Mapping the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict

1
Mapping the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Solution

• The question of borders

Part 1 How the Sides Look at Borders
Presented by S. Daniel Abrahams Center for
Middle East Peace Prepared by Dan Rothem In
collaboration with Lara Friedman
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Borders

• Both Israelis and Palestinians come to
  negotiations over borders with positions that are
  informed by their own experiences and
  understandings of the current territorial
  situation, their own sense of reasonable
  concessions for each side, and their own red
  lines (real and perceived).
• These experiences and understandings form the
  basis for each sides classic approach to
  negotiating the issue.
• An examination of these classic approaches to
  borders can help in understanding the areas of
  potential agreement, the real negotiating red
  lines, and the areas where compromises are
  necessary and possible.
• This examination also demonstrates the fact that
  borders may be the final status issue on which
  agreement between the sides is the least
  difficult.

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Classic Palestinian borders approach(reflecting
traditional claims and grievances)
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The Basic map of historic Palestine (shaded in
yellow) and its environs
Classic Palestinian borders approach(reflecting
traditional claims and grievances)
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Classic Palestinian borders approach(reflecting
traditional claims and grievances)

• The Peel Commission of 1937
• A plan (not implemented) to divide historic
  Palestine into
• a Jewish state in the north on 20 of the land
  (shaded in blue)
• An Arab state in the south on 73 of the land
  (shaded in yellow)
• 7 of the land, including Jerusalem and a land
  corridor to the Mediterranean, left under
  international mandate (shaded in pink)

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Classic Palestinian borders approach(reflecting
traditional claims and grievances)

• UN Resolution 181 (1947)
• Dividing historic Palestine to create
• a non-contiguous Jewish state in 52 of the land
  (shaded in blue)
• a smaller, non-contiguous Arab state in 46 of
  the land (shaded in yellow)
• 2 of the territory, including Jerusalem, set
  aside as Corpus Separatum (shaded in pink)

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Classic Palestinian borders approach(reflecting
traditional claims and grievances)

• 1949 Armistice Lines
• (finalized in 1951)
• These lines reflected the situation on the ground
  until June 4, 1967, i.e., the de facto division
  of historic Palestine, following Arab rejection
  of the UN partition plan Resolution 181 and
  the ensuing Israeli War of Independence. This
  map comprises
• A contiguous Jewish state on 78 of the land
  (blue)
• Arab (Jordanian and Egyptian) control over 22 of
  the land (non-contiguous), including East
  Jerusalem (light green)

8
Classic Palestinian borders approach(reflecting
traditional claims and grievances)

• The Post-1967 War Map
• As a result of the 1967 War, the map became
• The sovereign state of Israel on 78 of the land
  (dark blue)
• Israeli-occupation of the remaining 22,
  comprised of the West Bank (including East
  Jerusalem) and Gaza (turquoise)
• (Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula and
  the Golan Heights both outside the scope of
  this presentation)

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Classic Palestinian borders approach(reflecting
traditional claims and grievances)

• 2007 Reality
• Israeli control over 88 of historic Palestine,
  including all of East Jerusalem and its environs,
  plus settlement blocks, the security barrier, and
  other infrastructure and security measures
  (shaded in light blue).
• Palestinian partial or limited control over 12
  of the land of historic Palestine (shaded in
  light green).

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Elements of the Classic Palestinian Approach to
Borders

• Since the Peel Commission, each historical
  development has diminished the land under
  Palestinian control and increased the land under
  Jewish/Israeli control.
• Recognition of the 1967 line as the legitimate
  border and the basis of negotiations in
  essence, Palestinian acceptance of Israel on 78
  of the land of historic Palestine constitutes
  an historic concession to Israel.
• All Israeli settlement activity beyond the 1967
  line violates international law, including in
  East Jerusalem.
• The West Bank and Gaza Strip must be considered a
  single territorial unit and a safe passage must
  be established to allow unimpeded movement
  between them.

