PLAAF ORGANISATION

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PLAAF ORGANISATION

• BASED ON SOVIET PATTERN
• 12 AIRCRAFT PER SQN
• 03 SQN PER REGIMENT
• 03 REGIMENTS PER AIR DIVISION

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ROLES ASSIGNED

• AIR DEFENCE
• GROUND ATTACK
• TACTICAL BOMBING

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PLA AF HOLDING

• 03 AIRBORNE PARA DIV
• 16 DIV AD ARTY

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PLA AF HOLDING

• FIGHTERS 4100 ( F-6,A-5, F-
  7,F-8,Q-5)
• BOMBERS 400
• TRANSPORT 400
• RECCE 290
• HEPTRS 210

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MODERNISATION

• AIRCRAFT SU-27
• LONG RANGE INTERCEPTORS
• LICENSE PRODUCTION OF MIG 31
• AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM
• DEVELOPMENT OF MULTIROLE AGILE AIRCRAFT
• MOU WITH INDIA AND KOREA FOR TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

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FORCE MULTIPLIERS

• AVIONICS FOR SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE AND
  ELECTRONIC
• WARFARE
• ASI-5 MULTIMODE FIRE CONTROL RADAR
• DAY/NIGHT IMAGING PODS

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STRATEGIC MISSILES

• DF-5 (CSS-4) ICBM/MIRV NUCLEAR
  15000 KM
• DF-4 (CSS-3) ICBM NUCLEAR
  7000 KM
• DF-5 (CSS-2) IRBM NUCLEAR
  2700 KM
• JL1 SLBM NUCLEAR
  2200 -3000 KM
• DF-31 ICBM NUCLEAR
  gt8000 KM

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LEGEND
AIRFIELD
ROAD
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CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

• HOW MIGHT CHINA USE THE ATOM BOMB?

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NUCLEAR POLICY

• NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
• PROGRESS ON THEIR OWN
• POSSESS SEVERAL HUNDRED NUCLEAR DEVICES AND
  MISSILES

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OBJECTIVES OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

• NATIONAL SECURITY BY DETERRING AN ATTACK BY A
  SUPER POWER
• ESTABLISH INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATING POSITION FROM
  A POSITION OF STRENGTH

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OBJECTIVES OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

• TO BREAK THE NUCLEAR MONOPOLY OF WORLD SUPER
  POWERS

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NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

• BEGAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME IN 1950s
• DECIDED TO GO AHEAD ON HER OWN
• NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY STOLEN FROM THE USA

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NUCLEAR ARSENAL

• 400 WARHEADS
• SECOND ARTY CORPS HANDLES NUCLEAR WEAPONS
• DELIVERY BY FIGHTER/BOMBER AIRCRAFT

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CHINESE NUCLEAR STRATEGY

• AMBIGUOUS IN CONTRAST WITH THAT OF RUSSIA AND USA
• FINAL AUTHORITY FOR THE USE RESTS WITH THE PARTY
  

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CHINESE NUCLEAR STRATEGY

• BELIEVES IN FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY
• RETAIN THE OPTION OF SELECTIVE DETERRENCE

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CHINESE NUCLEAR STRATEGY

• TO FORCE NUCLEAR INACTION BY FRIGHTENING THE
  ADVERSARY
• PLEDGES NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR
  WEAPONS

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CHINESE NUCLEAR STRATEGY

• USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN OWN TERRITORY NOT A
  VIOLATION OF THE PLEDGE

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TRI-POLAR DETERRENCE

• TWO PRONGED STRATEGY TO DETER RUSSIA AND US
• MATERIALLY INCREASE NUMBER OF TARGETS IT CAN
  ATTACK

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CATEGORISATION OF THREAT

• INTERNAL
• MINORITIES
• LIBERALISATION
• CHANGING CULTURAL VALUES

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CATEGORISATION OF THREAT

• EXTERNAL
• USA - OPEN ADVERSARY
• JAPAN - POWERFUL RESURGENT ADVERSARY
• VIETNAM - UNPREDICTABLE ACE HITMAN

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CATEGORISATION OF THREAT

• EXTERNAL
• RUSSIA - POWERFUL THREATENING FORCE
• INDIA - NEO-NUCLEAR WITH ADVANCING MISSILE
  TECHNOLOGY

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CHINESE GEOPOLITICAL FACETS

• EXTREME POSSESSIVE ATTITUDE TO HER TERRITORIES
• SENSITIVENESS TO SECESSIONERY TENDENCIES

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IRREDENTISM

• TAIWAN
• MACAU

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SUPPORT TO SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT

