New RussianAmerican Nuclear Deal

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New Russian-American Nuclear Deal and Russian
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Policy

Presentation by Prof. Alexander
NIKITIN (Russia)
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Russia and America negotiate Until December 2009
Treaty on cuts in deployed nuclear wrhds to
less than 1500 Strategic, tactical,
all? Deployed? Reserves? Warheads? Carriers?
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Obama Medvedev Summit July 2009. Possibility
for Two steps solution Simple ceilings
agreement till December 2009. Big Treaty later.
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Rejkiavik Plan of Nuclear Zero in 10 years
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NO SDI
1986 REJKIAVIK
50 cuts in 5 years 100 cuts in 10 years
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RUSSIA UKRAINE BELARUS KAZAKHSTAN
Tactical Nukes Ukraine- 2345 Georgia-
320 Armenia- 200 Azerbaijan- 75 Lithuania- 325...
Counter-proliferation initiatives in 1991
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RUSSIA UKRAINE BELARUS KAZAKHSTAN
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Counter-proliferation actions 1992-1995
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Russian "Nuclear Triad" in the beginning of
the 2000-2010 decade
LAND ICBMs 756 carriers / 3540 warheads
SEA SLBMs 348 carriers / 1576 warheads
AIR Strategic bombers 69 carriers/ 790 units
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Russian "Nuclear Triad" estimated for the end of
the 2000-2010 decade
LAND ICBMs 230 carriers / 690 warheads
SEA SLBMs 72 SUBMARINES/ 448168 warheads
AIR Strategic bombers 1010 carriers/ 120120
units
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Russian "Nuclear Triad" estimated AFTER the end
of the 2000-2010 decade
All-in-all not more than 400 strategic carriers
All-in-all between 1000 and 1500 strategic
warheads
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Crisis of Nuclear Disarmament
ABM
CTBT
SORT
START-2
START-1
INF ?
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INF at risk Sub-strategic missiles with range
500 5500 km This range is strategic for the
Middle East
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Intermediate and short range Missiles Elimination
Treaty
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INF 1987
Eliminated 2,692 missiles 4,000 warheads
USSR - 1,846
USA - 846
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Inspections 1988-2001
20,000 experts
1,116 inspections USA - 774 Russia -
442
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Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov in
2007 INF Treaty is a Cold War Relict
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Chief of General Staff Baluevsky Time to quit
from the Treaty
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MFA Lavrov Nothing is decided yet
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Defense budgets
Great Britain 59 bln.
France 53 bln.
Germany 39 bln.
Russia 34 bln.
Italy 32 bln
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Defense budgets
USA
480
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Russia
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Defense budgets CSTO
Russia
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1,2
0,9
0,052
KAZ
UZB
TAJ
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Joint Defense Spending of the CSTO 38- 42 bln.
USD
CSTO
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Joint Defense Budget of NATO states 800-900 bln.
NATO summit
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In absence of conventional capabilities
parity Russia adds value to operationalizing its
nuclear arsenal, though all NPT policies remain
at place
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Potential parameters of New Russian-Western
deal Cut to lower than 1000 deployed strategic
warheads on 300-400 carriers for each side,
then involve smaller nuclear powers in
negotiations
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• Potential parameters of
• New Russian-Western deal
• Slowly and in stages destroy
• reserves of
• decommissioned strategic
• warheads

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• Potential parameters of
• New Russian-Western deal
• No nukes
• deployed outside national
• territory
• (Remove about 250 US residual nukes
• from Europe, Russia in response
• may move all tactical nukes
• behind Ural to Asia)

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• Potential parameters of
• New Russian-Western deal
• Achieve Zero in production
• of new fissile materials
• (negotiate and conclude
• Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty)

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• Potential parameters of
• New Russian-Western deal
• Destroy all
• nuclear weapon-grade quality
• fissile materials
• outside military complex

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Potential parameters of New Russian-Western deal
Keep Zero of short and medium range Nuclear
missiles (dont break INF!) Proposal to make it
Global Zero of INF, as USA and Russia jointly
proposed, doesnt suit Israel
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Potential parameters of New Russian-Western deal
No nuclear tests (US Congress may ratify
CTBT at last)
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Nuclear tests before 1996 up to 170 per year
in certain years
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• Potential parameters of
• New Russian-Western deal
• Keep proliferation at Zero
• Make sure that
• no new countries
• develop military nuclear programs
• and enter Nuclear Club.