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Expected Palestinian Positions in Negotiations

• Any agreement must be based on the 1967 lines and
  must refer explicitly to these lines.
• The starting point of any agreement must be
  recognition of the Palestinian claim to 100 of
  the land of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, based
  on the 1967 lines and constituting 22 of
  historic Palestine.
• The Palestinian concession regarding the
  remaining 78 of historic Palestine represents
  the final Palestinian position regarding the
  amount of territory it will concede.
• Any deviations from the 1967 lines must be
  mutually agreed on and compensated by land swaps
  that are equal in quantity and quality.
• Such land swaps should be minimal (2 or less of
  the total land area).
• A safe passage route between the West Bank and
  Gaza Strip must be established.

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Classic Israeli Borders Approach(reflecting
traditional military thinking)
13
Classic Israeli borders approach(reflecting
traditional military thinking)

• The basic map of the West Bank and Gaza, showing
• Israeli settlements (in blue)
• Palestinian localities (in green)
• the 1967 line (in bold green)

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Classic Israeli borders approach(reflecting
traditional military thinking)

• The basic map, showing
• the current approved route of the West Bank
  security barrier (in red)
• Settlement blocks that Israeli wishes to annex
  (shaded in blue)

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Classic Israeli borders approach(reflecting
traditional military thinking)

• Traditional Israeli view of territorial demands
• Annexation of settlement blocks (in dark blue)
• Israeli control over or annexation of the Jordan
  Valley and a land corridor to Jerusalem (in
  bright blue)

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Classic Israeli borders approach(reflecting
traditional military thinking)

• Traditional Israeli territorial demands
• Annexation of settlement blocks (in dark blue)
• Israeli control over (or annexation of) the
  Jordan Valley and a land corridor to Jerusalem
  (in turquoise)
• Israeli control over additional settlements and
  land corridors into and through the West Bank (in
  light blue)

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Classic Israeli borders approach(reflecting
traditional military thinking)

• Traditional Israeli view of potential territorial
  concessions
• Palestinian control over roughly 45 of the West
  Bank, in three disconnected areas (dark green)
• Israeli control and/or annexation of roughly 55
  of the West Bank (various shades of blue)

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Classic Israeli borders approach(reflecting
traditional military thinking)

• Variation on traditional Israeli view of
  territorial concessions
• Palestinian control over roughly 80 of the West
  Bank, in three disconnected areas (dark green)
• Israeli control and/or annexation of roughly 20
  of the West Bank (maintaining control over a
  smaller area of the Jordan Valley) (various
  shades of blue)

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Classic Israeli borders approach

• The 1967 lines have no legal standing and are not
  sacred.
• The fate of the territories will be resolved in
  negotiations, without regard to prior claims by
  the Palestinians.
• Israeli interests require the annexation of
  large, expanded settlement blocks and areas
  around Jerusalem.
• Israeli security requires a long-term presence in
  all or part of the Jordan Valley.

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Expected Israeli Position in Negotiations

• Israel may accept the legitimacy of the 1967
  lines, as mentioned in the Bush speech of 2002
  and as referenced in the 2004 Israeli-US exchange
  of letters (referred to as the 1949 Armistice
  Line).
• Israel will be prepared to make painful
  compromises and evacuate many West Bank
  settlements (with the route of the barrier as the
  likely starting point), but will not compromise
  on some land that it views as strategically vital
  or that is home to large settler populations.
• Land swaps will be considered, but not according
  to a 11 ratio.
• Safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza Strip
  will not be viewed as a Palestinian entitlement
  but rather as an Israeli concession that will be
  used as negotiating leverage.

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The Previous Round ofFinal Status Negotiations

• Camp David is often mentioned in discussions of
  what Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in the past
  were able (or not able) to achieve, and by
  inference, what negotiations can be expected to
  achieve (or not achieve) in the future.
• In this context, it is important to clarify what
  Camp David actually means.

