Major Hazard Facilities Hazard Identification

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Major Hazard Facilities Hazard Identification
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Overview

• This seminar has been split into two sections
• Hazard Identification
• Major Accident Identification and Risk Assessment
• The seminar has been developed to provide
• Context with MHF Regulations
• An overview of what is required
• An overview of the steps required
• Examples of hazards identified

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Some Abbreviations and Terms

• AFAP - As far as (reasonably) practicable
• DG - Dangerous goods
• Employer - Employer who has management control of
  the facility
• Facility - any building or structure at which
  Schedule 1 materials are present or likely to be
  present for any purpose
• FMEA/FMECA - Failure modes and effects analysis/
  Failure modes and effects criticality analysis
• FTA - Fault tree analysis
• HAZID - Hazard identification
• HAZOP - Hazard and operability study
• HSR - Health and safety representative
• LOC - Loss of containment
• LOPA Layers of protection analysis

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Some Abbreviations and Terms

• MHF - Major hazard facility
• MA - Major accident
• OHS - Occupational health safety
• PFD Process Flow Diagram
• PID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
• PSV Pressure safety valve
• SMS - Safety management system

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Topics Covered In This Presentation

• Regulations
• Definition Hazard
• Introduction
• HAZID Requirements
• HAZID Approach
• Consultation
• Conducting the HAZID
• Overview of HAZID techniques
• Review and Revision
• Sources of Additional Information

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Regulations
Basic outline

• Hazard identification (R9.43)
• Risk assessment (R9.44)
• Risk control (i.e. control measures) (R9.45, S9A
  210)
• Safety Management System (R9.46)
• Safety report (R9.47, S9A 212, 213)
• Emergency plan (R9.53)
• Consultation

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Regulations
Regulation 9.43 (Hazard identification)
states The employer must identify, in
consultation with employees, contractors (as far
as is practicable) and HSRs

• All reasonably foreseeable hazards at the MHF
  that may cause a major accident and
• The kinds of major accidents that may occur at
  the MHF, the likelihood of a major accident
  occurring and the likely consequences of a major
  accident.

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Definition

• Hazard
• Regulatory definition per Part 20 of the
  Occupational Health and Safety (Safety Standards)
  Regulations 1994
• A hazard means the potential to cause injury or
  illness
• Interpreted Any activity, procedure, plant,
  process, substance, situation or other
  circumstance that has the potential to cause harm.

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Introduction

• HAZID is critical to safety duties and the safety
  report
• Employer must identify all major accidents and
  their related causes using a systematic and
  documented HAZID approach
• The process must be transparent
• HAZID results must be reflected in risk
  assessment, SMS, adoption of control measures and
  safety report

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Introduction

• An example - Gramercy Alumina Refinery, US
  Department of Labor Report ID No. 16-00352, 5
  July 1999 at 5am

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Introduction
Were the hazards identified?
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Introduction

• HAZID process must be ongoing to ensure existing
  hazards are known, and
• New hazards recognised before they are
  introduced
• Prior to modification of facility
• Prior to change in SMS or workforce
• Before and during abnormal operations,
  troubleshooting
• Plant condition monitoring, early warning signals
• Employee feedback from routine participation in
  work
• After an incident

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Introduction

• Information from accident investigations can be
  useful as input to determine contributing causes

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HAZID Requirements

• A systematic, transparent and comprehensive HAZID
  process should be used based on a comprehensive
  and accurate description of the facility
• MAs and the underlying hazards should not be
  disregarded simply because
• They appear to be very unlikely
• They have not happened previously
• They are considered to be adequately controlled
  by existing measures

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HAZID Requirements
The risk diagram can be useful for illustrating
this aspect, as shown below
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HAZID Requirements
Exclusions

• The HAZID process (for MHF compliance) is not
  intended to identify all personnel safety
  concerns
• Many industrial incidents are caused by personnel
  safety breaches, such as the following
• Person falls from height
• Electrocution
• Trips/slips
• Contact with moving machinery
• etc

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HAZID Requirements
Exclusions

• These are generally incidents that do not relate
  to the storage or processing of Schedule 9
  materials and are covered by other parts of an
  Employers safety management system for a
  facility such as
• Permit to work
• Confined space entry and management
• Working at heights
• Work place safety assessments
• etc

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HAZID Approach

• What can go wrong?
• What incidents or scenarios could arise as a
  result of things going wrong?
• What could cause or could contribute to these
  incidents?

