Aristotle

1
Aristotle

• Nicomachean Ethics

2
Overview

• The NE is a work in practical ethics. I.e.,
  Aristotle explains how we can lead a satisfying
  life.
• The NE fits into Aristotles overall philosophy
  it is deeply teleological, speaks of the way in
  which humans differ from others (a genus-species
  definition), explains our happiness (eudaimonia)
  in terms of our telos/diferentia/function, and
  provides a way in which we can actualize our
  potential.
• As elsewhere, A. rejects many aspects of Platos
  thought. Here, he rejects the notion that there
  is a single Form of Goodness. For A., there are
  many virtues.

3
Book I, Ch. 1

• Everything aims at an end which is good.
• Hence, the good is what we all aim at.
• People disagree over what good is.
• Is it an activity or a product of an activity?
• Some ends are merely mid-way points to some other
  end. Subordinate ends are less valuable than more
  ultimate ends.

4
I, 2

• There must be an ultimate end in order to avoid
  an infinite regress. I.e., there must be a single
  end at which all things aim.
• This raises two questions (1) what is this end,
  and (2) what science investigates it.
• The NE as a whole is required to answer (1).
• Re. (2), A says its political science (rather
  than ethics) since it looks at the end of the
  community and not just an individual. At other
  points, though, he says its ethics.

5
I, 3

• Our discussion will be adequate if its degree of
  clarity fits the subject-matter (1094b 13).
• Ethics and politics are relatively inexact. We
  can only indicate the truth roughly and in
  outline.
• Politics and ethics require life experience as
  our data. Hence, the young are not suitable
  students for these subjects.
• Plus, they rely too much on uncontrolled feelings.

6
I, 4 5

• Eudaimonia (usually translated as happiness) is
  the good toward which we all aim.
• People disagree over what happiness is
• Life of gratification (pleasure)? Too superficial
  and slavish
• Life of political activity (honour)? Too
  superficial, dependent on those bestowing honour.
  Virtue - actuality
• Life of study (contemplation)?
• Wealth? Instrumental only

7
I, 6 (Not in text)

• Here, A rejects Plato and the Form of the Good
• (1) Good has no meaning common to all its
  applications
• (2) no Form of Good separate from its
  particular manifestations
• (3) If there were, it would be useless for
  practical purposes.

8
I, 7

• Instrumental vs. Intrinsic value. We are looking
  for later.
• Formal properties of happiness
• Final
• Complete
• Self sufficient
• Happiness is like this.

9
I, 7 Function of a human (1097b 23 ff.)
substantive conditions of happiness

• Teleology and differentia
• Potentiality/actuality -- scale of life
• the human function is the souls activity that
  expresses reason or requires reason
• The human good turns out to be the souls
  activity that expresses virtue (1098a 16).

10
I, 9

• How is happiness acquired?
• By learning? By habituation? By other training?
  Divine provenance?
• Aristotle will argue that it is a sort of
  habituation
• A life can only be assessed in its totality

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Book II, Ch. 1

• Two kinds of virtue (arete/excellence)
  intellectual and moral.
• Intellectual virtue can be taught and learned
  from a book.
• Moral virtue cannot be learned in this way it
  requires time and experience and results from
  habit (like learning a skill such as piano
  playing or skating).
• No virtues arise entirely by nature although they
  are not contrary to nature either. We all have
  the potential to be virtuous.

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II, 1

• Potentiality actuality again
• Through habituation, we develop a state of
  character, which is a propensity to act in one
  way rather than another.
• It is important, then, to begin doing the right
  activities early, thus building the right habits
  and propensities

13
II, 2

• This is a practical work aimed at action. We
  dont simply want to understand what good or
  virtue is, we want to become virtuous and good.
• Not an exact science
• Tendency that these sorts of stets naturally
  tend to be ruined by excess and deficiency.
• E.g., strength/health and exercise

14
II, 2

• The same is true of the moral virtues e.g.,
  temperance, bravery, etc.
• For if someone avoids and is afraid of
  everything, standing firm against nothing, he
  becomes cowardly, but if he is afraid of nothing
  at all and goes to face everything, he becomes
  rash. Similarly, if he gratifies himself with
  every pleasure, and refrains from none, he
  becomes intemperate, but if he avoids them all,
  as boors do, he becomes some sort of insensible
  person (1104a).

