Effectiveness of New York State Sex Offender Management Policies: Are We Making Communities Safer?

1
Effectiveness of New York State Sex Offender
Management Policies Are We Making Communities
Safer?

• Jeffrey C. Sandler, Ph.D.
• Talk presented by the New York State Alliance
• of Sex Offender Service Providers
• March 30, 2012

2
Purpose Review the Public Safety Research
Literature

• Registration and Community Notification
• Existing research
• The NYS offender-leveling instrument
• Residency Restrictions
• Civil Management

3
Part 1Sex Offender Registration and Community
Notification
4
(No Transcript)
5
Offenders in New York State

• Map says 32,994 as of November 4, 2011
• Ackerman, Levenson, Harris (in press) wanted to
  know how many were actually in the community
• Examined the number of registered sex offenders
  in five states, including NYS
• Took out offenders not in the community (i.e.,
  living out of state, dead, civilly committed,
  and/or deported)
• Were left with 15,950 in the community in NYS

6
Legislative History

• Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
  Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (1994)
• Megans Law (1996)
• Pam Lychner Act (1996)
• New York States Sex Offender Registration Act
  (SORA 1996)
• Campus Sex Crimes Prevention Act (2000)
• Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (2006)

7
Research on the Impact of Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Evaluations using
Offenders

• Schram Milloy (1995) No significant difference
  in re-arrest rates between registered (n 90)
  and unregistered (n 90) sex offenders in
  Washington State
• Adkins, Huff, Stageberg (2000) No significant
  difference in sexual reconviction between 201 sex
  offenders released in Iowa prior to registration
  enactment and 233 sex offenders subject to
  notification (sexual reconviction rates of 3.5
  and 3.0, respectively)

8
Research on the Impact of Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Evaluations using
Offenders (cont.)

• Duwe Donnay (2008) Examined the impact of
  community notification using a notification group
  (n 155), a pre-notification group (n 125),
  and a non-notification group (n 155) in
  Minnesota and found notification to significantly
  reduce odds of sexual recidivism
• Freeman (in press) NYS sex offenders subject to
  notification were re-arrested more quickly and at
  a higher rate for sexual offenses than those not
  subject to notification requirements after
  controlling for supervision effects

9
Research on the Impact of Sex Offender
Registration and NotificationEvaluations using
Crime Rates

• Barnoski (2005)
• Findings
• Rates of sexual felony recidivism dropped after
  1990 passage of registration law
• Rates of sexual felony and violent felony
  recidivism dropped after 1997 amendment of the
  notification law
• Study limitations
• Like the previous studies, only looked at
  recidivisms
• Only examined rates through percentage
  comparisons and binary logistic regression, so
  ignored natural changes in the crime rate

10
Research on the Impact of Sex Offender
Registration and NotificationEvaluations using
Crime Rates (cont.)

• Walker, Maddan, Vásquez, VanHouten,
  Ervin-McCarthy (2005)
• Findings
• Six states experienced no change in rape arrest
  rates
• Three states experienced a drop in rape arrest
  rates
• One state experienced an increase in rape arrest
  rate
• Study Limitations
• Used UCR data Could not separately model
  recidivisms, first time offenses, or different
  sex offenses
• Modeled no non-sexual offense series for
  comparison

11
Research on the Impact of Sex Offender
Registration and NotificationEvaluations using
Crime Rates (cont.)

• Zgoba, Witt, Dalessandro, Veysey (2008)
• Findings
• Statewide sexual offense rates steadily decreased
  from 1985 to 2005
• No consistent effect of Megans Law at county
  level
• Costs an average of about 265,000 per county per
  year to maintain the registry (mostly for staff)
• Limited effect of Megans Law may not justify
  expense
• Study Limitations
• Used UCR data Could not separately model
  recidivisms, first time offenses, or different
  sex offenses

12
Using a New York State SampleDoes a Watched Pot
Boil? A Time-Series Analysis of New York States
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law

• Jeffrey C. Sandler
• Naomi J. Freeman
• Kelly M. Socia
• Article published in
• Psychology, Public Policy, and Law (2008), 14,
  284-302

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Goals of the Study

• An empirical time-series analysis of the impact
  of New York States 1996 Sex Offender
  Registration Act (SORA)
• An attempt to understand how SORAs enactment
  influenced arrests rates
• An attempt to investigate how different types of
  offending were impacted

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Data

• Two hundred and fifty-two months (21 years) of
  statewide individual-level arrest data from 1986
  10 years before SORA to 2006 11 years
  afterward
• Aggregated to the state level
• Included every sexual offense arrest and
  therefore every sex offender arrested during
  that time
• Over 170,000 sexual offenses
• Over 160,000 different sex offenders

