Announcements

1
Announcements

• For Tuesdays class read Heideggers Fundamental
  Question of Metaphysics and Sartres Bad Faith
• Papers are due next Thursday
• Exam Review Questions should be posted by this
  weekend bring them to next Thursdays tutorial

2
Searle, Minds, Brains and Programs The Chinese
Room
3
Some Background

• (1) Machine Functionalism
• (2) Turing Test for Intelligence

4
Machine Functionalism

• Predicated upon a functionalist theory of mind
• Whats that? Based upon the idea of functional
  explanations.
• What is a functional explanation?
• A functional explanation relies on the breaking
  down of a system into its various component parts
  and then seeks to explain the workings of the
  system in terms of the capacities of the parts
  and the way the parts are integrated with one
  another.

5
Functionalism

• A functional explanation is very similar, if not
  identical, to what is called an operational
  definitional in that instead of seeking the
  essence of something, a what it is, we define
  that something in terms of what it does,
  operationally, the roles and purposes it
  fulfills. That is what it primarily IS in a
  functional explanation i.e., a VP in a
  corporation it can be you, me, or anybody with
  the requisite training thus, what makes a VP in
  a corporation is not the .

6
Functionalism

• particular physical instantiation, in this case
  what particular person it happens to be, but
  rather the tasks, purposes and experience in the
  business setting. A VP is defined by his or her
  role in the company not body size, ethnicity,
  hair colour, etc.
• Functionalism in the philosophy of mind
• The defining feature of a mental state is the
  causal role it plays with respect to (1) inputs
  (i.e., environmental effects on the body

7
Functionalism in the philosophy of mind

• (2) other mental states and (3) outputs (i.e.,
  behaviour)
• Mental state defined by causal relations or as
  is the case in machine functionalism a
  programmable set of instructions, to sensory
  stimulations (inputs), behavioural outputs and
  other mental states.

8
Functionalism in the philosophy of mind

• A Metaphysical thesis metaphysical
  functionalism as a theory of mind. The
  complexities of the functional analysis of how
  mental states causally interact with each other
  given inputs leading to behavioural outputs is
  just WHAT MENTAL STATES ARE. In itself,
  functionalism doesnt care what physical
  realizations brains, silicon chips or whether
  there are any such instantiations disembodied
  spirits underlying such an analysis.

9
Functionalism in the philosophy of mind

• Mental terms are characterized by their
  functional role not physical composition think
  of the VP example.
• Machine Functionalism The Turing Machine
  Example of functionalism
• Turing machine specified by two functions
• (I) from inputs and states to outputs
• (II) from inputs and states to outputs

10
Turing Machine Outline

• Turing machine finite number of states, inputs
  and outputs and the two functions mentioned above
  specify a set of conditionals, one conditional
  for each combination of state and input.
• Conditionals if the machine is in state S1 and
  receives input I, it will then emit output O and
  go into the next state S2. These conditionals
  are often expressed in a machine table.

11
Turing Machine Outline

• Simple version each system that has mental
  states is described by a least one Turing machine
  table of a certain sort. Also, each type of
  mental state of a system is identical to one of
  the machine table states specified in the machine
  table
• An illustration sufficient for our purposes on
  board

12
Turing Test for intelligence

• The test of which Schanks project is derivative.
• Let me explain.
• Now to Searle
• The target Strong AI
• Whats that?
• An appropriately programmed computer with the
  right program successfully imitating our actions
  and response really is a mind, it really has
  intelligence it can understand and have mental
  states.

