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Economics as a Complex System

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Title: Economics as a Complex System


1
Economics as a Complex System
  • Alessandro Cappellini
  • November 19th 2004
  • cappellini_at_econ.unito.it

2
  • In fact, Adam Smiths invisible hand (1776) is
    a classical example of unexpected features that
    complex systems exhibit whenever their
    participants reach a critical mass and
    self-organize, in this case into a centralized
    competitive market.
  • (Lewis L. Smith 2002)

3
Agenda
  • Economics as a Complex System (Network)
  • Complex System (Lewis L. Smith)
  • Karl Popper
  • Mainstream and Complex System approach
  • Product Function - Keynes
  • Firm as Complex System
  • Macro Meso Micro
  • Firms as Complex Systems 1/2
  • Firms as Complex Systems 2/2
  • Alfred Marshall
  • Remarks

4
Economics as a Complex System (Network)
  • Quantitative associations between monetary
    associations and variables.
  • Learning and experimentation forge new connection
    between network elements.
  • Joseph Schumpeter innovation and growth are to
    be paralleled to the extension of new credit.
  • If everything is fully connected to everything
    else (perfect knowledge) then there is no real
    distinction between elements and systems.
  • Complex system are not fully connect but
    partially, and have actual potential connection
    with other system.

5
Complex System (Lewis L. Smith)
  • Properties
  • A critical mass of varied participants with some
    characteristics in common (heterogeneous
    agents).
  • Access of this participants to some local
    information.
  • A set of rules for their interaction.
  • Exhibit surprising emergent properties.
  • Ability of self-organization depend on positive
    feedback.
  • Spend more time in dis-equilibrium than in
    equilibrium.
  • In economics and markets instability and
    disequilibrium are normal, stability and
    equilibrium are not.

6
Karl Popper
  • Warning on historicism (trying to predict the
    course of history in context that involve open
    system and evolutionary change).
  • Modern economists say that
  • Theory and history should be separated
  • But
  • Historical trends can be separated by theoretical
    propositions, concerning logical tendencies
    towards never existing long run equilibrium state.

7
Mainstream and Complex System approach
  • from individual (psycological system) to the
    whole economy (macroeconomic system).
  • from logical proposition to represent tendencies
    observed to underlying principles that govern
    behaviour of system.
  • Value of economics
  • Veblen (1898) to explain and to predict in
    historical contexts.
  • Marshall to address historical events over short
    period.

8
Product Function - Keynes
  • Production function is a trivial association of
    input and output.
  • Data and process are correlated but separated in
    quantitative and qualitative domains.
  • Data represent only a manifestations of
    historical process.
  • Keynes theory was general because it could
    encompass the historical experience of systems as
    reflected in quantitative data.
  • Aspects of process that investigate
    macro-instability.
  • There isnt supply/demand dichotomy at the
    aggregate level, but only a network of
    connections for expenditures and income for good
    and services.

9
Firm as Complex System
  • Firm is a governance structure (Williamson).
  • In the case of the firm, full information (full
    connectedness) allows economists to treat the
    firm as a single decision-making entity that can
    optimize in a way that permits a supply curve to
    be derived from its cost structure.
  • This kind of economics as about over-connected,
    simplistic systems that, by definition, are not
    representations of reality.
  • Network structure flow and asset values.
  • Connections that are definably economic are
    those that have a monetary value attached.

10
Macro Meso Micro
  • One of the limitations of Keyness analysis is
    that the macroeconomic level of inquiry is
    inappropriate to capture the complexity of
    processes in an economic system what we observe
    are the stock and flow of funds consequences of
    complex interactions. The elements and
    connections that make up the network structure of
    the economy and how this changes are, rendered
    invisible by aggregations of value flows and
    asset valuations. At the same time, a wholly
    microeconomic perspective that tries to build up
    from individual elements and connections is not
    very helpful either because so much behaviour at
    that level constitutes component connections
    between elements embedded in higher level network
    structures. Meso-level analysis, that
    identifies the generic rules that govern the
    behaviour of complex systems, is most appropriate
    approach. There are many examples of complex
    network structures in the economy that are
    governed by generic rules that are meso in
    character. The one that we wish to focus on here
    is the firm.

11
Firms as Complex Systems 1/2
  • Firms are complex adaptive systems with connected
    network structures that evolve over time not
    occur across the total space of connective
    possibilities but evolves sequentially from a
    pre-existing network base then unique connective
    structures emerge.
  • The profitability of a firm ultimately depends
    upon making the right internal and external
    network connections and knowing how to break
    connections that no longer perform a useful
    function without, at the same time, destroying
    connections that still deliver value.

12
Firms as Complex Systems 2/2
  • Thus, a supposedly suboptimal configuration of
    inputs and outputs may allow the firm to survive
    simply because the neglect of optimizing
    calculations and adjustments allows the firm to
    concentrate on, for example, learning by doing
    and experimentation in the product development
    and marketing activities that are crucial to
    generate revenue flows.
  • Not directly related to production but to other
    processes going on as time passes, the
    environment changes, requiring new products and
    processes, but much of the network structure of
    the firm is committed to earlier strategies.
    Thus, this relates to the emergence of external
    disconnections as time passes.

13
Alfred Marshall
  • All inputs can be varied in the long period, he
    recognized that the complex nature of the firm
    and its environment diminished the usefulness of
    constrained optimization theory.
  • Partial constrained optimization should be used
    implies that network connections are restricted
    and incomplete.

14
Remarks
  • It is possible to obtain simple representations
    of their growth and decline by theorizing about
    the flows of funds that parallel the processes
    that such systems enact.
  • The creation, growth and destruction of firms are
    emergent processes that can be understood
    analytically and empirically investigated. How we
    construct emergent models must be guided by
    multi-agent simulations that are subject to the
    operation of stylized rules that are calibrated
    on actual rules we observe in the real world.

15
  • Does our market converge to the rational
    expectations equilibrium of the academic theory
    or does it show some other behavior? What we
    found to our surprise was that two different
    regimes emerged. One, which we called the
    rational expectations regime, held sway when we
    started our agents off with sets of predictive
    hypotheses close to rational expectations.
    But there was a second regime, which we called
    the complex regime, and it prevailed in a much
    wider set of circumstances. We found that if we
    started our agents with hypotheses a little
    removed from rational expectations, or
    alternatively, if we allowed them to come up with
    hypotheses at a slightly faster rate then before,
    the behavior of the market changed. Subsets of
    mutually reinforcing predictions emerged .
  • (W. Brian Arthur, The End of Certainty in
    Economics Talk given at the Conference Einstein
    Meets Magritte, Free University of Brussels, July
    1994. )

16
Bibliography
  • Based on
  • John Foster Why is Economics not a Complex
    Systems Science? presented at International J.A.
    Schumpeter Society Conference University of
    Bocconi, Milan, 9-12 June 2004.
  • W. Brian Arthur, The End of Certainty in
    Economics, Talk given at the Conference Einstein
    Meets Magritte, Free University of Brussels, July
    1994. Appeared in Einstein Meets Magritte, D.
    Aerts, J. Broekaert, E. Mathijs, eds. 1999,
    Kluwer Academic Publishers, Holland. Reprinted in
    The Biology of Business, J.H. Clippinger, ed.,
    1999, Jossey-Bass Publishers.
  • John Foster From Simplistic to Complex Systems in
    Economics, presented at Economics for the Future
    Conference Cambridge (UK) 17-19th September 2003
  • Lewis L. Smith, Economies and markets as complex
    systems Looking at them this way may provide
    fresh insight, 2002
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