• HAS LARGE ETHNIC POPULATION OF
• KAZAKHS
• KYRGHYS
• TAZIKS
• UIGHURS

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SUPPORT TO SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT

• MOSTLY MUSLIMS AND SHARE CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS
  LINKS WITH CARs
• RISE OF TALIBAN ALARMED THESE STATES

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SUPPORT TO SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT

• LESS LIKELY TO SUPPORT THESE MINORITIES
• SHANGHAI TREATY STOP SPONSORING THESE GROUPS

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TIBET

• CONQUERED BY MONGOLS IN 13TH CENTURY
• CAME UNDER MANCHU CONTROL IN 18TH CENTURY

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CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES IN MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF
CHINA

• EQUIPMENT 10-20 YEARS BEHIND THAT OF THE WEST
• MILITARY COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT OUTDATED

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CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES IN MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF
CHINA

• LACKS INTEGRATED AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL
  SYSTEM (AWACS) FORCE
• UAVs ARE UNDER DEVELOPMENT

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CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES IN MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF
CHINA

• SYSTEMS - INTEGRATION SKILLS ARE POOR
• INADEQUATE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES AND
  NON-EXISTENT INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT

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PROGRESS MADE

• SOME AREAS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
• CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY

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BAY OF BENGAL

• NAVAL CONFLICT IN BAY OF BENGAL LESS LIKELY
• SLOCs IN THIS REGION ARE IMPORTANT FOR WESTERN
  POWERS

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LAND THREAT

• INTEGRATED WAR IN THREE DIMENSIONS AIR LAND
  BATTLE
• INTEGRATED AIR, HELIBORNE, AIRBORNE AND SPECIAL
  FORCES
• TRAINING IN NBC SCENARIOS, BOTH IN OFFENCE AND
  DEFENCE

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MARITIME THREAT

• REGARDS INDIA AS A POTENTIAL COMPETITOR
• INDIA PRINCIPLE ADVERSARY ACROSS MALACCA STRAITS
  
• HER INTERESTS IN INDIAN OCEAN ARE LONG-TERM AND
  STRATEGIC

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POLICY IN THE BAY OF BENGAL

• TO DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH MYANMAR - LAND BASED
  ACCESS IN BAY OF BENGAL
• TO DEVELOP A BLUE-WATER CAPABILITY
• TO LIMIT INDIAN NAVAL FORCE PROJECTION TO THE
  WEST OF SINGAPORE

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Military Counter Measures
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MILITARY COUNTER MEASURES

• INDIAN ARMED FORCES UNDER CONSTRAINTS OF
  BUDGETING
• UNLIKELY TO GROW IN SIZE

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MILITARY COUNTER MEASURES

• CHINA RECOGNISED THE NEED TO REDUCE MANPOWER
• PLA HAS LESS ECONOMIC LIMITATIONS
• INDIAN ARMED FORCES RESTRUCTURE ITSELF TO SUIT
  POLITICAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

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INDIAN RESPONSE TO CHINESE THREAT IN 21ST CENTURY

• RESTRUCTURING AND DOWNSIZING THE ARMY
• DEVELOPMENT AND ADOPTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL FORCE
  MULTIPLIERS
• INTEGRATED STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL C4I2 SYSTEMS

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INDIAN RESPONSE TO CHINESE THREAT IN 21ST CENTURY

• DEVELOPMENT AND ADOPTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL FORCE
  MULTIPLIERS
• BETTER RADARS, SAMS, SSMS, UAVS,
• AIR-TO- AIR REFUELLING
• INTEGRATED LOGISTICS

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INDIAN RESPONSE TO CHINESE THREAT IN 21ST CENTURY

• DEVELOPMENT OF CREDIBLE RAPID DEPLOYMENT AND
  AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY OF A DIVISION EACH
• DOCTRINAL SHIFT TO INFO-AGE WARFARE

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P A R T I V
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FOREIGN POLICY OF CHINA
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SINO - RUSSIA
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SINO RUSSIA

• SITUATION CHANGED WITH THE FORMATION OF THE CIS
• RUSSIA APPRECIATED THAT CHINA COULD BECOME AN
  IMPORTANT ALLY
• CHINA HAD MONEY POWER AND RUSSIA HAD THE
  TECHNOLOGY

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HISTORICAL AGREEMENT

• ALL CONTROVERSIES AND BORDER DISPUTES BE SETTLED
  BY PEACEFUL MEANS
• CEDING OF TERRITORIES TO EACH OTHER AND REDUCTION
  OF TROOPS