13
The Target

• The example Schanks work though the same
  argument can be extended to AI in general.
• Schank to program a computer to fill in the
  gaps as we do in listening to stories.
• This in-itself would be impressive like
  understanding a joke, a whole lot of background
  is implied and utilized.
• Strong AI thus claims machines upon such
  successful programming can understand such
  stories and this explains the human ability to do
  so

14
Searle and the Chinese Room Argument

• The argument
• What can be concluded from this argument
• 1. I have inputs/outputs indistinguishable from
  the most successful AI project and yet I do NOT
  understand a single word of Chinese or any such
  story.
• 2. Therefore, formal manipulation does not
  explain our grasp of language or stories. Though
  as Searle concedes this example doesnt rise
  to the level of proof that symbol manipulation is
  not

15
The Argument

• what is involved in our understanding, it does
  make the hypothesis extremely implausible.
• Well, I suppose that is an empirical
  possibility, that such programs are part of
  what we do in understanding but not the
  slightest reason has so far been given to believe
  that it is true, since what is suggested though
  certainly not demonstrated by the example is
  that the computer program is simply irrelevant to
  my understanding of the story. (390)

16
The Argument

• Whats missing meaning, representational
  content, intentionality and consciousness.
• The rest of the article consists of defending the
  central argument against various objections and
  then a diagnosis of how we ever came to believe
  that AI was possible.
• Objection understanding comes in degrees.
  Couldnt a computer nevertheless partially
  understand? For example, if we do logical
  derivations and a computer does such derivations,

17
The Argument

• then couldnt it be said that at least at that
  level of intelligence, we are doing the same
  thing? What is lacking?
• Searle No, No, and what is lacking can be
  referred to as original or intrinsic
  intentionality.

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Key Quote

• We often attribute understanding and other
  cognitive predicates by metaphor and analogy to
  cars, adding machines, and other artifacts, but
  nothing is proved by such attributions. We say,
  The door knows when to open because of its
  photoelectric cell. The adding machine knows
  how (understands how, is able) to do addition and
  subtraction but not division, and The
  thermostat perceives changes in the temperature.
  The reason w make these attributions is quite
  interesting, and

19
Key quote continued

• it has to do with the fact that in artifacts we
  extend our own intentionality our tools are
  extensions of our purposes, and so we find it
  natural to make metaphorical attributions of
  intentionality to them (390-1)
• We have original intentionality a machine at
  best has derivative intentionality i.e., a
  machine could be calculating payroll or with
  the same set of instructions calculating student
  grades it doesnt care or know.

20
The Debate

• Lets pause here How would you apply this
  argument and quote to Dennetts intentional
  stance? What is the debate? How do you think
  Dennett would respond?
• Can a machine think?
• Searle yes, we are such machines
• Can a digital computer think?
• Searle No. No amount of programming will lead
  to understanding. Why not?

21
Key quote

• Because the formal symbol manipulations by
  themselves dont have any intentionality they
  are quite meaningless they arent even symbol
  manipulations, since the symbols dont symbolize
  anything. In the linguistic jargon, they have
  only a syntax but no semantics. Such
  intentionality as computers appear to have is
  solely in the minds of those who program them and
  those who use them, those who send in the input
  and those who interpret the output. (391)

22
Key Quote

• Or to make the same point somewhat differently a
  symbol is just that, a symbol. It begins to
  symbolize something only after it has been
  interpreted. For example, I am driving in my car
  and see a sign symbolizing a school nearby. I
  know what to do slow down because there may be
  children playing. I have interpreted the sign in
  such a manner in order for it to function as a
  sign/symbol. The sign in-itself does not wear
  its interpretation on its sleeve, nor is it an .

23
Key Quote

• .interpretation. It has to be assigned an
  interpretation- Let x represent.. Yet if
  programs or functionalist theories of mind in
  general, are composed of nothing more than the
  manipulation of symbols or signs, then they do
  not work in accounting for how we are able to
  refer to things or to interpret they presuppose
  an interpretation and thus they do not account
  for such interpretation. And yet we, as
  conscious beings, are fundamentally interpreting
  beings.

24
Metaphor

• A biological brain is needed.
• A popular metaphor of how to think of the
  mind/body relation mind is to the brain as
  program is to hardware
• This metaphor breaks down at three points.
• 1. The hardware could be anything as long as
  it satisfies computational specifications. It
  could be stones, toilet paper, wind and water
  pipes. This wont due it is not the right
  stuff.

