Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from

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Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from Missing Imports in China Raymond Fisman Columbia University Shang-Jin Wei IMF and NBER Plan of the Presentation ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from


1
Tax Rates and Tax Evasion Evidence from
Missing Imports in China
  • Raymond FismanColumbia University
  • Shang-Jin WeiIMF and NBER

2
Plan of the Presentation
  • Motivation Basic Methodology
  • Data
  • Basic Results
  • Economic Interpretation
  • Robustness Checks and Extensions
  • Conclusions

3
Public Finance Theory The Role of Evasion
  • Often, collection assumed to be perfect
  • Correlates of evasion-punishment (cost)-tax
    rate (benefit)
  • How important is this effect?

4
Theory Rate-Evasion Relationship may be
Counterintuitive
Model Allingham Sandmo (1972) Predicted
Relationship Depends on U(w)
Model Yitzhaki (1972) Predicted Relationship
Positive if punishment is a function of evaded
taxes
5
How much evasion is there? Measuring what we
cannot observe
  1. Discrepancy in Macro-variables-Difference
    between national income and product
    accounts-Ratio of currency to M2
  2. U.S. Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program
    (TCMP)

6
Measuring Evasion Previous Work
Method Approach/ Examples Problems
Inference from obs. quantities M Demand I C -based on dubious assumptions -measures evasion level (not sensitivity)
U.S. TCMP Intensive Audit -Rate-Evasion relationship not separable from income effect
7
Our Approach
Without Evasion (and measurement error)
Exports from Hong Kong to China
Imports from China to Hong Kong
8
In reality
HK-Reported Exports to China
China-reported Imports from HK
Evasion
Noise
9
Does Tax Rate Affect Evasion?
HK-Reported Exportsi China-Reported
Importsi Evasion Gapi Noisei ?i
?(Tax Rate)i ?I
H0 ? gt 0
10
Predictions Types of Evasion
  • Smuggling that bypasses Hong Kong Not detected
    by analyses
  • Under-reporting prices
  • Under-reporting quantities
  • Mislabeling goods

11
Summary of Predictions
Type of Evasion Predictions
Under-reporting per unit value Tax rate positively correlated with evasion gap in values
Under-reporting quantities Tax rate positively correlated with evasion gap in values and quantities
Mislabeling goods Tax rate of closely related goods negatively correlated with evasion gap in values and quantities
12
Plan of the Presentation
  • Motivation Basic Methodology
  • Data
  • Basic Results
  • Economic Interpretation
  • Robustness Checks and Extensions
  • Conclusions

13
Trade Flow Data WITS(World Integrated Trade
Solutions)
  • Derived from UN Comtrade
  • 6-digit Harmonized Commodity Description and
    Coding System (HS)
  • Available since 1996
  • Data Utilized 1998 (little year-to-year
    variation in tax rates) (and later also 1997)
  • Both Value and Quantity data available

14
Industry-level data Examples
15
Tax Rate on Product k
  • Tariff rate on Product k VAT on k
  • In 1998, across 8 digit categories
  • Mean 36, min13 and max 135
  • standard deviation 10.34

16
Direct vs. Indirect Imports/Exports
HK Reported Exports
China Reported Imports
  • Entry point for many 3rd country exports
  • Indirect exports reported separately
  • In theory, Chinese reported imports reflect
    country of origin
  • Not always successfully separated (esp. Taiwan)

Key Fact Tax Rates are Identical for Direct
Indirect Imports
17
Evasion Gap Defined
Gap_Value log(Export_Value) - log(Import_Value)
Gap_Qty log(Export_Qty) - log(Import_Qty)
All Export Figures reflect Direct Exports only
18
Tax Rate Data WITS
  • Derived from UNCTAD TRAINS (Trade Analysis and
    Information System) Database
  • Tariff and VAT rates at the 8-digit level
  • No within-variation for almost all 6-digit
    industries analysis restricted to this subsample
  • TAX Tariff VAT
  • Taxes on similar goods Tax rate of all other
    goods in 4-digit class

19
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Gap_Value -0.62 2.43
Gap_Qty -1.06 2.56
Tax Rate (TariffVAT) 36.09 10.34
Direct Export Ratio 0.17 0.23
20
Specification
log(Exportk ) - log(Importk ) a ß Taxk ek
But observed imports (Import) are imperfectly
recorded
Importk Importk Misclassified Indirect
Importk
21
Recall Tax Rates are Identical for Direct
Indirect Imports
Tax rate uncorrelated with Misclassified Imports
Modeling Assumption Misclassified Indirect
Importk k ?k Importk
22
Hence
Importk Importk Misclassified Indirect
Importk (1 k ?k ) Importk
Combining with previous equations, we estimate
log(Exportk ) - log(Importk ) a ß Taxk ek
Evasion Gap
23
Summary of Predictions
Sign In Value Regression Sign In Value Regression Sign In Qty Regression Sign In Qty Regression
Tax Avg(Tax) Tax Avg(Tax)
Underreported Prices 0 0 0
Underreported Quantities 0 0
Relabeling
Type of Evasion
24
Tax Rates and Tax Evasion
  • Motivation Basic Methodology
  • Data
  • Specification
  • Results and Interpretations
  • Extensions

25
Table 2 Tax Rate and Evasion
26
Table 3 Aggregation by Tax Rates
27
Economic Interpretation of the Estimate
  • Let M reported imports X true imports.
  • M X - Evasion
  • Evasion constant ? Tax rate noise
  • dlog(M)/d Tax dlog(X)/dTax - ?
  • dlog(M) / d Tax gt ? ? 3

28
Economic Interpretation (continued)
  • Any tax rate above 33.3 is on the wrong side of
    the Laffer curve a reduction in rate can result
    in an increase, rather than decrease, in revenue
    collection.
  • The avg. tax rate in China was 36 (in 1998).
  • So many rates were too high even from a revenue
    point of view.

29
Effect of mis-labeling increasing taxes on
similar goods reduces evasion
Gap_Valuek a ß1Taxk ß2Avg(Tax_o)
?k
If mis-labeling exists ß2 lt 0
30
Table 4 Evidence of Mis-labeling
31
Table 5 Evidence on Quantities
32
Robustness Checks
  • Controlling for Exemptions
  • Exclude indirect export dominated industries
  • Results Qualitatively unchanged

33
Table 6 Controlling for Exemptions
34
Table 7 First Differences 1997-98
35
Flexible Functional Form
36
Conclusions
  • Evasion is highly correlated with tax rate
  • Above average tax rates cause most evasion
  • Evasion correlated with tax rates is primarily-
    under-reporting the unit value
  • - mis-reporting goods as lower-taxed types

37
Future Work
  • Apply the same technique to a broader set of
    countries
  • -How does tariff dispersion affect evasion?
  • -Is this an objective measure of corruption?
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