The Cold War

1
The Cold War

• US Involvement in Vietnam
• 1946 - 1975

2
US Involvement in Vietnam

• US involvement began during the closing days of
  World War II when the first US casualty, Lt. Col.
  A. Peter Dewey was killed on 26 September 1945.
• US involvement in Vietnam spanned six
  presidential administrations over a thirty year
  period.
• By 30 April 1975 when the US completed its
  withdrawal the US had suffered 58,209 KIA and
  more than 2,000 MIA.

3
Roots of US Involvement

• Truman Administration 1945 to 1953
• Refused to recognize Hos government
• Ignored communications from Ho
• Reluctantly agreed to Frenchreconquest
• Financially supported French efforts
• Accused of losing China, did not want to lose
  Vietnam

4
Roots of US Involvement

• With the fall of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 the
  French were forced out of Vietnam in July.
• Realizing they could not sustain their colonies
  in Indochina the French petitioned for peace.
• The resulting peace conference reflected the
  mounting tensions of the Cold War and the recent
  armistice ending the conflict in Korea.

5
Roots of US Involvement

• The victorious Viet Minh, acceding to pressure
  from the USSR and communist China, agreed to a
  interim division along the 17th parallel.
• The Soviets and the Chinese feared a strained and
  confrontational peace agreement would further
  anger France and, more importantly, Frances ally
  the United States.
• The Communists also believed they were in a
  better position politically and felt they could
  resolve the situation in Vietnam by political
  action.

6
Roots of US Involvement

• The Geneva Accords
• Vietnam would hold national elections in July
  1956 to reunify the country
• The division at the seventeenth parallel would
  vanish with the elections
• Opposing forces (the Viet Minh and former
  Vietnamese troops who supported the French) were
  to withdraw to their respective sections

7
Roots of US Involvement

• Eisenhower Administration 1953 to 1961
• Refused to sign Geneva Accords
• Violated the spirit of the accords
• Installed Diem as president of RVN
• Replaced France as Diems primarysupporter
• Articulated the Domino Theory
• Sent about 750 military advisors to train army of
  RVN

8
Roots of US Involvement

• With Vietnam split into theDemocratic Republic
  ofVietnam (the north) and theState of Vietnam
  (the south)which ultimately became theRepublic
  of Vietnam (aka theRepublic of South Vietnam)
  northern leadership moved to oust the US backed
  government in the south headed by Ngo Dinh Diem.

9
Roots of US Involvement

• President Ngo Dinh Diem had no intentionof
  holding elections for a united Vietnam andas his
  regime became more unpopular hispolitical
  opponents began to consider alternatives. They
  eventually came to believe violence was the
  onlyway to persuade Diem to agree to the terms
  of the1954 Geneva Conference.
• From 1956 to 1957 the south experienced a huge
  increase in the number of peasants leaving their
  homes to join armed insurgent groups in the back
  areas of Vietnam.
• The insurgents could not take on the South
  Vietnamese Army at first so they concentrated on
  'soft targets'.
• In 1959, an estimated 1,200 of Diem's government
  officials were murdered.

10
Roots of US Involvement

• 1959
• At first the leader of North Vietnam opposed the
  terrorism but changed his mind when he was
  informed the attacks had been so successful that
  if the north did not support the insurgents
  unified Vietnam was out of the question.
• North Vietnams Central Executive Committee
  issues Resolution 15, changing its strategy
  toward South Vietnam from "political struggle" to
  "armed struggle."
• The North Vietnamese Army creates Group 559 the
  specialized group is given the mission of
  establishing a supply route from the north to
  rebel forces in the south. Prince Sihanouk of
  Cambodia allows Group 559 to develop the route
  along the Vietnamese/Cambodian border, with
  branches spreading into Vietnam along its entire
  length. This route becomes known as the Ho Chi
  Minh Trail.

11
The Ho Chi Minh Trail
12
Roots of US Involvement

• 1960
• In 1960 Ho Chi Minh persuaded the various
  insurgent groups to form a more powerful and
  effective resistance organization.
• In December, 1960, insurgents formed the
  NationalFront for the Liberation of South
  Vietnam (NLF).
• The NLF, or the 'Vietcong', as the Americans
  wereto call them, was a conglomeration of more
  then adozen different political and religious
  groups.
• The leader of the NLF, Hua Tho, was a
  non-Marxist, Saigon lawyer, but large numbers of
  the movement supported communism.
• The NLF fell more and more under the control of
  Ho Chi Minh and North Vietnam.