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Series Modeled

• Test (9)
• Registerable sex offenses (RSOs)
• Total
• Recidivisms
• First time sex offenses
• Rapes
• Total
• Recidivisms
• First time sex offenses
• Child molestations
• Total
• Recidivisms
• First time sex offenses

• Comparison (8)
• Within group (sex offenders)
• Assaults
• Robberies
• Burglaries
• Larcenies
• Outside group (statewide)
• Assaults
• Robberies
• Burglaries
• Larcenies

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• RSO Arrest Counts

17
ResultsBasic offending statistics

• Most sexual offenses committed by first time sex
  offenders (i.e., were not sexual recidivisms)
• Total RSOs 95.88
• Rapes 95.94
• Child molestations 94.12

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ResultsInterrupted ARIMA

• All test and comparison series were found to be
  ARIMA (0,1,1)(0,1,1)12 models
• Test series No significant change (increase or
  decrease) in the number of monthly arrests in any
  of the sexual offense series

19
Discussion

• Limitations
• Arrest and re-arrest only a proxy measures for
  offending
• Were not able to account for sex offenses
  committed in another state
• Conclusions
• No evidence that registration and community
  notification laws impacted rates of sexual
  offending
• Given that the vast majority of sexual arrests
  are of first time (i.e., unconvicted) sex
  offenders, public policies that target convicted
  sex offenders may be limited in their ability to
  significantly reduce sexual offenses

20
Research on the Impact of Sex Offender
Registration and NotificationEvaluations using
Crime Rates (cont.)

• Letourneau, Levenson, Bandyopadhyay, Armstrong,
  Sinha (2010)
• Findings
• A significant reduction in adult sexual offending
  following the enactment of South Carolinas sex
  offender registry
• No significant impact on sex offenses following
  the enactment of South Carolinas internet
  notification
• Study Limitations
• Only looked at first time offenses
• Did not separately model different sexual offense
  types

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Research on the Impact of Sex Offender
Registration and NotificationEvaluations using
Crime Rates (cont.)

• Prescott Rockoff (2011)
• Findings
• Reduced sexual offenses associated with
• Broad registration without notification
• Only of cases when the victim knew offender (not
  stranger cases)
• Reduced sexual offenses associated with
  notification when applied narrowlybut increases
  when applied broadly
• Study Limitations
• Used NIBRS data Could not identify
  recidivisms/first time offenses, findings subject
  to reporting changes
• Had big holes in their registry size variable

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Research on the Impact of Sex Offender
Registration and NotificationEvaluations using
Crime Rates (cont.)

• Agan (2011)
• Findings
• No significant impact associated with registry or
  notification enactment
• No significant difference in sexual recidivism
  rates for offenders released before and after
  enactment
• No relationship between the number of registered
  sex offenders living in an area and sexual abuse
  rates
• Study Limitations
• Used UCR data
• Had big holes in her registry size variable

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Why No Impact in New York?

• Way the public is using registry and notification
  information is limiting the potential impact

24
Research on the Public and Registration and
Notification

• Phillips (1998)
• More than 60 of community members believed
  registration and notification encouraged sex
  offenders to behave better
• Over 50 of respondents
• No change in leaving children with babysitter or
  unsupervised
• No less likely to go out alone
• No change in level of community involvement

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Research on the Public and Registration and
Notification (cont.)

• Anderson Sample (2008)
• Almost 90 of respondents aware of the registry
• Only 35 had accessed it
• Over 60 of community members report taking no
  preventative measures
• The most common preventative measure taken was to
  pass the information along to
• Children
• Neighbors

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Research on the Public and Registration and
Notification (cont.)

• Kernsmith, Comartin, Craun, Kernsmith (2009)
• Over 94 of respondents aware of the registry
• Only 37 had accessed it Families with young
  children most likely (59)
• Sex offenders found to live in 99 of zip codes
• Only 27 of all respondents believed an offender
  lived their community
• Of those respondents who had accessed the
  registry, 51 believed an offender lived in their
  community

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Research on the Public and Registration and
Notification (cont.)

• Sample, Evans, Anderson (2011)
• A study of internet registry access specifically
  (which the authors feel is a more true test of
  the impact of community notification than
  recidivism)
• About 17 of the sample accessed the registry for
  safety reasons
• About 14 got their registry information from
  other sources
• Did a bunch of regression analyses, but the
  methodology was questionable

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Why No Impact in New York?