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HISTORICAL AGREEMENT

• MODEL TREATY FOR SETTLING BORDER DISPUTES BETWEEN
  VARIOUS NATIONS

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SINO - JAPAN
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SINO - JAPAN

• HISTORICALLY JAPAN HAS BEEN A THREAT TO CHINA
• 1978 TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP
• 1996 JAPANESE RIGHT WING GROUP LANDED ON SENKAKU
  ISLAND

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STEPS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS

• PRESIDENT HASHIMOTO MET PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN IN
  1996
• IN 1997 JAPAN ANNOUNCED LIFTING OF THE FREEZE OF
  GRANTS IN AID

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STEPS TO NORMALISE RELATIONS

• UNDERSTANDING REACHED TO EXPAND CO-OPERATION IN
  THE AREAS OF
• HIGH TECHNOLOGY
• INFORMATION

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STEPS TO NORMALISE RELATIONS

• UNDERSTANDING REACHED TO EXPAND CO-OPERATION IN
  THE AREAS OF
• ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
• AGRICULTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE
• PROMOTE SECURITY DIALOGUES
• 33 ITEM CO-OPERATION PLAN

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TAIWAN
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REASONS FOR TENSIONS

• VISIT TO CORNELL UNIVERSITY IN 1995 BY TAIWAN
  PRESIDENT LEE TENG HUI
• SHIFT FROM THE AGREEMENT SIGNED BY PRESIDENT
  RICHARD NIXON

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TAIWANS REQUIREMENTS

• VOTERS ON THE ISLAND FOR INDEPENDENCE
• INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF ITS SOVEREIGN STATUS

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RESULTS OF INTERNET SURVEY CARRIED OUT FOR
SOVEREIGNTY

• 70.17 SAID "YES"
• 20. 28 SAID "NO

NO
YES
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CHINESE CLAIM OVER TAIWAN

• SOVEREIGN STATE HAS RIGHT TO PROTECT ITS UNITY
  AND INTEGRITY
• TAIWAN HISTORICALLY BELONGS TO CHINA

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CHINESE CLAIM OVER TAIWAN

• PROCLAMATION ISSUED AT CAIRO CONFERENCE IN 1943
  STATES THAT TAIWAN BE RETURNED TO CHINA
• TAIWAN IS CONSIDERED A PART OF CHINA BY THE
  INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

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WORLD POSITION ON TAIWAN

• NO PERMISSION REQUIRED FROM CHINA TO
• TRADE WITH TAIWAN
• TRANSIT PEOPLE, AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS TO AND FROM
  TAIWAN

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WORLD POSITION ON TAIWAN

• CHINAS CLAIM OVER TAIWAN IS FACTUALLY WEAK
• NO IMMEDIATE ANSWER

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SINO US
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SINO-US RELATIONS

• DECISION OF THE US TO SUPPORT CHIANG KAI SHEK
• KOREAN CONFLICT OF 1950

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SINO-US RELATIONS

• EISENHOWER'S THREAT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPON
• US SUPPLY OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT TO TAIWAN

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RELATIONS NOW

• RICHARD NIXON REALISED THE IMPORTANCE OF CHINA
• MILITARY TIES WERE STRENGTHENED IN THE LATE 70s

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RELATIONS NOW

• CHINA CONSIDERS USA MORE AS A FRIEND THAN AN ALLY
• USA SEES CHINA AS AN EMERGING MARKET FOR HER GOODS

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AMERICAN POLICY

• BASED ON 1979 TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT
• BEIJING OPPOSED INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS
• LIKELY DANGER TO SINO-US RELATIONS

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SINO - EU
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SINO EU RELATIONS

• CHINA IS THE THIRD LARGEST NON-EUROPEAN TRADING
  PARTNER FOR EU
• ACCOMMODATING CHINA IN 21st CENTURY-A BIG ISSUE
  FACING EUROPE
• EU SUPPORTS
• TRANSITION TO OPEN SOCIETY
• RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

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AREAS OF MUTUAL CO-OPERATION

• REGIONAL CO-OPERATION
• ENVIRONMENTAL AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
• ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION
• REDUCTION IN CROSS BORDER CRIME

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SINO - SRILANKA
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FOREIGN POLICY

• WAS DETERMINED BY THREE MAJOR FACTORS
• SRI LANKA'S CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH UNITED KINGDOM
  