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Camp David and the Chronology of
Israeli-Palestinian Final Status Negotiations

• The Camp David summit of July 2000 was only one
  event in a series of events surrounding Final
  Status discussions that took place between the
  fall of 1999 and January 2001
• Fall 1999 official negotiations
• Winter 1999-Spring 2000 break (to pursue
  negotiations with Syria)
• May 2000 intense negotiations in Stockholm
• July 2000 the Camp David summit
• September 2000 intense negotiations (35
  meetings)
• October 2000 Sharm al-Sheikh Summit
• December 23, 2000 President Clinton
  articulates the Clinton Parameters
• January 2001 the Taba negotiations

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Camp David - July 2000

• There was never one authoritative Camp David
  proposal or Camp David map
• The Israeli side presented several maps at Camp
  David, most of which reflected the Israeli
  traditional military/security approach on borders
  (as described earlier in this presentation).
• These maps depicted proposals along the lines of
• around 12 Israeli annexation of settlement
  blocks,
• another 10-11 of special long-term arrangement
  in the Jordan Valley,
• the rest (roughly 77) in three non-contiguous
  areas, to become a Palestinian State once an
  agreement was signed.

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Camp David - July 2000

• Verbally, other Israeli border schemes
  (reflecting a somewhat more pragmatic traditional
  military/security approach) were communicated
  during the summit, including a scheme proposing
• 9 percent annexation, 1 percent swap
• limited Israeli presence along the Jordan River
• willingness to transfer (some) Arab parts of
  Jerusalem to Palestinian sovereignty

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Map of Israeli proposal at Camp David
(provided by a Palestinian source)

• The map depicts the Israeli demand for
  continued control over key settlement blocks, and
  the entire greater Jerusalem area Israeli
  demands for two east-west land corridors and the
  demand for an Israeli presence and/or control in
  most of the Jordan Valley (various shades of
  blue).
• It includes no offsetting land swaps.

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Clintons Parameters Articulated by President
Clinton on December 23, 2000

• (Territory)
• begin quote
• ... Based on what I heard, I believe that the
  solution should be in the mid-90s, between
  94-96 of the West Bank territory of the
  Palestinian State.
• The land annexed by Israel should be compensated
  by a land swap of 1-3 in addition to territorial
  arrangement such as a permanent safe passage.
• The parties should also consider the swap of
  leased land to meet their respective needs.
  These are creative ways for doing this that
  should address Palestinian and Israeli needs and
  concerns.
• The Parties should develop a map consistent with
  the following criteria
• 80 of the settlers in blocks
• Contiguity
• Minimize annexed areas
• Minimize the number of Palestinians affected
• end quote

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Clintons Parameters - December 23, 2000
Clinton never presented a map reflecting his
principles
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• Hypothetical map reflecting one application of
  the Clinton parameters
• 6 Israeli annexation of settlement blocks (in
  blue)
• 3 in offsetting land swaps (in light green)

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Taba - January 2001

• The final round of Final Status negotiations
  took place in Taba (Egypt) in January 2001. 
• In Taba, Israel presented a map depicting the
  annexation of 8 of the West Bank.
• The map did not depict any land swaps, but the
  negotiations dealt with the idea more thoroughly
  than in the past.

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• Map presented by Israel at Taba, depicting
• 8 annexation of settlement blocks (in blue)
• 92 of the West Bank under Palestinian control
  (in dark green)
• No land swaps

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Some lessons

• At no time in any official Israeli or American
  proposal did the words 1967 lines or 1967
  borders appear.
• Recognition of the 1967 lines was implied,
  however, since they were the lines used as the
  basis for calculating percentages of land under
  Israeli and Palestinian control.
• In terms of land Israel was willing to see end up
  under Palestinian control, Israel shifted from
  the 40-plus approach that guided the interim
  agreements to a 100-minus approach.
• However, neither Israel nor the U.S. ever
  embraced the 100 Principle (i.e., that a peace
  agreement will be based on Israel relinquishing
  control over 100 of the land in question, with
  any annexed land being compensated for through
  11 land swaps, as was the basis for peace
  agreements with Egypt and Jordan).

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Where to from here?
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Possible points of agreement on borders
A model formula Borders will be based on the
1967 lines with agreed-upon modifications that
will include land swaps equal in size (11) and
will take into consideration the parties
security and demographic interests while
maintaining territorial contiguity.

• Includes explicit reference to 1967 (as demanded
  by the Palestinians)
• Includes idea of modifications to 1967 borders
  (as demanded by the Israelis)
• Includes concept of 11 land swaps (as demanded
  by the Palestinians)
• Places no limitation on size of modifications and
  swaps (as demanded by the Israelis)