• Way the public is using registry and notification
  information is limiting the potential impact
• The way New York State operates its registry and
  notification is limiting the potential impact
• May be an artifact of the systems structure
• Letourneau et al. (2010) Different (more broad)
  system
• Prescott Rockoff (2011) Registration should
  be broad, but notification needs to be narrow
• May be that SORA levels are not truly indicative
  of sexual recidivism risk
• The instrument has never been validated since its
  inception (Guidry, 2004)

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SORA risk-leveling instrument

• Intended to assess two things
• Likelihood of an offender sexually recidivating
  (risk)
• Seriousness of the offense if the offender
  sexually recidivates (harm)
• Developed shortly after the passage of SORA
• Before much research on sex offender risk was
  available (e.g., Hanson Bussiére, 1998)
• Before many sex offender-specific risk assessment
  measures were available (e.g., the Static-99)

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SORA risk-leveling instrument

• Contains 15 items within four categories
• Current offense(s)
• Criminal history
• Post-offense behavior
• Release environment
• Various weights given to each item
• Generates a total score ranging from 0 to 300,
  which corresponds to a level designation
• Allows for the possibility of an override

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SORA risk-leveling items

• Current offense(s)
• Use of violence
• Sexual contact with victim (e.g., over vs. under
  clothing)
• Number of victims
• Duration of offense conduct with victim
• Age of victim
• Other victim characteristics (e.g., mentally
  disability)
• Relationship with victim

32
SORA risk-leveling items

• Criminal history
• Age at first sex crime
• Number and nature of prior crimes
• Recency of prior felony or sex crime
• Drug or alcohol abuse
• Post-offense behavior
• Acceptance of responsibility
• Conduct while confined/supervised
• Release environment
• Supervision
• Living/employment situation

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SORA risk-leveling instrument

• Risk level assignment from score
• 0-70 Level 1
• 75-105 Level 2
• 110-300 Level 3
• Four possible reasons for override (presumes a
  Level 3 designation) if the offender
• Has a prior felony sex conviction
• Inflicted serious physical injury or death
• Made recent threat to re-offend
  sexually/violently
• Has an abnormality that hinders his/her ability
  to control impulsive sexual behavior

34
SORA risk-leveling instrument

• According to the website of the New York State
  Division of Criminal justice Services (DCJS)
• 39 of all offenders are designated as Level 1
• 36 of all offenders are designated as Level 2
• 25 of all offenders are designated as Level 3
• As stated earlier, there has been no validation
  of the SORA risk-leveling instrument since its
  inception

35
Study Goals

• Investigate the predictive validity of the SORA
  risk levels
• Risk of sexual re-arrest
• Harm of sexual re-arrest
• Investigate how the SORA risk levels compare to
  other predictors of sexual recidivism

36
Method Data and Analyses

• Data A sample of 3,633 sex offenders
• Registered in New York State as of August 2005
• With 5 years of post-release follow up (study
  censor date was January 2007)
• Analyses
• Basic frequencies and descriptives to examine
  both risk and harm
• Receiver operating characteristic area under the
  curve (AUC) to test predictive accuracy
• Ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 (AUC 1.0 means perfect
  prediction)
• Prediction no better than chance is AUC .50

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Method Study Variables

• Outcome variables
• Risk Sexual re-arrest within 5 years of release
  (no/yes)?
• Harm New York State penal code arrest class
  (misdemeanor/felony)?
• Independent (predictor) variables
• SORA risk levels Those actually assigned (e.g.,
  after overrides)
• Variables empirically-related to recidivism

38
Method Comparison Models

• Wanted to keep them simple and straightforward

• Model 1
• Age at release
• Prior RSO arrests
• Variety of offense types

• Model 2
• Age at release
• Prior RSO arrests
• Variety of offense types
• Stranger victim

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Method Analytic Strategy

• Comparison models
• Randomly split the sample in two
• Developmental dataset (n 1,831)
• Validation dataset (n 1,802)
• Generate risk models using logistic regression
  with sexual recidivism within 5 years as the
  dependent variable on the developmental dataset
• Test the predictive accuracy of the models on the
  validation dataset
• Assigned 39, 36, and 25 of offenders to Levels
  1, 2, and 3, respectively

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Results Risk

• 5-Year Sexual Re-Arrest Rates

Level 1 2 3
SORA Levels 5.9 6.5 10.8
Model 1 3.5 7.9 13.6
Model 2 3.5 6.8 15.4
41
Results Risk
42
Results Risk

• Predictive Accuracy

Level SORA Levels Model 1 Model 2
AUC .572 .646 .667
95 CI .537 - .607 .600 - .692 .620 - .713
43

