Free Will

1
Free Will

• PHIL30088
• Markus Schlosser
• University of Bristol
• markus.schlosser_at_bristol.ac.uk

2
Lecture 1

• Introduction of core concepts
• Determinism
• Moral Responsibility
• Free Will
• (Questions and problems)
• (Overview of the main positions)

3
Determinism

• Determinism usually means nomological
  determinism (Greek nomos, law)
• The main idea
• The past, in conjunction with the laws of nature,
  determines a unique future
• A first characterization
• At any point in time, given the actual laws of
  nature and given the actual past, there is only
  one possible future

4
Determinism Cont.

• Two illustrations
• If determinism is true, the future is not open in
  the sense that there are no forking paths
• Rewind and replay
• For present purposes, indeterminism is the
  negation of determinism
• Indeterminism is true if and only if determinism
  is false
• Determinism is a controversial thesis. Some
  scientific theories seem to support it, others
  seem to contradict it. There is no proof of its
  truth or falsity.

5
Moral Responsibility

• Moral vs. causal responsibilitySuppose you
  cause an accident. You are, in this sense,
  responsible for bringing it about. But it does
  not follow that you are morally responsible.
• Moral responsibility vs. responsibilitiesCertain
  roles and functions entail certain
  responsibilities (e.g. the duties of judges,
  doctors, parents etc.)
• Moral responsibility vs. intentional action
  (agency)It is plausible to think that we
  perform many actions of which it is true to say
  that we did it without being morally
  responsible for them.

6
Moral Responsibility Cont.

• Common characterization in terms of reactive
  attitudes (e.g. expressions of praise and blame,
  feelings of admiration and resentment etc.)
• Main idea being morally responsible is being an
  appropriate candidate or worthy target of the
  reactive attitudes (desert)
• One is a morally responsible agent just in case
  one is an appropriate candidate for some of the
  reactive attitudes on the basis of some of ones
  actions, omissions or character traits
• One is a morally responsible for a particular
  action (omission or trait) just in case one is
  an appropriate candidate for some of the reactive
  attitudes on the basis of that action (omission
  or character trait)

7
Free Will

• Van Inwagen lets use the term free will out
  of respect for tradition
• Free will is a misnomer there is no such thing
  as the will
• Outdated philosophical psychology partition
  doctrines of the soul (e.g. Plato) and doctrines
  of human faculties (e.g. Kant)
• Reason
• Appetite (desire)
• The will

8
Free Will Cont.

• According to commonsense, it is sometimes
  claimed, to believe in free will is to believe
  that things are not pre-determined
• It is questionable that the commonsense concept
  of free will is that thin
• The philosophy of free will is to a large extent
  about the question whether or not free will is
  compatible with determinism
• We cannot simple settle this dispute by defining
  free will as incompatible with determinism

9
Free Will Cont.

• Preliminary thoughts
• When we speak of free will we speak of freedom
  of action and freedom of choice
• Hence, free will entails certain abilities or
  powers the ability or power to chose and act
• Free will is attributed of agents it can be
  possessed and exercised only by agents
• What kinds of agents? Most philosophers think
  that only rational agents can have free will
• Hence, free will entails the ability or power to
  choose and act in the light of reasons

10
Free Will Cont.

• A first proposal
• To have free will is to have the ability or power
  to chose and act freely (in the light of reasons)
• What is this freedom?
• Two influential ideas
• Absence from constraint and interference
• Could have done otherwise
• The proposal An agent S performed an action with
  free will just in case
• S was not constrained (coerced, manipulated etc.)
• S could have done otherwise

11
Free Will Cont.

• Remark 1. Can and could have is ambiguous.
  Consider actions that involve some degree of
  luck. I could have made it or I could have
  missed it I could have done otherwise in the
  sense that things could have turned out
  otherwise.
• Clarifications
• We mean that the agent could have done
  otherwise in the sense that the agent was able
  to do otherwise
• What we mean is that it must have been up to the
  agent to do otherwise it must be within the
  agents power to do otherwise. This, it seems, is
  just to say that the agent must have had the
  ability to do otherwise.