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Metaphor

• 2. Programs are purely formal mental states
  are not
• Indeed the belief as such hasnt even got a
  formal shape in this syntactic sense, since one
  and the same belief can be given an indefinite
  number of different syntactic expressions in
  different linguistic systems.(392)
• 3. We need a brain.

26
Diagnosis

• Computers provide simulations. We wouldnt
  mistake a computer simulation of a forest fire
  for the real thing, so why should we so mistake a
  simulation of mental processes for the real
  thing?
• So why did we ever believe in AI?
• (1) Unlike the forest fire simulation example we
  believe there is something called information
  processing that we do and a computer does as
  well interesting idea dont we simulate
  forest fires as well in our thoughts about them?

27
Diagnosis

• Searles response a return to his point
  concerning original intentionality.
• Thus if you type into the computer 2 plus 2
  equals? it will type out 4. But it has no
  idea that 4 means 4 or that it means anything
  at all.(392)
• (2) A residual behaviourism
• The Turing test is typical of the tradition in
  being unashamedly behavioristic and
  operationalistic, and I believe that if AI
  workers totally repudiated

28
Diagnosis

• Behaviorism and operationalism much of the
  confusion between simulation and duplication
  would be eliminated.(393)
• (3). (2) combines with a residual dualism.
  Recall the description of metaphysical
  functionalism given above. The reason we
  believe AI in terms of algorithms and computer
  programming to be possible is because we are so
  convinced that the mind is different from the
  brain therefore, what is special about mental
  processes could be captured

29
Diagnosis

• via programs and silicon chips think of Data
  on Star Trek.
• Unless you believe that the mind is separable
  from the brain both conceptually and empirically
  dualism in a strong form you cannot hope to
  reproduce the mental by writing and running
  programs since programs must be independent of
  brains or any other particular forms of
  instantiation. (393)

30
The Solution

• We need the brain.
• Whatever else intentionality is, it is a
  biological phenomenon, and it is as likely to be
  as causally dependent on the specific
  biochemistry of its origins as lactation,
  photosynthesis, or any other biological
  phenomena.(393)
• A Critique by way of illustration let us return
  to one of our key quotes.

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Key quote

• Because the formal symbol manipulations by
  themselves dont have any intentionality they
  are quite meaningless they arent even symbol
  manipulations, since the symbols dont symbolize
  anything. In the linguistic jargon, they have
  only a syntax but no semantics. Such
  intentionality as computers appear to have is
  solely in the minds of those who program them and
  those who use them, those who send in the input
  and those who interpret the output. (391)
  Critique

32
A Critique

• Searles main argument is that no matter how
  sophisticated the program is, it is still just
  symbol manipulation that doesnt rise to the
  level of intentionality, meaning or
  consciousness. To understand this we need brain
  science.
• But how is it any less mysterious and problematic
  that intentionality, meaning or consciousness can
  arise from neuron firings out of molecules and
  cells as opposed to a manipulation of 0s and 1s
  in a computer program? Isnt it just as
  mysterious?

33
A Critique

• Let us reread our primary quote on page 391, this
  time substituting neuron firing for formal
  manipulation system. Notice just how easily we
  can do this. So then, what is the principled
  difference? Can we not apply the same kind of
  Chinese Room argument to a set of brain
  processes causally described in terms of such
  neuron firings? It too doesnt get us to
  meaning, intentionality or consciousness. What
  has the move to the brain accomplished?