13
Roots of US Involvement

• Kennedy Administration 1961 to 1963
• Rejected negotiated settlement with Ho
• Refused recommendations todramatically increase
  U.S. militarypresence but did increase
  thenumber of advisors to about16,000 by 1963
• Encouraged coup that deposed assassinated Diem

14
Army of the Republic of Vietnam(ARVN)

• In 1957 the US Military Assistance Advisor Group
  (MAAG) assumed responsibility for training South
  Vietnamese forces.

15
Republic of Vietnam Navy
16
Vietnamese Marines
17
Ap Bac The First Invasion
January 2, 1963
350 Vietcong inflict 191 casualties on a
combined ARVN/US (advisors transport) assault
force of 1400 while suffering but 57.
More serious was the timidity and utter
unwillingness of the South Vietnamese to engage
the enemy or to advance under fire even to aid
fellow ARVNs.
"These people (the Vietnamese) won't listenthey
make the same mistakes over and over again in the
same way."
18
The Buddhist Crisis

• In the days just previous to the Buddhist
  celebration of Vesak the birthday of Gautama
  Buddha Vatican flags had been flown in
  association with a Catholic celebration.
• Following the Catholic celebrations, Diem came to
  the conclusion that the government ought to
  enforce a longstanding though seldom enforced law
  prohibiting the flying of ALL religious flags
  outdoors.
• The flying of flags represented an assertion of
  power to the Vietnamese and Diem in all
  likelihood enforced the law in order to
  preserve the governments prestige.
• (Moyar, Mark. Triumph Forsaken. p. 212)

19
The Buddhist Crisis

• The ordinance applied to ALL religious groups but
  the timing of the decision to enforce the decree
  was ill advised at best.
• On 07 May 1963 at the urging of several Buddhist
  monks, thousands of Buddhist flags were flown
  publically and the next day 500 Buddhists
  protesters gathered at a pagoda in Hue with
  banners protesting the ban of the public display
  of their flags.

20
The Buddhist Crisis

• The protesters were led by Tri Quang who told the
  crowd the government favored the Catholics and
  persecuted Buddhists.
• When Tri Quang attempted to broadcast a tape
  critical of the government the local radio
  stations director refused to permit the
  broadcast.
• When the provincial chief arrived he attempted to
  convince the protesters to go home but they
  refused and scuffling followed by rock throwing
  and eventually the use of fire hoses to break up
  the protesters was employed.
• When the army arrived and the protesters
  continued to refuse to leave, artillery blanks
  and rifles were fired into the air.
• According to Buddhists the Army then opened fire
  on the protesters and threw grenades into the
  crowd.
• While some protesters were in all likelihood
  injured by government troops it is also probable
  that some of the protesters were injured when the
  protesters themselves set of explosives among
  the crowd.
• What is for certain is that 8 people died and 14
  were injured, most of them Buddhist protesters.

21
The Buddhist Crisis

• The government expressed sorrow for those that
  had been killed and promised the government would
  provide compensation to the families leading
  many, including the American consul in Hue to
  Believe crisis nearing end.
• Tri Quang and other leaders refused to be
  conciliated. They issued a new list of demands
• responsible government officials had to be
  punished
• removal of all restrictions concerning the flying
  of flags
• a prohibition against the arrest of Buddhists

22
The Buddhist Crisis

• Diem opened a dialogue with the Buddhists but
  refused for obvious reasons to give in to the
  Buddhist demands, especially the last.
• Diem did not round up and silence the Buddhists
  though the example coming from Ho Chi Minh in the
  north was for him to do exactly that.
• The US press corps in Saigon seized on this
  incident and began to use it as evidence that the
  Diem government lacked public support, was
  hopelessly repressive and therefore deserved to
  be overthrown.

23
The Buddhist Crisis

• The two main sources of information used by the
  US press were Pham Ngoc Thao and Pham Xuan An
• Pham Ngoc Thao was a colonel in the South
  Vietnamese Army.
• Pham Xuan An was a member of the press corps
  serving Reuters as a stringer.
• Both were communist spies.

