partitions truly
transparent to an independent reality ?

• (second Kantian argument)

218
DEspagnat Die verschleierte Wirklichkeit
die HeisenbergscheUnschärferelation (die
Medien der Erkenntnissind im Grundbereich der
Physik undurchsichtig ...)
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There are no veridical (transparent) partitions
at the quantum level
220
concepts vs. categories

• on the Kantian reading species are concepts
• on the Aristotelian reading the world itself
  exhibits a species-genus structure independently
  of how we conceive it