• AUC Results
• Assigned SORA level

44

• AUC Results
• Model Age, RSO Arrests, Variety

45

• AUC Results
• Model Age, RSO Arrests, Variety, Stranger

46
Results Harm

• Felony Sexual Re-Arrest Rates

Level 1 2 3
SORA Levels 51.7 60.5 65.4
Model 1 58.5 59.6 65.4
Model 2 59.6 56.2 67.2
47
Results Harm

• Predictive Accuracy

Level SORA Levels Model 1 Model 2
AUC .543 .534 .548
95 CI .473 - .613 .464 - .604 .478 - .617
48
Results Harm

• Rethought harm variable
• Recoded it to be continuous (i.e., B misdemeanor
  through A-1 felony)
• Analyzed its correlation to the various risk
  levels

Level SORA Levels Model 1 Model 2
Correlation to Harm .092 .109 .138
p .125 .068 .021
49
Discussion

• Limitations
• Re-arrest only a proxy measure for re-offending
• Official arrest offense class is only a proxy
  measure for seriousness of the sexual arrest
• Conclusions
• Risk
• Assigned SORA risk levels do significantly
  predict 5-year sexual re-arrest
• Using logistic regression and just a few
  variables, its possible to significantly improve
  risk prediction above SORA levels
• Harm
• SORA risk levels do not significantly predict
  sexual re-arrest offense class, whether coded
  dichotomously or continuously
• One of the logistic models did significantly
  predict continuous sexual re-arrest offense class

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SummaryRegistration and Notification

• Majority of research has found no significant,
  systematic impact of the policies, however
• Some emerging evidence of sexual crime reduction
  associated with registration
• Some emerging evidence of sexual crime increase
  associated with broad notification
• No research to support the ability of
  registration and/or notification to reduce child
  molestations

51
SummarySORA Risk-Leveling Instrument

• NYS SORA-levels
• Do significantly predict sexual re-arrest
• Do not significantly predict sexual re-arrest
  class
• A simple logistic model
• Can predict sexual re-arrest significantly better
  than SORA risk levels
• Can significantly predict sexual re-arrest class
  if coded continuously

52
Selected References Registration and Notification

• Barnoski, R. (2005). Sex offender sentencing in
  Washington State Has community notification
  reduced recidivism? Olympia, WA Washington
  Institute for Public Policy.
• Freeman, N. J. (in press). The public safety
  impact of community notification laws Re-Arrest
  of convicted sex offenders. Crime Delinquency.
  Available though OnlineFirst at
  http//cad.sagepub.com/pap.dtl
• Letourneau, E. J., Levenson, J. S.,
  Bandyopadhyay, D., Armstrong, K. S., Sinha, D.
  (2010). Effects of South Carolinas sex offender
  registration and notification policy on
  deterrence of adult sex crimes. Criminal Justice
  and Behavior, 37, 537-552.
• Prescott, J. J., Rockoff, J. E. (2011). Do sex
  offender registration and notification laws
  affect criminal behavior? Journal of Law and
  Economics, 54, 161-193.
• Sandler, J. C., Freeman, N. J., Socia, K. M.
  (2008). Does a watched pot boil? A time-series
  analysis of New York States Sex Offender
  Registration and Notification, Psychology, Public
  Policy, and Law, 14, 284-302.
• Schram, D. D., Milloy, C. D. (1995). Community
  notification A study of offender characteristics
  and recidivism. Olympia, WA Washington State
  Institute for Public Policy.
• Walker, J. T., Maddan, S., Vásquez, B. E.,
  VanHouten, A. C., Ervin-McCarthy, G. (2005).
  The influence of sex offender registration and
  notification laws in the United States. Retrieved
  June 1, 2007, from www.acic.org
• Zgoba, K., Witt, P., Dalessandro, M., Veysey,
  B. (2008). Megans Law Assessing the practical
  and monetary efficacy. Trenton New Jersey
  Department of Corrections.