24
The Buddhist Crisis

• Thieh Quang Duc June 11, 1963

• Concerning the supposed Diem persecution and
  repression of the Buddhists
• 1,275 Buddhist pagodas were built under the Diem
  administration
• The Diem administration provided large amounts of
  money for Buddhists schools, ceremonies and other
  activities.
• Of Diems 18 cabinet members 5 were Catholic, 5
  were Confucians, and 8 were Buddhists.
• 12 Provincial chiefs were Catholic while 26 were
  either Buddhists or Confucians.
• Only three of the top military officers were
  Catholic.

25
The Great Myth Population

• The US press consistently claimed that 70 to 80
  of the South Vietnamese population was Buddhist.
• A large portion of the population did have some
  type of Buddhist affiliation HOWEVER
• only 3 to 4 million of 15 million South
  Vietnamese were Buddhists and only 50 of those
  were actual practicing Buddhists
• most Buddhists lived in the countryside and knew
  nothing of political disturbances
• Confucians numbered about 3 to 4 million also
• 1 ½ million were Catholics
• Another 2 ½ to 3 million were either Cao Dai or
  Hoa Hao
• The remainder were animists, Taoists, Protestant
  Christians, Hindus or Muslims.

26
Initial Involvement and Escalation

• Johnson Administration (1963 1968)
• Wanted to avoid provoking wider war
• Followed a policy of gradual escalation
• Hoped DRV would eventually quit
• Dramatically increased U.S. involvement
• Troop strength peaked at 500,000in 1968
• Initiated peace talks with DRV in 1968

27
Initial US Involvement

• August 2 4, 1964

DD 731 USS Maddox DD 951 USS Turner C.
Joy
28
Initial Involvement

• On 11 October 1964 the Central MilitaryCommission
  and the HighCommand of theVietnamesePeoples
  Army ordered thecommunist forces operating in
  thesouth to initiate three offensivesduring the
  winter and spring 1965.
• Eastern Nam Bo
• Central Trung Bo
• Tay Nguyen (Central Highlands)

29
Initial Involvement

• 1965
• February 07 Viet Cong attack the military
  barracks at Pleiku the early morning attack
  leaves 8 Americans dead and 108 wounded several
  US aircraft are damaged or destroyed
• President Johnson takes the attack personally and
  orders air strikes that will become Operation
  Rolling Thunder. The operation will bomb targets
  in North Vietnam over the next three years.
• March 08 Two battalions of US Marines land at
  Da Nang their primary mission is to provide
  security for the US airbase
• Aug Marines conduct first offensive operations
  against VC south of Chu Lai
• Nov US Army engages NVA regulars in the Ia
  Drang Valley
• Dec US troops strength reaches 200,000

30
Initial Involvement

• Escalation

31
Initial Involvement

• Escalation

8 March 64 two battalions of Marines land at
Danang to provide security or the US air base 30
June 65 The Marines have some seven battalions
in Military Region 1 I Corps. The Marines
establish bases at Phu Bai, and Chu Lai north and
south of Danang.
32
The Second Invasion - 1965

• In early August the Marine commander at Chu Lai
  learned of a planned VC attack. Instead of
  waiting for the VC to strike General Lew Walt
  directed a pre-emptive attack.
• Operation Starlight lasted 6 days and involved
  both US Marines and ARVN troops defeating the 1st
  VC Regiment. The US/ARVN troops claimed 29 KIA
  and another 70 WIA while inflicting 281 KIA on
  the VC Regiment reflecting the popular idea of
  body count during this phase of the war.
• In November, following another attack in the
  Pleiku area the US 7th Cavalry conducted
  operations in the Ia Drang valley against North
  Vietnamese Regulars this proved to be the
  initial invasion by NVA regulars.

