Representing the Contemporary Operational Environment in Objective OneSAF - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 19
About This Presentation
Title:

Representing the Contemporary Operational Environment in Objective OneSAF

Description:

The contemporary operational environment (COE) is the synergistic combination of ... Critical variables: Political, Military, ... Quadrennial Defense Review ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:1442
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 20
Provided by: MCCA66
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Representing the Contemporary Operational Environment in Objective OneSAF


1
Representing the Contemporary Operational
Environment in Objective OneSAF
TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity
(TRISA)-Threats Ft. Leavenworth, KS Benjamin
Jordan Director, TRISA MS
2
COE Definition and Critical Variables
  • The contemporary operational environment (COE)
    is the synergistic combination of all the
    critical variables and actors that create the
    conditions, circumstances, and influences that
    can affect military operations today and in the
    near- and mid-term. 
  • Critical variables Political, Military,
    Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information
    plus Physical Environment and Time PMESIIPT

The force on force paradigm has
changedrepresentation must incorporate
political, economic, cultural and informational
effects over time
3
Strategic Realities Impacts on the US Army
  • Irregular warfare is our steady state environment
    for near term a period of consistent conflict
  • Army Posture Statement
  • More than just OEF/OIF
  • Adversaries will employ traditional, irregular,
    catastrophic and disruptive challenges
  • Quadrennial Defense Review
  • Must be prepared to fight any type of adversary
    (or combination of adversaries) at various points
    along the spectrum of conflict

Niche technologies increase risk and probability
across conflict continuum
4
Adversary View of US
  • Major power with overall technological advantage.
  • Prefer standoff combat.
  • Depend on high technology.
  • Depend on information dominance.
  • Conduct predictable military operations.

5
Adversary View of US Cont.
  • Unwilling to accept heavy losses.
  • Sensitive to domestic and world opinion.
  • Lack of commitment over time.
  • Lack of cultural awareness.

6
Adversary View of US Cont.
  • Vulnerability of coalitions.
  • Vulnerability of force projection.
  • Depend on robust logistics.
  • Rely on contractor support.
  • Stretched military resources.

7
OOS Development Process
Behavior data reasonable versus correct
8
Stability Reconstruction Operations
Methodology
Observe Orient Decide Act Force Activity
(FA)
Reactive Events
Alternate Communications Architecture (e.g.,
media)
Various FA (e.g., assassinate)
Continuous Entity Behavior Change (e.g.,
go/dont go to market)
  • FA
  • IO
  • PSYOP
  • (threat to
  • assassinate)
  • CMO
  • Kinetic
  • Soft Factors
  • Autonomy
  • QOL
  • Culture
  • Safety

MOOD -
Cooperation Level -
Information Exchange (HUMINT -)
Third order effects
First order effects
Second order effects
Time warping2-3 month turns over 1-3 year time
period(s)
Cyclical process
-Political Activity -Economic Activity -Informati
on Activity
DIME
9
Alternate Communications Means
10
OOS COE(-) C2 Messaging Development Sequence
(i.e. Terrorist)
1. ID COE(-) Organization.
(i.e. Multi-function Direct Action Cell)
2. ID Sub-Org Type.
(i.e. Cell Leader)
3. ID Organization Role.
(i.e. Kidnap)
4. ID Behavior.
5. What is information exchange required For
behavior or due to behavior.
From To Means Content Data Range Stimuli
?
(include other COE(-) orgs, sub-orgs and org
roles)
?
6. What is done with information provided to
recipient.
Message Action Reply (see above for
requirements) Forward (see above for
requirements) New Message (see above for
requirements) None Behavior Action Do Dont
Do
11
Message Path Diagram Unattended IED
(Roadside/HB/VB) Terrorist Group
Assumptions 1. Terrorists have a single
network with multiple comms means therefore the
network path does not change based on ACM
type. 2. ACM can change from echelon to echelon
as long as transmission ACM is compatible with
receiver ACM. 3. IED can be VB, HB or
Roadside. 4. Behavior Message can start as low
as Cell Leader. 5. Controller type will depend
on IED type. 6. Subscriber type will depend on
IED type.
2W Radio - VHF-H, VHF-V Telephonic Land Line
Cell Phone, Sat Phone, Pager Web Based - email
Group Leader
Terrorist Group
2W Radio - VHF-H, VHF-V Telephonic Land Line,
Cell Phone, Sat Phone, Pager Web Based - email
Wing Leader
Armed Wing
2W Radio - VHF-H, VHF-M, VFH-V Telephonic Land
Line, Cell Phone, Sat Phone, Pager Web Based -
email
Cell Leader
DA Cell
Event Sequence
2W Radio - VHF-H, VFH-M Telephonic Land Line,
Cell Phone, Sat Phone Web Based - email
Cell Leader
Bomb Sabotage Cell
  • Group Leader issues IED directive to Armed Wing
    Leader.
  • Wing Leader forwards IED directive to Direct
    Action Cell Leader.
  • Direct Action Cell Leader forwards directive to
    Bomb Sabotage Cell Leader.
  • Bomb Sabotage Cell Leader forwards directive to
    Bomb Sabotage Team Leader.
  • Bomb Sabotage Team Leader forwards directive to
    Tactical Bomb or Suicide Bomb Element Controller.
    Team Leader consumes message.
  • Bomb Element Controller forwards directive to
    Suicide Bomber or Technician. Controller and
    Bomber or Technician consume message.

