SAIDR Project

1
Strategic Review Meeting

• SAIDR Project
• General Organization for Veterinary Services
• And
• Food and Agriculture Organization

2
Keynotes

• H5N1 HPAI Situation Update in poultry
• SAIDR Achievements
• Challenges
• Strategic points
• Recommendations

3
H5N1 HPAI Situation Update in Poultry

• H5N1 poultry outbreaks in Egypt show a seasonal
  pattern (4 waves from 2006 up to 2009) mainly all
  waves occur from Dec to May
• In both farms and household sector, number of
  reported outbreaks decreased over the waves.
• Except for Wave 1, outbreak reports in poultry
  are mainly shown in the household sector

Sources GOVS through June 15, 2009
4
Situation update (cont.)
Wave 1
Wave 2
Wave 3
Wave 4

• H5N1 is present in most parts of the country.
• Same spatial distribution shown for the 4 waves
  with decrease in density of reported cases
• This could mainly be due to trading birds from
  infected flocks in farms over long distances.

Sources GOVS through June 15, 2009
5
Geographic Distribution of Reported H5N1 Poultry
Outbreaks in Egypt

• 73 of poultry outbreaks in 7 governorates
  Menofia, Menia, Dakahlia, Gharbia, Giza (6th of
  October), Qualiubia, Sharkia
• These governorates have been the focus for SAIDR
  activities in year I and year II

Sources GOVS through June 15, 2009
6
SAIDR Achievements

• Surveillance
• Assessment of current surveillance system
• Study production value chain
• Epidemiological study to identify risk factors
• New comprehensive Surveillance Plan developed
• Implementation of new developed Surveillance
  plan, LBM, PDS.
• Strengthening of epidemiological network at
  governorate level and district level.
• Transparent notification to other partners of new
  HPAI poultry cases.
• Link established between all surveillance aspect.

7
SAIDR Achievements (Cont)

• Communication
• Upgrade capabilities for veterinary extensions
  staff,
• Study for identification of biosecurity
  interventions in sector 4 .
• Developing of SOPs (field manual)
• Development of new communication materials
• Introduction of House to house communication from
  Veterinary side.
• Seminars in villages and orientation days for
  veterinarians.
• KAP survey for issues related to Bird to Bird
  transmission
• Hotline system

8
SAIDR Achievements (Cont)

• Assessment of control strategies
• Assessment of Vaccination strategy and flock
  immunity using Participatory Epidemiology
• An elaborated risk-based targeted vaccination
  strategy with post-vaccination monitoring and
  exit strategy developed (plus SOPs)

9
Result Study Assessment of Risk factors

• Factors characterizing infected areas are mainly
  related to
• abattoir capacity,
• commercial farms density
• cultivated areas.
• human and poultry populations,
• density of roads,
• irrigation canals and agricultural land.
• These factors highlight the role of trade and the
  production chain in disease occurrence.

Source Toni Wilsmore Report an avian influenza
ECTAD mission in Egypt
10
Result value chain analysis

• Egg production,
• the table egg layer farms provide the potential
  reservoir and source for transmission for H5N1
• Meat production
• broiler fattening units
• abattoirs
• live bird markets .
• Household sector
• Nursery farms
• the informal rural and urban markets
• The traders.

Source Toni Wilsmore Report an avian influenza
ECTAD mission in Egypt
11
Challenges

• No compensation scheme which lead to under
  reporting in farms and backyard.
• No effective link established with private
  sectors.
• Weak biosecurity in commercial poultry sectors
  constituting major H5N1 virus reservoir and
  source for disease spread downstream and exposure
  of humans infection
• Weak coordination among all stakeholders involved
  in HPAI control measures.
• Heavy reliance on mass poultry vaccination
  against HPAI.
• Vaccination and culling/disposal interventions
  are implemented without adequate biosecurity
  precautions. These malpractices may have
  contributed to the spread of the disease

12
Strategic Points to focus on in Year III

• Strengthening surveillance capacity of veterinary
  services.
• Outbreaks investigation and disease response.
• Communication
• Control policies (new vaccination strategy)

13
Strengthening surveillance capacity of veterinary
services.

• Lessons learned and rationale
• Weak notification and reporting
• New implemented Surveillance plan is targeted to
  risk areas but need more coordination between
  parties.
• Insufficient study performed (virus
  characteristics, how virus spread, etc).
• Weak field epidemiological investigation.
• Weak centralization of data for accurate analysis
  and good decisions.

14
Strengthening surveillance capacity of veterinary
services.

• Future Actions
• Deep comprehensive study on H5N1 virus movement
  in Egypt and study for virus genetic
  characteristic variation need to be done.
• Enhance implementation of previously approved
  surveillance plan (LBM, PDS,etc)
• Enhance notification from all sectors and field
  vets.
• Assign volunteers in each district directly
  managed from GOVS.
• Maximize involving of vets at village level in
  passive surveillance.
• Add value to PDS (communication, detecting of
  human cases).

15
Strengthening surveillance capacity of veterinary
services.

• Future Actions (cont)
• Continue efforts to develop a mechanism for
  effective epidemiological surveillance.
• Enhance field investigation to suspected and
  confirmed HPAI outbreaks.
• Assess, identify and map CCP where is control
  measures should be implemented.
• Continue with data centralization and management
  system for analysis and provide periodical
  recommendation.
• Monthly comprehensive epidemiological report
  published and disseminated.

16
Outbreaks investigation and disease management

• Lessons learned and rationale
• Inadequate response to outbreaks in many areas.
• Insufficient resources within Veterinary Services
  to lead the process of response
• (skilled manpower, transportation, equipments,
  good practice, etc),
• lack of epidemiological investigation at field
  level,

17
Outbreaks investigation and disease management

• Future actions
• Develop guidelines and SOPs to identify correct
  CCP in each value chain.
• Re-enforce zoning, culling and disinfection.
• Improve disease management operation at all level
  
• Response actions should be at district level,
  give power to response teams with authority, full
  equipments and skills
• Divide the response teams into investigation
  team, culling team and communication team with
  clear SOPs for action.

18
Control Policies (Vaccination)

• Lessons learned and rationale
• vaccine coverage after mass vaccination in
  Backyard not sufficient to lower virus spread (up
  to 35)
• Uncontrollable use of the vaccines in farms.
• Limited bio-security precautions during
  vaccination which probably lead to disease
  spread.
• No efficient post-vaccination monitoring system
  in place for both household and commercial poultry

19

• Control Policies (Vaccination)

• Future action
• Creation of awareness of the revised strategy and
  dissemination of approved SOPs
• Efficient monitoring of flock immunity and
  vaccine coverage.
• Improve biosecurity measures taken during
  vaccination process.
• Add value in communication (using vaccinators)

20
Communications and outreach

• Lessons learned and rationale
• Inadequate good biosecurity practices among field
  professional staff.
• Weak awareness in farms in relation to
  biosecurity and roles in virus spreading.
• Weak awareness for household and villagers on the
  risk of HPAI

21

• Communications and outreach

• Future actions
• clear communication plan and methodology.
• Focus on effective outreach system by using
  vaccinators and surveillance team and staff of
  vet clinics.
• Expand training on biosecurity for farmers.
• Support implementation of good biosecurity in
  commercial farms .
• Continuous communication with governors for all
  interventions.
• Use of community based activities

22
General Recommendations

• Maintain linkages with other projects
• Improvement of surveillance and reporting system,
  focus on CCP.
• Improvement of outbreak management and response.
• Improve biosecurity practices for field
  professionals.
• Increase awareness for small-scale poultry
  breeders

23
THANK YOU