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OPV Cessation Guidelines

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Title: OPV Cessation Guidelines


1
Guaranteeing our InvestmentOutcomes of the Ad
Hoc Advisory Committee on Polio Eradication
(AACPE)
2
Circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses
(cVDPVs) China, 2004
Polio outbreak 2 cases
3

Clinical and laboratory surveillance network for
acute flaccid paralysis
















































































































































Specialised Reference Laboratory
Regional Reference Laboratory

National/ Sub-national Laboratory

4
Circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses
(cVDPVs) 2000 - 2004
Hispaniola 2000 22 cases
China 2004 2 cases
Philippines 2001 3 cases
Madagascar 2002 4 cases
5
Vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP)
  • VAPP polio occurring in vaccine recipients or
    contacts
  • Temporal association with immunization
  • Greatest risk in those receiving first dose of
    OPV
  • Generally healthy, very small percentage
    immunodeficient
  • Overall risk 2-4 VAPP cases/million birth
    cohort 250-500 cases per year

6
Summary of iVDPV long-term excretion cases
known to WHO
  • 24 iVDPVs, including 22 long term excretors
  • 2 currently known to excrete
  • 7 type 1, 16 type 2, 1 type 3
  • cases have been from Europe (9), USA (7), Japan
    (1), Argentina (1), Kuwait (1), Taiwan (1), Iran
    (1), Ireland/Zimbabwe (1), Thailand (1), Peru (1)

7
Vaccine-associated risks to polio eradication
Frequency Annual Evolution Risk
to date burden over time
cVDPV 1 per year 10 increases VAPP
2-4/million birth cohort 250-500 stable iVDPV
24 identified lt1 under study since
1963
IPV sites 1 accident (1990s) lt1 decreases with
containment lab accident 1
investigation NK decreases with
containment deliberate 0
NK unknown
based on current understanding
8
Timing of OPV cessation
'As soon as possible after interruption of wild
poliovirus transmission globally, to take
advantage of high population immunity
surveillance sensitivity.' Expert Consultation on
Vaccine-derived Polioviruses (VDPVs), Sept
2003, Geneva
  • '3-5 years after interruption of wild poliovirus'
  • Advisory Group on Polio Eradication
  • Sept 2004, Geneva

9
Conditionalities for OPV Cessation
  • Appropriate containment of all polioviruses.
  • Global surveillance notification capacity.
  • Coordinated cessation of OPV.
  • 'Post OPV' immunization policy in place.
  • Vaccine stockpile response mechanism.

10
Schematic Main Risks Timeline
  • Main Risk
  • Years after last wild poliovirus

0
1
2
4
5
3
Routine immunization campaigns, Continued AFP
surveillance
Vaccine stockpile, Continued AFP surveillance
11
AACPE Recommendations
  • 1. The synchronized cessation of OPV, the
    containment of polioviruses, and the
    establishment/use of a vaccine stockpile should
    be submitted to the WHA to achieve a global
    consensus on cessation of OPV.

12
AACPE Recommendations
  • 2. The draft National Guidelines for OPV
    Cessation should be tested with selected national
    health policy makers so that the revised version
    can be finalized for WHO Member States by
    mid-2005.

13
AACPE Recommendations
  • 3. The framework for a vaccine stockpile (size,
    composition, operation) should be available by
    mid-2005. Full, front-loaded financing for the
    stockpile should be sought urgently to allow WHO
    to engage vaccine manufacturers in its
    development while sufficient production capacity
    is still available.

14
Potential WHA Resolutions
  • OPV Cessation consensus on globally coordinated
    OPV cessation as key goal of the eradication
    initiative.
  • Containment (future handling of polioviruses)
    consensus on need for safe storage at secure
    biosafety levels for Sabin, vaccine-derived
    wild polioviruses after OPV cessation.
  • Outbreak Response (reintroduction of
    polioviruses) consensus on the need for vaccine
    stockpile and international controls, mechanism
    for responding to polio outbreak should one occur.

15
Next Steps
  • Sep 04 'Ad Hoc Advisory Committee'
  • Nov 04 Pilot and further revise National
    Guidelines
  • Jan 05 WHA Executive Board consideration 1st
    rev OPV cessation, containment, stockpiles
  • May 05 World Health Assembly information item
  • Sep 05/06 WHO Regional Committees information
    items

16
Smallpox Eradication certified 1980
17
HIV first identified 1981
18
Polio Eradication seize the opportunity
while window of opportunity is open
  • Interrupt transmission by end of 2005
  • Guarantee the investment
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