Interest Groups Lecture Or, Rather: Collective Action and Interest Groups Lecture

1
Interest Groups Lecture(Or, Rather Collective
Action and Interest Groups Lecture)

• Prof David Rueda
• Department of Politics and International
  Relations
• and
• Merton College

2
Introduction

• The main theme
• The Logic of Collective Action as the main
  theoretical framework which we will apply to
  interest groups, corporatism and policy networks.
• Lecture available on my website
• Go to my website (http//users.ox.ac.uk/polf0050/
  ) and then teaching, Oxford, etc.
• Or go to Politics Department website, staff, etc.
• There are some additional references at the end
  of the lecture notes.
• Feel free to interrupt and ask.

3
Summary

• Collective Action
• Collective Action The Free Rider Problem.
• Collective Action Problems of the Free Rider
  Problem.
• Interest Groups
• Collective Action, Interest Groups and Pluralism.
• Problems of Interest Groups.
• Corporatism
• Collective Action and Corporatism.
• Corporatism in Practice Small States in World
  Markets.
• Problems of Corporatism.
• Policy Networks.
• Collective Action and Policy Networks.
• Problems of Policy Networks.
• References.

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Interest Groups and Collective Action Why Do
They Matter?

• Interest Groups have been studies extensively in
  political science
• Some have argued that they are essential for
  democracy.
• Some have argues that interest groups are not
  good for democracy.
• How do we figure out who is right?
• We will use a theoretical approach to collective
  action to make sense of interest groups and their
  effects.

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Collective Action The Free Rider Problem (1).

• Olsons The Logic of Collective Action and Rise
  and Decline of Nations.
• Collective action and collective goods.
• Collective action the action needed from the
  group to obtain the collective good.
• Collective good a good that, if provided to one
  member of the group, cannot be withheld from any
  other member of the group.
• Pre-Olson conception
• If an outcome benefits everyone in a group then
  
• The free-rider problem
• Collective good and rational behavior.
• If the collective good cannot be withheld from
  any member of the group, rational individuals
  have a motivation to free ride on the actions of
  others.
• Example Group (classroom), Collective action
  (demonstration), Collective good (lower fees for
  all).
• Outcome?

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Collective Action The Free Rider Problem (2).

• The problem before Olson why doesnt collective
  action happen more often?
• The problem after Olson why does collective
  action happen at all?
• Are there factors that make collective action
  more likely?
• Selective incentives (negative and positive).
• Example of positive selective incentive
  National Retired Teachers Association (NRTA) and
  the American Association of Retired Persons
  (AARP) in the US.
• Membership rose from 750,000 in 1965 to 13
  million in 1979.
• The secret of this phenomenal growth, however,
  was not the attractiveness of the policies being
  advocated by the group rather it was the special
  medical insurance policies available to older
  persons through membership, the tours and
  vacations conducted by the groups with the
  special needs of the elderly in mind (Walker,
  1983 396).

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Collective Action The Free Rider Problem (3).

• Social selective incentive like-mindedness,
  homogeneity (group heterogeneity would therefore
  exacerbate the free-rider problem), etc.
• Without selective incentives, group size
  compounds the free-rider problem less
  membersgreater individual pay-off, less
  memberseasier supervision.

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Collective Action The Problems of the Free
Rider Problem.

• Weaknesses in Olsons argument?
• Selective incentives cannot solve the free rider
  problem. Why?
• Selective incentives are themselves a collective
  action problem.
• Accepting the diversity of selective incentives.
• They can be material (mostly in Olson).
• But also solidary (emerging from social
  interaction praise, respect, friendship, shame,
  etc).
• Or purposive (emerging from internalized norms
  self-esteem, doing the right thing, etc).
• Are these problems for Olson?
• Other problems?
• See Oliver (1993) and McLean (2000).

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Collective Action, Interest Groups and Pluralism
(1).

• What is an interest group
• A group of organized individuals seeking to
  influence public policy, usually though not
  exclusively by attempting to influence government
  actors.
• These groups vary considerably in every
  imaginable way - in age, size, sophistication,
  resources, tactics, policy focus, geographic
  focus, and ideological orientation.
• Some groups focus on only a single issue, while
  others focus on broader areas of public policy.
• Some groups are born and disappear over the
  period of a single election, while others have a
  long tradition of influencing elections and
  public policy choices.
• Some choose to focus not only on government, but
  on persuading the public or other non-
  governmental organizations to support their
  objectives.
• Examples?

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Collective Action, Interest Groups and Pluralism
(2).

