Title: Interest Groups Lecture Or, Rather: Collective Action and Interest Groups Lecture
1Interest Groups Lecture(Or, Rather Collective
Action and Interest Groups Lecture)
- Prof David Rueda
- Department of Politics and International
Relations - and
- Merton College
2Introduction
- The main theme
- The Logic of Collective Action as the main
theoretical framework which we will apply to
interest groups, corporatism and policy networks. - Lecture available on my website
- Go to my website (http//users.ox.ac.uk/polf0050/
) and then teaching, Oxford, etc. - Or go to Politics Department website, staff, etc.
- There are some additional references at the end
of the lecture notes. - Feel free to interrupt and ask.
3Summary
- Collective Action
- Collective Action The Free Rider Problem.
- Collective Action Problems of the Free Rider
Problem. - Interest Groups
- Collective Action, Interest Groups and Pluralism.
- Problems of Interest Groups.
- Corporatism
- Collective Action and Corporatism.
- Corporatism in Practice Small States in World
Markets. - Problems of Corporatism.
- Policy Networks.
- Collective Action and Policy Networks.
- Problems of Policy Networks.
- References.
4Interest Groups and Collective Action Why Do
They Matter?
- Interest Groups have been studies extensively in
political science - Some have argued that they are essential for
democracy. - Some have argues that interest groups are not
good for democracy. - How do we figure out who is right?
- We will use a theoretical approach to collective
action to make sense of interest groups and their
effects.
5Collective Action The Free Rider Problem (1).
- Olsons The Logic of Collective Action and Rise
and Decline of Nations. - Collective action and collective goods.
- Collective action the action needed from the
group to obtain the collective good. - Collective good a good that, if provided to one
member of the group, cannot be withheld from any
other member of the group. - Pre-Olson conception
- If an outcome benefits everyone in a group then
- The free-rider problem
- Collective good and rational behavior.
- If the collective good cannot be withheld from
any member of the group, rational individuals
have a motivation to free ride on the actions of
others. - Example Group (classroom), Collective action
(demonstration), Collective good (lower fees for
all). - Outcome?
6Collective Action The Free Rider Problem (2).
- The problem before Olson why doesnt collective
action happen more often? - The problem after Olson why does collective
action happen at all? - Are there factors that make collective action
more likely? - Selective incentives (negative and positive).
- Example of positive selective incentive
National Retired Teachers Association (NRTA) and
the American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP) in the US. - Membership rose from 750,000 in 1965 to 13
million in 1979. - The secret of this phenomenal growth, however,
was not the attractiveness of the policies being
advocated by the group rather it was the special
medical insurance policies available to older
persons through membership, the tours and
vacations conducted by the groups with the
special needs of the elderly in mind (Walker,
1983 396).
7Collective Action The Free Rider Problem (3).
- Social selective incentive like-mindedness,
homogeneity (group heterogeneity would therefore
exacerbate the free-rider problem), etc. - Without selective incentives, group size
compounds the free-rider problem less
membersgreater individual pay-off, less
memberseasier supervision.
8Collective Action The Problems of the Free
Rider Problem.
- Weaknesses in Olsons argument?
- Selective incentives cannot solve the free rider
problem. Why? - Selective incentives are themselves a collective
action problem. - Accepting the diversity of selective incentives.
- They can be material (mostly in Olson).
- But also solidary (emerging from social
interaction praise, respect, friendship, shame,
etc). - Or purposive (emerging from internalized norms
self-esteem, doing the right thing, etc). - Are these problems for Olson?
- Other problems?
- See Oliver (1993) and McLean (2000).
9Collective Action, Interest Groups and Pluralism
(1).
- What is an interest group
- A group of organized individuals seeking to
influence public policy, usually though not
exclusively by attempting to influence government
actors. - These groups vary considerably in every
imaginable way - in age, size, sophistication,
resources, tactics, policy focus, geographic
focus, and ideological orientation. - Some groups focus on only a single issue, while
others focus on broader areas of public policy. - Some groups are born and disappear over the
period of a single election, while others have a
long tradition of influencing elections and
public policy choices. - Some choose to focus not only on government, but
on persuading the public or other non-
governmental organizations to support their
objectives. - Examples?
10Collective Action, Interest Groups and Pluralism
(2).
