Title: Contemporary Accounting Research Conference
1Contemporary Accounting Research Conference
- Brokerage Industry Self-Regulation
- The Case of Analysts Background Disclosures
- by
- Lawrence D. Brown, Artur Hugon, and Hai Lu
- Discussion by
- Michael Mikhail
- Arizona State University
2Contemporary Accounting Research Conference
- Primary Findings
- Disclosed Analysts earning forecasts are
relatively less accurate than those of
non-disclosed analysts following the same
firm-quarters (Disclosed analysts were also
relatively inaccurate in the pre-incident period) - Controlling for firm and analyst characteristics
as well as past accuracy, the market reaction is
weaker to forecasts revisions issued by disclosed
analysts relative to those by non-disclosed
analysts (No differential market response is
observed in the pre-incident period) - Controlling for firm and analyst characteristics
as well as past accuracy, average trade size is
less strongly associated with disclosed analysts
forecast revisions, suggesting that more
sophisticated investors pay relatively less
attention to earnings revisions by disclosed
analysts
3Contemporary Accounting Research Conference
- Suggestions / Concerns
- How should we interpret DISC?
- What are the implications of analyst turnover and
brokerage house quality/prestige? - Trade volume investigation can we gain anything
by bifurcating the analysis by trader type? - Other
4Contemporary Accounting Research Conference
- How should we interpret DISC?
- Its not clear whether its the disclosure of the
background event per se that is important or
whether this merely proxies for some unexamined
aspect related to the analyst - The types of disclosures discussed in the
appendix have different implications for
performance and/or credibility - Some disclosures are related to items of a
personal nature while others are related to an
analysts professional outputs
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- How should we interpret DISC?
- Is there variation in the observed association
between DISC and relative accuracy or the market
reaction conditional on the type of disclosure? - Replace DISC with a set of indicators to account
for the major types of disclosure (Criminal,
Customer Complaints, Bankruptcies, Regulatory
Actions, Terminations) and other - alternatively
- Examine the 116 disclosure events and categorize
into two groups one related to the analysts
professional outputs and one related to
disclosures of a personal nature
6Contemporary Accounting Research Conference
- How should we interpret DISC?
- Bonner, Hugon and Walther (2007) document that
celebrity defined as media coverage (e.g.,
newspapers, magazines, newswires, television,
etc.) is positively related to the markets
reaction to forecast revisions even after
controlling for forecast performance variables
examined in prior studies - Is the observed reduction in market reaction in
the post disclosure period a result of CNBC not
wanting an analyst with a felony record on any of
their shows?
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- Turnover Brokerage House Quality/Prestige
- Mikhail, Walther Willis (1999) and Hong, Kubik
and Solomon (2000) provide evidence that analysts
who are relatively worse at forecasting earnings
are more likely to turnover - Hong Kubik (2003) find that analysts who are
relatively inaccurate are about 62 more likely
to experience a move down the brokerage house
hierarchy - Given the current papers results that analysts
experiencing a DISC were relatively inaccurate in
the Pre-incident period as well (reported in
footnote 16), is it possible that the decreased
market reaction observed is a consequence of
turnover that results in employment at a less
prestigious/low quality brokerage? - Approximately 15 of the disclosures were
explicit terminations - What percentage of the total sample of DISC
analysts experienced turnover between the pre and
post period?
8Contemporary Accounting Research Conference
- Low Cost Approaches to Control
- for Brokerage House Quality/Prestige
- Classify Brokerages based on Size
- Prestige is probably not perfectly linear in
brokerage house size - Consistent with Clement (1999) and Hong Kubik
(2003), classify the 10 biggest brokerage houses
each year as high quality/prestige firms (Bulge
bracket firms) and the remainder as low
quality/prestige firms
9Contemporary Accounting Research Conference
- Low Cost Approaches to Control
- for Brokerage House Quality/Prestige
- Institutional Investor Annual Survey
- The 10 or so brokerage houses with the most
All-American analysts are identified as The
Leaders for a particular year - Table AI in Hong Kubik (2003) provides a
listing of brokerages classified as leaders for
each year from 1983 to 2000 - Consistent with prestige not being perfectly
linear in brokerage house size, only 63 of the
firms classified as leaders during this time
period were also one of the 10 biggest for that
year the range extended from a low of 30 in
1983 to a high of 90 in 1998
10Contemporary Accounting Research Conference
- Low Cost Approaches to Control
- for Brokerage House Quality/Prestige
- Carter-Manaster investment banking measure
- Determines investment banking ranking using
underwriters relative placements in stock
offering tombstone announcements (see Carter
and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark, and Singh
(1998)) - Appendix in Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998)
provides the Carter-Manaster measure for
approximately 180 investment banks using data
from 1985 to 1991
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- Trading Volume Analysis
- Given the authors objective of evaluating how
different investor segments vary their reliance
on DISC, I would be interested in an analysis
that treats each investor type individually - Bhattacharya (2001), Mikhail, Walther and Willis
(2007) and DeFranco, Lu and Vasvari (2007), among
others, follow this approach - Calculate unexpected trading volume for large and
small traders separately - Estimate equation (3) individually for each
trader type
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- Other Issues
- Im concerned that the authors only require that
a firm be followed by 2 analysts. - In thinly followed firms, analysts are likely to
have extreme ranks regardless of their
performance. How are the results affected if the
sample is restricted to firms followed by at
least 5 analysts? - Several DISC analysts have multiple disclosure
events is there a more significant outcome for
this subset of the sample? - Additional information on the NASD disclosure
process may be helpful does an analyst have the
ability to appeal? Given resources to fight a
disclosure event, can analysts from larger firms
eliminate their disclosure requirement?