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HAZID Approach

• Considers all operating modes of the facility,
  and all activities that are expected to occur
• Human and system interfaces together with
  engineering issues
• Dynamic process to stay ahead of any changes in
  the facility that could erode the safe operating
  envelope or could introduce new hazards

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HAZID Approach

• The HAZID approach is required to
• Be team-based
• Use a a process that is systematic
• Be pro-active in searching for hazards
• Assess all hazards
• Analyse existing controls and barriers -
  preventative and mitigative
• Consider size and complexity in selecting
  approach to use

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HAZID Approach

• Consideration needs to be given in selecting the
  HAZID technique
• Some issues to take into account are
• Life cycle phase of plant
• Complexity and size
• Type of Process or activity covering
• Engineering or procedural
• Mechanical, process, or activity focussed

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HAZID Approach
Life Cycle Phases of a Project

• The HAZID approach can be used in the first
  stages of the life cycle phase of a project
• Prior to design phase, little information will be
  available and the HAZID approach will need to be
  undertaken on flow diagrams
• Assumptions will need to be transparent and
  documented

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HAZID Approach

• Complexity and Size
• The complexity and size of a facility includes
  the number of activities or systems, the number
  of pieces of equipment, the type of process, and
  the range of potential outcomes
• Some HAZID techniques may get bogged down when
  they are applied to complex processes
• For example, event tree and fault tree analyses
  can become time consuming and difficult to
  structure effectively
• However, simple techniques may not provide
  sufficient focus to reach consensus, or
  confidence in the identification of hazards
• Conclusion Start with simple techniques and
  build
• in complexity as required

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HAZID Approach

• Type of Process or Activity
• Where activities are procedural or human error is
  dominant then task analysis may be appropriate
  (e.g. task analysis, procedural HAZOP, etc)
• Where knowledge of the failure modes of equipment
  is critical (e.g. control equipment, etc) then
  FMEA may be appropriate

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HAZID Approach

• Type of Process or Activity
• Where the facility is readily shown on a process
  flow diagram or a process and instrumentation
  diagram, then HAZOP may be used
• Where multiple failures need to be combined to
  cause an accident, or multiple outcomes are
  possible then fault tree analysis and event tree
  analysis may be beneficial

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Consultation

• The MHF Regulations require Employers to consult
  with employees in relation to
• Identification of major hazards and potential
  major accidents
• Risk assessment
• Adoption of control measures
• Establishment and implementation of a safety
  management system
• Development of the safety report

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Consultation

• Consultation is also required in relation to the
  roles that the Employer defines for employees
• The adequacy of the consultation process is a key
  step in decision-making with regards to the
  granting of licences
• A teamwork approach between the Employer, HSRs
  and employees is strongly advocated for the
  safety report development process as a whole

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Consultation

• Employees have a significant effect on the safety
  of operations, as a result of their behaviour,
  attitude and competence in the conduct of their
  safety-related roles
• The involvement of the employees in the
  identification of hazards and control measures
  enhances
• Their awareness of these issues
• and
• Is critical to the achievement of safe operation
  in practice

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Conducting the HAZID

• HAZID Team Selection
• The team selection for the area or plant is
  critical to the whole hazard identification
  process
• Personnel with suitable skills and experience
  should be available to cover all issues for
  discussion within the HAZID process
• A well managed, formalised approach with
  appropriate documentation is required
• Team selection and training in methodology used
  is to be provided

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Conducting the HAZID

• HAZID Team Selection
• Facilitated multi-disciplinary team based
  approach
• Suitably qualified and experienced independent
  person to facilitate
• Suitably experienced and qualified personnel for
  the process, operations and equipment involved

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Conducting the HAZID

• HAZID Team Selection
• These employees MAY BE the HSRs but DO NOT HAVE
  TO BE
• However, the HSRs should be consulted in
  selection of appropriate persons - this process
  must be documented and be transparent
• No single person can conduct a HAZID
• A team approach will be most effective

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Conducting the HAZID

• HAZID Study Team
• The typical study team would comprise
• Study facilitator
• Technical secretary
• Operations management
• HSR/Operations representative
• Project engineer or project design engineer for
  new projects
• Process engineer
• Maintenance representative
• Instrument electrical representative
• Note the above team make up is indicative only

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Conducting the HAZID

• HAZID Planning
• The following steps are required
• Planning and preparation
• Defining the boundaries and provide system
  description
• Divide plant into logical groups
• Review PIDs and process schematics to ensure
  accuracy
• Optimise HAZID process by means of preplanning
  work involving relevant stakeholders (operations,
  maintenance, technical and safety personnel)

