A Simple Taxonomy for Mobile Emergency Announcement MEA Systems

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A Simple Taxonomy for Mobile Emergency
Announcement (MEA) Systems

• Ronja Addams-Moring et al.
• Helsinki University of Technology (TKK)
  Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Finland
  (STUK)
• Presented at the 2nd ISCRAM conference Brussels,
  April 2005

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Outline

• What are MEA systems
• Research question
• From observations to taxonomy
• Taxonomys consequences for MEA systems
• understandability and credibility
• security
• Papers analysis vs. recent developments
• Practical use of the taxonomy
• Future work

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The concept

• Mobile Emergency Announcements (MEA), Valtonen
  et al. (2004)
• emergency announcement public warning
• sent by authorities
• to the general public
• to such mobile user devices (e.g. pagers, phones)
• that are located in the danger zone
• Can be, for example
• SMS, MMS, paging (at least)
• ? mobile phone TV car radio MEA ?

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Research questions

• Are all requirements in literature always
  necessary for each and every MEA system?
• Is security really essential for MEA systems?
• Authenticity
• Integrity
• Non-repudiation
• (Confidentiality temporarily)
• Could there be MEA systems that do not need one
  or more of these (security) requirements?

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Observed reality

• What kind of MEA (-like) systems are or have been
• In use
• Proposed
• Selection based on our MEA system definition
• MEA system (here) sender forwarder parts
• The recipient parts (devices) are naturally also
  needed authorities do not control them

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MEAs so far 1(3)

• Many pre-planned systems for pre-registered users
• Ramos / Austria
• Dubai e-Government
• C.A.T.S. / Britain
• McGinley Turk (2004) / Murdoch Univ. Western
  Australia
• Prototype, multi-channel, multi-source
• Real use twice, spring-summer 2004

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MEAs so far 2(3)

• One semi ad hoc system
• Simon Fraser Univ. / Alberta, Canada
• Built in a van
• Multi-purpose
• Almost real use August 2004
• MEA capacity ?

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MEAs so far 3(3)

• Examples of ad hoc MEA-like systems
• Wireless Emergency Response Team (WERT) / New
  York, WTC ruins (9/11/01)
• Multiple technologies, multiple authorities
• None saved
• Indian Ocean earthquake tsunami (26.12.04)
• Multiple mobile operators national authorities
• Mobile positioning, SMS cell broadcast
• How many saved 100 1000 ?

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Taxonomy proposal

• Based on observations of MEAs so far
• Pre-planned MEA systems
• Built on purpose, fully beforehand
• Semi ad hoc MEA systems
• Built on purpose, most of the way beforehand
• At least one major component is mobile
• Ad hoc MEA systems
• Bootstrap solution when all else has failed

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Consequences 1(2)

• Understandability and credibility
• Pre-planned MEA system
• Well-known by all
• Understandability and credibility at their
  strongest
• Semi ad hoc MEA system
• Well-known by at least responsible authority
• Understandability and credibility may falter
• Ad hoc MEA system
• Well-known by all in its normal role not
  necessarily as a MEA system (surprise effect)
• Understandability and credibility at their weakest

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Consequences 2(2)

• Security
• Pre-planned MEA system
• Well-known to all also adversaries
• A target for adversaries
• Semi ad hoc MEA system
• Well-known to at least authorities also some
  adversaries will know about it
• A target for a subset of adversaries
• Ad hoc MEA system
• Not known beforehand to anyone
• At least quite difficult to target successfully

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Papers analysis

• So are all requirements in literature really
  essential for MEA systems?
• Our answer for security yes and no
• Essential for pre-planned and semi ad hoc MEA
  systems
• this still holds
• Impossible or unnecessary for true ad hoc MEA
  systems
• this should be questioned

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What we thought
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Recent developments

• Observing the discussions and descisions after
  February 2005
• In particular Finnish government
• How risky are ad hoc MEA systems after Indian
  Ocean tsunami 26.12. 2004?
• If fake MEAs, how dire results?
• How should governments, EMR community etc.
  answer to end user driven MEA (technology)
  demand?

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Caveat!
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MEAs without security?

• Maybe not such a good idea after all
• Definitive solution authentication in network
  infrastrucure, e.g. PLA / Lundberg J. (2004)
• as low down in the protocol stack as possible
• as close to the sender as possible
• Open question 1 how to update the networks? (not
  that bad, though a lot of work)
• Open question 2 how to update the end user
  devices? (major challenge, will take time)
• What to do before definitive can be deployed?

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Useful taxonomy? 1(2)

• May answer questions on what type of MEA systems
  we need in an area / region
• Pre-planned MEA systems a part of EMR
  infrastructure
• Built fully in place naturally local / regional
• Ad hoc MEA systems plans based on what is
  available in the area / region
• Local mobile communications resources naturally
  local / regional

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Useful taxonomy? 2(2)

• May answer questions on who should finance which
  type(s) of MEA systems
• Semi ad hoc MEA systems should we build an EU
  fleet? Why or why not?
• Van-based
• Helicopter-lifted, after that stationary
• Zeppelin-based or (HALE) UAV-based
• Other, what?

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Future work

• General MEA requirements (Zhao et al. / to be
  published)
• The Boy Who Cried Wolf! can we find
  scientific proof for the myth?
• Are faked or false alarms really that bad or do
  we just believe so?
• Prototypes as M.Sc. (Tech) theses (if funding)
• Internet EAs
• SMS MEAs
• MEAs to Symbian 9.0 phones
• Travel safety portal (Finnish government)
• Ensuring MEA system security is a priority for us

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Questions comments?

• Thank you for your time!
• Ronja Addams-Moring
• Telecommunications software and Multimedia
  laboratorio (TML)
• Helsinki University of Technology (TKK)
• P.O.Box 5400, FIN-02015 TKK
• Finland, EU
• http//www.tml.hut.fi/ronja/