34
A Critique

• But you say we know its the brain nor a formal
  program. But we want to know how? If the exact
  same argument can be successfully applied to such
  neuron firings then it is mere prejudice to
  state that exactly the same conclusions shouldnt
  apply.
• But it takes the actual neuron firings
  themselves, not just its description to do the
  mental representative work? If Searle were to
  take this line then (a) one could equally well
  respond that it takes the actual algorithm itself
  in its running to

35
A Critique

• get AI and not merely a description i.e.,
  describing how to bake a cake is not the same as
  baking it, actually following the instructions.
  Searle would reject this (b) still doesnt tell
  us how we bridge the gap from a description of
  such neuron firings and brain processes to
  intentionality or consciousness. Can we not have
  neurological processes occurring without meaning
  or the same neurological process occur regardless
  of what is being represented or said of the
  world? What is ...

36
A Critique

• so special about these neuron firings when other
  such firings do not lead to consciousness? What
  is so special about this greyish matter that it
  gives rise to consciousness? More empirical
  research wont help us we are asking what is it
  about these bunches of cells that leads to
  consciousness more detailed and complicated
  description of such cells wont help us.
• If the response is it just happens, brute
  metaphysical fact.

37
A Critique

• Well then, with formal symbol manipulation with a
  program quite sophisticated and complicated
  enough to truly imitate us it just happens.
  Two can play at that game
• There exists a conceptual gap for how symbol
  manipulation leads to meaning. And Searle has
  exploited that gap quite nicely with his thought
  experiment. But, doesnt there exist a similar
  conceptual gap for how neuron firings leads to
  meaning or consciousness?

38
A Critique

• If we are allowed to ignore the conceptual gap
  with respect to brain processes by saying that it
  just happens, then why are we not allowed to
  ignore it in another respect a sophisticated
  program?
• Therefore, what exactly does the move to the
  brain accomplish?

39
Heidegger, On Dasein and Anxiety
40
On Dasein and Anxiety

• This is actually the introduction to Heideggers
  classic work Being and Time
• I dont know why Pojman decided to call it On
  Dasein and Anxiety given that in the
  introduction, Heidegger doesnt talk about
  anxiety
• This presentation will take the form of two
  parts (1) present what is here in the reading
  (2) on Tuesday of next week, I will present some
  of Heideggers existentialist themes FYI that
  do talk about anxiety in order to complete the
  presentation

41
The Fundamental Question

• In the question which we are to work out, what
  is asked about is Being that which determines
  entities as entities, that on the basis of which
  entities are already understood, however, we may
  discuss them in detail. The Being of entities
  is not itself an entity.(467-8)
• Every inquiry is a seekingInquiry, as a kind of
  seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is
  sought. So the meaning of Being must already be
  available to us in some way. As we have..

42
The Fundamental Question

• intimated, we always conduct our activities in
  an understanding of Being. Out of this
  understanding arise both the explicit question of
  the meaning of Being and the tendency that leads
  us towards its conception.(467)
• Two points here (I) a pre-ontological
  understanding of Being we all have it
• (II) How Heideggers project differs from
  traditional metaphysics the forgotten question
  of Being.

43
A Clue to understanding Being

• Being is always the Being of an entity. The
  totality of entities can, in accordance with its
  various domains become a field for laying bare
  and delimiting certain definite areas of subject
  matter. These areas, on their part (for
  instance, history, Nature, space, life, Dasein,
  language, and the like) can serve as objects
  which corresponding scientific investigations may
  take as their respective themesThe basic
  structures of any such area have already been
  worked out after a

44
A Clue to understanding Being

• fashion in our pre-scientific ways of
  experiencing and interpreting that domain of
  Being in which the area of subject matter is
  itself confined. (469)
• Being as that which is understood in the forming
  of the basic concepts that demarcates a field of
  study such basic concepts arises from our
  understanding of Being itself.

45
A Clue to understanding Being

• A psychologist, sociologist, biologist etc., has
  an understanding of what it is that they are
  studying and the methods appropriate for that
  field of study. This understanding which
  underlies the various methodologies and forms the
  criterion for that field of study, Heidegger
  claims arises from an understanding of being that
  has already been presupposed. We need to make
  that understanding explicit.

