Feeding 10 million people where there are no telephones Peter Casier Chief FITTEST, WFP

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Feeding 10 million peoplewhere there are no
telephones Peter Casier (Chief FITTEST,
WFP)
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UN World Food Programme

• Food aid organisation of the UN
• 2,600 staff - mostly locally recruited
• In 2001, delivered 4.2 million tons of food to
  77 million people in 82 countries
• Total operational expenditure US1.74 billionof
  which 7.5 administrative overhead
• In Afghanistan 10 million beneficiaries during
  winter 01-02. Max delivery 120,000 tons/month

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FITTESTFast Telecoms/IT Emergency Support Team

• WFPs global technical intervention/support team
• covering IT, telecoms and power utility systems
• 20 international staff, backstopped by commercial
  companies
• rapid deployment ICT equipment in stock for 30
  offices, valued at 3,000,000
• Yearly turnover of 5,000,000 in stocks and
  services
• operating using full cost recovery
• in 2001 95 missions in 45 countries
• part of the Dubai service office which also
  provides
• regional procurement
• contingency services (airops, warehousing,
  evacuations,..)

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Where there are no telephones...
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Re-entry into Afghanistan

• WFPs ICT team had a double mandate
• Support to WFPs operation
• Coordination of interagency security
  communications

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Re-entry internal WFP ICT work

• First wave (Nov-Dec 2001)
• Ensure good local security and operational comms
  (VHF)
• Ensure basic inter-site security comms (HF)
• Re-install basic networks and IT infrastructure
• Re-install data telecommunications (HF)
• Deploy portable satellite comms (Thuraya and
  MiniM)
• Second wave (Jan-June 2002)
• Extension of all existing networks to ensure
  MISTS compliance
• Installation of additional sites
• Migrate data comms to satellite (WebSat)
• Upgrade electricity systems
• Third and final wave (June 2002 to Sept 2002)
• Installation of VSAT/microwave voice and data
  network

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Re-entry interagency coordination

• Reinstall/extend common security comms
• Re-design the HF and VHF systems
  (frequencies/callsigns)
• Re-install common security comms serving all
  agencies
• Install WFP/Ericsson GSM network in Kabul
• Hand-over to an interagency team with dedicated
  funding

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WFP ICT lessons learned

• ICT is a core function and a core service.
• But is not recognized as such by many agencies
• ICT is a critical security tool
• But is not recognized as such by many agencies
• The difference between the UN ICT haves and
  have-nots increases dramatically
• Many agencies in the field are still in the ICT
  dark ages
• The users demand more and faster
• This increases the cost and complexity of
  networks

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Lessons learned increased demands

• The right to access information
• The right to communicate
• The right to personal security
• needs large, fast deployable complex ICT
  infrastructures
• needs well trained technical support staff
• And most agencies are not up to par with the
  demands from the field

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Increased ICT demands
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Increased staffing
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Some thoughts relevant to this forum

• The communications layer is the very first
  requirement for ICT standardization
• Within the humanitarian community, there are some
  basic standards for the radio-layer
• But there is quasi non for IT (systems nor comms)
• And certainly none for applications
• ICT is not only a means, but also a goal in
  itself
• Give people the means to communicate and they
  will communicate
• The real requirement for inter-operatibility is
  at a (deep-) field level.
• Humanitarians are competing on the same market

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