Team Leader
Bomb Sabotage Team
2W Radio - VHF-H Telephonic Land Line, Cell
Phone
Tactical Bomb IED Element/ Suicide Bomb Element
Controller
2W Radio - VHF-H Telephonic Land Line, Cell
Phone
Subcriber
Suicide Bomber/ Technician
Telephonic Cell Phone, Pager
12
Key COE Behaviors/Functionality/Effects
  • IED attack against Convoy, Entry Control Point,
    Explosive Ordinance Detachment, and Tactical
    Operations (ordnance based, plastic)
  • Unattended IED
  • HBIED
  • VBIED
  • Ambush (ground/air/urban) Volley indirect fire
    of direct fire weapons, e.g., RPG
  • Collateral effects noncombatants civilian
    vehicles
  • Coercion
  • Assassination
  • Hostage Taking
  • Intimidation by Presence
  • Shielding Tactics --Attack and Defend from
    protected sites (hospitals, mosques, markets,
    residential sites)

13
Key COE Behaviors/Functionality/Effects
  • Penetration/spalling of wall/building/assorted
    materials by direct fire/indirect fire munitions/
    consequent effects on DI, vehicles, buildings
    etc.
  • Simultaneous detonation effects of multiple mixed
    caliber munitions or plastic
  • Cache Cache Networks (weapons/explosives/etc.,)
    vice normal re-supply
  • Improvised weapons (rocks, machetes, side attack
    mines, incendiaries (Molotov Cocktail, thickened
    fuel), industrial chemicals, burning debris
    (tires/ other flammables)
  • Improvised/expedient obstacles (e.g., IEDs)
    placed in rubble, building rubble, vehicle hulks,
    burning debris
  • Shooting within and from subterranean features

14
Key COE Behaviors/Functionality/Effects
  • HUMINT Modelinformation exchange between groups
    and forces
  • Dynamic side change as second third order
    effects
  • Arming noncombatants attack by noncombatants
  • Continuous Entity Behaviors (CEB)scheduling
    routine activities--representing patterns of
    noncombatant behavior
  • CEB response to PSYOP/Coercionpressure metrics
    to express second or third order effects
  • Reactive events generation as function of force
    activities soft factors influence second/third
    order effects (e.g., spawning/absorbing
    insurgents, information exchange)

15
Key COE Behaviors/Functionality/Effects
  • OPFOR transport and small arms attack from
    non-tactical vehicles (pickups, sedans, vans,
    motorcycle)
  • Terrain as a weapon--ability to cause
    environmental obstacle/hazard (e.g., detonate oil
    wells, cause industrial chemical spill, detonate
    nuclear waste site, contaminate H20)
  • Expedient field fortification of fighting
    positions within buildings
  • Sniper (counter-sniper role and counter-force
    role, noncombatant assassination
  • Soft Factors influence second/third Order Effects
  • Reduced-profile shooting (e.g., prone shooting
    from roof top) shooting from loop holes,
    subterranean features spider holes, cellar,
    sewers

16
Key COE Behaviors/Functionality/Effects
  • Mouse-holing ability to cut mouse-holes and fire
    from mouse-holes vice defined apertures
  • Expedient breach (satchel charge) for movement
    between buildings, rooms floors
  • Expedient interior urban obstaclesdestroy
    stairwells rubble/debris to block
    entrances/exits
  • Infiltration of OPFOR force, foreign combatants,
    etc., disguised as noncombatants, acquire weapons
    from cache, captured stocks, move to rally point,
    attk target
  • Weather/climate/terrain/ effects upon combatant,
    noncombatant mobility, visibility, lethality,
    communications

17
Key COE Behaviors/Functionality/Effects
  • Mass migration, looting, rioting
  • Stand off attack indirect harassing fires
  • Information Operations (PSYOP, EW)
  • Direct fire of indirect fire weapons
  • Urban attack/defense
  • Battle Command/C2 -- Alternate Communications
    Means
  • Controlled Mines

18
Key COE Organizations
  • Conventional unit formations-- IC through
    division (CBT, CS, CSS)
  • SOF formations
  • State-sponsored paramilitary
  • Non-state sponsored paramilitary/irregulars/Insurg
    ent
  • Terrorist formations
  • Guerrilla
  • Civilian non-combatantsrefugees/displaced
    civilians
  • NGO, IO
  • Civilian combatants --not part of any
    paramilitary construct but have, or may acquire
    arms (e.g., criminal elements, PSO, rioters) may
    act individually or collectively

19
  • Questions/Discussion
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com