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Problems with New Russian-Western deal
Political pre-conditions From Russia USA
should stop BMD plans for Europe From USA
Russia should cooperate more on Iranian issue
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Problems with New Russian-Western deal Methods
of counting carriers and warheads Russia
MIRVed missile counted as 3-10 USA MIRVed
missile counted as 1
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Problems with New Russian-Western deal Methods
of counting Nuclear and non-nuclear
missiles Russia Any nuclear-capable missile
must be counted as nuclear USA Missile which
has conventional warhead right now is not
counted as nuclear
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Problems with New Russian-Western deal Until
BMD in Europe is not canceled, Russia is afraid
of deeper cuts, as far as USA can destroy quite
many Russian missiles in first strike and block
by BMD retaliatory strike
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Hot Issue A B M
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A B M in Europe as an obctacle to US-Rus deal
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Obering IRAN will not get ICBMs before
2015 2007 14 interceptors in Alaska2 in
California 2009 21 in Alaska 2011 40 in Alaska
10 interceptors in Europe between 2011-2013
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Chief of Russian General Staff BALUEVSKY Genuine
hidden reason for ABM in Europe interception
not of Iranian, but of Russian and Chinese
missiles
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Russian "Nuclear Triad" estimated for the end of
the 2000-2010 decade
All-in-all not more than 400 strategic carriers
All-in-all up to 1600 strategic warheads
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Bulgaria, Greece, east of Romania and Turkey are
out of the coverage by American ABM shield NATO
Sec Gen NATO may cover these four
countries with additional NATO ABM system (?!!)
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• President MEDVEDEV
• (In Address to Federal Assembly)
• Well stop planned
• decommissioning
• of three regiments
• of SS-18 strategic missiles

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President MEDVEDEV 2. Well place ISKANDER type
operational-tactical complexes in Kaliningrad and
target them onto Western missiles in Poland (200
km from targets)
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President MEDVEDEV 3.Well start
from Kaliningrad area electronic jamming of Czech
radar and other ABM components
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Lt General Khvorov (Chief Commander of Russian
Strategic Air Force) Russian pilots are able
to jam electronically, or physically
destroy American radars
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Lt General Deinekin (former Chief Commander of
Russian Strategic Air Force) ISKANDERs even not
much needed we may use high-precision Air-based
cruise missiles (X-55) with conventional
warheads for destroying components in Poland
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Lt General Deinekin X-55 is a Soviet analogy to
the US Tomahawk missiles are not seeable by
radars during all trajectory. (Altitude 20-100
meters)
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Lt General Deinekin X-55 Could be launched
from over mainland Russian territory - Range is
4,5 thousand km (reach any site in Europe Or in
the Middle East, Kaliningad basing not important)
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Lt General Deinekin (former Chief Commander of
Russian Strategic Air Force) X-55 precision
allows us, if required, to target and hit even a
mobile phone
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GRYZLOV (Chairman of the Parliament) Russia
will not deploy missiles in Kaliningrad until US
will start deploy their missiles in Poland
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OBAMA USA will not deploy BMD in Europe until
successful tests will prove its effectiveness
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Deputy MFA of Russia Grushko Earlier Moscow
suggested Joint Russia-NATO Theater ABM
system, which was supposed to be able to cover
joint Russian-NATO Peace-keeping force in course
of any potential joint Peace support operation
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S-300, S-400 missile defense
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Problems with New Russian-Western deal Russia
is not yet sure what is the US new policy
towards Iran, India, Pakistan and Middle East
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Russian and US positions on Iran and North
Korea become closer. In spite of
Akhmadinejads recent visit to Russia Moscows
role as a mediator may melt
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Nuclear-Free Middle East is a clear Russian
preference but breaking lower than a 1000
warheads ceiling is not yet a guarantee
of involvement of other nuclear states (including
India, Pakistan and Israel) into nuclear
disarmament talks.
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New beginning in US-Russian nuclear
disarmament does not yet bring solutions to the
Middle East.
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But RESET of the US-Russian arms control
removes many old obstacles and sets up new
background for such solutions for the Middle East
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Technical Impediments to Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Long life cycle of FM
Huge size and variety of arsenals
Abundance of weapon-grade nuclear materials and
ability to recover them to weapon-usable status
after most ways of disposition
Difficulties with inspections and reliable
verification methods
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Legal problems

• Legality of NW and FM
• / Impasse of NW Convention

• Weakness of international legal regimes
• (NPT, NWFZs, MTCR, etc.)
• Weak sanctions. No sanctions btw P5

• Limited (bilateral) nature
• of most disarmament treaties
• with their verification practices

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Political obstacles
Weakness of World Community as a
political regulator
Divergence of interests of nuclear
powers, absence of joint strategy on
non-proliferation
Absence of positive international stimuli for
nuclear disarmament
Difference in priorities btw superpowers regarding
problems with nuclear weapons
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Current Russian Perceptions of Foreign Threats
War between Russia and the West
2007 26.
2008 31.
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Perception of Foreign Threats
NATO enlargement, Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO
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Conflict on Caucasus
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Terrorism.
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World War
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USA strengthening
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