Public private partnerships in education in India

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Public private partnerships in education in
India

• by
• Geeta Kingdon

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• Quality crisis primary level secondary level
• Solutions not in inputs but in incentives for T
  and schools
• Performance related pay for teachers
• Changed accountability system via PPPs

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Public private partnerships

• Private schooling growing rapidly
• If private schools attract HHs, they must operate
  with some competitive advantages
• Its the nature of these advantages that shapes
  views about how the private sector can be most
  effectively used
• Challenge for policy how to harness the
  efficiency / accountability of private schools to
  create better outcomes
• PPPs are avowedly one way of doing that

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PPPs permit separating operation from funding
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• Woessmans findings suggest it makes fundamental
  diff how partnership between public private is
  set up.
• private op with public funding brings large gains
  
• public op with private funding brings large losses

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PPPs in education

• 2 types of PPPs combine private operation /
  public funding
• direct aid to private schools (supply-side
  funding)
• school vouchers to parents (demand-side funding)

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School Vouchers PPP demand side funding

• Govt funds go to schools via voucher to families
• Aim - school choice sets up competition bet
  schools
• Evidence Colombia/Chile. 2 randomised studies
• Critique - Exacerbate inequality
• poor parents cannot supplement V, have to remain
  in public schools
• private schools can reject poor applicants on
  grounds of low achievement
• Suggested solution (Nechyba, 2005)
• voucher amount made inverse to the economic
  status of HH, so poorest receive highest-value
  vouchers

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PPP in education in India

• Aided Schools extensive form of PPP
• Enrolment share
• History
• Funding formula
• Relative performance
• Political economy aspects
• New proposed PPP in education

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Inter-state variation in PA schools share of
total public education expenditure
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History

• Inherited from British
• Originally by religious/linguistic minorities
• At independence
• avoided govt. regulations
• teachers recruited by school
• autonomy to set staff-discipline/firing policies
• teachers paid out of school revenues
• had to attract students to succeed only partly
  funded

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Evolution, funding

• Over time, aided school teachers became unionised
• Lobbied in mid-late 1960s - paid directly by
  state
• Passage of important Acts in 1971 and 1972
• In 1982, teacher recruitment by state appointed
  body
• Massive centralisation reduced local
  accountability
• Efforts in 1990s to give local managers greater
  say opposed
• Block grant, based on of sanctioned teachers
• No incentives in grant formula

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• 12 22 of MLCs have been teachers

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Grant formula devoid of performance conditions
and unresponsive to needs

• Block grant, based only on number of sanctioned T
• To increase efficiency, there needs to be a
  formula
• pass rate fixed at a paltry 45 percent (pass mark
  set low 33)
• No. of working days
• political manoeuvres overrule provisions to
  regulate grants
• System of grants-in-aid same as 150 years ago.
• By contrast, British system underwent
  revolutionary changes, became more objective.
  based on dozen needs indicators
• Japanese other countries grant formulae
• Rational grant structure a policy correction
  potentially high pay-offs in terms of improved
  cost-efficiency

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Relative effectiveness of aided schools

• Quantitative studies relied on small surveys
  Govinda Varghese (1993) Bashir (1994) Kingdon
  (1996)
• Use different methods, diff levels of education,
  diff states
• General conclusion
• P schools outperform G and A schools in all 4
  states
• A schools outperform G schools in some states and
  the vice versa in others

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Summary of findings

• Bashir (1994, 1997) Tamil Nadu, primary schools
• P performed better than G in math
• P performed no better than G in Tamil language
  but they were E/M
• A schools more effective than G schools
• Govinda and Varghese (1993) Madhya Pradesh
  primary schools
• achievement levels in P schools considerably
  higher in both maths and language than in G
  schools. But they pool A and P schools
• Kingdon (1994, 1996) Uttar Pradesh, junior
  schools
• P school students outperformed their A and G
  counterparts
• A and G schools were similar
• Non-standardised comparisons across G, A, P
  schools
• Tooley Dixon (2003), Andhra Pradesh dont
  include A schools
• CBSE board data (2004) Delhi Municipality area

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Problems of inference

• Even with measured student traits inference is
  difficult
• Need randomised experiment or correction for
  selection
• Kingdon on UP, India, attempts to address SSB
• Illustrate from that

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Political economy

• This form of PPP not cost-effective
• Lack of incentives in grant formula
• Suffered loss of local accountability
• Strength of unions (NCT) - some of the
  Principals deposing before us lamented that they
  had no powers over teachers and were not in a
  position to enforce order and discipline. Nor
  did the District Inspectors of Schools and other
  officials exercise any authority over them as the
  erring teachers were often supported by powerful
  teachers associations. We were told that that
  there was no assessment of a teachers academic
  and other work and that teachers were virtually
  unaccountable to anybody (NCT, 1986, p68).
• Aided school teachers hold political office
• Teachers are legislators (MLAs MLCs)
• Aided teachers in politically advantageous
  position
• NCT 1986 the most important factor responsible
  for vitiating the atmosphere in schools, we were
  told, has been the role of teacher politicians
  and teachers organisations.

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Conclusions so far

• PPP not a panacea
• The design of PPP matters
• Indias experience has lessons
• whether/what are incentives built into grant
• capitulation to teachers demands for comparable
  treatment to G and to be sheltered from local
  level accountability
• if A and G operate together, political pressure
  can mount, but?
• Why certain PPPs work well or not, is the Q
  devil in detail

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PPP reform in education

• Considering new per-student subsidy to private
  schools again supply-side
• Draft Right to Education Bill 2005 private
  schools to give 25 of places to weaker
  sections
• Govt promises to reimburse the schools
• Expect long queues way of selection not
  specified
• Implications for number of private schools / fee
  levels not thought through
• unclear whether response will be to create new
  places or to replace 25 of existing students or
  both
• If existing students replaced, departure of
  fee-paying students increases demand for
  establishment of new private schools, which will
  themselves allocate 25 places to poor students.
  Overall, number of private schools likely to
  increase
• Govt will compensate schools at the lower of
  private schools fee rate and PPE in public
  schools. Since public PPE is much larger, could
  increase private fee levels

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Lack of PPP debate

• In many countries vigorous debate /
  experimentation with diff types of PPPs,
  including demand-side funding (vouchers)
• 1 Non-acceptability of profit-based approach
• Unlikely reason for lack of consideration of
  vouchers
• India proposes to use P fee-charging schools
• 2 Most obvious failure of schools lack of
  resources
• seen as demotivating
• obvious solution fix physical
  deficiencies/provide inputs
• other countries, focus of reform moved to
  improving incentives
• 3 Fear of upsetting powerful vested interests
• teacher unions vehemently oppose decentralising
  reform
• also likely to oppose competition reform
• edu legislation follows teacher lobbying
• no state govt. courage to touch Acts that upset
  TUs
• possible TUs stronger force in India than others

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• 4 Disappointing past experience with PPP
• 5 Voucher schemes raise equity concerns
  (Hsieh Urquiola, 2003 Ladd,
  2002)
• Arguably potentially addressed by voucher design
• Voucher can be an efficient targeting tool, with
  higher voucher amounts going to poorer children
• However, devising PPP scheme which targets diff
  voucher amounts to diff groups carries own admin
  and implem problems

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• 6 Concerns about implementation
• Will adequate private entrepreneurs come forward
• How to implement choice in small villages
• Weak systems to ensure compliance with standards
• Illiterate parents making informed school choice
• Scope for corruption under weak monitoring
• PPP design needs careful thought
• Formula needs reform, contracts encourage
  accountability
• widespread debate
• international evidence
• pilot testing