Title: Carbon as a Commodity Emissions Allowances and Carbon Constraints The Legal Straitjacket for UK Elec
1Carbon as a CommodityEmissions Allowances and
Carbon ConstraintsThe Legal Straitjacket for UK
Electricity Generation
- Robert Tudway
- Partner, Nabarro Nathanson
2The UK Draft National Allocation PlanUK Power
Generation
- The United Kingdom Dimension
3Power Generation Draft National Allocation Plan
- The UK has decided that the power generation
sector will be responsible for the additional
emissions trading savings which it expects the
EU ETS to deliver beyond the U.K. Climate Change
Programme projections. This reflects the fact
that this sector faces limited international
competition and is thought to have a relatively
large scope for low cost abatement
opportunities. - draft National Allocation Plan, para 2.9
4What are the Effects of the Draft National
Allocation Plan on the UK Price of Power?
- EITHER
- Version 1
- Our suggestion is that industrial electricity
prices will increase on a reasonably conservative
set of assumptions by something like 6, not just
in the UK but in major industrial economies, in a
fairly uniform way. The comparable figure for
domestic bills would be about 3, but it may
actually prove to be rather less than that - Steven Timms, draft NAP press conference
19/01/04
5What are the Effects of the Draft National
Allocation Plan on the UK Price of Power?
- OR
- Version 2
- UK wholesale electricity prices rallied recently
to reflect expectations of higher costs and lower
output from coal power stations as a result of
the trading scheme. - Electricity prices could rise by up to 80 by
2010. - The Guardian 19 and 20/01/04
6The UK Draft National Allocation PlanUK Power
Generation
7Some Key Criteria for National Allocation
Plans(Annex III EU ETS Directive)
- consistent with each Member States contribution
to the Kyoto Protocol - non discriminatory
- based on average emissions, but with potential
for reduction - anticipating early emission reduction measures
and benchmarking - reflecting how energy efficiency technologies are
taken into account - existence of competition outside the EU
8Are the Criteria a Straitjacket or too Flexible?
The Commission must accept/reject draft NAPs by
reference to their compatibility with Annex III
criteria and Article 10 of the Directive, but
there are variables in each Member State
- differing Member States emission levels under
the Kyoto Protocol and domestic emissions
programmes - use of average (historic) emissions
- account taken of early reduction measures and
benchmarking - some Annex III criteria optional (see Guidance
on Implementation).
The Commission will not reject a plan if
optional criteria or optional elements of
criteria are not applied (Guidance on
Implementation of Annex III Criteria).
9The Draft Allocation Plan as it Affects the UK
Power Industry
- will the special allocations position of the UK
power industry create a market distortion for UK
major energy users? - will the Commissions power to reject a Member
States allocation plan be sufficient to take
account of any distortive effects on UK major
energy users?
The Commission has an over-riding duty to avoid
distortion of competition under the Treaty
(Article 3) (reflected in pre-amble to the
Directive).
10State Aid
11State AidUK Allocation Plan
- The Government remains committed to its target
of 10GW installed CHP capacity by 2010. In order
to help achievement of the target, a proportion
of the NER will be ring-fenced for CHP projects
- to be based on current projections for CHP
capacity para 110 Consultation Paper - difficult to argue state aid - see Preussen
Elektra AG v Schleswag AG. If NAP is a special
advantage to CHP, very questionable whether the
advantage is through a state resource - also the practical merits of a challenge on the
basis of state aid low - CHP applicable to a wide spectrum of power
generation activity - The Directive on the promotion of cogeneration
12The Impact
13- the task of the Commission in judging Member
States national allocation plans by reference to
the Annex III criteria means managing the
flexibility left to Member States, to avoid
distortion in competition - the UK Power industry is a case in point. The
draft UK plan may not distort competition within
the UK generating industry, but could place
higher (uncompetitive) cost burdens on major
energy users - is the Government right about the modest
effects of the NAP on power pricing? - if not, have the competitive effects on UK
industry been assessed?