- Pluralism
- Competing interests balance each other by
bringing resources and arguments to bear on
different sides of important public policy
decisions. - Groups compete on a more or less level playing
field created by national constitutions as well
as by laws. As a result, multiple competing
interests are believed to create a stable
political environment that allows those interests
to be represented before the government. - The Logic of Pluralism
- Individuals form groups and these groups are the
principal actors in "democratic" politics. - Groups will accurately represent the beliefs and
preferences of group members. - All interests form groups and are politically
active. - All interest groups compete for influence on
governments. - All interest groups provide information (at a
level where they are more efficient than
governments). - The government promotes equal access to the
decision-making process, and reflects the
equilibrium reached by the groups.
11Collective Action, Interest Groups and Pluralism
(3).
- Before Olson
- Political scientists had assumed that the
interplay of pressure groups was the essence of
democracy. Some got their way, others did not.
Well, that showed that the first had more members
than the second, or members who cared more
deeply, or both. So it was right and proper that
they should get their way. This classical
pluralism both described and celebrated lobbying
in a democracy. (McLean 2000 653)
12Problems of Interest Groups (1).
- In practice interest groups do not enjoy uniform
capabilities or effectiveness, despite having
equal rights to attempt to influence government. - E. E. Schattsneider the problem with the
interest group chorus was that it sang with an
upper-class accent. - More importantly
- For Olson, not all groups accomplish collective
action. - Some lobbies (such as the poor or consumers) are
dispersed. Others (such as producers) are
concentrated (McLean 2000 654). - What groups would be less likely to organize?
13Problems of Interest Groups (2).
- For Olson, will the result of interest group
actions be optimal/good for a democracy? - There is no basis for expecting countervailing
powers to develop, indeed quite the contrary
successful groups will strengthen over time,
while under-mobilised groups will remain latent
(Dunleavy, 1991 36). - For Olson, do interest groups provide
information? - Interest groups are not likely to provide
reliable information and governments use the
information that its most useful to them. This
discretionary ability explains why many Western
European social democratic governments accord
primary influence to trade unions, while
right-wing governments exclude the unions from
influence and defer instead to business
organisations (Dunleavy, 1991 36).
14Collective Action and Corporatism (1).
- What is corporatism?
- A particular interest group structure,
characterized by monopolistic, centralized
associations, and a particular policy-making
process, also known as 'concertation' or 'social
partnership'. - What groups? Unions, employers, the state.
- Groups are encompassing.
- Tripartism.
- Why Corporatism?
- Very important interest groups. The organization
of labor and employers and its relationship to
the state influences politics, policy, economic
outcomes, etc.
15Collective Action and Corporatism (2).
- How can bargaining among organized groups result
in efficient out comes? - Implication of Olsons argument large groups
should not obtain collective goods (low
inflation, low unemployment, etc). - Example Unions as the actors, low inflation as
the collective good and high wage demands as free
riding. - Is Corporatism a Solution?
- The incentives facing an encompassing special
interest organization are dramatically different
from those facing an organization that represents
only a narrow segment of society (Logic of
Collective Action 48). - The members of an encompassing organization own
so much of the society, that they will be ready
to make sacrifices for a collective good.
Distributive outcomes that benefit the group but
harm the whole society will be less likely to be
promoted. Example enterprise unions vs.
industry unions.
16Corporatism in Practice Small States in World
Markets (1).
- How does corporatism come about?
- Katzensteins Small States in World Markets.
- The small corporatist states Sweden, Norway,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and
Switzerland. - Corporatist states not big enough and too
dependent on trade to be statist (Japan), and too
dependent on trade to be immune to international
crisis (like the US). - The solution adaptation to change by promoting
compensation for losers. - Democratic corporatism an ideology of
partnership, centralized and concentrated
interest groups, voluntary and informal
coordination through tripartite exchanges.
17Corporatism in Practice Small States in World
Markets (2).
- The consequences of corporatism
- Cameron in Goldthorpes Order and Conflict in
Contemporary Capitalism. - The Corporatist/Social Democratic give and
take - Unions give low earnings, few strikes.
Result low unemployment, low inflation. - Unions take favorable collective bargaining
legislation, higher social wage, and more
comprehensive welfare state. And low
unemployment. - Calmfors and Driffill corporatism and economic
efficiency.