53
Part 2Sex Offender Residency Restrictions
54
Brief History

• First enacted in Florida and Delaware in 1995
• Usually restrict sex offenders from residing
  within 1,000 to 2,500 feet of schools,
  playgrounds, daycare centers, and other places
  where children congregate
• No statewide residency restriction law in NYS,
  but there are numerous township, city, and county
  laws (think the first was in 2005)
• The Office of Sex Offender Management (OSOM) used
  to provide a list of these on their website

(See Meloy, Miller, Curtis, 2008 Socia, 2011
for factors influencing the enactment of
residence restrictions)
55
Intent and Basis

• Attempt to protect children from sexual abuse
  committed by previously convicted sex offenders
• Based on several assumptions related to sexual
  offending
• Sexual recidivism accounts for many, if not most,
  instances of child sexual abuse
• The majority of child sexual abuse is perpetrated
  by strangers
• Residential proximity to areas where children
  congregate is related to sexual offending

56
Research on the AssumptionsRecidivisms are the
Problem

• Nationwide, 87 of all individuals arrested for
  sexual crimes had been not previously convicted
  of a sexual crime
• In New York State, only 5 of all sexual crimes
  (and only 6 of all child molestations) were
  committed by individuals previously convicted of
  a sexual crime

(Greenfeld, 1997 Sandler et al., 2008)
57
Research on the AssumptionsPerpetrated by
Strangers

• Only about 18 of child sexual abuse victims did
  not know their abuser (71 were acquainted/knew
  by sight 10 were family)
• For elementary and middle school age victims of
  child sexual abuse, only 5 were abused by a
  stranger
• For victims of sexual abuse under the age of 6,
  only 3 of the offenses were committed by a
  stranger

(Finkelhor, 2008 Greenfeld, 1997 Synder, 2000)
58
Research on the AssumptionsResidential Proximity

• Chajewski Mercado (2009)
• Sex offenders did not live closer to schools on
  average than community members in towns and
  counties (but did in cities)
• Sex offenders with child victims did not live
  closer to schools than those without child
  victims
• Sex offenders with stranger victims did not live
  closer to schools than those without stranger
  victims

(see also Zgoba, Levenson, McKee, 2009)
59
Research on the ImpactProximity and Offending

• Minnesota Department of Corrections (2003)
• Examined the cases of all Level 3 sex offenders
  who had been released in 1997-1999 (before the
  enactment of the MN residence restriction) who
  sexually recidivated before March 2002 (N 13)
• Concluded
• There were no examples that residential
  proximity to a park or school was a contributing
  factor in any of the sexual re-offenses (p. 9)
• Enhanced safety due to proximity restrictions
  may be a comfort factor for the general public,
  but it does not have any basis in fact (p. 9)

60
Research on the ImpactProximity and Offending
(cont.)

• Colorado Department of Public Safety (2004) Sex
  offenders with an offense during the first 15
  months of their post-release supervision usually
  did not live within 1,000 feet of a school or
  child care center
• Blood, Watson, Stageberg (2008) Iowas
  residency restriction does not seem to have led
  to fewer charges or convictions, indicating that
  there probably have not been fewer child victims
  (p. 10)

61
Research on the ImpactProximity and Offending
(cont.)

• Duwe, Donnay, Tewksbury (2008)
• Used the files of 224 recidivistic sexual
  offenses involving minors to examine relationship
  between
• The location where offenders made first contact
  with their victims
• Locations included in residency restrictions
• Found
• None of the child sexual recidivists contacted
  their victims near a school, park, playground,
  or other location included in residential
  restriction laws (p. 500)
• Most offenders made first contact over a mile
  from their home

62
Research on the ImpactProximity and Offending
(cont.)

• Zandbergen, Levenson, Hart (2010)
• Matched 165 Florida sexual recidivists to 165
  non-recidivists on criminal history and victim
  variables
• Found
• Non-recidivists were significantly more likely
  than recidivists to live within 2,500 feet of at
  least one school
• No significant difference in the number of
  recidivists and non-recidivists who lived close
  (whether defined as within 1,000 feet or 2,500
  feet) to day cares
• No significant difference between recidivists and
  non-recidivists in distance between home and
  school or day care

63
Research on the ImpactProximity and Offending
(cont.)

• Nobles, Levenson, Youstin (in press)
• Examined sexual offending trends before and after
  Jacksonville, FL expanded its residency
  restriction
• Found
• No significant change in overall sexual crime
  rates following expansion of the restriction
• No significant change in recidivistic sexual
  crime rates following expansion of the
  restriction
• Important to remember this was a test of
  expanding the restriction to 2,500 feet, a
  1,000-foot restriction had been in place for years

64
Using a New York State SampleThe Efficacy of
County-Level Sex Offender Residence Restrictions
in New York

• Kelly M. Socia, Ph.D.
• University of New Mexico
• University of Massachusetts, Lowell (2012)
• Article accepted for publication and in press
  with
• Crime Delinquency

65
Study Goals

• Examine whether the enactment of county-level
  residence restrictions was associated with rates
  of recidivistic sexual offenses involving
• Child victims
• Adult victims
• Examine whether the enactment of county-level
  residence restrictions was associated with rates
  of non-recidivistic (i.e., first time) sexual
  offenses involving
• Child victims
• Adults victims