15
II, 2

• As points here relate again to potentiality and
  actuality. We are all potentially strong, but we
  have to do the right things eat and exercise
  well in order to actualize this potential.
• Similarly, we are all, e.g., potentially brave,
  but we need to be in the right situations and
  stand up to our fears (and to not entirely
  dismiss them either) if we are to actualize this
  potential

16
II, 2

• Problems?
• Not all virtues are means. E.g., justice
• Some situations are simply to be avoided. We
  dont actualize our potential for fidelity by
  putting ourselves in situations that test it.

17
II, 3

• Even though ethics for A primarily involves
  action, it also requires right reason and correct
  feeling.
• Connection between virtue and pleasure. E.g., a
  temperate person is one who (comes to) finds
  pleasure in moderation.

18
II, 3

• Two psychological points
• (1) typically we tend to engage in behaviour that
  we find pleasurable and avoid those we find
  painful.
• (2) We must become habituated in such a way that
  we find pleasure in the prope/virtuous activity.
  I.e., we must internalize these causes of
  behaviour (which we will do best through proper
  education).
• Early behaviour modicfication?

19
II, 4

• Paradox How can you become good by doing good
  acts? Doesn't doing good acts imply that you are
  already good, not becoming so?
• A. points to 3 characteristics of being virtuous
• (1) we must know what we are doing (and not
  simply following someone else's instructions or
  being lucky).
• (2) we must choose the correct actions for their
  own sake.
• (3) the action must proceed from a firm and
  stable character.

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II, 5

• Does virtue arise from feelings, capacities, and
  states (of character)?
• Feelings accompanied by pleasure and pain
• Capacities to experience these feelings
• States the way we deal with our feelings
  moderately, or an extreme
• A. states that we are virtuous in terms of our
  state of character i.e., the way we deal with
  our feelings.

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II, 5

• We are neither praised or blamed for our feelings
  themselves whether its anger or fear. In some
  ways, these are given to us (at least initially).
  Its how we come to deal with them, and how,
  through habituation we come eventually to take
  pleasure in our moderation (of whatever
  feelings).
• States of character, then, is the genus of virtue.

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II, 6

• What is the differentia here? I.e., what type of
  state of character is virtue?
• Virtues will enable us to perform
  well/excellently.
• In everything continuous and divisible, we can
  take more, less or equal, and each of them either
  in the object itself or relative to us and the
  equal is some intermediate between excess and
  deficiency. (1106a 26-28).

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II, 6

• A says virtue deals with the relative
  (subjective) mean, not the objective one.
• Virtue, then, is (a) a state that decides, (b)
  consisting in a mean, (c) the mean relative to
  us, (d) which is defined by reference to reason,
  (e) i.e., to the reason by reference to which the
  intelligent person would define it. It is a mean
  between two vices, one of excess and one of
  deficiency(1107a 1-5).

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II, 6

• This scheme does not cover all vices. E.g.,
  adultery, theft, murder, etc.

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Virtues and Vices  
Sphere of action of feeling Excess Mean Deficiency
Fear and Confidence Rashness Courage Cowardice
Pleasure and Pain Licentiousness Temperance Insensibility
Getting and Spending (minor) Prodigality Liberality Illiberality
Getting and Spending (major) Vulgarity Magnificence Pettiness
Honor and Dishonor (minor) Ambition Proper Ambition Unambitiousness
Honor and Dishonor (major) Vanity Magnanimity Pusillanimity
Anger Irascibility Patience Lack of Spirit
Self-expression Boastfulness Truthfulness Understatement
Conversation Buffoonery Wittiness Boorishness
Social Conduct Obsequiousness or Flattery Friendliness Cantankerousness
Shame Shyness Modesty Shamelessness
Indignation Envy Righteous indignation Malicious enjoyment