The Southwest Center for Public Health Preparedness

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The Southwest Center for Public Health
Preparedness
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History of Attacks on Water Systems

• 6th. Century B.C. Assyrians poisoning enemy
  wells with rye ergot (fungi)
• Romans poisoned wells of enemies with cadavers
  and carcasses
• 1998 Kosovo. Yugoslav army poisoned 70 of the
  water wells in Kosovo as they withdrew.

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Background

• Materials captured from Al Qaeda included
  detailed maps of several U.S. municipal drinking
  water systems
• 2002
• National Research Council of the National Academy
  of Sciences concluded that water supply system
  contamination and disruption was a terrorist
  threat.
• 2003
• EPA and CDC issued a Water Advisory in Response
  to the High Threat Level

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EPA/CDC Health Advisory

• While there are no data to indicated that water
  has been specifically targeted, our nations
  water infrastructure remains at risk to terrorist
  attacks, or acts intended to substantially
  disrupt the ability of a water system to provide
  a reliable supply of water.

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EPA/CDC Health Advisory

• If real-time environmental detection and
  identification fail to detect the release of a
  CBR agent,
• The first indication of a terrorist attack may be
  an increased number of patients present to
  healthcare providers or emergency departments
  with unusual or unexplained illness.

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• The vulnerability of the nations water supply
  isnt in the headlines, its in the details of
  the 54,065 public and private water systems. For
  years, experts have warned about the need to
  upgrade, repair and thoroughly assess the risk of
  terrorists targeting the nations water supply
  and distribution channels. Yet most of those
  warnings have been ignored, under-funded or
  relegated to the back burner as policy-makers
  addressed more important projects.
• Brock Meeks, MSNBC

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• Water supply facilities offer a particularly
  vulnerable point of attack to the
• foreign agent.
• J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, 1941

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Why Water Supply Systems?

• Nearly 60,000 community supplies
• Serving 225,000,000 people
• 63 supply water to less than 2.4 of the
  population
• 5.4 supply water to 78.5 of the population
• Most supply water to less than 500 people
• 140,000 non-community water systems that serve
  schools, recreational areas, trailer parks, etc.

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Why Water Supply Systems?

• Great opportunity for terrorism
• Extensive systems
• Pipelines
• Pipes
• Pumps
• Storage tanks
• Valves
• Meters
• Relatively unprotected
• Accessible
• Isolated

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Why Water Supply Systems?

• Norman, OK
• 104,000 persons served by water system
• Including 20,000 students
• 1 water treatment plant
• 31 ground water wells
• 5 water towers
• 7 mile pipe from reservoir to treatment plant
• 440 miles of pipes
• Hundreds of access points
• hydrants

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Why Water Supply Systems?

• Lack of public confidence in the safety of the
  water would create fear.
• Lack of water would significantly disrupt economy
  as well as health and safety.
• Contamination, if successful, could affect a
  large population.

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Exercise in Water System Security

• Divide main group into sub-groups
• Malefactors (evil-doers)
• Public utility workers
• Health workers
• Think tank (environmental health workers)
• Risk communicators
• Each group will address one aspect of water
  system security and report back to the main group

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Exercise in Water System Security

• Simulated assault on the water system of Redmond,
  Washington
• Malefactors have decided to disrupt this water
  system (they will tell us what they intend to do)
• Other groups will design programs to protect the
  system and detect disruption or contamination
• The Risk Communication group will tell us what
  messages to give under various scenarios

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Exercise in Water System Security

• You cant all be malefactors

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Redmond, Washington

• 16.88 mi2
• Average elevation 50 ft.
• 35.5 inches of rainfall/year
• Population 47,260
• 35,888 white
• 687 black
• 5,893 Asian
• 2,538 Hispanic
• 203 Native American

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Redmond, WashingtonWater System

• Combined ground water, treated surface water, and
  purchase water
• 26.6 million gallons in storage
• 67 pressure reducing stations
• 12,176 water meters
• 422 miles of water pipe
• 2,995 fire hydrants
• 9,010 mainline valves

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Redmond, WashingtonWater System

• Surface water comes from the Tolt Reservoir in
  the Cascade Mountains
• Serves residents west of the Sammamish River
• Water is treated by disinfection, mineralization,
  filtration, and ozonation.
• Several reservoirs (14 ,10, 6, 3.5, 5.2 million
  gallons)
• Ground water comes from 4 wells
• 4 reservoirs (4.5, 4, 3, and 0.5 million gallon
  capacity).
• Wells service residents east of the Sammamish
  River
• Treated purchase water comes via a pipe from
  Seattle

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Water Storage Tanks for Redmond
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Example of Water Transfer
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Potential Threats to Water Supply Systems

• Structural damage to water system infrastructure
• Cyber attacks on supervisory control and security
  systems
• Deliberate contamination of water at the supply
  intake, treatment facility, or within the
  distribution system
• Fake attack
• Idle threat

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Typical Water Treatment Process
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View of Typical Water Treatment Plant
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Potential Weapons

• Nuclear weapons or improvised nuclear device
• Radiological material dispersal device
• Chemical weapons
• Biological agents
• Explosive device

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Terrorist Attacks Using Car Bombs
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Cyber Attacks

• The Internet Storm Center (run by the Security
  Administration, Networking and Security
  Institute) gathers more than 3 million
  cyber-attach reported entries each day (likely
  under-reported)

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Cyber Attack Examples

• Maroochy Sewage Spill, Australia
• Vitek Boden hacked into a local waste management
  system computer
• Caused discharge of millions of liters of raw
  sewage into rivers, parks, and grounds of a Hyatt
  Regency hotel during 2000.
• He used a two-way radio to alter pump operations.
• Authorities found a program on his laptop that
  allowed him to control the sewage management
  system.

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Cyber Attack Examples

• In the U.S., Kevin Mitnick eluded authorities for
  over 2 years.
• Broke into countless computers
• Intercepted private electronic communications
• Copied personal and confidential materials
• Corrupted system software
• Used a variety of mechanisms to access computers

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Raw Water Reservoir

• Open Water Reservoirs
• Wells
• Source Intakes
• Easy access
• Subject to dilution, exposure to sunlight, and
  treatment
• Early warnings are available (aquatic life)

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Treatment Facilities

• Treatment/Holding Tanks
• Chemical Storage
• Pump Houses
• Fluoridation Stations
• Chlorine Stations
• Higher Levels of security prevent easy access

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Treated Water Storage

• Access to tops of tanks
• Hatches
• Air vents
• Pressure relief valves
• Often in rural locations
• Often have direct access to drinking waters
  through latches
• No treatment

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Transmission Main/Point Source

• Any access to pipes
• Fire hydrants
• Faucets
• Many in rural or dark locations
• Tools necessary truck, pump

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Other Potential Targets

• Private home or office building connections,
  building water supplies or water tanks, cisterns,
  storage tanks
• Water used in food processing, bottled water,
  commercial water
• Deliberate contamination of recreation waters and
  receiving waters

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Protective Measures in PlaceA Sobering Reality
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Tasks for Groups

• Introduce yourselves
• Select a spokesperson
• Select a scribe
• Answer the questions provided for your section
  using the information provided
• In bulleted format
• Use any other information/knowledge that you have
• Return this information to me

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QUESTIONS?