Moral Dilemmas and Peacekeeping: Lessons from Rwanda

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Moral Dilemmas and Peacekeeping Lessons from
Rwanda

• General Dallaire UNAMIR Commander.

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• Teaching Ethics
• Raising Self Awareness - Moral Awareness

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John Gardner, On Leadership, p. 13

• Ethical behavior and decisions are determined by
  a set of beliefs, assumptions, customs, ideas,
  norms, and values

In any healthy, reasonably coherent community
society, people come to have shared views
concerning right and wrong, better and worse in
personal conduct.
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• Normally we make decisions without even being
  aware of their ethical dimensions.

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• Understanding the true dimension of dilemmas
• Ethical vs Personal

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Leading Marines MCWP 6 11 p. 39
Ethical Dilemmas

• the necessity to choose between competing
  obligations in circumstances that prevent one
  from doing both. Action is at the heart of
  ethical behavior. An academic understanding of
  what is right and wrong is irrelevant unless it
  is coupled with appropriate action. And even
  then, the answer is not always clear.

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• Ethical dilemmas normally do not give us a feel
  good course of action.
• Leaders should be prepared to deal with two
  potentially bad courses of action.

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Relevant factors when facing ethical dilemmas

• Pressure of time
• Limits of knowledge
• Emotions

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Limits of Knowledge

• Improve our ability to analyze the small amount
  of information available.
• Sharpening moral awareness.
• Intellectual development
• Education

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• Stimulate moral imagination to promote creative
  problem solving out-of-the-box courses of
  action
• Develop analytical skills
• Elicit a sense of (moral) responsibility and
  obligation from individual marines, soldiers,
  airmen, sailors. Use EDGs.
• Develop an understanding of tolerance (deal with
  other cultures).

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Emotions

• Know yourself your limitations and your
  strengths
• Know your peers
• Know your troops

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compliance with DoD ethics regulations may keep
you out of jail, but it will not suffice to get
you into heaven.

• Legal Responsibility vs. Moral Obligation
• When does the Moral Imperative provide a strong
  enough justification for us to disregard or even
  go against our legal responsibility? Is it ever
  justified to lie?

CDR Tom Grassey, Why Ethics Is So Hard
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UNSC Res. 872 UNAMIRs mandate

• To contribute to the security of the city of
  Kigali
• To monitor observance of the cease-fire
• To monitor the security situation during the
  final period of the transitional government,
  leading up to the elections
• To investigate instances of alleged
  non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha
  Peace Agreement

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• Problems related to the establishment of UNAMIR
• Number of troops
• Force composition
• Deployment of troops
• Rules of Engagement.

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• Number of troops
• Dallaire suggested
• The ideal deployment would be comprised of
  5,500 troops and 350 observers with full
  logistical support.
• The reasonable viable option would consist of
  2,500 troops. He knew that the ideal option did
  not stand a chance at the UN.

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Force Composition March 1994

• Bangladesh 942 - no training, no equipment
• Ghana 843 - trained, minimal equipment
• Belgium 440 - trained (Somalia) equipped
• Tunisia 61- trained but poorly equipped

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• Deployment of Troops
• The Belgian contingent - UNAMIRs strongest
  component - was deployed over 14 posts throughout
  Kigali when the genocide began this became a
  major issue there was no quick reaction force
  available in April 1994.

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The ROE Dallaire drafted for the mission
considered the possibility that the peacekeepers
might legally resort to the use of force to
confront situations that clearly went beyond the
concept of self-defense.

• There may be ethnically or politically
  motivated criminal acts committed during this
  mandate which will morally and legally require
  UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them.
  UNAMIR will take the necessary action to prevent
  any crime against humanity.

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The ETO School in Kigali

• 90 Belgian paratroopers deployed at ETO
• From April 7 to April 11 the refugee population
  grew to 2,000. Food, water other supplies very
  limited.
• ETO compound surrounded by the militia.
• CC received confusing orders, yet he knew that
  the moment he left the refugees would be
  slaughtered.

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• On April 11th French troops evacuated all
  Europeans from ETO.
• CC decision to leave the ETO was not the outcome
  of a tactical requirement, he decided to leave
  after the French troops cleared a path to the
  airport.
• We left our conscience there.
• Lt Lecomte, Second in Command ETO

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• Hutu Forces
• Forces Armées Rwandaises 1990 10,000 - in 1994
  30,000
• Presidential Guard - 700
• Interahamwe, 1991

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• Tutsi Forces
• RPF
• 1988 Uganda
• Smaller in size than government forces.
• Better led, better trained

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Case Study 1 - The Responsibility to Protect

• What do you think would be the best course of
  action to deal with the moral dilemma faced by
  peacekeepers at the ETO?

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Case Study 2 Commanders Moral Responsibility

• My enthusiasm for making this work got to the
  point that I had to sit back and assess whether
  or not I was taking too many risks, whether or
  not I was prepared to cut too many corners. I
  wanted that command, and I wanted it to be a
  successful exercise, so I had to sit back and go
  through all these parameters that were all
  pointing in a wrong direction and saying,

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General Dallaire, The Ghosts of Rwanda, Frontline
2004

• Am I right, am I being ethical? Is this
  morally correct to take all these risks and to
  have the mission created and me commanding it? Or
  should I pull the plug on it? Ultimately, I felt
  we could do it. But that was bravado, I think.
  Nothing was going to stop me.