Voting observation in the context of the Swiss internet voting projects

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Voting observation in the context of the Swiss
internet voting projects

• Workshop on the "Observation of e-enabled
  elections Oslo, 18-19 March 2010

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1. Context
2. International guidelines on i-voting observation
3. Regulatory framework
4. I-voting observation in practice
5. Conclusions

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• Switzerland a federal state (cantons have big
  cstl autonomy with respect to political rights)
  and a (semi-) direct democracy (frequent votes at
  communal, cantonal and federal level)
• Three voting channels at federal level polling
  station, postal voting (fully liberalized),
  i-voting (currently available to a part of the
  electorate in 4 cantons three of them have
  developed their own i-voting system)
• A fourth channel at cantonal, communal level
  Landsgemeinde
• Switzerland is the only country to have fully
  liberalized distant postal voting at federal
  level some 90 of voters vote (4 times a year)
  and elect (each 4 years) through this channel
• I-voting is being tested 10 years with the aim
  of meeting existing needs (ex. Swiss abroad) and
  to gain experience currently 5 of the federal
  electorate are being involved in internet voting
  tests

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• Control procedures vary depending on the voting
  channel
• Landsgemeinde (only cantonal and communal level)
  each voter can see the result and hear the
  estimation of results
• Polling station vote democratic control (of
  voting, counting, establishing and transmission
  of results) is exercised by voters
  representatives jurés and electoral commissions
• Postal vote same control as vote at polling
  station
• i-voting the impossibility to see needs be
  compensated
• Andreas Auer, Nicolas von Arx, La légitimité
  des procédures de vote les défis du
  e-votinghttp//www.geneve.ch/evoting/doc/rappor
  ts/legitimite_e-vote.pdf

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1. Context
2. International guidelines on i-voting observation
3. Regulatory framework
4. I-voting observation in practice
5. Conclusions

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• 1990 OSCE Copenhagen commitments
• Council of Europe Venise CommissionCode of
  good practice in electoral matters (2002)Code of
  good practice on Referendums (2006)
• Council of Europe Recommendation on Legal,
  Operational and Technical Standards for E-Voting
  (2004)
• OSCE-ODIHR Discussion paper in preparation of
  guidelines for the observation of electronic
  voting (2008)

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1. Context
2. International guidelines on i-voting observation
3. Regulatory framework
4. I-voting observation in practice
5. Conclusions

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Regulation of observation in general

• Art. 34.2 Federal Constitution1 Political
  rights shall be guaranteed.
• 2 The guarantee of political rights protects the
  freedom of the citizen to form an opinion and to
  give genuine expression to his or her
  will.Extent modalities - regulated in
  cantonal legislation
• Internal partisan and non-partisan observation
  andinternational observation are not explicitly
  foreseen in federal law (but are possible).
• Internal partisan observation (and sometime
  non-partisan) is foreseen in cantonal/communal
  legislations.
• Ways are always found to allow interested
  non-partisan observers to follow the election
  process see OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment
  Mission Report, Swiss Confederation federal
  elections 21 october 2007, chap. IV, E

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Regulation specific to i-voting observation

• Art. 8a.2 BPR/LDP (electronic voting) - the
  verification of eligibility to vote, voting
  secrecy and the counting of all the votes cast
  must be guaranteed and abuses prevented - the
  Federal Council (Gvt.) regulates
  details Federal control exercised during the
  authorization procedure
• Asked how observers could exercise their task in
  the context of internet voting, the Federal
  Council replied (2005) that electoral
  commissions could also be involved in the
  establishing of internet voting results. Details
  are regulated in cantonal legislation.Democratic
  control exercised through electoral commissions
• Individual voters control? Regulated in
  cantonal law

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1. Context
2. International guidelines on i-voting observation
3. Regulatory framework
4. I-voting observation in practice
5. Conclusions

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Federal authorization

• When applying for authorization, cantons have to
  prove that i-voting will respect federal
  requirements
• They submit a complete documentation (complete
  transparency) to the federal authority
• An independent verification (ordered by the
  federal authority) is done when a system is first
  implemented and at each system modification
• Federal authorities have access to audit reports
  (ordered and paid by cantons)
• Issue of authorization is conditioned by
  implementation of recommendations for
  improvements
• The Federal Council can withdraw the
  authorization
• Communication concept for reporting problems
  during an i-voting trial is implemented

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Electoral commission (best practices)

• A permanent electoral commission (EC) controls
  the regularity of i-voting (partisannon partisan
  observers)
• EC can access documentation incl. source code of
  the applications and order controls all the time
• EC encrypts and decrypts the electronic ballot
  box makes a control vote during a real vote
  (27nbis VPR/ODP). Control votes are treated as
  other votes. At the end of the vote the electoral
  commission can see whether systematic external
  manipulation of the ballot box occurred
• Procedural measures (federal and cantonal
  provisions) to control internal threats have been
  adopted. Ex. any intervention in the system
  during the vote should be duly authorized, made
  by at least 2 persons (specific employment
  rules), duly reported and controlled ( incl. by
  observers)
• System monitoring produces observable data

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Individual elector (best practices)

• Voter can verify that her vote was counted
  (control codes published on the Internet after
  the end of the vote)
• Transparency (publication of documents) of
  internet voting systems is regulated by cantonal
  legislation transparency laws, political rights
  regulation and regulation specific to internet
  portal of cantons. Best practices include
• Audits results are published
• Source code of the applications is made available
  for verification to any voter with an
  ideal/scientific interest who agrees to respect
  its confidentiality (upheld by the Federal
  supreme court)
• Access to other system documents same as access
  to source code

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1. Context
2. International guidelines on i-voting observation
3. Regulatory framework
4. I-voting observation in practice
5. Conclusions

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• In Switzerland Internet voting observation is
  organized similar to postal voting observation
  through an electoral commission. Technical and
  procedural measures as well as access to the
  entire documentation by a permanent commission,
  make such observation meaningful
• Identification of best existing practices and
  their dissemination in i-voting cantons. Adopting
  specific communal/cantonal regulation takes more
  time
• Individual traceability (each voter verifies
  that her vote was counted as cast) is not
  possible in other voting channels. Its
  feasibility in the Internet voting context is
  being studied (workshop on transparent i-voting
  systems, Fribourg 6 September 2010,
  www.e-voting-cc.ch/)

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Thank you !

• ardita.driza-maurer_at_bk.admin.ch