CONTINENTAL EARLY WARNING AND INFORMATION SHARING: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE FOR DETERRING AND RESOLVING COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

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CONTINENTAL EARLY WARNING AND INFORMATION
SHARING A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE FOR DETERRING AND
RESOLVING COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

• PERSONAL IMPPRESSIONS BY BRIG GEN GORDON
  MZWANDILE YEKELO
• MEMBER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE
  FORCE (SANDF)

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INTRODUCTION

• Changed strategic environment has made it
  imperative that Africans continuously search for
  effective solutions to problems and challenges
  facing the continent
• Effective solutions are only possible through
  collective action, co-operative arrangements and
  alliances
• African approaches to Development, Peace and
  Security are premised on co-operative
  arrangements Continental (AFRICA), Regional
  (RECs) and global strategies and initiatives

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SITUATION IN MANY STATES IS CHARACTERISED BY

• Underdevelopment and poverty
• A grinding debt burden
• Instances of corruption and undemocratic
  governments
• Humanitarian crises
• Lack of mutual confidence and consensus between
  populace and state, with resultant suppression of
  minority or majority groups and ethnic tensions
• Mil support for these regimes and/or rebel
  formations by neighbours and/ or by northern
  powers etc
• Fragile/collapsed States and intrastate
  conflict

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SITUATION IN

• Fracture into rebellions opposition /rebel
  groups, quasi-rebel groups, warlords
• Development of war economies
• CONCLUSION African social, economic and
  political structures have the potential to
  generate conflict

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WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

• Having recognised the abovementioned potential
  what are the options?
• Do you focus on Preventive measures?
• Do you focus on management of conflict?
• Do you focus on Resolution of conflict?
• THESE SHOULD BE SEEN AS A CONTINUUM, BUT THAT
  INCREASED EFFORTS SHOULD BE INJVESTED IN
  PREVENTION

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EVOLUTION OF AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY
RESPONSES AND ARCHITECTURE

• The vision of the OAUS 23rd Ordinary Session
  WHILST establishing its MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT
  PREVENTION,MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION was
  encapsulated in the following words To bring
  to the process of dealing with conflicts in our
  Continent a new institutional dynamism enabling
  speedy action to prevent or manage and ultimately
  resolve conflicts

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EVOLUTION OF AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY
RESPONSES AND ARCHITECTURE

• The OAU went on to state that Emphasis on
  anticipatory and preventive measures, and
  concerted action in peace-making and
  peace-building will obviate the need to resort to
  the complex and resource demanding peacekeeping
  operations, which our countries will find
  difficult to finance.
• COST!! EXISTENT AND NON-EXISTENT BUDGETS?

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A CURSORY GLANCE AT THE SUDAN

• Initial estimates indicated that
• UNMIS (UN Mission In S Sudan)budget estimate
  would be about USD279.50m. Though a CPA had
  already been signed and in place.
• AMIS (African Mission in Sudan) budget estimate
  of USD252m. Though without a holdingceasefire.
• Consider What would Conflict Prevention cost?
• Such costs are indeed beyond the capacity of both
  the OAU then, and the AU at present!

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OTHER FACTORS IMPACTING ON THE OAU VISION AND
MECHANISM

• The following guiding principles impacted on the
  Mechanism
• Non interference in the internal affairs member
  state
• The sovereign equality of member states
• The inalienable right to independent existence
• Consent and cooperation of the parties to a
  conflict
• The peaceful settlement of disputes as well as
  the inviolability of borders.

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CONSEQUENCES FLOWING FROM THE ABOVE

• The factors translated into the following
  reality
• The undertaking of Conflict Preventive measures
  constrained by the requirement for consent from
  the government concerned and/or parties to the
  conflict. As a result mostly Conflict management
  and resolution efforts could be undertaken

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CONSEQUENCES FLOWING FROM THE ABOVE

• The lack of clarity in defining clear entry
  points for OAU involvement in conflict situations
• Failure to create an environment conducive to
  the enhancement of Early Warning of potential
  conflict
• Consequently inability to undertake proactive and
  effective action in instances of complex
  emergencies (eg Rwanda, DRC, Darfur)

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NEW ENVIRONMENT NEW SECURITY CONCEPTS

• The Constitutive Act of the AU defined a new
  guiding principle on peace and security viz
  the right of the Union to intervene in a member
  state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in
  response to grave circumstances, namely war
  crimes, genocide and crimes against humanityand
  the right of Member states to request
  intervention from the Union in order to restore
  peace and security.
• This represents a departure from long-held OAU
  positions However reference to Grave may be
  interpreted as referring only to worse case
  situations

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NEW ENVIRONMENT NEW SECURITY CONCEPTS

• A common security policy
• A security policy that encompasses human security
  and the rule of law.
• The common security agenda further defined
  strategies for
• Collective security and mutual defence from
  internal and external threats.
• Development of capacity for Conflict Prevention,
  Management and Resolution.