33
Escalation
34
US Goals in Vietnam

• Limited war, didnt want to provoke
• Soviet Union (USSR)
• Peoples Republic of China (PRC)
• A stable, non-communist government in South
  Vietnam (RVN)
• Hoped to Get in, get out, get on

35
Early Opposition

• Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis) - Questioned the
  unlimited nature of the wording of the resolution
  as it applied to presidential power concerning
  both troop strength/deployment and military
  response including a direct military assault.
• J. William Fulbright (D-Ark) Read the
  resolution to the Senate but during the debate
  that followed said he would deplore the
  deployment of large number of US troops
• William Gruening (D-Alk) Disagreed with the
  presidents policy. Questioned the limits (or
  lack of limits) on presidential powers under the
  resolution. I am opposed to sacrificing a
  single American boy in this venture.
• Wayne Morse (D-Ore.) I believe that history
  will record that we have made a great mistake. .
  . I believe this resolution to be a historic
  mistake. I believe that within the next century,
  future generations will look with dismay and
  great disappointment upon a Congress which is now
  about to make such a historic mistake.

36
Declining Public Support
37
Progress Reports

• In November of 1967, the Administration launched
  an extensive "public relations" campaign. It was
  designed to convince Congress, the press, and the
  public that there was "progress" in Vietnam and
  that the war was being "won.
• Johnson was advised to "Emphasize light at the
  end of the tunnel instead of battles, deaths, and
  danger." "There are ways," Johnson was told, "of
  guiding the press to show light at the end of the
  tunnel
• To head this effort, Johnson brought General
  William Westmoreland, commander of American
  forces in Vietnam, to Washington. Westmoreland
  addressed the National Press Club saying that the
  U.S. had reached the point "where the end comes
  into view"

38
Turning Point 1968

• Just after midnight on 31 January 1968 the North
  Vietnamese launched the Tet Mau Than (Tet)
  offensive in Nha Trang
• The primary objectives of this offensive, as with
  all offensives launched by Hanoi, were political.
• The North Vietnamese were well acquainted with
  the US political process and for two years had
  been preparing this offensive with the eventual
  goal of affecting the 1968 Presidential Election.
• The offensive would also serve to show the world
  that the South Vietnamese people, when given the
  chance, would rally to the cause of the National
  Liberation Front (NLF) and the Viet Cong (VC).

39
Turning Point 1968

• By the end of the offensive the world knew that
  the RVNAF were defeated at every juncture. It
  was a broken force and the government in the
  South was ready for conquest because it was about
  to disintegrate
• The American media had a field day.
• Every night pictures of dead US service men
  streamed across television sets.
• It was implied that the VC had captured the US
  Embassy in Saigon (they had not).
• 27 February 1968 Walter Cronkite delivered his
  famous broadcast for CBS in which he said We are
  mired in stalemate.
• To make matters worse, President Johnson and his
  staff were watching Cronkites broadcast and
  began to second guess themselves.

40
Turning Point 1968

• The chief of the Saigon police executing a
  suspected Viet Cong

41
Turning Point 1968

• Unfortunately, the world if not flat out wrong
  was at least incorrect in its perceptions.
• The South Vietnamese people did not rally to the
  north.
• The guerrilla movement was exposed and its
  infrastructure decimated.
• The VC were devastated.
• While actual looses may never be known, between
  50,000 and 80,000 communists were killed.
• Two-thirds of those were VC casualties.
• The VC lost its prime source of leadership.

42
Turning Point 1968

• On St. Patricks Day, March 17, 1968, Wallace
  Carroll, an anti-war newspaper columnist, wrote
  and published a signed column titled Vietnam
  Quo Vidas? In it he contended that America was
  misguided and that the war was irrelevant to
  the goal of thwarting Soviet expansion. Dean
  Acheson, a former Secretary of State, and an
  advisor to President Kennedy showed the article
  to President Johnson. The Washington Post would
  later report that this column had a huge impact
  on Johnsons decision not to seek re-election

43
Turning Point 1968

• Webb summed up the outcome of the offensive when
  he wrote that the offensive was the,
• watershed event of the war from the American
  perspective, since public support fell steadily
  from that point forward. Nonetheless, Tet 1968
  was a clear military victory. American and South
  Vietnamese forces at a cost of 4,000 and 5,000
  lives respectively, killed 58,000 enemy soldiers,
  turned back the communists at every point, and
  effectively destroyed the South Vietnamese
  communist military (NLF). In Vietnamese terms
  Tet 1968 was a political victory as well.
  Contrary to the predictions of General Giap and
  others, the South Vietnamese people declined to
  support the communists who temporarily gained
  control of their towns and villages.