66
Method

• Examined sexual crime rates in all 62 NYS
  counties
• Recidivistic (looking for specific deterrent
  effect)
• First time (looking for general deterrent effect)
• Compared the crime rates of counties that enacted
  residence restrictions with those of counties
  that had not, while controlling for influences
  other than a residence restriction
• Temporal factors
• Factors impacting all types of crime (i.e., not
  specific to sexual offenses)

67
Results

• Enactment of a residence restriction
• Had no significant impact on recidivistic sex
  offenses against children
• Had no significant impact on recidivistic sex
  offenses against adults
• Had no significant impact on first time sex
  offenses against children
• Significantly reduced (by about 10) the number
  of first time sexual offenses against adults

68
Discussion

• No evidence of any impact of residence
  restriction enactment on sexual offenses with
  child victims
• Evidence of a general deterrent effect on sexual
  offenses against adults
• First finding of its kind for residence
  restrictions
• Supports some emerging findings of a general
  deterrent effect for registration
• Letourneau et al. (2010) Only for crimes sexual
  crimes committed by adults
• Prescott Rockoff (2011) Only for crimes where
  the victim was not a stranger

69
Research on the ImpactUnintended Consequences

• An increase in sex offenders registered as
  homeless in California by up to 60 (up 800
  among parolees)
• About 50 of residential space in Newark, NJ
  restricted by a 1,000 foot restriction zone
• Much affordable housing in cities is in densely
  populated areas, which tend to contain many
  schools and day cares

(California Sex Offender Management Board, 2008
Chajewski Mercado, 2009 Tewksbury Mustain,
2006)
70
(No Transcript)
71
Using a New York State SampleThe Policy
Implications of Residence Restrictions on Sex
Offender Housing in Upstate NY

• Kelly M. Socia, Ph.D.
• University of New Mexico
• University of Massachusetts, Lowell (2012)
• Article published in
• Criminology Public Policy (20ll), 10, 351-389

72
Study Goals

• Examine what the areas open to sex offenders
  under a hypothetical statewide residence
  restriction would look like in terms of housing
• Density
• Availability (residences open for rent)
• Affordability (ratio of median area rent to fair
  market rent)
• Social disorganization (e.g., unemployment,
  poverty)
• Examine how varying the restriction size and
  scope would impact housing options for offenders

73
Method

• Examined neighborhoods in 47 of NYS 62 counties
  (excluded all counties that were way outside
  national normssorry NYC)
• Analyzed census block groups to examine
  neighborhood characteristics
• Applied hypothetical residence restrictions of
  varying size and scope to the counties, then
  compared characteristics of neighborhoods with
  the most restricted housing to the
  characteristics of neighborhoods with the least
  restricted housing

74
Results and Discussion

• Results Neighborhoods that would have the least
  amount of restricted housing (meaning they would
  have the most housing left open)
• Were less dense
• Typically had less housing available for rent
• Typically had less affordable housing
• Were less disorganized
• Discussion From the research on successful
  offender reentry
• The first three results are barriers to success
• The fourth is a boon to success

75
Research on the ImpactUnintended Consequences
(cont.)

• Levenson Cotter (2005) Offenders report
  increased
• Financial and emotional hardships
• Difficulty obtaining employment, finding
  affordable housing, and sustaining relationships
  with pro-social support networks
• Tewksbury Mustaine (2006) Force sex offenders
  to reside in mostly rural areas where there are
  few employment, treatment, and educational
  opportunities

(see Lasher McGrath, 2012 for the unintended
consequences of community notification)
76
Research on the ImpactUnintended Consequences
(cont.)

• Willis Grace (2008, 2009)
• Developed a release plan quality measure for sex
  offenders being released in New Zealand
• Compared scores of recidivists and
  non-recidivists
• Sexual recidivists had significantly poorer
• Housing plans (2008)
• Social support (2009)
• Employment plans (2008, 2009)
• Important to remember this was only a measure of
  release planning, not of release experiences

(see Meredith, Speir, Johnson, 2007
Schulenberg, 2007 for research on housing and
recidivism in non-sex offenders
77
SummaryResidency Restrictions

• Little research to show an impact on sexual
  offending
• None showing an impact on child victim crimes
• Some showing an impact on adult victim crimes
• No research to show sex offenders (specifically
  child molesters) choose to live close to schools,
  parks, and the like
• Found to aggravate certain factors that inhibit
  successful community reentry