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NEW ENVIRONMENT NEW SECURITY CONCEPTS

• Establishment of an Early Warning System in order
  to facilitate prompt response and action to
  prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflict.
• Mediation in intra-state and interstate conflicts
  and disputes.
• Development and enhancement of capacity for
  Peace-making, peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
  This gives priority to the development of African
  Standby Force Arrangements (ASF).

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NEW ENVIRONMENT NEW SECURITY CONCEPS

• Establishment of the AU Peace and Security
  Council (PSC) with the following instruments
• Continental Early Warning system (CEWS)
• Military staff committee
• Panel of the Wise
• African Standby Force
• Peace Fund
• N.B. PSC established as a Collective security and
  EW set-up to ensure timely and efficient response
• Note Early Warning Warning plus Response

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BUILDING BLOCKS FOR EFFECTIVE EARLY WARNING

• Both at the Continental and Regional level there
  is a critical requirement for
• Co-operative and collaborative arrangements both
  inter and intrastate
• X-cutting info-sharing (eg between the various
  Divisions of the AU and RECs, Govt depts,
  agencies within states, between the above and
  IG/CSO/NGOs
• Orchestration of all efforts be it preventive,
  management and resolution

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BUILDING BLOCKS FOR EFFECTIVE EARLY WARNING

• Effective and efficient utilisation of
  instruments such as African Peer Review
  Mechanism (APRM), Panel of the Wise, Mediation by
  Regional governments, Fact Finding Missions,
  Election Monitoring etc
• Establishment of linked databases at both
  regional and Continental level
• N.B. Info-sharing obviously should be guided by
  Procedures and guidelines, not excluding
  confidentiality, and allow for decision-making

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DEVELOPMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS

• The establishment of the REWS is premised on the
  5 Regional Economic Communities (RECs) setting up
  REWS which become building blocks for the CEWS
• There is uneven development between the RECs ito
  their establishment and operationalisation
• Establishment and development of REWS is
  influenced by each regions historical conditions
  and situation

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REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

• ECOWAS History of intrastate conflict with
  grave implications for interstate conflicts
• IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on development-
  Horn of Africa) History of interstate conflict,
  internal conflict with implications for regional
  security and humanitarian emergencies(famine etc)
  
• ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African
  States) History of inter and intrastate conflict
• SADC (Southern African Development Community)
  Evolved from the former Frontline States

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WHY REWS ?

• To anticipate and identify emerging conflict
  situations and crises
• To monitor, report on and facilitate decision
  making and responses to ongoing conflict
  situations and crises
• To monitor , report on,facilitate decision making
  and responses on countries/states emerging from
  conflict (transition period and post-conflict
  situation)
• To translate intimate knowledge of situation in
  regional and contiguous states into warnings
  against instability

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IDEOLOGICALAPPROACHES TO EARLY WARNING

• Statist EW should be state-centred ie within the
  framework of state organs or agencies
• Civil society EW should be based and centred
  around CSO/NGOs
• Is it an either or matter?
• EW should be based and developed around
  co-operative and collaborative arrangements
  without an either/or scenario
• Guidelines! Procedures! Principles!

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APPROACHES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

• Debates over such approaches delay the
  operationalisation of effective responses to
  situations with dire consequences
• Provision of indispensable donor support can be
  sacrificed on the alter of semantics and
  diplomatic manuevring

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ENHANCING CAPACITY

• The establishment and development of Early
  warning Mechanisms requires
• Resources (incl. Equipment - communication means
  eg internet)
• Funding (operational costs)
• Training
• Simplicity
• Utilisation of all available resources for
  example Use of SMS as warning and response
  planning in case of flooding (The key
  requirement is innovative solutions)

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ANY ROLE FOR THE MILITARY? IS THERE A MILITARY
PERSPECTIVE?

• An unqualified Yes!!
• There is a keen recognition of the fact that the
  military should play a supportive role to all
  political, diplomatic etc . And that doctrine
  should be informed and guided by such principle
  throughout the conflict continuum
• They define and inform scope for operational and
  tactical initiative and responses
• This constitutes a firm rejection of the view
  that (political) power grows out of the barrel
  of the gun
• Any lessons from history?

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THE RSA EXPERIENCE

• FLASHBACK 1964
• Height of the power of the apartheid regime
  characterised
• Defeat of the democratic movement and the
  resultant triumphalism
• Rise of military power
• Acquisition of nuclear technology(Valindaba,
  Pelindaba- as terminology of metaphoric
  militarism)

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RESPONSES BY THE RESISTANCE

• FASTFORWARD 1970s AND 1980s
• Integrated strategic responses Appropriate
  strategy and tactics
• Clearly defined goals and objectives
• Military playing a supportive and armed
  propaganda role
• Clear definition of the nature and character of
  the problem/conflict
• As mobilisation and propaganda (read- information
  sharing and distribution) asfocus of main

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Thank you !!!

• SIYABONGA!!