Towards Proactive ComputerSystem Forensics - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 16
About This Presentation
Title:

Towards Proactive ComputerSystem Forensics

Description:

(1) Use the Neyman-Pearson Lemma. Get best-critical regions for hypothesis testing ... Neyman-Person Lemma. Conditions to determine optimal critical regions ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:83
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 17
Provided by: pgb8
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Towards Proactive ComputerSystem Forensics


1
Towards Proactive Computer-System Forensics
  • Phillip G. Bradford
  • Marcus Brown
  • Josh Perdue
  • Bonnie Self
  • The University of Alabama

2
Outline
  • Motivation
  • Classical Forensics
  • Digital Forensics
  • Different from Classical Forensics
  • Leverage Computer Science
  • This papers focus
  • Sequential Statistics
  • System Design
  • Conclusions

3
Motivation
  • Computer Assisted Crimes
  • Computer Enabled crimes
  • Focus computer enabled crimes
  • Employees or stakeholders of a firm
  • Most likely to commit computer crimes against the
    firm
  • Which employees should be the focus?
  • Must be careful of resource use!
  • A few Cycles to ensure security before donating
    them!

4
Classical Digital Forensics
  • Classical Forensics is reactive
  • Digital Forensics has opportunity to be proactive
  • Digital forensics (so far)
  • A lot of focus on file recovery from disks
  • Generally reactive
  • Computer Security
  • Focus on preventative measures

5
Proactive Computer-System Forensics
  • System structuring and augmentation for
  • Automated data discovery
  • Lead formation
  • Efficient data preservation
  • Make these issues proactive
  • Challenges
  • System resources
  • Exposure

6
Proactive Forensics
  • Our proposal
  • Sequential Hypothesis testing
  • (1) Use the Neyman-Pearson Lemma
  • Get best-critical regions for hypothesis testing
  • Assuming empirical data
  • (2) Use classical Stopping rules
  • Aggregate cost is the same as fixed sample
    hypothesis testing
  • Incremental cost is negligible

7
Proactive Forensics Principles
  • Small-security-breach Principle
  • A single breach of a system can be catastrophic.
  • Viruses as small as 1K bytes
  • Small-user-world Principle
  • Most users only use a very few systems or
    programs.
  • Incremental violation Principle
  • Learning curve for breaking (internal) security

8
Implementing Proactive Forensics
  • Fixed Hypothesis Testing

9
Implementing Proactive Forensics
  • How often do we run fixed hypothesis testing?
  • How much data do we save?
  • How costly?
  • How can we adjust it with the changing demands of
    our employees?

10
Sequential Hypothesis Testing
  • Let f(Xi, T1) or f(Xi, T2) be the ith data points
    for samples from T1 and T2.
  • Likelihood ratio
  • Rn S log ( f(Xi, T1) / f(Xi, T2) )
  • For i?1 to n
  • Stopping Rule
  • Used to focus more resources

11
Sequential Hypothesis Testing
  • Given a and b
  • H0 holds with error probability a
  • H1 holds with error probability b
  • Let A ? (1- b)/a and B ? b/(1- a)
  • Stopping Rule
  • Stop if Log(B) gt Rn or Rn gt Log(A)
  • If Rn lt Log(B), then H0 with conf. a
  • If Rn gt Log(A), then H1 with conf. b

12
Stopping Rule
  • A. Wald showed the stopping rule will eventually
    terminate with probability 1.
  • Convergence issues
  • Also
  • Wald and Wolfowitz
  • This is the best ratio test possible
  • Expected number of steps to get conclusion is at
    least as good as any other test

13
Back to Forensics
  • Neyman-Person Lemma
  • Conditions to determine optimal critical regions
  • Best regions for determining which category the
    data falls into
  • Why is optimality important?
  • Forensics!!

14
Implementation Issues
  • Starting work with FUPIDS
  • Fuzzy User Profile Intrusion Detection
  • By S. Wendzel
  • Gathers data and compares to static tables of
    expectations
  • Modified the kernel on openBSD
  • Small mods, but potentially costly in timing
  • Stays stealthy

15
Implementation Issues
  • How we are different
  • Data is not static
  • Online rebalancing
  • We use sequential statistics
  • Focus more resources on target users
  • Not just for intrusion detection
  • Still potentially costly!

16
Conclusions
  • Proactive Forensics
  • New area
  • Different from intrusion detection, security,
    classical digital forensics
  • May be unique to computers networks
  • Lots of possibilities
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com