• Pluralism
• Competing interests balance each other by
  bringing resources and arguments to bear on
  different sides of important public policy
  decisions.
• Groups compete on a more or less level playing
  field created by national constitutions as well
  as by laws. As a result, multiple competing
  interests are believed to create a stable
  political environment that allows those interests
  to be represented before the government.
• The Logic of Pluralism
• Individuals form groups and these groups are the
  principal actors in "democratic" politics.
• Groups will accurately represent the beliefs and
  preferences of group members.
• All interests form groups and are politically
  active.
• All interest groups compete for influence on
  governments.
• All interest groups provide information (at a
  level where they are more efficient than
  governments).
• The government promotes equal access to the
  decision-making process, and reflects the
  equilibrium reached by the groups.

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Collective Action, Interest Groups and Pluralism
(3).

• Before Olson
• Political scientists had assumed that the
  interplay of pressure groups was the essence of
  democracy. Some got their way, others did not.
  Well, that showed that the first had more members
  than the second, or members who cared more
  deeply, or both. So it was right and proper that
  they should get their way. This classical
  pluralism both described and celebrated lobbying
  in a democracy. (McLean 2000 653)

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Problems of Interest Groups (1).

• In practice interest groups do not enjoy uniform
  capabilities or effectiveness, despite having
  equal rights to attempt to influence government.
• E. E. Schattsneider the problem with the
  interest group chorus was that it sang with an
  upper-class accent.
• More importantly
• For Olson, not all groups accomplish collective
  action.
• Some lobbies (such as the poor or consumers) are
  dispersed. Others (such as producers) are
  concentrated (McLean 2000 654).
• What groups would be less likely to organize?

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Problems of Interest Groups (2).

• For Olson, will the result of interest group
  actions be optimal/good for a democracy?
• There is no basis for expecting countervailing
  powers to develop, indeed quite the contrary
  successful groups will strengthen over time,
  while under-mobilised groups will remain latent
  (Dunleavy, 1991 36).
• For Olson, do interest groups provide
  information?
• Interest groups are not likely to provide
  reliable information and governments use the
  information that its most useful to them. This
  discretionary ability explains why many Western
  European social democratic governments accord
  primary influence to trade unions, while
  right-wing governments exclude the unions from
  influence and defer instead to business
  organisations (Dunleavy, 1991 36).

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Collective Action and Corporatism (1).

• What is corporatism?
• A particular interest group structure,
  characterized by monopolistic, centralized
  associations, and a particular policy-making
  process, also known as 'concertation' or 'social
  partnership'.
• What groups? Unions, employers, the state.
• Groups are encompassing.
• Tripartism.
• Why Corporatism?
• Very important interest groups. The organization
  of labor and employers and its relationship to
  the state influences politics, policy, economic
  outcomes, etc.

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Collective Action and Corporatism (2).

• How can bargaining among organized groups result
  in efficient out comes?
• Implication of Olsons argument large groups
  should not obtain collective goods (low
  inflation, low unemployment, etc).
• Example Unions as the actors, low inflation as
  the collective good and high wage demands as free
  riding.
• Is Corporatism a Solution?
• The incentives facing an encompassing special
  interest organization are dramatically different
  from those facing an organization that represents
  only a narrow segment of society (Logic of
  Collective Action 48).
• The members of an encompassing organization own
  so much of the society, that they will be ready
  to make sacrifices for a collective good.
  Distributive outcomes that benefit the group but
  harm the whole society will be less likely to be
  promoted. Example enterprise unions vs.
  industry unions.

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Corporatism in Practice Small States in World
Markets (1).

• How does corporatism come about?
• Katzensteins Small States in World Markets.
• The small corporatist states Sweden, Norway,
  Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and
  Switzerland.
• Corporatist states not big enough and too
  dependent on trade to be statist (Japan), and too
  dependent on trade to be immune to international
  crisis (like the US).
• The solution adaptation to change by promoting
  compensation for losers.
• Democratic corporatism an ideology of
  partnership, centralized and concentrated
  interest groups, voluntary and informal
  coordination through tripartite exchanges.

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Corporatism in Practice Small States in World
Markets (2).

• The consequences of corporatism
• Cameron in Goldthorpes Order and Conflict in
  Contemporary Capitalism.
• The Corporatist/Social Democratic give and
  take
• Unions give low earnings, few strikes.
  Result low unemployment, low inflation.
• Unions take favorable collective bargaining
  legislation, higher social wage, and more
  comprehensive welfare state. And low
  unemployment.
• Calmfors and Driffill corporatism and economic
  efficiency.