78
Selected References Residency Restrictions

• Chajewski, M., Mercado, C. C. (2009). An
  evaluation of sex offender residency restriction
  functioning in town, county, and city-wide
  jurisdictions. Criminal Justice Policy Review,
  20, 44-61.
• Duwe, G., Donnay, W., Tewksbury, R. (2008).
  Does residential proximity matter A geographic
  analysis of sex offense recidivism. Criminal
  Justice and Behavior, 35, 484-504.
• Blood, P., Watson, L., Stageberg, P. (2008).
  State legislation monitoring report FY2007. Des
  Moines, IA Author.
• Minnesota Department of Corrections. (2003).
  Level three sex offenders residential placement
  issues. St. Paul, MN Author.
• Socia, K. M. (2011). The policy implications of
  residence restrictions on sex offender housing in
  upstate NY. Criminology Public Policy, 10,
  351-389.
• Socia, K. M. (in press). The efficacy of
  county-level sex offender residence restrictions
  in New York. Crime Delinquency.
• Zandbergen, P. A., Levenson, J. S., Hart, T. C.
  (2010). Residential proximity to schools and
  daycares An empirical analysis of sex offender
  recidivism. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 37,
  482-502.
• Willis, G. M., Grace, R. C. (2008). The quality
  of community reintegration planning for child
  molesters Effects on sexual recidivism. Sexual
  Abuse A Journal of Research and Treatment, 20,
  218-240.
• Willis, G. M., Grace, R. C. (2008). Assessment
  of community reintegration planning for sex
  offenders Poor planning predicts recidivism.
  Criminal Justice and Behavior, 36, 494-512.

79
Part 3Sex Offender Civil Management
Laws(a.k.a. Civil Commitment Laws, Civil
Confinement Laws, or Sexually Violent Predator
Laws)
80
Legislative History

• Sexual psychopath laws of the 1920s and 1930s
• Most of these repealed in the 1980s and 1990s
• First modern sex offender civil commitment
  statute passed by Washington State in 1990
• New York enacted its Sex Offender Management and
  Treatment Act (SOMTA) in 2007

81
Modern Civil Management Laws

• Statutes vary slightly from state to state
• Share certain key elements
• Sexual crimes are particularly heinous
• Some sex offenders have mental abnormalities that
  predispose them to engage in repeat sexual
  offending
• Such offenders need specialized, intensive
  treatment
• The offenders need to be monitored and/or
  confined while receiving the treatment

82
New York States Sex Offender Management and
Treatment Act

• Enacted April 13, 2007
• All offenders about to be released on a
  qualifying offense reviewed
• Offenders must have
• More than one victim (establish a pattern)
• High risk of sexual recidivism
• Mental abnormality related to risk of sexual
  recidivism
• Two possibilities for management
• Outpatient (SIST)
• Inpatient (confinement)

83
Civil Management Research on Public Safety

• Problems with studying the public safety impact
• Many statutes are still new
• Highest risk offenders get confined (except in
  Texas)
• Approaches to studying
• Track offenders recommended for civil management
  who never get managed
• Study a cohort of offenders matched to offenders
  recommended for civil management
• Compare the sexual recidivism rates of offenders
  screened out of civil management to unbaised
  samples

84
ResearchRecommended, but Not Managed

• Three studies from Washington State
• Schram Milloy (1998)
• N 61, all released by DOC
• 4-year follow up
• Milloy (2003)
• N 89, all released by DOC
• 6-year follow up
• Milloy (2007)
• N 135, 123 released by DOC, 12 by another
  source
• 6-year follow up
• In all three studies, offenders had a high rate
  of sexual felony recidivism (range 23-29)

85
Using a New York State SampleEvaluating New
York States Sex Offender Management and
Treatment Act A Matched Historical Cohort
Analysis

• Larkin S. McReynolds
• Jeffrey C. Sandler
• Article accepted for publication and in press
  with
• Criminal Justice Policy Review

86
Study Goals

• Determine which variables contributed
  significantly to offenders being deemed high risk
  and receiving a psychiatric exam
• Assess the likely public safety impact of civil
  management by examining the recidivism rates of a
  historical sample of offenders matched to
  SOMTAreviewed offenders on variables important
  to receiving a psychiatric exam

87
Method

• Samples
• SOMTA cohort All offenders reviewed under SOMTA
  through November 2008 (N 1,991)
• Historical cohort All sex offenders released
  from DOCS between 2000-2005 on what would have
  been SOMTA-qualifying offenses (N 4,807)
• Study design
• Identify variables important to offenders being
  referred for a psychiatric exam (the second level
  of review)
• Match the SOMTA-cohort to the historical cohort
  on the important variables
• Examine recidivism rates of the
  matched-historical cohort

