John Locke ja J.S. Mill suvaitsevaisuuden puolestapuhujina

1
John Locke ja J.S. Mill suvaitsevaisuuden
puolestapuhujina

• A Letter Concerning Toleration 1689
• On Liberty 1859

2
Locken argumentti

• 1. The argument from the irrationality of
  imposition by its very nature, faith cannot be
  imposed, therefore the intolerant religious
  oppressor acts irrationally.
• 2. The arg from scepticism rulers cannot know
  which for of worship is the path to salvation,
  which counsels them to practice toleration with
  respect to this aspect of faith (Locke did not
  include atheists!)

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• 3. The argument from pragmatism and rulers
  self-interest there is no alternative to
  toleration if stability is to be secured such
  stability is in the interests of any ruler.

4
Lockelaisen suvaitsevaisuuden vastustus
heijastaa ylemmyyttä!

• Respect and recognition muiden edustamille
  arvoille!
• Mitä respect täsm ottaen tarkoittaa?
• Act in a certain way? A x gt Ay
• Ihmistä? Kulttuuria? Tapaa?

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• A acts as if she respected y/B
• Jos riittää respect vaatijoille gt R
• Jos tarvitaan myös aito tunne
• Mahdotonta kuten Locke jo huomautti
• (voimme act as if, emme feel respect jos sitä
  emme aidosti tunne!

6
Millin mukaan edustuksellinendemokratia on
luonut uuden uhan enemmistön diktatuurin,
tyrannian
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Mills Liberty Principle

• LP 2 necessary and jointly sufficient
  conditions for the interference of society (law
  and public opinion) with the individual action
  interfered with is
• a) other-regarding
• b) harmful
• (leksikaalinen järjestys, an ensin täytyttävä)

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Pitää kattaa 3 vapauden aluetta

• 1) liberty of conscience in the most
  comprehensive sense liberty of thought and
  feeling, absolute freedom of opinion and
  sentiment on all subjects, practical or
  speculative, scientific, moral or theological)
• 2) liberty of tastes and pursuits, of framing
  the plan of our own life to suit our character,
  of doing as we like, subject to the consequences
  that may follow without impediment from our
  fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not
  harm them, even though they should thinki our
  conduct foolish, perverse or wrong

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and

• 3. liberty of combination amond individuals
  freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving
  harm to others.

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• It is proper to state that I forego any
  advantage which could be derived to my argument
  from the idea of abstract right, as a thing
  independent of utility. I regard utility as the
  ultimate appeal on all ethical questions but it
  must be utility in the largest sense, grounded in
  the permanent interests of man as progressive
  being.

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Sn viisi piirrettä (mm. McKinnon, Nicholson)

• Difference (S O eroaa suvaitsevan subjektin
  näkemyksestä tms.)
• Importance (S O ei triviaali)
• Opposition (S S dislikes/disapproves what she
  tolerates)
• Power
• Non-rejection (S S ei käytä valtaansa)

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Suvaitsevaisuuden käsitteellinen määrittely
heikko, vahva ja laaja tulkinta

• Heikko tulkinta
• S S ei pidä tai paheksuu (dislikes and / or
  disapproves) S O
• Vahva tulkinta
• S on responssi evaluatiiviseen paheksuntaan
  (differences evaluatively disapproved of by the
  tolerator)

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• 3. Laaja tulkinta
• kohteena yhtä lailla dislike /disapproval
• S S pitää omaa näkemystään aidosti oikeutettuna
• (miksi S O on syytä paheksua tms. JA miksi sitä
  pitää kuitenkin suvaita)

14
Bernard Williams

• If we are asking people to be tolerant, we are
  askingthem to lose something, their desire to
  suppress or drive out the rival belief but they
  will also keep something, their commitment to
  their own beliefs, which is what gave them that
  desire in the first place. There is a tension
  here between ones own commitments and the
  acceptance that other people may have other and
  perhaps quite distasteful commitments. This is
  the tension that is typical of toleration, and
  the tension which makes it so difficult.

15
John Horton

• There are, so to speak, two directions from
  which toleration can cease to be a virtue on the
  one hand, some things should not be tolerated,
  because they should not be permitted, on the
  other, some things should not be objected to,
  hence are not the approriate objects of
  toleration.