46
The ontic/ontological

• Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial,
  as over against the ontical inquiry of the
  positive sciences.(470)
• What is the ontic/ontological distinction?
• A good way of describing this distinction is
  through a chess playing example.
• Ontic the pieces themselves rook, knight,
  king, queen. They are the beings.
• Ontological the chess playing itself. Such
  playing, its rules and strategies, is itself ..

47
The ontic/ontological

• .not a chess piece. It is what gives the
  meaning and significance for all the pieces
  themselves. Thus Being is not a being. The ontic
  is not the ontological however, it is the
  ontological that gives meaning and access to
  whatever it is that we understand by the ontic.

48
Where and How do we begin?

• Answer with us?
• Dasein is an entity which does not just occur
  among other entities. Rather it is ontically
  distinguished by the fact that, in its very
  Being, that Being is an issue for
  itUnderstanding of Being is itself a definite
  characteristic of Daseins Being.
• We are the ones that asks the question we have
  a priority and privilege in that regard

49
So how does it stand with our Being

• Dasein always understands itself in terms of its
  existence in terms of a possibility of itself
  to be itself or not itself. Dasein has either
  chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself
  into them or grown up in them already. Only the
  particular Dasein decides its existence, whether
  it does so by taking hold or by neglecting.(471)
• Main point the model of self-knowledge that
  arises here.

50
Our Basic Defining Characteristic

• What is that? Our being-in-the-world
• But to Dasein, Being in a world is something
  that belongs essentially. Thus Daseins
  understanding of Being pertains with equal
  primordiality both to an understanding of
  something like a world, and to an understanding
  of the Being of those entities which become
  accessible within the world (471)
• Why is this important? (1) The metaphysics
  behind it. As Gadamer would say, the relation
  takes precedence over the relata

51
Our Basic Defining Characteristic

• We are being-in-the-world therefore,
  Descartes, Hume, Russells etc. starting point of
  a self-contained subject that needs to break
  out into the world is already a mistaken
  philosophical beginning and misunderstanding of
  who we are. Without others and a world there
  would be no subject
• Some illustrations here (i) historical work
  (ii) the reading of texts (iii) game playing
• What these illustrations are supposed to.

52
Our basic defining characteristic

• .accomplish is that we can make sense of the
  idea of a middle ground between subject and
  object. How the relation takes precedence over
  the relata.
• 2) As a response to the skeptic the
  relationship between metaphysics and
  epistemology.
• No ontological gap that needs to be traversed.
  If anything as being-in-the-world we are already
  that so-called ontological gap

53
The Ontological Analytic

• The kind of Being which belongs to Dasein is
  rather such that, in understanding its own Being,
  it has a tendency to do so in terms of that
  entity towards which it comports itself
  proximally and in a way which is essentially
  constant in terms of the world. In Dasein
  itself, and therefore in its own understanding of
  Being, the way the world is understood is, as we
  shall show, reflected back ontologically upon the
  way in which Dasein itself gets interpreted.
  (473)

54
The Ontological Analytic

• This relates to the question of self-knowledge we
  posed earlier. What are the entities closest to
  us that we have dealings with?
• Objects.
• Thus, it is in terms of these entities that we
  have the habit of interpreting ourselves
  reflected back ontologically upon the way in
  which Dasein itself gets interpreted.
• This is not to be our approach

55
The Ontological Analytic

• We have fundamentally a different mode of being
  than objects. It was a mistake, though naturally
  done, to interpret ourselves with the same
  categories and understanding as we do objects.
  How we relate to our own mortality and finitude
  which fundamentally defines the self we are
  involves different considerations than that
  employed in the study of objects. It is mere
  prejudice to sweep this under the rug or
  describe such considerations as merely
  psychological with ontological truth being the
  studies of objects.