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Conducting the HAZID Consider the Past, Present
and Future
What has gone wrong in the past?
Historical conditions
Identified Hazards
What could go wrong currently?
Existing conditions
What could go wrong due to change?
unforeseeable
Future conditions
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Conducting the HAZID

• It is tempting to disregard Non-Credible
  Scenarios BUT
• Non-credible scenarios have happened to others
• Worst cases are important to emergency planning

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It happened to someone else
Aftermath of an explosion (U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY
AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD, SIERRA CHEMICAL
COMPANY REPORT NO. 98-001-I-NV, January 1988)
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Conducting the HAZID

• Issues for consideration
• Equipment can be off-line
• Safety devices can be disabled or fail to operate
• Several tasks may be concurrent
• Procedures are not always followed
• People are not always available
• How we act is not always how we plan to act
• Things can take twice as long as planned
• Abnormal conditions can cross section limits
• Power failure

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Conducting the HAZID HAZID Process
System description
Define boundary
Divide system into sections
Existing studies
Selected methods
Systematically record all hazards
Independent check
Hazard Register
Revisit after risk assessment
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Conducting the HAZID

• Meeting Venue
• Hold on site if possible
• Avoid interruptions if possible
• Schedule within the normal work pattern, or
  within the safety report activities
• Meetings less than 3 hours are not effective
• Meetings that last all day are also not
  effective, however practicalities may require all
  day meetings
• Dont underestimate the time required

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Conducting the HAZID

• Recording Detail
• The level of detail is important for
• Clarity
• Transparency and
• Traceability
• A system (hazard register) is required for
  keeping track of the process for each analysed
  section of the facility
• The items to be recorded are
• Study team
• System being evaluated
• Identified hazard scenario
• Consequences of the hazard being realised
• Controls in place to prevent hazard being
  realised and their adequacy
• Opportunity for additional controls

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HAZID Techniques - Overview
Increasing effort required

• Checklists - questions to assist in hazard
  identification
• Brainstorming - whatever anyone can think of
• What If Analysis - possible outcomes of change
• HAZOP - identifies process plant type incidents
• FMEA/FMECA - equipment failure causes
• Task Analysis maintenance activities,
  procedures
• Fault Tree Analysis - combinations of failures

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Checklists

• Simple set of prompts or checklist questions to
  assist in hazard identification
• Can be used in combination with any other
  techniques, such as What If
• Can be developed progressively to capture
  corporate learning of organisation
• Particularly useful in early analysis of change
  within projects

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Checklists
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Checklists

• Advantages
• Highly valuable as a cross check review tool
  following application of other techniques
• Useful as a shop floor tool to review continued
  compliance with SMS
• Disadvantages
• Tends to stifle creative thinking
• Used alone introduces the potential of limiting
  study to already known hazards - no new hazard
  types are identified
• Checklists on their own will rarely be able to
  satisfy regulatory requirements

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Brainstorm

• Team based exercise
• Based on the principle that several experts with
  different backgrounds can interact and identify
  more problems when working together
• Can be applied with many other techniques to vary
  the balance between free flowing thought and
  structure
• Can be effective at identifying obscure hazards
  which other techniques may miss

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Brainstorm

• Advantages
• Useful starting point for many HAZID techniques
  to focus a groups ideas, especially at the
  projects concept phase
• Facilitates active participation and input
• Allows employees experience to surface readily
• Enables thinking outside the square
• Very useful at early stages of a project or study
• Disadvantages
• Less rigorous and systematic than other
  techniques
• High risk of missing hazards unless combined with
  other tools
• Caution required to avoid overlooking the detail
• Relies on experience and competency of
  facilitator

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What If

• What if analysis is an early method of
  identifying hazards
• Brainstorming approach that uses broad, loosely
  structured questioning to postulate potential
  upsets that may result in an incident or system
  performance problems
• It can be used for almost every type of analysis
  situation, especially those dominated by
  relatively simple failure scenarios

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What If

• Normally the study leader will develop a list of
  questions to consider at the study session
• This list needs to be developed before the study
  session
• Further questions may be considered during the
  session
• Checklists may be used to minimise the likelihood
  of omitting some areas

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What If

• Example of a What If report for a single assessed
  item

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What If

• Advantages
• Useful for hazard identification early in the
  process, such as when only PFDs are available
• What If studies may also be more beneficial than
  HAZOPs where the project being examined is not a
  typical steady state process, though HAZOP
  methodologies do exist for batch and sequence
  processes
• Disadvantages
• Inability to identify pre-release conditions
• Apparent lack of rigour
• Checklists are used extensively which can provide
  tunnel vision, thereby running the risk of
  overlooking possible initiating events