12
Free Will Cont.

• Remark 2. One might think that the first
  condition (absence from constraint) is
  superfluous, because one is able to do otherwise
  only if ones actions are not constrained,
  coerced, manipulated etc.
• But, firstly, free will concerns free action and
  free choice. In chains and looked in a room, you
  are able to do otherwise in the sense that you
  can chose to try to break free.
• Secondly, cases of manipulation, brainwashing,
  and the like, raise difficulties. Someone who was
  brainwashed - thoroughly and effectively - may be
  able to do otherwise. But it is plausible to
  think that he or she lacks free will.

13
Free Will Cont.

• Remark 3. Note that freedom and free will can
  be attributed to agents, actions and choices. In
  particular, one can have free will as an agent
  and act without free will on some (maybe even
  many or most) occasions.
• Remark 4. Note that we can distinguish between
  having free will and acting with free will
  (having the ability to act with free will and
  exercising this ability)

14
Free Will Cont.

• Remark 5. Some philosophers hold that free will
  requires more than absence from constraint and
  the ability to do otherwise.
• To act with free will is to act such that one is
  ultimately responsible for it.
• One is ultimately responsible for an action only
  if one is the ultimate source or origin of
  this action.
• One is the ultimate source or origin of an action
  only if the cause, reason or ground of the
  actions performance lies within oneself (the
  performance of the action cannot be explained by
  referring to things external to the self)
• This condition is rather controversial. It seems
  to rule out some positions on free will by
  definition.

15
Free Will Alternative Approaches

• The offered characterization is conceptual and
  theoretical analysis of the concept and
  commonsense theory of free will
• A first alternative appeals to phenomenology
  Whats it like to make a free choice from the
  agents points view?
• Salient first-personal features of free rational
  choice
• You considered alternatives
• You considered reasons for and against your
  options
• It seemed to you that the alternatives were open
  to you
• It seemed to you that it was up to you to decide
  which alternative to pursue on the basis of the
  reason that you considered

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Free Will Alternative Approaches Cont.

• Assume that we have free will only if these
  first-personal appearances are real (otherwise,
  free will would be merely subjective)
• Extract a characterization of free will
• An agent chooses and performs and action with
  free will just in case
• The considered alternatives are in fact open
• The agents mental states and events (desires,
  beliefs etc.) do not determine the choice and
  action
• The agent chooses an alternative on the basis of
  his or her own desires, preferences, beliefs,
  intentions etc.

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Free Will Alternative Approaches Cont.

• Remark 1. It is not obvious that there is a sharp
  distinction between conceptual analysis and
  phenomenological reflection
• Remark 2. The characterization may be too narrow
  it is not obvious that all free choices are based
  on evaluation of alternatives
• Remark 3. It is problematic to base metaphysical
  claims about the causes of actions on
  phenomenology. Maybe our desires and beliefs do
  determined our choices, and maybe this is
  realized by wholly deterministic processes in the
  brain. (Schopenhauer We must not confuse the
  lack of awareness of causation with the awareness
  of absence of causation)
• Remark 4. This proposal is problematic insofar as
  it appears to rule out some positions on free
  will by definition

18
Free Will Alternative Approaches Cont.

• Another alternative is to pass the buck to
  moral responsibility
• There is considerable disagreement about the
  nature of free will. But there is less
  disagreement about what its good for (its role
  or function) free will grounds moral
  responsibility.
• Define free will as that kind of freedom and
  control in virtue of which we are morally
  responsible
• An action is performed with free will just in
  case it is performed with that kind of freedom
  and control that is required for moral
  responsibility
• Call this the function role approach free will
  is whatever plays the role of grounding moral
  responsibility

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Free Will Alternative Approaches Cont.

• Remark 1. The exact nature of moral
  responsibility is controversial, and the exact
  nature of the relationship between free will and
  moral responsibility is controversial as well.
  Hence, the functional role approach does not seem
  to provide a less controversial route to free
  will.
• Remark 2. Our beliefs and intuitions about free
  will are by no means exhausted by beliefs
  concerning its relation to moral responsibility.
  We can describe free will independently of moral
  responsibility as a kind of agency or control.
• Given that our beliefs on the relationship with
  moral responsibility are no more robust (no less
  controversial), there is no reason to dismiss or
  ignore our beliefs concerning the nature of free
  will.