Glenberg on Embodiment and Memory

1
Glenberg on Embodiment and Memory

• memory is embodied to facilitate interaction
  with the environment
• the meaningful, action-oriented component of
  conceptualization is not abstract and amodal. It
  reflects how bodies of our sort can interact with
  objects (p. 3)
• the world is perceived in terms of its potential
  for interaction with the individuals body (p. 4)

2
Some Results Related to Embodiment

• --Typists prefer pairs of letters typed with
  opposing fingers over pairs typed with the same
  finger. Non-typists show no such preference.
• --Physical rotation improves ability to locate
  unseen objects.
• --Hand shapes prime sensibility judgments for
  phrases about actions requiring the use of those
  hand shapes (pinching and dart-sentences).

3
The framework

• --projectable properties objective properties of
  the environment, such as shapes of objects
• --nonprojectable properties properties that
  cannot be directly picked up from the environment
  (ownership)
• --conceptualization possible ways of acting in a
  given situation, as a function of the relevant
  projectable and nonprojectable properties

4

• --mesh the degree to which actions represented
  by ideas can be simultaneously or sequentially
  executed
• --clamping attending to the projectable
  properties of the current environment
• --suppression ignoring projectable properties
• --trajectories series of past actions that
  become natural or preferred

5
Some applications of the theoretical framework

• In planning, predicting, or anticipating, we
  suppress the clamped features and follow a
  natural trajectory.
• The effort of suppressing the projectable
  features explains the phenomenology of memory,
  i.e., the way in which memory feels different
  from perception.
• The degree to which we understand a sentence is
  determined by the meshing of ideas associated
  with the component words.

6
Questions and concerns

• What is the scope of the thesis? Does it apply
  to all forms of meaning, perception, and memory?
• Does the thesis account for standard inferences
  that are drawn from our understanding of text?
  Take a theoretical claim from Glenbergs own
  article. Can you reduce its meaning to a claim
  about ways of interacting with the world?
• Will the reduction work? Behaviorism and
  phenomenalism did not do very well. How will
  this work abstract ideas, such as reference or
  justice?