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HAZOP

• A HAZOP study is a widely used method for the
  identification of hazards
• A HAZOP is a rigorous and highly structured
  hazard identification tool
• It is normally applied when PFDs and PIDs are
  available
• The plant/process under investigation is split
  into study nodes and lines and equipment are
  reviewed on a node by node basis
• Guideword and deviation lists are applied to
  process parameters to develop possible deviations
  from the design intent
• HAZOP results in a very a systematic assessment
  of hazards

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HAZOP
Example of a HAZOP report for a single assessed
item
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HAZOP

• Advantages
• Will identify hazards, and events leading to an
  accident, release or other undesired event
• Systematic and rigorous process
• The systematic approach goes some way to ensuring
  all hazards are considered
• Disadvantages
• HAZOPs are most effective when conducted using
  PIDs, though they can be done with PFDs
• Requires significant resource commitment
• HAZOPs are time consuming
• The HAZOP process is quite monotonous and
  maintaining participant interest can be a
  challenge

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FMEA/FMECA

• Objective is to systematically address all
  possible failure modes and the associated effects
  on a technical system
• The underlying equipment and components of the
  system are analysed in order to eliminate,
  mitigate or reduce the failure or the failure
  effect
• Best suited for mechanical and electrical
  hardware systems evaluations

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FMEA/FMECA

• Example of an FMEA/FMCEA report for a single
  assessed item

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FMEA/FMECA

• Advantages
• Generally applied to solve a specific problem or
  set of problems
• FMEA/FMECA was primarily considered to be a tool
  or process to assist in designing a technical
  system to a higher level of reliability
• Designed correction or mitigation techniques can
  be implemented so that failure possibilities can
  be eliminated or minimized
• Disadvantages
• It is very time consuming and needs specialist
  skills from different backgrounds to obtain
  maximum effect
• Very hard to assess operational risks within an
  FMEA/FMECA (like they can be within a HAZOP or
  What if study)

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Task Analysis

• Technique which analyses human interactions with
  the tasks they perform, the tools they use and
  the plant, process or work environment
• Approach breaks down a task into individual steps
  and analyses each step for the presence of
  potential hazards
• Used widely to manage known injury related tasks
  in workplace
• Excellent tool for hazard identification related
  to human tasks

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Task Analysis

• Disadvantages
• Does not address plant process deviations which
  are not related to human interaction
• Caution
• Relies on multi-disciplined input with specific
  input of person who normally carries out the task
• Often assumed to be the only tool of hazard
  identification or risk assessment, as it is used
  generally at the shop floor

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Fault Tree Analysis

• Graphical technique approach
• Provides a systematic description of the
  combinations of possible occurrences in a system
  which can result in an identified undesirable
  outcome (top event)
• This method combines hardware failures and human
  failures
• Uses logic gates to define modes of interaction
  (ANDs/ ORs)

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Fault Tree Analysis
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Fault Tree Analysis

• Advantages
• Quantitative - defines probabilities to each
  event which can be used to calculate the
  probability of the top event
• Easy to read and understand hazard profile
• Easily expanded to bow tie diagram by addition of
  event tree
• Disadvantages
• Need to have identified the top event first
• More difficult than other techniques to document
• Fault trees can become rather complex
• Time consuming approach
• Quantitative data needed to perform properly

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Review and Revision
The following are examples of when a HAZID
revision should occur
HAZID Revision
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Sources of Additional Information

• Loss Prevention In The Process Industries, Second
  Edition, Reed Educational and Professional
  Publishing, F. P Lees,1996
• Guidelines for Hazard Analysis, Hazardous
  Industry Planning Advisory Paper No.6, NSW
  Department of Planning, June 1992
• HAZOP and HAZANs, Notes on the Identification and
  Assessment of Hazards, Second Edition, Trevor
  Kletz, The Institution of Chemical Engineers, 1986

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Sources of Additional Information

• Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures,
  Second Edition, Centre for Chemical Process
  Safety, American Institute of Chemical Engineers,
  1992
• Layer of Protection Analysis, Simplified Process
  Risk Assessment, Centre for Chemical Process
  Safety, American Institute of Chemical Engineers,
  2001
• Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, Geoff
  Wells, The Institution of Chemical Engineers, 19.
• MIL-STD-1629A, 1980
• Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, J. Moubray,
  RCM II, 2000

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Questions?