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Ka-fu Wong University of Hong Kong

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Title: Multi-fiber agreement Subject: Competition, Regulation and Business Strategy Author: Ka-fu WONG Last modified by: School of Economics and Finance – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Ka-fu Wong University of Hong Kong


1
Ka-fu WongUniversity of Hong Kong
Why do some activities organized by charitable
organizations require a deposit upon registration
of the activities, which is later refunded to the
participants?
2
Outline
  • Why do we need prior registration at all?
  • If no deposit is required
  • Who will register?
  • Who and how many will attend after registration?
  • If deposit is required, but no refund is provided
  • Who will register?
  • Who and how many will attend after registration?
  • If deposit is required, but deposit will be
    refunded upon participation
  • Who will register?
  • Who and how many will attend after registration?

3
Why do we need prior registration at all?
  • Organizers have to get an estimate of
    seats/resources needed to accommodate the
    participants.
  • If we know that there are 1000 participants, we
    need to prepare 1000 chairs and tea sets.
  • Organizers have to make sure that resources are
    not wasted.
  • More aggressive advertisement may be need if too
    few people are going to attend.

4
If no deposit is required, who will register?
  • Suppose there is no other opportunity cost in
    doing the registration of an activity X.
  • Suppose John, a typical individual, is willing to
    pay A1 dollars to activity X on any other days.
    And, on that particular day, he could have
    engaged in another activity Y that has a value of
    B1. John will choose to register if A1 - B1
    gt0
  • Suppose Jane, another typical individual, is
    willing to pay A2 dollars to activity X on any
    other days. And, on that particular day, she may
    have the chance to engage in another activity Z
    that has a value of B2, with a probability p.
    And, A2 - B2 lt 0. Besides these two activities,
    her best alternative on that day is to stay home,
    which has a value of zero to her. Because Jane
    know that she can always decide whether to go
    later, Jane will choose to register if (1-p)A2
    gt0.

5
If no deposit is required, who and how many will
attend after registration?
  • Suppose among those registered, 50 are like John,
    and 50 others are like Jane.
  • 50 registrants who are like John will go to
    activity X because
  • A1 - B1 gt0
  • Suppose all other participants who are like Jane
    find out that the other activity, that they
    value at B2, is available. Because A2 - B2 lt
    0, all the 50 other will not attend the activity
    X.
  • In this example, only 50 of the registered (only
    those who are like John) will attend.
  • If you were the organizer and you had prepared
    100 tea sets for those registered, will you be
    disappointed?

6
If a deposit D is required but no refund will be
given, who will register?
  • Suppose there is no other opportunity cost in
    doing the registration of an activity X.
  • Suppose John, a typical individual, is willing to
    pay A1 dollars to activity X on any other days.
    And, on that particular day, he could have
    engaged in another activity Y that has a value of
    B1. John will choose to register if A1 - B1 -
    Dgt0
  • Suppose Jane, another typical individual, is
    willing to pay A2 dollars to activity X on any
    other days. And, on that particular day, she may
    have the chance to engage in another activity Z
    that has a value of B2, with a probability p.
    And, A2 - B2 lt 0. Besides these two activities,
    her best alternative on that day is to stay home,
    which has a value of zero to her. So Jane has
    to decide to pay D to hedge against the risk of
    not able to engage in Z. Jane will choose to
    register if (1-p)A2 - Dgt0.

7
If deposit is required and no refund will be
given, who and how many will attend after
registration?
  • The deposit is a sunk cost at the time of making
    decision.
  • Suppose among those registered, 50 are like John,
    and 50 others are like Jane.
  • 50 registrants who are like John will go to
    activity X because
  • A1 - B1 gt0
  • Suppose all other participants who are like Jane
    find out that the other activity, that they
    value at B2, is available. Because A2 - B2 lt
    0, all the 50 other will not attend the activity
    X.
  • In this example, only 50 of the registered (only
    those who are like John) will attend.
  • If you were the organizer and you had prepared
    100 tea sets for those registered, will you be
    disappointed?

8
If a deposit D is required but it will be
refunded upon participation, who will register?
  • Suppose there is no other opportunity cost in
    doing the registration of an activity X.
  • Suppose John, a typical individual, is willing to
    pay A1 dollars to activity X on any other days.
    And, on that particular day, he could have
    engaged in another activity Y that has a value of
    B1. John will choose to register if A1 D -
    B1 - Dgt0
  • Suppose Jane, another typical individual, is
    willing to pay A2 dollars to activity X on any
    other days. And, on that particular day, she may
    have the chance to engage in another activity Z
    that has a value of B2, with a probability p.
    And, A2 - B2 lt 0. Besides these two activities,
    her best alternative on that day is to stay home,
    which has a value of zero to her. So Jane has
    to decide to pay D to hedge against the risk of
    not able to engage in Z. Jane will choose to
    register if (1-p)(A2 D) - Dgt0.

9
If a deposit D is required but it will be
refunded upon participation, who and how many
will attend after registration?
  • Note that an amount of D may be given upon
    participation.
  • Suppose among those registered, 50 are like John,
    and 50 others are like Jane.
  • 50 registrants who are like John will go to
    activity X because
  • A1 D - B1 gt0
  • Suppose all other participants who are like Jane
    find out that the other activity, that they
    value at B2, is available.
  • If A2 D - B2 lt 0, all the 50 other will not
    attend the activity X. Hence, only 50 of the
    registered (only those who are like John) will
    attend.
  • If A2 D - B2 gt 0, all the 50 other will
    attend the activity X. All 100 of the registered
    will attend.

10
If a deposit D is required but it will be
refunded upon participation, who and how many
will attend after registration?
  • Suppose all other participants who are like Jane
    find out that the other activity, that they
    value at B2, is available.
  • If A2 D - B2 lt 0, all the 50 other will not
    attend the activity X. Hence, only 50 of the
    registered (only those who are like John) will
    attend.
  • If A2 D - B2 gt 0, all the 50 other will
    attend the activity X. All 100 of the registered
    will attend.
  • In reality, those registered have a distribution
    of p and a distribution of A and B. An
    estimation of the participation rate requires
    assumptions of these distribution and the skills
    of integration.
  • In any case, by making D big enough, the
    organizer can make sure that all registered will
    participate in the activity.

11
Additional work if interested
  • Why do we need prior registration at all?
  • If no deposit is required, but a payment will be
    given to participants upon participation
  • Who will register?
  • Who and how many will attend after registration?
  • If deposit D1 is required, but an amount of D2
    will be given to participants upon participation
  • Who will register?
  • Who and how many will attend after registration?

12
End
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