The Trusted Computing TC and Next Generation Secured Computing Base NGSCB

1
The Trusted Computing (TC) and Next Generation
Secured Computing Base (NGSCB)

• Joseph Yu
• Jeffrey Khuu
• CS158B
• Dr. Stamp

2
Table of Contents

• Introduction
• TC
• TCG
• NGSCB
• TC
• NGSCB
• Architecture
• Features
• Analysis of NGSCB
• Summary

3
Introduction TC, TCG, NGSCB

• TC Trusted Computing, TCG Trusted Computing
  Group, NGSCB Microsofts TC
  
• Original Motivation for TC
• TC was intended for DRM
• Limits the abuse of file sharing over the
  network
  
• Prevent making illegal copies without the
  authorization from the vendor
  
• Restrict users computing actions

4
Introduction - TC

• Current Motivation for TC
• For years, Bill Gate has dreamed of finding a
  way to make the Chinese pay for software TC
  looks like being the answer to his prayer.
  Ross Anderson
• TC extend way more than DRM It gives more
  authorizations to the computers over users

5
Introduction - TC

• Fundamental Concept of TC
• Software runs and communicates securely over
  applications and servers
  
• Use locked-down architecture
• Hardware level cryptographic keys for encryption
  and authentication
  
• Tamper-resistant
• Seal secure data within curtained memory
• Input/Output communication path are encrypted

6
Introduction - TCG

• Many vendors provide hardware support for major
  components of NGSCB
  
• For example, Intels LaGrande Technology (LT) and
  AMDs Secure Execution Mode (SEM) technology
  
• TCG is an alliance of Microsoft
• Manage TC activities for different
  hardware/software vendors AMD, HP, IBM, and
  others

7
Introduction - TCG

• Goal
• Claimed Non-Profit industry standards
  organization to enhance the security and
  computing in different platforms
  
• Provide a secured TCB for the system
• Activities
• Formed in Spring 2003 and adopted a set of
  specification made by Trusted Computing Platform
  Alliance (TCPA)
  

8
TC

• What is Trusted Computing?
• Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
• TCB
• TCB is everything in operating system that we
  rely on for security Dr. Stamp
  
• If TCB is damaged/non-secured, the whole system
  broken.
  
• If the system is broken, and TCB is ok. We still
  have system security
  
• Part of the system (combines software and
  hardware components)
  
• Responsible for regulate information security
  policies
  
• Consist of Kernel, OS

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TC -- overview
10
TC

• Should be expected the computing behave the way
  we wanted and do what we wanted securely
  
• Any trusted platform has the following three
  fundamental features
  
• Protected Capabilities
• Integrity Capabilities
• Integrity Reporting

11
NGSCB

• Microsofts version of TC NGSCB
• Will be implemented in the upcoming version of
  Windows as known as Microsoft Windows Longhorn
  
• Architecture
• Computing Environments
• Four Features of NGSCB

12
NGSCB - architecture
13
NGSCB - architecture

• Two primary system components in NGSCB
• Nexus
• Special kernel (core of the trusted operating)
• Goal Isolate the process of normal mode and
  trusted mode differently in memory
  
• Functionality Authenticate and protect data
  (entered, stored, communicated, and displayed) by
  data encryption
  
• Nexus Computing Agent (NCA)

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NGSCB - architecture

• Nexus Computing Agent (NCA)
• Trusted software component
• Runs in trusted mode that communicates with
  Nexus
  
• Open-source for NCA specifications
• Developers can make their own agents to run on
  the trusted platform
  

15
NGSCB Computing Environments Overview

• NSGCB operates two operating systems in ONE
  system
  
• Two Modes
• Normal Mode vs. Trusted Mode
• Normal Mode
• Un-protected environment
• Same as our current Windows series
• Fully Controlled by the users
• Trusted Mode
• Protected environment
• Users have no authorities to modify, delete, or
  copy ANY content.
  
• Implemented TC Hardware and Software
  implementation
  
• Fully Controlled by the computers

16
NGSCB operating environments
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NGSCB operating environments

• Microsoft claimed Only an NGSCB trusted
  application, NCA, can run securely within the
  protected operating environment.
  