88
Method (cont.)

• Variables for matching
• Offender age at release (/- 1 year)
• Partial Static-99 (sum of Items 1, 3, 4, 5, 6,
  and 7)
• Number of prior sexual offenses
• Crime of conviction
• Found matches for 1,546 offenders (78)
• Analyses
• Recidivism rates and survival analyses
• Dependent variable Re-arrest for a sexual
  offense within 5 years of release (yes/no)

89
Results
90
Results
91
Discussion

• Appears the SOMTA-screening process is doing a
  good job of identifying higher risk offenders,
  which implies SOMTA is likely reducing instances
  of sexual recidivism
• Difference in sexual re-arrest rates between
  historical offenders whose SOMTA match received a
  psychiatric exam and historical offenders whose
  SOMTA match did not receive a psychiatric exam
  was significant, but moderate (5 over 5 years)

92
Using a New York State SampleRisk Assessment
and Sex Offender Screening in New York

• Naomi J. Freeman
• Jeffrey C. Sandler
• Article published in
• Sex Offender Law Report (2012), 13, 17-30

93
Study Goals

• Assess the likely public safety impact of civil
  management by comparing
• The 3-year sexual re-arrest rate of offenders
  screened out of the SOMTA-review process
• The 3-year sexual re-arrest rate of offenders
  convicted of SOMTA-qualifying offenses, but
  released before SOMTA was enacted

94
Method

• Samples
• SOMTA cohort All offenders reviewed under SOMTA
  and deemed to not need civil management through
  December 2010 (N 3,999)
• Historical cohort Sex offenders released from
  DOCS between 2000-2005 on what would have been
  SOMTA-qualifying offenses (N 1,546)
• Study design Compute and compare sexual
  recidivism rates across the two samples

95
Results

• Sexual Re-arrest Rate

Follow-Up Period 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year
SOMTA- Reviewed 1.1 2.2 2.9
Unbiased Historical 1.2 2.8 3.8
96
Results
97
Discussion

• Appears the SOMTA-screening process is doing a
  good job of identifying higher risk offenders,
  which implies SOMTA is likely reducing instances
  of sexual recidivism
• Difference in sexual re-arrest rates between
  SOMTA offenders screened out for civil management
  and the unbaised historical offenders was
  significant, but small (0.9 over 3 years)

98
Summary Civil Management

• Tough to assess the impact of these laws, so
  there are few direct studies of civil management
  laws and public safety
• The few studies there are, however
• Indicate the review process seems to be
  accurately identifying high risk offenders
• Indicate, therefore, likely increases in public
  safety as a result of the laws

99
Selected References Civil Management

• Freeman, N. J., Sandler, J. C. (2012). Risk
  assessment and sex offender screening in New
  York. Sex Offender Law Report, 13, 17-30
• McReynolds, L. S., Sandler, J. C. (2009).
  Evaluating New York States Sex Offender
  Management and Treatment Act A matched
  historical cohort analysis. Manuscript submitted
  for publication.
• Milloy, C. (2003). Six-Year Follow-Up of Released
  Sex Offenders Recommended for Commitment Under
  Washingtons Sexually Violent Predator Law, Where
  No Petition Was Filed. Olympia, WA Washington
  State Institute for Public Policy.
• Milloy, C. (2007). Six-Year Follow-Up of 135
  Released Sex Offenders Recommended for Commitment
  Under Washingtons Sexually Violent Predator Law,
  Where No Petition Was Filed. Olympia, WA
  Washington State Institute for Public Policy.
• Schram, D., Milloy, C. D. (1998). Sexually
  violent predators and civil commitment A study
  of the characteristics and recidivism os sex
  offenders considered for civil commitment but for
  whom proceedings were declined. Olympia, WA
  Washington State Institute for Public Policy.

100
Conclusions Public Safety

• Registration and notification
• Some evidence of an increase to public safety
  with registration, but only under specific
  circumstances
• Some evidence shows a decrease in public safety
  with notification (particularly broad
  notification)
• Residency restrictions
• Some evidence of an increase to public safety,
  but only for sexual crimes involving adult
  victims
• Some evidence shows a decrease in public safety
• Civil management
• Evidence shows a likely increase to public safety

101
Contact Information/Websites

• New York State Alliance of Sex Offender Service
  Providers
• www.nysalliance.com
• New York State chapter of the Association for the
  Treatment of Sexual Abusers
• www.nysatsa.com
• Jeff Sandler
• jcsandler_at_gmail.com