18Problems of Corporatism
- Decline of corporatism?
- Union decline.
- Welfare state retrenchment.
- Globalization.
- Etc.
19Collective Action and Policy Networks (1)
- Starting in the late 1960s and 70s, network
perspectives have grown increasingly popular in
the field of politics and political science. - The network approach presents an alternative to
both the pluralist and the corporatist model. The
policy network is a meso-level concept of
interest group intermediation which can be
adopted by authors operating with different
models of power distribution in liberal
democracies (Rhodes and Marsh 1992 4) - Defining Networks
- Networks involve the institutionalization of
beliefs, values, cultures and particular forms of
behaviour. They are organizations which shape
attitudes and behaviour. Networks result from
repeated behaviour and consequently, the relieve
decision makers of taking difficult decisions
they help routinize behaviour. They simplify the
policy process by limiting actions, problems and
solutions. Networks define roles and responses
(Marsh and Smith 2000 6).
20Collective Action and Policy Networks (2)
- Governance nowadays involves the close
cooperation of a large number of semi-autonomous
actors who operate in networked structures,
because of a need to exchange resources and
negotiate goals (Rhodes 1996). - Networks can be analyzed formally
- Indicators such as intensity of communication,
reputation or resources may be used to map
networks (Thatcher 1998). - Networks as a form of interest group/collective
action analysis.
21Collective Action and Policy Networks (3)
- An Illustration
- Baumgartner and Jones 1991 The interaction of
beliefs and values concerning a particular policy
explain both periods of extreme stability and
short bursts of policy change. They examine
civilian nuclear power policy in the US. - A British example
- Roads Policy by Dudley and Richardson (1998).
22The Problems of Policy Networks
- In most of the work featuring policy communities
and issue networks, networks have a descriptive
function and do not aspire to account for changes
in policy (Thatcher 1998). - Current definitions are often weak and
contradictory too broad to distinguish policy
networks from other types of cooperation, or too
precise to allow for variations across cases. - Is everything a network? What would not be a
network? (Dowding 1995). - Do they resolve Olsons problem?
23References (1)
- Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones,
Agenda Dynamics and Policy Sub-Systems, Journal
of Politics 53, no. 4 (November 1991), 1044-1074. - Cameron, David. 1984. Social Democracy,
Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the
Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced
Capitalist Society, in John Goldthorpe, Order
and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (New
York Oxford University Press). - Dowding, Keith, Model or Metaphor? A Critical
Review of the Policy Network Approach, Political
Studies 43, no. 1 (March 1995), 136-158. - Dudley, Geoffrey, and Jeremy Richardson, Arenas
without Rules and the Policy Change Process
Outsider Groups and British Roads Policy,
Political Studies 46, no. 4 (September 1998),
727-747. - Dunleavy, Patrick. 1991. Democracy, Bureaucracy
and Public Choice (Hemel Hempstead Harvester
Wheatsheaf). - Katzenstein, Peter. 1985. Small States in World
Markets (Ithaca Cornell University Press).
24References (2)
- Marsh, David, and Smith, Martin, Understanding
Policy Networks towards a Dialectical Approach,
Political Studies, Vol. 48, Issue 1 (2000). - McLean, Iain, Review Article The Divided Legacy
of Mancur Olson, British Journal of Political
Science 30, no. 4 (October 2000), 651-668. - Oliver, Pamela. 1993. Formal Models of
Collective Action, Annual Review of Sociology
19 271-300. - Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective
Action (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University
Press). - Olson, Mancur. 1982. The Rise and Decline of
Nations (New Haven Yale University Press). - Rhodes, R. A. W., The New Governance Governing
without government, Political Studies (1996) - Rhodes, R. A. W., and David Marsh, Policy
Network in British Politics, in Marsh, David and
R. A. W. Rhodes (eds.), Policy Networks in
British Government, Oxford Clarendon Press.
25References (3)
- Thatcher, Mark, The Development of Policy
Network Analyses From Modest Origins to
Overarching Frameworks, Journal of Theoretical
Politics, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1998). - Walker, Jack. 1983. The Origins and Maintenance
of Interest Groups in America, American
Political Science Review 77 (2) 390-406. - Wilson, Carter A (2000) Policy Regimes and
Policy Change, Journal of Public Policy, 20 (3)
247-74.