56
The Ontological Analytic

• To put it negatively, we have no right to resort
  to dogmatic constructions and to apply just any
  idea of Being and actuality to this entity, no
  matter how self-evident that idea may be nor
  may any of the categories which such an idea
  prescribes be forced upon Dasein without proper
  ontological consideration (473)
  Question can you see how Ryle
  got his idea of a category mistake from his
  reading of Heidegger though Heidegger is not a
  behaviourist ?

57
The Ontological Analytic

• We must begin from the ground up. But how do we
  start?
• Heidegger states that we must start with our
  average everydayness.
• Not a la Descartes, with an epistemological
  agenda and criteria. We begin by analyzing how
  matters stand in everyday mundane activities.

58
Time the Key

• We shall point to temporality as the meaning of
  the Being of that entity which we call Dasein.
  If this is to be demonstrated, those structures
  of Dasein which we shall provisionally exhibit
  must be Interpreted over again as modes of
  temporality. (473)
• The Thesis every ontological/philosophical
  understanding that we possess comes with it a
  certain understanding of time which enables such
  an understanding.

59
Time the Key

• Time is the condition for the possibility of
  philosophical understanding, it is central.
• For example,
• An object understood in terms of constant
  presence. Time conceived of as a linear series
  of now points. The past as gone is thus not
  real while the future as not yet is similarly
  not real. What is real here is the now.
• The human being a different relation to time.

60
The task of Destroying the History of Ontology

• The importance of History?
• Three Key points here.
• (1) We are historical beings, radically,
  essentially, historical. The self is an entering
  into a historical transmission of ideas that
  needs to be considered and thematized in its own
  right. It needs to be critiqued and
  philosophically appropriated? We need to
  examine our cultural heritage of meanings that
  have in many ways formed us and ask ..

61
The Task of Destroying the History of Ontology

• .after its foundations. What is its basis?
  Do they attempt to hide a fundamental truth
  namely, cultural heritages may have no basis at
  all? What if such a proliferation of values and
  meanings that our cultural heritage gives us to
  justify and assure certain ways of living and
  also certain ways of surveillance and judgment of
  others is at root a fleeing in the face of the
  anxiety that it has no ultimate ontological
  foundation at all that the essence of grounds
  arises from the abyss?

62
The task of Destroying the History of Ontology

• How is this radical? Think of the philosophers
  you have studied. When Descartes secured his I
  think, therefore I am and built his house of
  knowledge upon such a basis, is what historically
  preceded him important?
• Did Hume need to think historically to piece
  together impressions?
• Main thesis here previous philosophy attempts
  to think ahistorically in securing truth. A
  mistake.

63
Importance of History

• (2) We study history not because we have some
  peculiar interest in the past but rather because
  of the possibilities buried in the past for our
  future.
• The future takes precedence the past comes to
  us from out of the future. It is in how we view
  our future that facts from the historical past
  becomes salient for us and are noticed.

64
The Importance of History

• (3) The philosophical questions we ask, what
  makes sense to us, are posed due to the
  historical tradition we inhabit and have
  inherited
• When tradition becomes master, it does so in
  such a way that what it transmits is made so
  inaccessible, proximally and for the most part,
  that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition
  takes what has come down to us and delivers it
  over to self-evidence it blocks our access to
  those primordial sources from which the
  categories

65
The Importance of History

• and concepts handed down to us have been in
  part quite genuinely drawn.(476)
• Notice here the negative critique of tradition
  the primary experiences becomes ossified into a
  tradition that has forgotten itself. They are
  simply received as self-evident truths and what
  has grounded them in terms of fundamental
  experience and insight, such self-evidence
  becomes lost.
• The same is true of our question concerning being.

66
The Importance of History

• Now, if we wish to pose our philosophical
  question concerning the meaning of Being we have
  to go back to where it all started
  philosophically for us ultimately to the
  ancient Greeks the beginnings of the Western
  philosophical and scientific tradition. Here is
  where we start our critique to regain what those
  fundamental experiences were that started us on
  the path to philosophizing.