44
The 1968 Election
lt Richard M. Nixon Republican
Hubert H. Humphrey gt Democrat
George W. Wallace gt American Independent party
45
DemocraticNationalConventionChicago1968
46
The 1968 Election

• The Candidates proposals for Vietnam
• Nixon Secret plan to end the war
• Humphrey Suspend bombing as an act of good
  faith, continue negotiations
• Wallace Expand war, use nuclear weapons to
  defeat North Vietnam

47
Trying to Disengage

• Nixon Administration (1968 1973)
• Claimed to have a secret plan to endthe war
• Promised peace with honor
• Expanded air war to Laos Cambodia
• Invaded Cambodia Laos
• Negotiated Paris Peace Accords
• Withdrew last U.S. troops in 1973

48
My Lai Massacre

• March 16, 1968

49
Changing Commanders

• Creighton Adams took command of USforces in June
  1968 and with thechange in command came a
  changein the way the US armed forcesapproached
  the war.
• There was an immediate shift in
• the concept of the nature and conduct of the war
• the appropriate measures of merit
• the tactics to be applied

50
The Cambodian Incursion(May June 1970)

• Attempt to cut Ho Chi Minh Trail
• Destroy PAVN, NLF forces in SE Cambodia
• Destroy communist base areas sanctuaries
• Provoked massive unrest in U.S. universities

51
Kent State UniversityMay 4, 1970
52
1972
For four years neither the NVA, the NLA or the VC
could mount a major offensive. Tet 68 had more
than decimated each. Hanoi decided to put all its
hopes and dreams into one massive offensive.
Always aware of the political environment and
election cycles in the US, they determined to
launch their Nguyen-Hue Offensive in the spring
of 1972. Both the timing and the naming of the
offensive were geared toward recalling Vietnamese
nationalism once again.

• The Nguyen-Hue Offensive was planned on three
  separate fronts.
• An assault would attack into Military Region (MR)
  1 or I Corps.
• Another point of attack would be the central
  highlands of MR II into Kontum Province with the
  provincial capital of Kontum city as an
  objective.
• Finally, in MR III and IV drives would be made to
  surround and isolate Saigon the capital of South
  Vietnam.

Truong, Ngo Quang. The Easter Offensive of 1972.
Washington U.S. Army Center of Military History,
1980. p. 9.
53
1972 Offensive Assault on Military Region I
54
The Christmas Bombings(1972)
55
Paris Peace Accords

• January 27, 1973
• General cease-fire
• All U.S. troops out in 60 days
• DRV to release all U.S. POWs
• Neither side to send further troops to RVN
• (150,000 PAVN troops allowed to remain)
• Created national Council of Reconciliation
• Reconciliation to be
• Gradual
• Peaceful
• Free of coercion

56
In January, 1973 the Agreement on Ending the War
and Restoring Peace in Vietnam more informally
know as the Paris accord was signed. Shortly
thereafter the United States Congress voted to
withdraw funding from the South Vietnamese. With
no money to buy bullets, beans or gas, the
defensive capabilities of the RVNAF eroded and
eventually collapsed. On April 29, 1975 the last
Americans who wished departed Saigon, South
Vietnam. The next day, the South Vietnamese
government surrendered. The North had finally
won a campaign in the South.
57
Operation Frequent Wind
58
The End

• Thousands upon thousands of our Allies were
  tortured and died in communist "Re-education
  Camps" after the fall of the South on April 30,
  1975. Multitudes of others have been scarred for
  life. During five trips back to Vietnam in the
  1990's one Vietnam veteran found that most of the
  former soldiers that he encountered still welcome
  the American veteran back with open arms. As
  strange as it may seem, the camaraderie of a
  shared experience is what continues to bind
  veterans together.
• Many former Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army
  soldiers who are still trying to come to terms
  with the war. One retired Viet Cong colonel said
  that, if he had to do it all over again, he would
  join the fight against the North. For his years
  of servitude to the communist regime all he has
  to show for it is a 5 a month retirement check.
  There are no other benefits to living under
  communist rule.

59
Assessing of the War

• Sapped national will
• Fragmented national consensus that had dominated
  foreign policy since 1947
• Failed to transfer democracy to Vietnam
• Eroded respect for the military
• Drastically divided the U.S. population
• Eroded trust and confidence between the American
  people and their government

60
The End

• We Joined their Dream We Fought Side by Side
  We Deserted Them