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Problems of Corporatism

• Decline of corporatism?
• Union decline.
• Welfare state retrenchment.
• Globalization.
• Etc.

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Collective Action and Policy Networks (1)

• Starting in the late 1960s and 70s, network
  perspectives have grown increasingly popular in
  the field of politics and political science.
• The network approach presents an alternative to
  both the pluralist and the corporatist model. The
  policy network is a meso-level concept of
  interest group intermediation which can be
  adopted by authors operating with different
  models of power distribution in liberal
  democracies (Rhodes and Marsh 1992 4)
• Defining Networks
• Networks involve the institutionalization of
  beliefs, values, cultures and particular forms of
  behaviour. They are organizations which shape
  attitudes and behaviour. Networks result from
  repeated behaviour and consequently, the relieve
  decision makers of taking difficult decisions
  they help routinize behaviour. They simplify the
  policy process by limiting actions, problems and
  solutions. Networks define roles and responses
  (Marsh and Smith 2000 6).

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Collective Action and Policy Networks (2)

• Governance nowadays involves the close
  cooperation of a large number of semi-autonomous
  actors who operate in networked structures,
  because of a need to exchange resources and
  negotiate goals (Rhodes 1996).
• Networks can be analyzed formally
• Indicators such as intensity of communication,
  reputation or resources may be used to map
  networks (Thatcher 1998).
• Networks as a form of interest group/collective
  action analysis.

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Collective Action and Policy Networks (3)

• An Illustration
• Baumgartner and Jones 1991 The interaction of
  beliefs and values concerning a particular policy
  explain both periods of extreme stability and
  short bursts of policy change. They examine
  civilian nuclear power policy in the US.
• A British example
• Roads Policy by Dudley and Richardson (1998).

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The Problems of Policy Networks

• In most of the work featuring policy communities
  and issue networks, networks have a descriptive
  function and do not aspire to account for changes
  in policy (Thatcher 1998).
• Current definitions are often weak and
  contradictory too broad to distinguish policy
  networks from other types of cooperation, or too
  precise to allow for variations across cases.
• Is everything a network? What would not be a
  network? (Dowding 1995).
• Do they resolve Olsons problem?

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References (1)

• Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones,
  Agenda Dynamics and Policy Sub-Systems, Journal
  of Politics 53, no. 4 (November 1991), 1044-1074.
• Cameron, David. 1984. Social Democracy,
  Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the
  Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced
  Capitalist Society, in John Goldthorpe, Order
  and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (New
  York Oxford University Press).
• Dowding, Keith, Model or Metaphor? A Critical
  Review of the Policy Network Approach, Political
  Studies 43, no. 1 (March 1995), 136-158.
• Dudley, Geoffrey, and Jeremy Richardson, Arenas
  without Rules and the Policy Change Process
  Outsider Groups and British Roads Policy,
  Political Studies 46, no. 4 (September 1998),
  727-747.
• Dunleavy, Patrick. 1991. Democracy, Bureaucracy
  and Public Choice (Hemel Hempstead Harvester
  Wheatsheaf).
• Katzenstein, Peter. 1985. Small States in World
  Markets (Ithaca Cornell University Press).

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References (2)

• Marsh, David, and Smith, Martin, Understanding
  Policy Networks towards a Dialectical Approach,
  Political Studies, Vol. 48, Issue 1 (2000).
• McLean, Iain, Review Article The Divided Legacy
  of Mancur Olson, British Journal of Political
  Science 30, no. 4 (October 2000), 651-668.
• Oliver, Pamela. 1993. Formal Models of
  Collective Action, Annual Review of Sociology
  19 271-300.
• Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective
  Action (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University
  Press).
• Olson, Mancur. 1982. The Rise and Decline of
  Nations (New Haven Yale University Press).
• Rhodes, R. A. W., The New Governance Governing
  without government, Political Studies (1996)
• Rhodes, R. A. W., and David Marsh, Policy
  Network in British Politics, in Marsh, David and
  R. A. W. Rhodes (eds.), Policy Networks in
  British Government, Oxford Clarendon Press.

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References (3)

• Thatcher, Mark, The Development of Policy
  Network Analyses From Modest Origins to
  Overarching Frameworks, Journal of Theoretical
  Politics, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1998).
• Walker, Jack. 1983. The Origins and Maintenance
  of Interest Groups in America, American
  Political Science Review 77 (2) 390-406.
• Wilson, Carter A (2000) Policy Regimes and
  Policy Change, Journal of Public Policy, 20 (3)
  247-74.