• NCA
• Defined by software developers
• Policies
• Security authentication
• Security authorization

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NGSCB - Features

• Claimed Four Features
• Strong Process Isolation
• Sealed Storage
• Attestation
• Secured Path to the user

19
NGSCB Four Features

• Strong Process Isolation
• Isolate protected and non-protected operating
  environment that are stored in the same memory
  
• Blocks the access of Direct Memory Access (DMA)
  devices in term of writing and reading to secured
  block of memory
  
• Block access of malicious code
• Claimed no illegitimate access will occurring
  in protected environment

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NGSCB Four Features

• Sealed storage
• Ensure the privacy of NGSCB data are not being
  exposed
  
• NGSCB use Security Support Component (SSC) to do
  this
  
• SSC has own encryption services and can be
  managed by the Nexus
  
• Use Advance Encryption Standard (AES), pair of
  public and private keys, and keys derived for
  trusted application

21
NGSCB Four Features

• Sealed Storage
• NCA uses these keys to encrypt data, access file
  system, and provide storage services.
  
• Claimed No unauthorized application can read the
  sealed storage whatsoever (at boot up, or running)

22
NGSCB Four Features

• Cryptographic Attestation
• Confirm the recipient that the data was digital
  signed by the NGSCB and data was
  cryptographically identifiable
  
• Authenticates software Process
• Prove application identity
• Useful in networking, prove its identity securely
  before transmit any data.
  
• Avoid Man in the Middle attack?

23
NGSCB Four Features

• Secure Path to the user
• Ensure the information remains securely through
  the input/output of the devices.
  
• Encrypt the input/output, creates a secure path.
• Protects computer from
• Keystroke recorded
• Hardware devices
• Need to upgrade current hardware devices
  mouse/keyboard/USB devices/ video adapter
  
• Input upgrade to USB devices Smart cards,
  biometrics, others
  
• Output upgrade to Graphic adapter, which prevent
  read/write to video memory

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NGSCB Applications

• Many applications involved NGSCB regular
  computing, networking, DRM, others
  
• Example Microsoft Word
• Restrict user
• View/Copy/Write/Open/Close
• Not compatible with other .doc applications, ie.
  OpenOffice
  
• Written document is Signed and Encrypted with
  Microsoft Word --- Only Word has the private key
  to decrypt it

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NGSCB Application

• Networking application
• Cannot file-sharing via P2P
• Cannot open your friends packed programs
• Presumably Secured with connected in network
• Good for networking?
• Microsoft Explorer / Outlook
• User might be able to see the content but not
  able to Copy-and-Paste to other applications
  
• Users have no right to do whatever they wanted
  to do
  

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Analysis of NGSCB

• Current Problematic Computing
• User can do whatever they wanted to do in
  computer taking all responsibility
  
• Unprotected Virus, worms, keystroke, spywares
• Abuse of file-sharing digital contents
• As a conclusion, we DO need a better computing
  protection operating system

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Analysis of NGSCB

• Will NGSCB be the solution?
• Human nature to control over things and not to be
  controlled by others.
  
• People will not use it if it blocks and
  restricts them doing what they want to do.
  Quote
  
• NGSCB will fails
• Companies will not tolerate attestations on the
  network and through the firewall every time their
  employee wants to open a file.
  
• They want open the application FAST!

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Analysis of NGSCB

• NGSCB will fails to work with DRM
• There is always WAYS to workaround of things.
• Music for example
• User still can record what comes out from the
  speaker, (poor quality but so what, its FREE)
  
• Recorded and make MP3 out of it
• Copy content for example
• Take a screen shot, digital camera?

29
NGSCB

• As a summary of our presentation
• NGSCB will fail.
• People will use alternative products
• Apple OS
• Linux
• Stay with Microsoft XP ??

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Q/A

• Q/A

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References

• 1 Mark Stamp's CS166 software presentation
  slides
  
• http//www.cs.sjsu.edu/stamp/CS166
• 2 System Management Concepts Operating system
  and Devices
  
• http//www.unet.univie.ac.at/aix/aixbman/admnc
  onc/tcb.htm
  
• 3 TCG Specification Architecture Overview
• https//www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/downloa
  ds/TCG_PCSpecificSpecification_v1_1.pdf
  
• 4 Microsofts Next Generation Secured Computing
  Base Overview
  
• http//www.microsoft.com/resources/ngscb/NGSCB_Ove
  rview.mspx
  
• 5 NGSCB Security Model
• http//www.microsoft.com/resources/ngscb/do
  cuments/NGSCB_Security_Model.doc
  
• 6 Trusted Computing and NGSCB
• http//www.cs.bham.ac.uk/mdr/teaching/Trus
  tedComputing.html
  
• 7 Ross Anderson's Trusted Computing FAQ
• http//www.cl.cam.ac.uk/rja14/tcpa-faq.htm
  l
  
• 8 Microsofts resource for NGSCB
• http//www.microsoft.com/resources/ngscb/productIn
  fo.mspx
  
• 9 Microsoft's NGSCB four features
• http//www.microsoft.com/resources/ngscb/f
  our_features.mspx