• DOMESTIC POLITICS
• SOVIET UNIONS VETO OF SRI LANKA'S ADMISSION TO
  THE UNITED NATIONS

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SRI LANKAS VIEW

• INTENSE DISLIKE FOR COMMUNISM
• IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH CHINA WHEN NEW POWER
  PATTERN EMERGED IN SUBCONTINENT
• WELCOMES CHINA AS A COUNTER TO INDIA'S POWER AND
  INFLUENCE
• ECONOMIC AID FROM CHINA

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SINO- MYANMAR
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CHINA'S POLICY

• MYANMAR PRO-WEST
• ACCUSED U NU AS STOOGE OF THE USA
• THE WHITE FLAG COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
• IN 1969 CHINA RESTORED TIES

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MYANMARS RESPONSE

• WITHDREW FROM NON-ALIGNMENT MOVEMENT
• RECEPTIVE TO CHINAS NEEDS TO WARD OFF THREAT
  FROM REBELS
• CHINESE OBTAINED BASE FACILITIES FROM MYANMAR AT
  HANGYI ISLANDS AND COCO ISLANDS

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SINO BANGLADESH
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BACKGROUND

• CHINA NEVER SUPPORTED BANGLA MOVEMENT FOR
  INDEPENDENCE
• RECOGNISED BANGLADESH AS LATE AS 1975

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PRESENT SITUATION

• ACTIVE CO-OPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND BANGLADESH
• CHINA IS MAJOR SUPPLIER OF ARMS
• SINO-BANGLA RELATIONS ATTRIBUTED TO BANGLA-INDIA
  RELATIONS

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SINO - NEPAL
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SINO NEPAL RELATIONS

• HISTORICAL LINKS
• GEO-CONTIGUOUS STATES
• LOFTY HIMALAYAS AS INSULATION

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CHINA NEPAL RELATIONS

• STRATEGIC LOCATION
• NEPAL A BUFFER STATE

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SINO - PAK
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SINO PAK RELATIONS

• FIRST MUSLIM COUNTRY TO RECOGNISE PRC
• PAKISTAN GAVE AWAY 2050 SQ KM OF POK
• PIA FIRST FOREIGN AIRLINE TO OPERATE SERVICE TO
  BEIJING

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CHINESE ROLE IN THE 1965 INDO-PAK WAR

• CHINA HELD INDIA SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR CONFLICT
• SUPPORTED KASHMIRIS RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

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CHINESE ROLE IN THE 1965 INDO-PAK WAR

• ACCUSED UN OF ACTING TO PAKISTAN'S DETRIMENT
• OPPOSED MERGER OF SIKKIM WITH INDIA

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CHINA'S POLICY ON PAKISTAN

• AGGRESSIVE EXPANSION ALTERNATED BY DIPLOMATIC
  MANOEUVRING
• DOMINATE SOUTH ASIA
• INTEGRATE SOUTH ASIAN ECONOMY WITH HER OWN
• SUPPLICATE US INFLUENCE IN ASIA

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BENEFITS TO PAKISTAN

• DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT
• MILITARY EQUIPMENT

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BENEFITS TO PAKISTAN

• ASSISTANCE IN ROAD CONSTRUCTION AND DEFENCE
  PRODUCTION
• TRANSFER OF INTERMEDIATE BALLISTIC MISSILES

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PRESENT RELATIONS

• CHINA SHOWN MODERATION ON VIEWS ON KASHMIR
• MODERATE VIEWS ON DOWNING OF ATLANTIQUE

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SINO - INDIA
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SINO INDIAN RELATIONS

• INDIA AND CHINA EMERGED AS POLITICAL ENTITIES AT
  THE SAME TIME
• INDIA A PEACEFUL DEMOCRATIC NON ALIGNED
  COUNTRY
• CHINA A MODERN COMMUNIST NATION

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SINO INDIAN RELATIONS

• NEVER FOLLOWED ANY UNIFORM PATTERN
• SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS BEST UNDERSTOOD BY DIVIDING
  INTO DIFFERENT PERIODS

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PERIOD FROM 1947-50

• PT JAWAHARLAL NEHRU DESCRIBED CHINA AS "A MIGHTY
  COUNTRY WITH A MIGHTY PAST"
• INDIA RECOGNISED THE PRC IN DEC 1949

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PERIOD FROM 1950-54

• CHANGES IN RELATIONS FROM IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE TO
  STATE OF FRIENDSHIP
• KOREAN WAR
• TAKE OVER OF TIBET BY THE PLA