67
The Importance of History

• We understand this task as one in which by
  taking the question of Being as our clue, we are
  to destroy the traditional content of ancient
  ontology until we arrive at those primordial
  experiences in which we achieved our first ways
  of determining the nature of Being the ways
  which have guided us ever since.In thus
  demonstrating the origin of our basic ontological
  concepts by an investigation in which their
  birth certificate is displayed.. (476)

68
The Importance of History

• We are to critique this tradition back to its
  primary experiences and consider whether such
  experiences of philosophical questioning has been
  corrupted i.e., in some of Heideggers writings
  it was those first fateful steps taken in Greek
  philosophy that led to our technological world
  and in general ultimately to Nihilism from
  Plato to Nietzsche encapsulates our Western
  Philosophical Tradition.

69
The Method Phenomenology

• Whats that?
• Phenomenology means to let that which shows
  itself be seen from itself in the very way in
  which it shows itself from itself.(477)
• The great battle cry of phenomenology in the
  early 20th century was a return to the things
  themselves. It was believed that philosophical
  thinking got lost in its abstractions and
  concept- ualizations, puzzles, so much so that it
  lost sight of our concrete lived experience of
  the world.

70
The Method Phenomenology

• It was time to recapture our concrete lived
  experience of phenomenon and let that be the
  guide to our philosophy and not false theoretical
  dichotomies. Our ontology should reflect
  concrete, lived, experience and not the
  abstractions and idealities that objectivistic
  thinking promotes. For many continental
  philosophers of that time this theme translates
  into a critique of the sciences they attempt,
  according to their methodology and idealizations
  to.

71
The Method Phenomenology

• to present the world as an omniscient god would
  perceive it rather than how we experience it.
  This attempt as Merleau-Ponty called it in the
  late 40s, the view from nowhere was
  considered to be itself a false philosophical
  ideal and abstraction. Thus, the preliminary
  conception of phenomenology was to let that which
  shows itself be seen from itself.

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The Method Phenomenology

• To make explicit what is hidden
• What is it that by its very essence is
  necessarily the theme whenever we exhibit
  something explicitly? Manifestly, it is
  something that proximally and for the most part
  does not show itself but at the same time it is
  something that belongs to what thus shows itself,
  and it belongs to it so essentially as to
  constitute its meaning and its ground. (478)

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The Method Phenomenology

• This corresponds to our basic theme being is
  what is closest to us, right under our noses, but
  for that reason it is what is farthest. We need
  to unearth what we mean here.
• An interesting manner in which phenomenon gets
  covered up the assertion.

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The Method Phenomenology

• Whenever a phenomenological concept is drawn
  from primordial sources, there is a possibility
  that it may degenerate if communicated in the
  form of an assertion. It gets understood in an
  empty way and is thus passed on, losing its
  indigenous character, and becoming a free
  floating thesis. (478)
• We can make some interesting linkages between
  this characteristic of the assertion and what has
  been said regarding tradition earlier.

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The Method Phenomenology

• But here two senses
• (1) What we would call the talking head
  syndrome. Our primary experience gets embodied
  in an assertion. However, assertions have the
  characteristic that as communication flows it can
  get severed from such primary experiences and
  become an object in its own right.

76
The Method Phenomenology

• Have you ever had the experience in talking to
  someone, say of a somewhat technical matter,
  where they are using all the concepts and
  theoretical terms correctly, in that they know
  what follows from what in the use of such
  concepts, but you cant help thinking that they
  do not have a clue what they are talking about?
  Happens all the time in philosophy.
• (2) The assertion is hypostatized as a thing
  itself either as a proposition and/or belief
  state.

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The method Phenomenology

• Phenomenology is this task of making explicit
  according to the things themselves
• And this leads to the fundamental theme of
  philosophical investigation
• Being is the transcendens pure and simple (479)
• Why is this important?
• A de-centering of the subject. The
  transcendental origins of all of our
  understandings are not categories of the
  understanding or a philosophy of mind but
  rather an understanding of Being.

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