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PERIOD OF HINDI-CHINI-BHAI-BHAI

• SOCIO-CULTURAL EXCHANGES
• CHINESE INCURSIONS INTO NORTHERN FRONTIERS
• 1956 57 ROAD ACROSS AKSAI CHIN

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PERIOD FROM 1959 - 62

• IN JAN 1959 CHOU EN LAI CHALLENGED ESTABLISHED
  BOUNDARY
• IN SEP 1959 CLAIMED 50,000 SQ MILES OF INDIAN
  TERRITORY

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PERIOD FROM 1959 - 62

• IN 1962 CHINA MOUNTED A FULL FLEDGED ATTACK ON
  INDIA
• CHINA MOVED CLOSER TO PAKISTAN
• SUPPORTED PAKISTAN IN 1965 AND 1971 WARS

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PERIOD SINCE 1976

• IN 1976 DIPLOMATIC TIES RESUMED
• MODEST LINKS IN TRADE, BANKING AND SHIPPING
  RE-ESTABLISHED
• IN 1988 JOINT WORKING GROUP SET UP TO SOLVE THE
  BORDER DISPUTES

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JOINT WORKING GROUP

• CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
• REDUCTION OF TROOPS

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HURDLES IN RELATIONS

• CHINA DOES NOT RECOGNISE Mc MAHON LINE
• SIKKIM AND ARUNACHAL NOT RECOGNISED BY CHINA AS
  PARTS OF INDIA
• AKSAI CHIN STANDS IN THE WAY

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HURDLES IN RELATIONS

• OVERT AND COVERT SUPPORT BY CHINA TO PAKISTAN
• CHINA SEES INDIA AS A MAJOR RIVAL IN SE ASIA

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HURDLES IN RELATIONS

• JOINED HANDS WITH PAKISTAN TO INTERNATIONALISE
  THE KASHMIR ISSUE
• CHINA'S MILITARY BASES IN MYANMAR AND TIBET
• INDIA'S NUCLEAR TESTS NOT LIKED BY CHINA

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HURDLES IN RELATIONS

• INDIA MUST SIGN THE CTBT AND THE NPT
  UNCONDITIONALLY
• INDIA'S SUPPORT TO THE DALAI LAMA

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WAY AHEAD

• INDIA HAS A PLACE IN SE ASIA
• STATEMENTS OF DISTRUST FROM INDIA MUST STOP
• CHANGING CHINESE STAND MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT

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PART V
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CHINA CRYSTAL GAZING
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• A first- rate theory predicts a second- rate
  theory forbids and a third- rate theory explains
  after the event.
• Alexander Isaakovich Kitaigordskii
•  

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PRO DEMOCRACY

• ELECTIONS AT VILLAGE AND LOCAL LEVELS
• KEEN INTEREST IN INDIAN DEMOCRACY
• DEMOCRACY AN ACCEPTABLE FORM OF GOVERNMENT
• TINANMEN SQUARE INCIDENT AND COLLAPSE OF
  ERSTWHILE USSR

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ANTI DEMOCRACY

• COMMUNISM MORE SUITED TO MANAGE LARGE
  COUNTRIES LIKE CHINA
• COMMON MAN NOT INTERESTED IN DEMOCRACY

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FINAL ANALYSIS

• PRO DEMOCRACY MOVEMENTS GAIN STRENGTH AS
  INFORMATION ERA CREEPS IN
• DEPENDENT ON SUCCESS OF INDIAN DEMOCRACY
• MAY ADOPT DEMOCRACY TO GAIN MORAL ASCENDANCY

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POLITICAL SCENARIO

• EMERGING MULTI-POLAR WORLD
• INDIA SHOULD MAINTAIN EQUI-DISTANCE
• INDO-RUSSIAN-CHINA AXIS

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RUSSIA
CHINA
STRATEGIC TRIANGLE
?
INDIA
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POLITICAL SCENARIO

• INDIA IS IN THE PERIPHERAL VISION OF CHINA
• SINO-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP--THE POWER FOR ASIANS
  THEORY
• LIKELY ADMISSION IN G-8 AND THE WTO

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FUTURE

• DREAM OF GREATER CHINA
• GREAT MILITARY POWER
• BEFRIEND PAKISTAN
• CONFRONTATION WITH ASEAN

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The 17th century has been described as the age of
reason the 18th as of enlightenment 19th as of
progress and the 20th as one of anxiety and
extremes My hunch is that 21st century would be
a century of uncertainty

• KR NARAYANAN

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CONCLUSION
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